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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this dissertation is to examine and assess the role of Philip Henry Kerr, eleventh
Marquis of Lothian, the British ambassador to the United States from August 1939 to December 1940.
While much of the historiography of Anglo-American relations during the Second World War focuses on
the Roosevelt-Churchill axis, this dissertation contends that Lord Lothian played a vital, if not the
principal, role in creating that axis and in forging closer relations during the vital months before Pearl
Harbor. More generally, this dissertation contends that Lothian is a vital, if not the principal, architect of
the “Special Relationship.” Anglo-American relations during the interwar years were characterized by an
underlying discord, caused by economic disparity, naval rivalry, and divergent approaches to international
security. By December 1940, however, relations were stronger and closer, as many Americans came to
appreciate that Britain’s survival was critical to keeping the United States out of the war.
Although not exclusively responsible, Lothian played a significant role in affecting this
transformation in public opinion. First, he established a British public relations apparatus and initiated a
vigorous publicity campaign in the United States, which generated greater awareness of Britain’s
increasingly dire military predicament and more widespread popular support for Britain. Second, Lothian
helped to broker the celebrated Destroyers-for-Bases deal, by which the United States agreed to provide
Britain with fifty destroyers in return for land rights in various British possessions in the Western
Hemisphere. Third, Lothian helped to lay the foundations for the Lend-Lease program. Following a brief
autumn visit to Britain, he intimated to the American press that London was running out of cash with
which to purchase American military supplies. He also urged Churchill to outline the realities of Britain’s
position in a long, detailed letter to Roosevelt.

These two initiatives presented the Roosevelt

administration with a comprehensive view of Britain’s desperate situation that compelled the president to
take action. The result was the Lend-Lease Act, which provided Britain with a program of American
assistance, hardly compatible with neutrality, and ultimately became the foundation of the AngloAmerican alliance during the Second World War.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this dissertation is to examine and assess the role of Philip Henry Kerr, eleventh
Marquis of Lothian, who served as the British ambassador to the United States from August 1939 to
December 1940. Lord Lothian was ambassador for only a brief time, but it coincided with a crucial
period in relations between Britain and the United States -- the first fourteen months of the Second World
War, when Britain faced Nazi Germany essentially without allies, while the United States remained
neutral. While much of the historiography of Anglo-American relations during the Second World War
focuses principally on the Roosevelt-Churchill axis, this dissertation contends that, in a fundamental way,
Lord Lothian played a vital, if not the principal, role in creating that axis and in forging closer AngloAmerican relations during the vital months before Pearl Harbor. More generally, this dissertation
contends that Lord Lothian is a vital, if not the principal, architect of the “Special Relationship.” The
United States and Britain are often seen as natural allies, held together by ties of kinship, language, and a
commitment to democracy and constitutional government. But there was nothing particularly “special”
about Anglo-American relations during the interwar years, which were, in fact, characterized by an
underlying discord, caused principally by economic disparity, naval rivalry, and divergent approaches to
international security.
Anglo-American discord emerged from the transfer of global economic leadership from Britain to
the United States. As early as 1919, the United States had replaced Britain as the leading creditor nation
in the world, its industrial production exceeded that of Britain, France, and Germany combined, and its
share of world trade began to displace the British. Furthermore, the United States kept its markets tightly
closed; the Fordney-MacCumber Tariff of 1922 imposed the highest import tariffs in American history.
Most important, however, although Britain hoped that the United States might agree to a general
cancellation of debts once the war was over, Wilson and American bankers made it clear that they
expected to be paid back. The severity of Britain’s repayment terms, particularly compared with the more
lenient terms ultimately granted to France and Italy, provoked considerable resentment in Britain and
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remained a source of persistent ill feeling in both countries. The onset of the Great Depression helped to
exacerbate these economic strains. In 1932, faced with a sterling crisis and tighter protectionism in the
United States, Britain decided to follow the American example and adopted a system of Imperial
Preference, provoking American denunciations of British policy, ironically, as protectionist. When the
United States Senate passed the “Johnson Act,” which proposed to ban all loans to countries that had
defaulted on previous debts, the British, who considered the legislation as a decidedly unfriendly gesture,
made a few more token payments and finally defaulted in 1933.
Another source of tension and misunderstanding during the 1920s was rivalry over naval
supremacy. As early as the First World War, London took the position that the American demand for
“absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas” represented a direct challenge to Britain’s sea power and
its right of blockade. Washington warned that if agreement could not be reached, the United States would
launch an all-out race to build the most powerful navy in the world. Although the Washington Naval
Conference of 1921-1922 temporarily improved Anglo-American naval relations, the persistence of a
fundamental incompatibility of strategic requirements provoked mutual suspicions and endless haggling
about the size and number of cruisers. Continuing tensions led to the break-up of the Geneva Naval
Conference in August 1927 and even a brief war scare from late 1928 to early 1929. The ferocity of this
naval rivalry continued unabated until the late 1920s, when elections in both countries brought to power
administrations intent on reaching compromise.
In addition, Anglo-American relations sputtered during the 1930s as a result of their divergent
attitudes toward the question of international security. Serious differences emerged as early as 1919 with
the American rejection of the peace treaties. Having followed Woodrow Wilson’s lead, and hoping for a
continuation of a cooperative spirit into the post-war period, British leaders felt a profound sense of
betrayal and thereafter found it difficult throughout the entire interwar period to place much confidence in
the assurances of the United States. During the 1930s, in particular, as the international situation became
increasingly dangerous, Washington and London often operated at cross-purposes. For example, in
response to the Japanese invasion of Manchuria, in 1931-1932, Britain and the United States acted
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independently and ineffectually, although both sides accused each other of refusing offers of cooperation.
London was sufficiently embittered by the experience that, by late 1933, in order to protect its interests in
China, and in the absence of any effective cooperation from the United States, British leaders took
initiatives to renew the former understanding with Japan, even though they realized that any
understanding with Japan was certain to stir up hostility in the United States. Such efforts, however,
collapsed when Japan withdrew from the League of Nations.
In July 1937, when Japan again attacked China, Britain sought to act in concert with the United
States. The Roosevelt administration, however, refused to participate in any joint action and indicated
that it would only take parallel action. While the American reluctance to act firmly in the Pacific
reflected the power of isolationist sentiment in the United States, it also reflected the persistence of an
underlying American mistrust for Britain. Indeed, there occurred a powerful resurgence of anti-British
opinion within the United States, driven principally by the growing belief that the United States had been
dragged into the Great War by British propaganda and so-called “merchants of death” -- armaments
manufacturers, bankers, and financiers.
American suspicions continued to increase in 1937 and 1938 due to British appeasement of
Germany and Italy. In the absence of any effective policy of deterrence, Neville Chamberlain and his
cabinet endeavored to reduce the number of potential enemies by satisfying their grievances in return for
guarantees of peace and disarmament. They did so, in part, because of an entrenched skepticism about
America’s reliability and ability to follow up inspiring words with practical assistance. Consequently,
when, in January 1938, Roosevelt put forward a proposal for a peace conference to be held under the
auspices of the United States, the British government did not express wholehearted support.

The

president was “sorely disappointed” and took Chamberlain’s lame response as an indication that Britain
placed no great stock in cooperation with the United States. American opinion grew progressively more
skeptical of Britain, with the resignation of Anthony Eden in February 1938, which convinced many in
Washington that Chamberlain was the agent of selfish City interests, and the British recognition of Italy’s
conquest of Ethiopia, in spite of Roosevelt’s warnings of a “serious effect upon public opinion.” During
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the Anschluss, and again, during the crisis over Czechoslovakia, Chamberlain and the cabinet did not
consider the policy and position of the United States as a factor of any significance in their plans. After
all, although there was great sympathy in the United States for the Czechs, and while many Americans
believed that Britain would in fact sell out Czechoslovakia, the American desire to stay out of any war
remained apparent and virtually universal. Consequently, it remained clear that Roosevelt would do little
more than offer words of support or reproach. Furthermore, although the United States celebrated the
Munich agreement, American denunciations of British policy resurfaced when it became clear that Hitler
would not be satisfied merely with the Sudetenland.

Americans condemned the agreement as

“disgraceful,” “shameless,” a “cynical sellout of principle,” and Roosevelt himself backed away from his
earlier endorsement, accusing British leaders of suffering from an inordinate fear of communism. In a
January 1939 conversation with Lothian, however, the president rejected any suggestion that the United
States should assume a tougher international role, arguing that the danger of the current situation stemmed
from Britain’s lack of nerve, not its lack of power.
As a result, when Lothian assumed control of the British embassy in late August 1939, there was
nothing really close or particularly “special” about the relationship between Britain and the United States.
The true measure of his achievement, therefore, is that, by the time of his premature death in December
1940, Anglo-American relations were much stronger and much closer. Although most Americans still
desperately wanted to remain out of the war, they had a far greater appreciation that Britain’s survival was
critical to realizing exactly that objective -- keeping the United States out of the war. In other words, in
spite of continuing isolationist political strength, by the end of 1940, there had occurred a significant sea
change in American public opinion. While British public relations and propaganda efforts by themselves
certainly did not bring the United States into the Second World War, at the very least they helped to
create a new climate of opinion, so that by the time of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, many
Americans were in fact prepared to enter the war. Although not exclusively responsible, Lothian played a
significant role in affecting this transformation in public opinion.
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Lothian, who ultimately became a primary intermediary between Winston Churchill and Franklin
Roosevelt, particularly during the summer and fall of 1940, initiated and/or shaped three key
developments within this transformation. First, Lothian established a British public relations apparatus
and initiated a vigorous publicity campaign in the United States, primarily to generate more widespread
awareness of Britain’s increasingly dire military predicament and thus more widespread popular support
for Britain. He understood that the Roosevelt administration, which confronted a powerful isolationist
movement during a presidential election year, was highly reluctant for political reasons to undertake any
definitive action to assist Britain’s war efforts. He realized that the key to pushing the administration to
action depended first and foremost on mobilizing American public opinion. As a former journalist,
Lothian, unlike previous British ambassadors to the United States, understood the value and power of
propaganda and public relations, particularly its effect on building consensus within popular opinion.
Consequently, he established an easy and open relationship with the press, delivered speeches and gave
press conferences to explain Britain’s needs, worked closely with American interventionists in order to
build support for Britain among the broader American population, and deliberately leaked sensitive
information explicitly to help American opinion leaders stimulate debate and further apply pressure on the
Roosevelt administration.
Second, Lothian helped to broker the celebrated Destroyers-for-Bases deal, by which the United
States agreed to provide Britain with fifty overage and obsolete destroyers in return for land rights in
various British possessions in the Western Hemisphere, including Bermuda, Newfoundland, the Bahamas,
Jamaica, Trinidad, and St. Lucia, for the establishment of American air and naval bases. At three separate
moments, Lothian took key initiatives. In late May 1940, aware of the concern in Washington for the
security of British bases in the Western Hemisphere, Lothian urged the War Cabinet to make a unilateral
offer of limited facilities in three British colonies. Then, in late June, he provided the Century Group, a
pro-British and pro-interventionist pressure group in the United States, with a full statistical accounting of
Britain’s situation and needs, as the basis for a public relations campaign to win more widespread
American support for the destroyers deal. The data Lothian supplied, without the approval or even the
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knowledge of his superiors in London, helped to focus the attention of American opinion leaders on the
real gravity of Britain’s predicament. Finally, in spite of Churchill’s opposition to one-sided concessions
unless they involved tangible U.S. concessions, Lothian convinced the prime minister to make a direct
and personal plea to Roosevelt on 31 July 1940. In the end, Lothian’s efforts helped to create a far more
favorable reception to the deal, which was finally announced on 3 September 1940. For many people in
Britain, the conclusion of the deal represented a significant American commitment to the Allied cause.
Third, in November 1940, Lothian helped to lay the foundations for the Lend-Lease program.
Following a brief visit to Britain, he intimated to the American press upon his return that Britain was
running out of cash with which to purchase American manufactured products and military hardware. His
comments effectively provoked widespread popular discussion in the United States about Britain’s
financial plight, which kept the issue on the front pages of American newspapers and thus in the public
eye from late November 1940 to the spring of 1941. At the same time, Lothian urged Churchill to frankly
and openly outline the urgent realities of Britain’s strategic, economic, and logistic positions and needs in
a long, detailed letter to Roosevelt. The prime minister proved reluctant to draft and dispatch such a
letter, but Lothian aggressively and successfully argued that the letter was vital in order to overcome
powerful American misperceptions that Britain possessed vast economic assets in the Dominions and the
Empire. These two initiatives -- the leak and the letter-- presented the Roosevelt administration with a
comprehensive view of Britain’s increasingly desperate situation that compelled the equally reluctant
president to take more direct and immediate action.

The result was the Lend-Lease Act, which

represented one of the great turning points of the war. Lend-Lease not only provided Britain with a
program of American assistance that was hardly compatible with neutrality, it also became the essential
foundation of the Anglo-American alliance during the Second World War.
.

.

.

It is reasonable to ask why Lord Lothian’s ambassadorship merits such analysis and attention. In
one respect, as has been asserted, Lothian’s vital contributions have largely been overlooked and
generally overshadowed by the traditional focus on Churchill and Roosevelt. Equally fundamental,
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however, this dissertation fills a considerable historiographical gap. There have only been two major
biographies of Lord Lothian, by J. R. M. Butler [1960] and David Billington [2006]. Both are full-length
biographies, which necessarily cover all aspects of Lothian’s life and career, from childhood to death.
Butler, who was given access to the ambassador’s papers by the Lothian estate, and whose brother was
Nevile Butler, Counsellor of the British Embassy in Washington, portrays Lothian in a most sympathetic
light. Billington, who was a bit more critical, adds little to Butler’s study but additional detail and much
more extensive documentation.

Both works, however, provide only brief surveys of Lothian’s

ambassadorship; Butler devotes two chapters, while Billington devotes one.
The more recent scholarship on Lothian’s career has focused on his outspoken support of
supranationalist solutions to international problems -- specifically, on his support for world federalism, or
at least a federal union of the western democracies. As a result, Lothian’s career has been the subject of
more interest in continental Europe than in Britain. European intellectual federalists, such as Altiero
Spinelli, tend to regard Lothian as something of a progenitor of the European Union. Priscilla Roberts’s
essay in the The Historian [2004] focuses on Lothian’s Atlanticism, which underlay his overriding
interest in making Anglo-American cooperation the core of British foreign policy. Roberts does not,
however, devote much more than two to three pages to Lothian’s ambassadorship. In a similar way, The
Larger Idea: Lord Lothian and the Problem of National Sovereignty [1988], a series of essays edited by
John Turner, assesses important episodes in Lothian’s career, but devotes almost half of the essays to the
development of Lothian’s ideas of federalism. As a result, similar to other recent scholarship, The Larger
Idea devotes only minimal attention to his ambassadorship.
The only study that focuses exclusively and substantively on Lothian’s ambassadorship is Lord
Lothian and Anglo-American Relations, 1939-1940 [1983] by David Reynolds. The bulk of Reynolds’s
study focuses primarily on the ambassador’s key political accomplishments of 1940, the Destroyers-forBases agreement and Lend-Lease. Reynolds, however, devotes little more than passing attention to
Lothian’s relentless efforts to improve Britain’s image and to publicize the dire reality of Britain’s
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military and financial situation, through publicity, propaganda, and his cultivation of relations with the
American press and pro-British, pro-interventionist pressure groups.
This dissertation, while much inspired by Reynolds, endeavors to refocus attention, not simply on
the political contributions made by this perpetually overlooked British diplomat, but on arguably his
significant achievement, his role in helping to transform American public opinion. To a considerable
degree because of Lothian’s initiatives and efforts, American public opinion between the summer of 1939
and late 1940 moved from skepticism and detachment to support and affection. By the end of 1940,
Americans had come to believe that their own security depended on Britain’s survival.

CHAPTER TWO: THE MYTH OF THE SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP
The history of the twentieth century, in many respects, is the chronicle of the United States’ rise
to global dominance, prompting some diplomatic historians to refer to the twentieth as the “American
Century.” Beginning with the Spanish-American War, through the Second World War and the Cold War,
until its emergence as sole superpower following the fall of communism in the early 1990s, the United
States exercised the most dominant and influential position in the world with respect to international
power politics and the global economy. In the process, it assumed the role of military and economic
powerbroker that Britain held during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Indeed, studies of
Anglo-American relations during the twentieth century describe the same fundamental story -- a process
of transition, from Pax Britannica to Pax Americana.
Historians of Anglo-American relations during the twentieth century place much emphasis on the
vital partnership forged during the Second World War, a partnership that led to the emergence of what is
called the “Special Relationship.” The term emerged immediately after the war, and was for many years
seen through the viewfinder of Winston Churchill as he described it in his memoirs of the war.1 Although
Churchill’s memoirs reflected his hopes for the future Anglo-American relationship during the Cold War
more than the reality of this relationship between 1940 and 1945, his interpretation significantly shaped
both the public perception and the academic history of Anglo-American relations.

Underlying the

evolution of the concept is the argument that the broad span of those relations have been characterized by
a gradual and steady, even inevitable, development of friendship, based on a number of shared features -a common language, a commitment to democracy and constitutional government, a high degree of
industrialization, and a mutual interest in maintaining strong commercial relations.2

1

John Charmley, Churchill’s Grand Alliance: The Anglo-American Special Relationship, 1940-1957 (New York:
Harcourt Brace and Company, 1995), 3; Ritchie Ovendale, Anglo-American Relations in the Twentieth Century
(New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998), 39.
2

H. C. Allen, Great Britain and the United States: A History of Anglo-American Relations (1783-1952) (London:
Archon Books, 1969), 28-29; David R. Reynolds, The Creation of the Anglo-American Alliance, 1937-41: A Study
in Competitive Cooperation (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1982), 1-2.
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Although much is made of the Special Relationship, diplomatic relations between Britain and the
United States during the 1920s and 1930s, in spite of efforts to forge a close international partnership, in
spite of continuing warmth in social and cultural terms, were in fact characterized by mutual suspicions
and bitterness. This general discord was principally the result of the transfer of global leadership, in
terms of their respective financial strength and military power, from Britain to the United States. One
commentator noted that the “position of arbiter” in the European balance of power passed to the United
States, leaving Britain increasingly to perform “in the old game on the old chessboard no longer as a
queen, but as a pawn.”3
The Great War, The “Great Divide”
British global dominance had already begun to decline by the turn of the twentieth century. In
one respect, it began to lose its traditional naval superiority, as Britain was increasingly challenged by
Germany, the United States, France, and Japan, whose navies collectively outmanned and outgunned the
Royal Navy.4 In addition, Britain began to lose its industrial edge, as its share of global manufacturing
capacity declined from 32 percent in 1870 to 15 percent by 1910, while its share of global trade dropped
from 25 percent to 14 percent.5 Furthermore, while the primary basis for Britain’s still immense global
domination remained the Empire, its economic value was questionable6 and some began to suggest that,
because it imposed security and financial burdens upon the mother country, the Empire was increasingly a
distraction and an encumbrance of which Britain should relieve itself as soon as possible.7

3

Walter Layton of The Economist, 1 December 1928, quoted in Anne Orde, The Eclipse of Great Britain: The
United States and British Imperial Decline, 1895-1956 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996), 89.
4

Howard Temperley, Britain and America since Independence (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave,
2002), 89.
5

Orde, 1; Temperley, 89.

6

The Empire was vastly rich in resources; with notable exceptions, however, very little had been done to develop
these colonies. Furthermore, India as a field for British investment occupied a position well below the United States
and slightly greater than Argentina. Economic development in the Dominions was always constrained by their lack
of population and lack of settlement. Temperley, 91; Orde, 3.
7

H. G. Nicholas, The United States and Britain (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1975), 75-76.
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The First World War accelerated the decline of Britain as a great power and the corresponding
rise of the United States. Consequently, the war is the single most important watershed with respect to
Anglo-American relations in the twentieth century, the point at which Britain’s global leadership and
power began to pass to the United States. By the end of the war, the United States was acknowledged to
be not merely a potential but an actual great power of the first rank.8
With the outbreak of war in 1914, the President of the United States, Woodrow Wilson, called
upon Americans to remain neutral in thought as well as deed. Maintaining neutrality, however, was far
easier said than done. In the first place, a large number of Americans, many of whom could trace their
cultural and ancestral heritage to Britain, openly favored the Allies, viewing Britain and France as liberal
democracies confronting an autocratic, militaristic power. Furthermore, the men who surrounded and
advised Wilson openly favored Britain and the Allied cause as well: his chief adviser, Colonel Edward M.
House; the American Ambassador in London, Walter Hines Page, sometimes described as “more British
than the British”; and Secretary of State Robert Lansing, who believed that an Allied victory was essential
to the United States.9
In the second place, the war was good for business. While the war broke out for reasons that had
nothing directly to do with its interests, the United States, as the world’s leading mercantile power,
claimed the right to trade freely with the belligerent states. Between 1914 and 1916, American exports to
Britain quadrupled, from $750 million in 1914 to $2.75 billion in 1916, while trade with the Central
Powers fell from $345 million to a mere $2 million. American business and industry boomed, in
munitions, steel, shipbuilding, and textiles. Price, employment, and income levels all rose dramatically.10
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As the war progressed, however, Britain’s financial dependence on the United States increased.
As a result, the war initiated a fundamental shift in the international financial balance of power from
Britain to the United States. When the war began, Washington owed money to Britain. Initially, this
source of revenue helped Britain pay for munitions, cotton, industrial raw materials, petroleum products,
foodstuffs, and other commodities. As its financial resources became strained, London began selling
British-owned securities in the United States. Increasingly, moreover, loans became necessary. Secretary
of State Lansing warned that, without loans, Britain’s trade would collapse, throwing the American
economy into depression and distress: “Can we afford to let a declaration as to our conception of the
‘true spirit of neutrality’ made in the first days of the war stand in the way of our national interests which
seem to be seriously threatened?” Between the first American loan in October 1915, from the Anglophile
House of Morgan, and the end of the war, Britain borrowed $3.7 billion.11
In such a manner, New York City began to emerge as the world’s leading financial center, as the
United States, for the first time, found itself a creditor nation. In the process, moreover, as some
commentators had warned, the impression began to emerge that market forces would dictate American
policy. As William Jennings Bryan had warned in 1915, a symbiotic relationship seemed to have
emerged between the British government and American financial interests.12
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At the same time, however, the war began to strain Anglo-American relations, most seriously
over maritime neutral rights. Although the United States, as a neutral, claimed the absolute right of
freedom of the seas,13 it was evident from the outset of hostilities that one of Britain’s principal weapons
would be a blockade of the continent.14 The British enforced the blockade by traditional methods: the
interception of shipments to neutral ports, confiscation of neutral cargoes, interference with the mails, and
the exercise of sweeping powers of search and detention. The blockade, however, induced the Germans
to respond with unrestricted submarine warfare.

Faced with Britain’s policy of starving it into

submission, and in light of America’s continuing trade with Allies, the Kaiser’s government abandoned
the legal niceties of search and seizure, and struck with the U-boats, a policy that culminated in the
sinking of the Lusitania on 7 May 1915.15
The blockade also increased tensions between Washington and London. The British blockade
seriously damaged American commercial interests, and the State Department lodged repeated protests.
Although both countries worked through 1915 to prevent such incidents from precipitating a break in
relations,16 by the summer of 1916, wholesale and blatant British violations of maritime law thoroughly
exasperated Wilson. American mail passing through British ports was opened and inspected, and 87
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American firms found themselves on a blacklist of companies suspected of trading with Germany, thus
banning them from all commerce with Britain. British merchant ships, moreover, flew the American flag
whenever they entered submarine waters, which contributed to the sinking of American ships.17 In late
July 1916, Wilson wrote to House:
I am, I must admit, about at the end of my patience with Great Britain and the Allies.
This black list business is the last straw . . . I am seriously considering asking Congress to
prohibit loans and restrict exports to the Allies.18
At the same time, public opinion in Britain grew wary of the United States. During the first three
years of the war, there existed a growing undercurrent of disappointment and even resentment that the
United States did not actually enter the war on the Allied side. The British had expected the United States
to enter the war, largely on the grounds of Anglo-American kinship.19 As early as 1914, some quarters of
Britain condemned the American decision to proclaim strict neutrality as vacillation, moral insensitivity,
or even “craven cowardice.”20 This sentiment was strengthened by Wilson’s comment, three days after
the sinking of the Lusitania in May 1915:
The example of America must be a special example. The example of America must be
the example not merely of peace because it will not fight, but of peace because peace is
the healing and elevating influence of the world, and strife is not. There is such a thing as
a man being too proud to fight. There is such a thing as a nation being so right that it
does not need to convince others by force that it is right.21
Although the sinking of the Lusitania prompted expressions of sympathy throughout Britain, many
greeted Wilson’s remarks greeted with contempt. American neutrality began to look more like cowardice
than principle. Resentment grew, furthermore, over the periodic American protests against the British
17
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blockade. Music hall comedians and the British press alike mocked the president. In the trenches of
France, dud shells that failed to explode were nicknamed “Wilsons.”22
Britain’s savage suppression of the 1916 Irish rebellion further strained Anglo-American
relations. Irish leaders were summarily tried and shot, while Sir Roger Casement was hanged for treason,
in spite of a plea of clemency from the United States Senate. Most Americans, not just those of Irish
heritage, were outraged.

“I doubt if the Germans have ever been as hopelessly stupid,” wrote a

correspondent of Colonel House, Wilson’s chief political adviser. “Certainly everything for which British
Liberalism has stood, as contrasted to Prussian Junkerism, has been brushed away.”23
Wilson became particularly exasperated with the British because of their refusal to accept his
offer of mediation. In February 1916, Colonel House reached an understanding with the British Foreign
Secretary Sir Edward Grey: when Britain and France judged the moment to be opportune, Wilson would
propose a conference to end the war. Should Germany refuse to participate or should it reject terms that
both the president and the Allies considered reasonable, then, according to the House-Grey memorandum,
“the United States would probably enter the war against Germany.”24
Although Wilson considered this to be a significant concession toward possible American
participation, the British were decidedly skeptical. Prime Minister Herbert H. Asquith considered the
president’s concession to be “humbug and a mere manoeuvre of American politics,” aimed at
strengthening Wilson’s chances of reelection in November. In any event, over the spring and summer of
1916, the British opposition to mediation hardened considerably. The American ambassador in London,
Walter Hines Page, told House in May: “The English do not see how there can be any mediation . . . this
German military caste caused all the trouble and there can be no security in Europe as long as it lives in
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authority. That’s the English view. It raped nuns in Belgium . . . it planned the destruction of the
Lusitania . . . It’ll do anything.” From the British point of view, Wilson’s apparent indifference to the
moral issues at stake -- indeed, his inability to see that too much had been sacrificed -- seemed incredible
and patently offensive.25
Wilson, equally infuriated and disillusioned by the British failure to act on the House-Grey
memorandum, became more determined than ever to bring about a peace settlement, with or without the
support of Britain. Shortly after his reelection in November, Wilson decided, he would approach both
sides impartially, as befitting a true neutral; after all, the failure of the House-Grey initiative had shown
the folly of relying on London. House, however, protested, arguing that if Germany went along with such
a peace proposal and the Allies did not, the United States might drift into war with Britain. Wilson,
convinced of his own moral authority, remained defiant, noting that “if the Allies wanted war with us we
would not shrink from it.”26 He further resolved to exploit Britain’s growing financial dependence on the
United States. By late 1916, American loans were covering close to one-third of Britain’s war costs. The
Chancellor of the Exchequer, Reginald McKenna, summed up the implications of Britain’s financial
crisis: “If things go as at present, I venture to say with certainty that by next June or earlier the President
of the American Republic will be in a position, if he wishes, to dictate his own terms to us.”27
Indeed, on 27 November 1916, immediately after the election, the Federal Reserve Board, with
Wilson’s approval, issued a warning to banks that it was not in the nation’s interest to invest in foreign
bonds.28 The reaction was immediate; there occurred a run on sterling, which triggered an abrupt fall in
the value of British treasury bills, and thus seriously damaged British credit. Wilson’s apparent intention
was to use American economic muscle to compel the Allies to negotiate; the British ambassador in
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Washington, Sir Cecil Spring-Rice, told the Foreign Office that “the object of course is to force us to
accept the President’s mediation by cutting off supplies.”29 By this point, however, the British would not
agree to a negotiated peace, nor to any arrangement that involved concessions to Germany. Moreover,
they found Wilson’s assumption that there existed any sort of moral equivalence in the behavior of the
two sides deeply offensive. King George V reportedly wept over the audacity of America’s belittlement
of Britain’s sacrifices.30
Wilson’s appeals met with no response in Britain. In December 1916, the Asquith government
fell and a new coalition was formed under David Lloyd George, who for two years, had denounced the
inadequacies of Britain’s war effort; the new prime minister thus felt little sympathy for Grey’s
conciliatory attitude to the United States. To forestall a mediation attempt by Wilson in September 1916,
he had insisted publicly that there could be no end to the war, “until the Prussian military despotism is
broken beyond repair . . . It took England twenty years to defeat Napoleon . . . it will not take twenty
years to win this war, but whatever time is required, it will be done . . . This fight must be to a finish -- to
a knock-out.” 31 After Washington broke off diplomatic relations with Germany in early 1917, following
Berlin’s resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare, Wilson’s refusal to declare war prompted Lloyd
George to note sarcastically, “So he is not going to fight after all! He is awaiting another insult before he
actually draws the sword.”32
Even after the United States finally entered the war in the spring of 1917, strains and tensions
between Washington and London continued. In part, disagreements over military strategy deepened
tensions. While the United States and Britain cooperated successfully in the war at sea, their two navies
collaborating in convoy duty, enforcing the blockade, and hunting for U-boats, there was much less
cooperation on land.

In the spring of 1918, for example, as the Germans mounted their great spring
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offensive on the Western Front, and American forces were only beginning to trickle in, Lloyd George and
the British Commander-in-Chief, Sir Douglas Haig, pleaded with Washington to send over as many
combat troops as possible, for immediate amalgamation into hard-pressed British and French units. The
American Commander-in-Chief, John Pershing, however, rejected the Allies’ urgent demands in order to
maintain an independent American army, to be used where and when American policy determined.33
It was not until the Allied counter-offensive in mid-July 1918 that American troops, now
organized into the First US Army, saw any significant action in large numbers. The brunt of the fighting,
however, was still borne by the British and French. In London, the cabinet feared that the war would drag
on into 1919 or 1920, and that by that time Britain would be exhausted and completely at the mercy of
any terms that Wilson cared to impose. General Jan Smuts warned Lloyd George in August 1918:
It may well be that, by the indefinite continuance of the war, we shall become a second or
third-class Power, and the leadership, not only financially and militarily, but in every
respect will have passed on to America and Japan.34
Similarly, Smuts circulated on 24 October a memorandum to the King and the War Cabinet:
The salient fact to remember is that, as matters now stand, this great result has been
achieved largely by the unexampled war effort of the British Empire. On land and sea
and in the air the great turn of the tide of war in the summer and autumn of this year has
been due to the supreme British effort. If peace comes now, it will be a British peace, it
will be a peace given to the world by the same Empire that settled the Napoleonic wars a
century ago.
Conversely, he concluded, if this war were prolonged for another year, the “centre of gravity” would shift
to the United States, which would become the “diplomatic dictator of the world.”35
In the end, however, American resources clearly enabled the Allies to continue fighting, and in
May and June 1918, the growing presence of American reinforcements helped to stem the second phase
33
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of the German spring offense, which had broken through Allied defenses on the Marne and at one point
seemed poised to capture Paris. In September 1918, 1.2 million American troops took part in the last
great battle on the Western Front, capturing Sedan and cutting off one of the key railroad links used for
supplying the now-exhausted German forces. In October, as German positions gave way along the entire
200-mile front, from Alsace-Lorraine to the North Sea, its High Command urged the Chancellor to ask for
an armistice. In doing so, however, the Germans appealed directly to President Wilson, rather than
negotiate with the Allies, for an armistice on the basis of his Fourteen Points.36 The Allied leaders were
furious, but at that late stage, there was little they could do, particularly as Wilson threatened to withdraw
American forces on the grounds that the United States could not support the efforts of countries that did
not share American war aims.37
One of the most considerable sources of strain in Anglo-American relations was the personality
of the American president, Woodrow Wilson.

Wilson was tense, self-righteous, and more or less

permanently indifferent to other men’s counsel, including that of his own advisers. He constantly
extolled the purity of American intentions and the selfishness of all others: “Great power may be used
either for good or for evil. If possessed by the United States we may be sure it will be used for good. To
my mind, we are the only nation that has taken a completely unselfish position in the war.” Wilson saw it
as his, and America’s, destiny to create a new liberal world order. He maintained that American
participation in the war must be justified by higher, noble, moral principles.

He implied that, as

inhabitants of the New World, untainted by the sins of the Old, it was incumbent upon the United States
to adopt a different approach from that of the other belligerents.38 Therefore, Wilson made it clear that
36
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the United States would cooperate with Britain but would not sign a treaty of alliance. He explained to
Arthur Balfour, Grey’s successor as foreign secretary, that the United States would be an “associate
power,” remaining independent of the Allies, and thus retaining the freedom to make peace on its own
terms when it chose. Although they were on the same side, Wilson was convinced that the United States
and the Allies had fundamentally different war aims: the United States wanted a just peace and a new
world order in which imperialism, arms races, and military alliances were a thing of the past, whereas the
Allies, he maintained, wanted territorial gain, vengeance, and reparation for the damage they had
suffered.39 As early as December 1914, Wilson was sure that “Germany is not alone responsible for the
war.” Consequently, he did not want to associate the United States too closely with British policy.40
Wilson believed, in any event, that he could bring the Allies to toe the American line; as he wrote in July
1917, “When the war is over we can force them to our way of thinking, because by that time they will,
among other things, be financially in our hands.”41
Wilson managed to provoke ill will even amid the public adulation that greeted him in London in
late 1918. Unimpressed by the display of royal opulence at a dinner at Buckingham Palace on 27
December, Wilson deliberately dressed in an ordinary black suit, in contrast to the other guests, who were
resplendent in dress uniforms, medals, and jewelry. He offended many with his after-dinner comments,
which were cold and aloof, and failed to make even the slightest passing reference to the contribution of
the British Empire in the defeat of Germany. Lloyd George noted that, “There was no glow of friendship
or of gladness at meeting men who had been partners in a common enterprise.” Furthermore, Wilson
dismissed standard references to the bonds of language and history linking the two nations:
39
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You must not speak of us who come over here as cousins, still less as brothers; we are
neither. Neither must you think of us as Anglo-Saxons, for that term can no longer be
rightly applied to the people of the United States. Nor must too much importance in this
connection be attached to the fact that English is our common language. . . . No, there are
only two things which can establish and maintain closer relations between your country
and mine; they are community of ideals and interests.42
Wilson inspired the same personality backwash in Paris. While many people throughout Europe came to
regard Wilson as a sort of “New World Messiah come to right the wrongs of the Old,” many inside the
conference began to suspect that this was also Wilson’s view as well.43 The French premier Georges
Clemenceau famously snorted that “Mr. Wilson bores me with his Fourteen Points. Why, God Almighty
has only ten.”
In spite of wartime tensions and personality clashes, Britain and the United States in fact shared
fundamental similarities of long-range outlook and interest, particularly with respect to the terms of the
peace. Both favored the establishment of the League of Nations as an international organization to limit
the future production of armaments and reduce the chances of war.44 Both wanted to eliminate Germany
as a naval power, but intended to preserve the territorial integrity of Germany against French demands for
dismemberment.

Both sought to settle the issue of European boundaries on the basis of national self-

determination, or, in exceptional cases, on natural economic units.45
Nevertheless, they disagreed strenuously over the issue of reparations. After a long and bloody
war, in which 750,000 Britons had been killed, the British demand for vengeance was overwhelming.
During the general election campaign of 1918, Lloyd George initially appealed for moderation, calling on
Britons to “relentlessly set our face against . . . squalid principles of either revenge or avarice.” The
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prime minister, however, found himself quickly under great political pressure, from the public, the
newspapers, and his own Conservative partners in the Coalition government, all of whom wanted
Germany squeezed “until the pips squeak.” As a result, Lloyd George was soon calling for reparations
from Germany “up to the limit of her capacity.”46
The first month of the Paris Peace Conference was dominated by Wilson, whose overriding
objective was to secure agreement for the League of Nations. After intense debate, a draft agreement
provided for an international assembly, led by the great powers, which would come to the aid of any state
whose territory was endangered or independence threatened, by either economic sanctions or direct
military force. Lloyd George thought this last provision would place impossible obligations on the great
powers to intervene in each and every dispute. Reluctantly, the British cabinet went along with Wilson’s
grand design, principally to ensure the president’s cooperation on issues Britain regarded as vital.
After securing the consent of Lloyd George and Clemenceau, Wilson returned temporarily to the
United States, where he discovered much opposition to the League of Nations in the Senate. First,
Wilson’s commitment to the League, and therefore a commitment to automatic action whenever the
League’s Covenant was violated, directly undermined two of the most hallowed traditions of American
diplomacy: the avoidance of entangling alliances, and the basic constitutional foreign policy prerogative
of the United States Congress to declare war. Second, Wilson’s commitment weakened the Monroe
Doctrine, the basis of America’s claim that it could legitimately intervene in the affairs of South and
Central America. Therefore, by the time he returned to Paris on 14 March 1919, Wilson had lost much of
the initiative and much of the moral high ground, as the Senate insisted that the American sphere of
influence in Central and South America, as defined by the Monroe Doctrine, be admitted as an exception.
Such special pleading was deeply embarrassing, particularly as Wilson had argued previously that the
new world order should be free of all taint of imperialism and “balance of power” politics.47
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Over the course of March and April 1919, as central and eastern Europe seemed on the brink of
anarchy and revolution, it became increasingly imperative that an agreement be reached. It was Wilson,
gradually worn down by Lloyd George and Clemenceau, and for a while seriously ill from the influenza
epidemic that was sweeping the world, who made most of the concessions. In order to satisfy Britain and
France, Wilson agreed that greater reparations should be exacted from Germany than had first been
proposed. To placate Clemenceau, Wilson and Lloyd George agreed to a temporary occupation of the
Rhineland. They also offered an Anglo-American guarantee of French security; if Germany attempted to
invade France, Britain and the United States would come to its assistance.48
In the summer of 1919, and again in March 1920, the United States Senate rejected the Treaty of
Versailles and therefore the League of Nations.49 The Senate voted against the treaty in part to move the
United States back to its traditional foreign policy posture of isolationism. But, the Senate, controlled by
the Republicans, also voted against the treaty for political reasons, to undermine the policies of an
unpopular Democratic president. A resurgence of Anglophobia also heightened opposition to the treaty.
Many of the groups who opposed the treaty had some grievance against Britain: German-Americans and
Irish-Americans in particular long regarded Britain as the primary enemy of their respective homelands.
Since the peace conference was being held at the same time that the British government was confronting
the demands for the partition of Ireland, it is possible that the activities of the Irish-American lobby
played a significant role in the vote.50 In addition, Midwestern progressives and populists associated the
British with the international bankers and businessmen from the American northeast, while liberals
denounced the British Empire and Britain’s suppression of nationalist movements, not only in Ireland, but
also in India and Egypt. Many of these groups argued that the League of Nations itself was stacked in
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Britain’s favor, because in the League assembly, not only would Britain have a vote, but Canada,
Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, and India would have votes as well. Since all five were British
dominions, some senators maintained that Britain would command not one vote but six. William Borah,
one of the Senate’s inveterate Anglophobes, called the League the “greatest triumph for English
diplomacy in three centuries of English diplomatic life,” a sentiment echoed by many others in the Senate
and the press.51
In spite of the conclusion of the peace conference and the signing of the Treaty of Versailles,
therefore, the United States undermined the entire process, and contributed to a course that would, over
the long-term, help to generate a second world war.52 In the short term, however, the American rejection
of Versailles strained Anglo-American relations once more. Having followed Wilson’s lead, and hoping
for a continuation of a cooperative spirit into the post-war period, British leaders felt a profound sense of
betrayal.

Lloyd George complained, as would many others, that the League of Nations had been

abandoned by the country whose president had been its architect: “America had been offered the
leadership of the world, but the Senate had tossed the sceptre into the sea.”53
The American rejection of the peace treaties set the tone for Anglo-American relations in the
period between the world wars in two significant ways. First, the Senate vote dramatically illustrated the
fact that an American president had much less maneuverability in foreign affairs than did the British
prime minister.54 Second, as a result of what London regarded as a fundamental breaking of trust, the
British government would find it difficult, throughout the entire interwar period, to place much
confidence in the assurances of the United States.
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In a fundamental way, the First World War transformed the power relationship between Britain
and the United States. The United States clearly emerged as the dominant power, in both military and
economic terms. By 1919, it had replaced Britain as the leading creditor nation in the world, while its
industrial production exceeded that of Britain, France, and Germany combined. The American army had
grown from 379,000 in 1917 to almost four million men, while its navy, although still inferior to the
Royal Navy, continued to grow, due to a massive and ongoing building programme.55 In spite of this
dramatic explosion in power and influence, however, Americans believed that they could turn their backs
on the world and return to the comfort and security they had enjoyed prior to the war. In its rejection of
the peace treaties and the League of Nations, the United States effectively attempted to shirk its new
global responsibilities that resulted from having become one of the world’s great powers.56
By contrast, Britain emerged from the war with its powers much impaired, although it was not
immediately apparent. Britain, after all, had been one of the victors. It had not been invaded. Its
principal pre-war rival, Germany, would not be in a position to threaten its interests for many years. With
the dismantling of the U-boats and the German High Seas Fleet, the Royal Navy appeared to be in a
stronger position than ever.57 Furthermore, Britain still had a relatively strong economy, overseas wealth,
and a stable currency, and its participation in the League of Nations helped to sustain its international
status as a Great Power. In the meantime, the British Empire had expanded by approximately 27 percent
with the acquisition of vast new regions in the Middle East and Africa, including Iraq and Persia, both of
which contained valuable oil reserves.58 Some observers, however began to question its value. While
some thought that the Empire might offer an alternative to European entanglements or perhaps relieve
Britain of any future dependence upon the United States, many others began to argue that because it
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imposed excessive burdens of defense and finance upon the mother country, it had become a distraction
and an encumbrance.59 Nevertheless, the Empire, over and above everything else, was what justified
Britain’s claim to Great Power status.60
While the weakness of Britain’s postwar position was not immediately apparent, however, the
dramatic and largely unanticipated expansion of American power and influence in the world was crystal
clear. Many British leaders, therefore, concluded that it would be vital to maintain the closest relations
and cooperation with the United States in order to safeguard British interests. They were convinced,
furthermore, that Britain could guide the United States along a course that would benefit Britain’s
interests, because American leaders were “almost exclusively Anglo-Saxons,” who shared British
political ideals. As Lloyd George asserted in 1921, “the people who govern America are our people.
They are our kith and kin. The other breeds are not on top.” Therefore, the hope of a special relationship
with the United States, the “Old World discreetly managing the New,” was to be at the center of British
policy in the post-war years.61
The war, however, had already indicated that Britain would not so easily manipulate the United
States. Furthermore, and far more serious, real sources of antagonism and rivalry began to emerge almost
immediately; these conflicts would shape Anglo-American diplomatic relations during the 1920s and into
the 1930s.

The two most central issues, and the two chief sources of contention, involved a series of

economic and financial disputes, and a rivalry over naval supremacy.
“Financially in Our Hands”: Economic and Financial Strains
The fundamental economic fact of life during the early 1920s was that, largely due to the war, the
British economy stagnated and sputtered, while the American economy boomed. Prior to 1914, Britain
had been the pre-eminent commercial and financial center of the world. The City of London managed
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international money, and sterling was used as the principal trading currency. During the war, unlike
France and Belgium, Britain had suffered a minimum of direct physical damage.62
In other respects, however, it fared quite badly. The war cost Britain 750,000 men in combat,
representing approximately 9 percent of all men under the age of 45 years, a significant proportion of the
nation’s youth, while another 1.5 million were wounded. Two-fifths of its merchant fleet had been lost to
enemy action. The financing of the war increased the national debt from £650 million to £7.8 billion;
throughout the 1920s, debt servicing would consume some 40 percent of the nation’s budget. As a result
of the debt, Parliament would be increasingly hard pressed to find the necessary funds to maintain the
nation’s defense capacity, improve infrastructure, and alleviate the lot of the unemployed.

More

important, the war severely damaged Britain’s ability to earn invisible income, on which the economy had
depended for decades, disrupted foreign markets, diverted foreign trade, and transformed Britain from a
creditor to a debtor nation. Britain lost around 10 percent of its major capital investments abroad and sold
off approximately £550 million of British assets in the United States. In addition, Britain had been forced
to borrow £1.4 billion to finance its war efforts, most of it from the United States. Although London in
turn loaned £1.7 billion to the Allies, much of that was never recovered.63
Adding to Britain’s problems was the fact that, during the war, Japan and the United States had
taken over markets formerly regarded as British preserves. Japanese manufacturing had increased by 75
percent during the war; South Americans looked now almost exclusively to the United States rather than
Britain for manufactures and investment capital. Canada, Brazil, and Argentina, formerly accustomed to
importing manufactured goods from Britain, had begun to develop their own industries, while China and
India had begun to manufacture their own textiles. As a result, by the mid-1920s, Britain’s proportion of
global exports had declined by one-third since before the outbreak of the war.
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This decline of Britain’s global economy undermined its domestic economy as well. Because of
the loss of its overseas markets, the textile, steelmaking, shipbuilding, and coal industries, having
expanded far beyond normal peacetime requirements, suffered from overcapacity, which drove up prices
and made competition difficult. Unemployment grew and remained consistently high; only once during
the 1920s did the unemployment rate drop below ten percent. Compounding the problem was an inherent
conservatism in British society, which was reflected in the inability or unwillingness in several sectors of
the British economy to adapt to changes brought about by science and technology. Therefore, Britain
continued to rely on old traditional staple industries, mining, coal, iron, steel, shipbuilding, and textiles,
and maintaining old habits and patterns, whereas the United States continued to revolutionize business
methods, mechanize its factories, and invest in research and development.64
By contrast, indeed, the United States economy enjoyed tremendous prosperity in the 1920s. Its
most significant advantage was a much greater internal market, protected from overseas competitors,
which led to the development of a full range of newer industries, based not on the use of coal and steam,
but on electricity and oil. The single most impressive and characteristic divide between the economies of
the United States and Britain was the manufacture of motor vehicles; whereas the number of cars on
Britain‘s roads barely reached one million by 1929, the number on America’s jumped from 8 million in
1920 to just under 23 million in 1929. Furthermore, American manufacturing output increased by nearly
one-third. Unemployment and inflation remained low, generally below 5 percent.
Most important, however, particularly as it impacted Britain’s global economic strength, the
American share of world exports rose to 16 percent by 1929, while Britain’s fell to 12 percent. While the
United States exported approximately one-twentieth of its national production, Britain needed to export
approximately one-fourth. For the United States, it appeared that foreign trade was the “icing on the
cake,” whereas for Britain, it was a matter of economic survival.65
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Not only did Americans begin to displace the British in overseas markets, they began
aggressively to take over large segments of Britain’s own domestic markets, as large American
companies, including Hoover, Ford, General Motors, General Electric, Firestone, Goodrich, and
Goodyear, established subsidiaries in Britain and began dominating market share there.66 For American
corporations, such subsidiaries afforded an effective way to get around British tariff barriers and to
penetrate the markets of the British Empire.67
The American belief that Britain used unfair methods to protect its global commercial position
exacerbated this growing rivalry. After the economic losses incurred during the war, London decided to
exploit the resources of the British Empire to the fullest. Because the Empire still covered a quarter of the
globe, and these possessions allowed Britain access to and control of much of the world’s supplies of raw
materials, such as rubber, tin, and oil, British policy aroused intense hostility within the United States.
As a result, American businessmen demanded an “Open Door” policy of equal access to the world’s
markets and raw materials.68
One particularly acrimonious example was a dispute over rubber, which directly affected the
booming American automobile industry. In the United States, car production increased every year, from
almost two million vehicles in 1920, to nearly four and a half million by 1929. This automobile boom of
the 1920s made the United States the world’s leading importer of rubber, consuming over two-thirds of
total production. Britain, with plantations in Malaya and Ceylon, controlled about three-quarters of world
supply.69 In the early twenties, when overproduction caused the price of rubber to fall, the British
government adopted the Stevenson Plan,70 which was designed to raise the price of rubber by reducing
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production, and, according to the Colonial Secretary, Winston Churchill, stabilize the dollar exchange by
making the Americans pay more for rubber. The effect on the prices of rubber in the United States was
devastating for American tire and automobile manufacturers. In 1921, the price of rubber had been
approximately 16 cents per pound; by 1925, however, the price had risen to $1.21 per pound.71
In 1925, the United States Secretary of Commerce, Herbert Hoover, mounted a vigorous
campaign against the Stevenson Plan, denouncing the price-fixing as a violation of Open Door principles
and encouraging Americans to reduce their consumption of rubber. London responded by pointing out
that the United States did exactly the same thing with cotton, manipulating output to keep the prices
artificially high. The British also reminded the Americans that, although they might talk about the Open
Door with equal opportunity in foreign markets, the United States maintained the highest tariffs in the
world. A third of American imports were liable for duty and on these the average rate was 40 percent,
making numerous staple British exports, such as steel and textiles, simply unsellable in the United States.
Although Hoover appealed to a still powerful American Anglophobia by promoting a rubber conservation
campaign with the emotive slogan “1776-1925,” in the end, market forces proved more effective.
American rubber manufacturers not only shifted to Dutch suppliers in the East Indies, but also established
control over rubber plantations in the west African state of Liberia, both of which led to a decline in
Britain’s price and sales. Consequently, London abandoned the Stevenson Plan, much to the relief of the
British ambassador in Washington, Sir Esme Howard, as this decision eliminated “a source of
misunderstanding and continual bickering between the United States and ourselves.”72
Just as serious as the American displacement of Britain as the leading financial power in the
world, another significant and lasting source of tension involved the question of war debts. During the
war, Britain supported its allies with loans, often raised on the American market. In total, the United
States loaned the Allies approximately $10 to $12 billion. By 1920, Britain owed the United States
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approximately $4.3 to $4.7 billion, while Britain’s allies owed London between approximately $7 and
$11 billion.73
In earlier conflicts, in which Britain funded the war efforts of its allies, it often had been the
practice to agree to a general cancellation of debts once the war was over. For the United States,
however, fighting as part of a coalition was a new experience. Furthermore, American culture was
largely a business culture. As Wilson, the bankers, and public opinion made clear, when they lent money,
they expected it to be paid back.74 Therefore, in the spring of 1922, Congress passed the Debt Funding
Act, which stipulated that the loans had to be repaid within a 25 year period, and that the rate of interest
charged was not to be less than 4.25 percent. Britain, in the Balfour Note of August 1922, suggested the
cancellation of all the inter-allied war debts; Balfour offered to forgive all war debts owed to Britain,
which were substantial, to the same extent that the United States forgave Britain’s debts. In doing so,
Balfour attempted to link the entire war debt question with the question of reparations. London argued
that German war guilt, as established in Article 231 of the Versailles Treaty,75 not only made the Germans
ostensibly the aggressors, it also made them the debtors of last resort. In addition to the economic
motivations, this argument also provided for an effective way of ensuring that, for want of resources,
Germany would be unable to make trouble in the future.76
The United States, however, stridently refused to acknowledge any connection between allied
debts and reparations. In part, the abrasiveness of the American position was driven by American
business culture; the debts had been incurred on a normal commercial basis. Business was business, and
those who borrowed, regardless of the circumstances, were under an obligation to pay back. If others
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owed money, that was their problem.77 In addition, domestic politics helped to shape the American
response as well. As London issued the Balfour Note in the midst of the 1922 congressional election
campaign, both Republicans and Democrats sought to outdo each other in their denunciation of the British
efforts to escape acknowledgement of their obligations.78
In any event, American insistence that the Allies dutifully pay their debts triggered considerable
resentment in Britain. “Uncle Sam” increasingly became “Uncle Shylock”; a senior Foreign Office
official noted that the American position “made the average Englishman think that the Americans were
dirty swine.”79 At the same time, however, many in Britain believed that payment was necessary in order
to restore the City of London’s position as the world’s banker. Montagu Norman, Governor of the Bank
of England, stated that foreign confidence in London as a financial center would collapse if Britain tried
to avoid its obligations. The establishment of a payment plan, furthermore, would likely strengthen
prospects for improved Anglo-American relations and longer-term cooperation. Otherwise, the British
ambassador in Washington, Sir Auckland Geddes, argued in 1921, Britain must comply or risk being
treated “as a vassal State so long as the debt remains unpaid.”80
Nevertheless, British resentment and the growing ill will between the two countries intensified as
a result of the debate over the settlement terms in the US Senate. One anti-British demagogue after
another denounced the entire renegotiation process as a “Hoover-Morgan scheme” to defraud American
taxpayers, and complained that Britain was getting the better end of the deal. The British Chancellor of
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the Exchequer, Stanley Baldwin, added fuel to the fire when he pointed out that the “majority of the
Members [of the Senate] come from agricultural and pastoral communities,” and were thus incapable of
understanding the connection between the debts and the health of the international economy: “The people
in the West merely sell wheat and hogs and other products and take no further interest in connection with
the international debt or international trade.” Baldwin’s comments triggered a full-scale assault on
Britain and its leaders. The New York Times characterized the debate on the Senate floor as the “liveliest
two hours which that body has had since the present administration came into power.”81
In the end, the United States insisted that each debtor state negotiate separate agreements for
repayment. In January 1923, Britain was the first to settle and, as it subsequently turned out, secured the
hardest terms -- full repayment over 62 years with an annual interest of 3.3 percent.82 The severity of
these terms, particularly compared with those ultimately granted to other debtors such as France and Italy,
which were markedly more lenient, made them unpopular in Britain, and therefore a source of persistent
ill feeling in both countries.83
The British generally protested that the American point of view was wrongheaded and shortsighted, on two levels. First, it was unjust. Relative to its financial resources, Britain had contributed far
more generously to the defeat of Germany than had the United States, which had actually profited from
the war. Britain, and to an even greater degree France, had contributed far more than the United States in
terms of human costs. In terms of their respective sacrifices, there was simply no comparison. The battle
casualties of the American Expeditionary Force amounted to 49,000 killed in action, compared to the
750,000 Britons and over one million Frenchmen killed. For three years, the Allies bled and held the
Germans at bay while the United States prospered, generally at the expense of Britain. Therefore,
considering how long it took the United States to enter the conflict, and how much longer it took for
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American troops to make a significant contribution in actual combat operations, it was exasperating and
unbelievable to many Britons that, even when the war came to an end, Washington was in a position to
dictate the terms of the armistice.
Second, London argued that the American position would exercise a disastrous effect on the
world’s economy.

Britain argued that the health of the international economy depended upon the

provision of easy credit and ready access to markets; after all, the long prosperity of the Victorian period
had been made possible by Britain’s adherence to free-trade principles, the gold standard, and the free
circulation of money. Burdening Europe with debts that could not be paid, however, would undermine
the ability for global economic recovery.84
The United States, in possession of a far larger internal market, was far less concerned with issues
of world trade. Furthermore, and most detrimental to Britain, the United States kept its markets tightly
closed. In 1922, the United States passed the Fordney-MacCumber Tariff, which imposed the highest
import tariffs in American history, particularly on both agricultural and manufactured goods, which made
selling to Americans almost impossible. These tariffs in turn made it even more difficult for Allied
debtors to repay their obligations.85
Naval Rivalry
In addition to the economic differences and disagreements, one of the most significant sources of
tension and misunderstanding between Britain and the United States throughout the 1920s was the rivalry
over naval supremacy. The foundations of this naval rivalry began to emerge during the war. In 1916,
when the United States took its first steps toward military preparedness, the Wilson administration made
the expansion of the American fleet its most vital priority, with the president in February demanding a
navy “incomparably the greatest in the world.” When his adviser Colonel House suggested later that
year, however, that the expansion of the navy was causing friction with the British, Wilson replied: “Let
84
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us build a navy bigger than hers and do what we please.” The president sought to secure America’s ability
to sail the oceans unimpeded, regardless of British sensibilities or strategic considerations.86
The British concern over Wilson’s Fourteen Points was a case in point. London was most
concerned about the call for “absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas.” In 1915, and again in 1918,
London suspected that Wilson intended to destroy British sea power. In late October 1918, for example,
House told Lloyd George that the United States would not allow Britain to dominate the seas and to
determine the conditions on which American ships might sail them. Wilson threatened, moreover, not to
participate in any peace negotiations that did not include freedom of the seas. Britain ultimately agreed to
discuss, but refused to concede, the principle.87
At the peace conference, Lloyd George continued to object, arguing that freedom of the seas
represented a direct challenge to Britain’s sea power and its right of blockade. Colonel House, however,
warned that if agreement could not be reached, the United States would launch an all-out race to build the
most powerful navy in the world. In order to make that point unambiguously clear, Wilson approved a
new naval appropriations bill in December 1918, providing for a fresh three-year building programme, on
top of the ongoing naval construction from 1916. Lloyd George understood that, as the United States
enjoyed far more resources and more money, Britain would lose any such contest. Nevertheless, he
replied that Britain would spend her last guinea to maintain a navy superior to that of the United States or
any other power, and that no cabinet official could “continue in the Government of England who took a
different position.”88
Although Wilson proved much more accommodating than expected, Lloyd George continued his
efforts to crush “freedom of the seas” as an essential part of the peace agreement. In January 1919,
according to the Admiralty Board, Britain had 42 capital ships in service, as opposed to the United States’
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sixteen and Japan’s fourteen.89 The Admiralty expected the current American programme to bring
numerical equality by 1923-1924, as well as qualitative superiority, since a number of British ships would
be obsolete, while all of the American ships were modern. In the end, after repeated rows with Lloyd
George, Wilson stopped pressing Britain on the freedom of the seas.90
For its part, the United States had two principal concerns.

Although Washington did not

seriously contemplate war with Britain, it nevertheless believed that trade rivalry was the root cause of
international conflict, and that the coming of peace would lead to a trade rivalry between the United
States and Britain, the world’s two leading economic powers. Therefore, Washington believed that
Britain would seek to defeat the United States by naval power, just as it had previously defeated, by naval
power, the earlier challenges of Spain, the Netherlands, France, and most recently, Germany. Britain now
had no more European naval rivals; Washington therefore believed that, in the future, every ship Britain
built or acquired could have in mind only the United States Navy.91
At the same time, however, the United States remained concerned about Britain’s naval alliance
with Japan.92 Although Washington initially regarded the Anglo-Japanese Alliance as a cheap way to
contain Russian expansion, by the early 1920s, Japanese imperial aspirations and its growing military
power became a greater threat to American interests in the Pacific; namely, its colonies in the Philippines
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and Guam. Therefore, Washington feared that, if war broke out between the United States and Japan, the
Anglo-Japanese Alliance could possibly bring the Royal Navy into the war on the Japanese side.
In spite of Japanese encroachments into China during the war, many British policy-makers
favored the alliance, due to expire in 1922, primarily to protect Britain’s still considerable commercial
interests in the Pacific, which were greater than those of the United States, and to avoid the need to
maintain large naval forces in the China Seas. At the same time, however, they feared that American
suspicions of Japan might trigger a renewed naval armaments race, which, considering the far greater
resources at the disposal of the United States, Britain would certainly lose.93
The United States clearly wanted to achieve parity with Britain and to destroy the Anglo-Japanese
Alliance. Although it had the wealth to outbuild Britain in a naval race, there were growing demands in
Washington for economy in 1921 as the postwar boom began to fade. These dual necessities, therefore,
led to the Washington Naval Conference of 1921-1922.

The United States proposed a ten-year

moratorium on the building of capital ships and the systematic scrapping of vessels already in
commission. In more specific terms, the United States government wanted to establish a ratio of 5-5-3 in
capital ships among the three principal naval powers, the United States, Britain, and Japan. Although the
British Admiralty strenuously opposed the moratorium, due to the damaging effects it would have on the
Royal Navy’s modernization programmes, Lloyd George recognized that the proposal would relieve
Britain of the strain and embarrassment of competing in a naval race that it could not possibly hope to
win. A naval race with the United States would further weaken Britain’s economy, already facing a
severe postwar recession and governmental efforts to reduce not only the National Debt, vastly inflated by
the war, but public spending as well. Therefore, London made it clear that it was prepared to accept the
idea of naval parity.94

93
94

Allen, 733-735; Dimbleby and Reynolds, 79; Nicholas, 78-79; Temperley, 116.

Dimbleby and Reynolds, 79-80; B.J.C. McKercher, The Second Baldwin Government and the United States,
1924-1929: Attitudes and Diplomacy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 4-5; Ovendale, AngloAmerican Relations, 21; Temperley, 116-117.

38
The conference resulted in a number of agreements, including the Four-Power Treaty, the NinePower Treaty,95 and the Five-Power Treaty, as well as a number of smaller agreements. The more
important of the agreements was the Five-Power Naval Treaty, signed on 6 February 1922. It provided
that the major naval powers of the world would retain capital ships in the approximate ratio of 5-5-3-1.71.7, which gave Britain and the United States ships of around 500,000 tons, Japan ships of around
300,000 tons, and France and Italy ships of around 175,000 tons each. The powers also agreed to halt the
construction of capital ships for ten years and limit the construction of new strategic bases. Therefore, in
place of a harmful armaments race, Britain achieved a relatively amicable settlement with the United
States.

The British accepted American equality in capital ships, while the United States secured

recognition from Britain of its claim to equality at sea.96
The Washington agreements applied only to capital ships, but not to cruisers or submarines. In a
fundamental way, this reflected the very different strategic requirements each country demanded. Britain,
with longer imperial lines of communication to defend, needed far more numerous, smaller, faster, and
lightly armed vessels. The United States Navy, operating from home waters, needed fewer numbers of
ships, but far heavier armor. These fundamental differences led to the calling of another naval conference
at Geneva in 1927. The breakdown of this conference, however, led to a renewal of acrimony in the late
twenties, which grew to nearly crisis proportions in 1928-1929.97
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The conference was initiated by the American president, Calvin Coolidge, who was under
political pressure to bring both armaments and defense budgets under control.98 It was doomed from the
beginning, however, breaking down over the fundamental differences regarding cruiser strength. In
specific terms, American naval planners sought to extend the Washington ratios, of 5-5-3-1.7-1.7, to all
classes of ships, including capital ships, so the United States could build about 30 large cruisers, able to
cruise at long range and with sufficiently heavy armament in the event it might have to confront Japanese
warships. The United States Navy maintained that since sea power consisted of warships, plus merchant
ships, plus bases -- and since Britain was predominant in the second and third elements -- every limitation
of warships weakened American sea power in relation to Britain: “With each further limitation of
armament, this relative weakening will increase until, should all combatant ships by [sic] abolished, Great
Britain, by reason of overwhelming superiority in merchant marine and bases, would completely
dominate the seas.” The British were far more concerned about the protection of their global commerce,
and therefore claimed the right to maintain 70 cruisers, most of them smaller vessels, more suitable for
protecting trade routes. They feared that, through such a building program, the US Navy would actually
achieve supremacy, not parity, on the high seas.99
This fundamental incompatibility of strategic requirements provoked mutual recriminations.
Many Americans suspected that the British were trying to perpetuate their superiority over the United
States in cruisers, a view driven by a chorus of insulting anti-British and pro-Navy agitation in the
American press, even from typically pro-British newspapers such as The New York Times. Indeed, its
Geneva correspondent, Wythe Williams, later recalled that his editor reminded him that he was reporting
a disarmament conference, not a battlefield. Lord Bridgeman, head of the British delegation, complained
98
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in a letter to the King that it was “evident that no agreement which did not humiliate the British Empire
was likely to find acceptance” on the American side.100
In the meantime, anti-American sentiment within the cabinet further precluded any compromise.
Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin cancelled plans for an official visit to the United States.101 Winston
Churchill, now Chancellor of the Exchequer, who had campaigned strongly against the Admiralty’s
building programmes on the grounds that they conflicted with his aim of reducing taxation, nevertheless
was appalled by the prospect of bowing to American pressure.

In July 1927, he told his cabinet

colleagues that “no doubt it is quite right in the interests of peace to go on talking about war with the
United States being ‘unthinkable.’” But, he warned, “everyone knows that this is not true”:
However foolish and disastrous such a war would be . . . . we do not wish to put
ourselves in the power of the United States. We cannot tell what they might do if at some
future date they were in a position to give us orders about our policy, say, in India, or
Egypt, or Canada, or on any other great matter behind which their electioneering forces
were marshalled. Moreover, tonnage parity means that Britain can be starved into
obedience to any American decree. I would neither trust America to command, nor
England to submit. . . . All the concessions that we made at the Washington Conference
in giving up the Naval supremacy we had so long enjoyed, in parting with our faithful
Japanese ally, and subsequently in paying these enormous sums, have only resulted in
new assertions and demands on their part.102
Churchill concluded that British concessions simply provoked more American demands. Consequently,
amid mutual suspicions and accusations, the Geneva Conference broke up in August 1927. There was
great resentment in Britain. The Cabinet Secretary, Sir Maurice Hankey, wrote bitterly to Balfour:
Time after time we have been told that, if we made this concession, or that concession,
we should secure good will in America. We gave up the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. We
agreed to pay our debts and we have again and again made concessions on this ground. I
have never seen any permanent results follow from a policy of concession. I believe we
are less popular and more abused in America than ever before, because they believe we
are weak.103
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There was much condescension on the American side as well.

For example, Frank Simonds, the

Anglophobic foreign editor of the American Review of Reviews, pointed out that, to the British, the
American demand for naval equality struck at the very root of British insecurity:
If we have the ships to “wage neutrality” . . . then Britain is relatively helpless in the face
of a Continental opponent with a large land force . . . On the day on which we actually
attain real equality on the blue water, we and not the British will be in a position to
determine the course of any new world conflict. Our fleet will not be used against the
British, but the fact of our fleet in being will utterly transform the whole character of
British action.104
In response to the breakdown of the Geneva conference, the House of Representatives, in March 1928,
passed the “Cruiser Bill,” which authorized the construction of 15 heavy cruisers and one aircraft carrier.
Although the Senate opted to delay action on the bill until after the 1928 national elections, the debate
was acrimonious.105
More important, American suspicions of Britain exploded in the summer of 1928 as a result of
the “Anglo-French compromise.” During the breakdown of discussions in Geneva, Britain turned to
France, the principal land power in Europe, for a bilateral arms control agreement that could ultimately be
enlarged to include the United States and any other interested powers. In the summer of 1928, they
reached a compromise, by which Britain would support France’s position on land armaments, leaving the
French free to build up their army in Europe, while the French would support the British in their dispute
over cruisers with the United States, leaving the British free to construct the number of small cruisers they
wanted. It gave the impression, however, that the United States would be limited in its construction of
cruisers, while Britain would be free to build whatever it wanted, behind America’s back.106
American comment on the Anglo-French compromise was uniformly hostile.

American

newspapers condemned the agreement, not only among those that were traditionally anti-British, such as

104

McKercher, 86-87; Orde, 85.

105

Moser 55-56.

106

Dimbleby and Reynolds, 81-82; McKercher, 140-149; Moser, 56-57; Orde, 86; Watt, Succeeding John Bull, 58.

42
William Randolph Hearst’s New York American and the Chicago Tribune, but also among those that were
traditionally pro-British and pro-Democrat, such as the New York World, edited by Walter Lippmann.
The most serious effect, however, of the Anglo-French compromise was that President Coolidge,
denouncing Britain as the chief obstacle to arms control, threw his support behind the “Cruiser Bill,”
which had been stalled in the Senate. Public outrage over British diplomacy swept aside nearly all
opposition. As a result, the bill passed in the Senate with overwhelming support, 68 to 12.107 Coolidge
also ordered Secretary of State Frank Kellogg to cancel a scheduled visit to London on his return home
from Paris, where he had just signed the Pact of Paris. Instead, Kellogg was to visit Dublin -- a calculated
insult to the British Tories, many of whom were still smarting over Irish independence.108
There was much criticism of the Anglo-French compromise within Britain as well. In the
Observer, James L. Garvin criticized the “dull and obstinate mishandling of American psychology” and
said that Britain had forfeited American confidence and respect.

The Spectator denounced the

government for its “abominable mismanagement” and for “providing one of the most perfect examples
we can remember of how to defeat your own purpose.” Lloyd George, now leader of the Liberal Party,
introduced a motion in the House of Commons declaring that the Anglo-French compromise “endangers
the prospect of peace in Europe and good relations with the United States.”109
From late 1928 to early 1929, the tensions stemming from the Anglo-French compromise grew so
serious that many on both sides of the Atlantic feared the outbreak of an Anglo-American war, a prospect
earlier dismissed as absolutely “unthinkable.” In Britain, a Foreign Office official, Robert L. Craigie,
maintained that there now appeared to be a danger of “drifting towards a situation of real gravity”:
Except as a figure of speech, war is not unthinkable between the two countries. On the
contrary, there are present all the factors which in the past have made for wars between
States.110
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In the United States, the press suggested that war was possible. For example, the New York World
asserted that war was, indeed, “thinkable,” while the Washington News wrote that “the specter of war
hovers black and ugly in the background” of Anglo-American relations. In the meantime, the War Plans
Division of the Navy Department, in its annual “Estimate of the Situation” for 1928, recommended the
“development and refinement” of Plans Red and Red-Orange, which envisioned a war against either
Britain alone or against a revived Anglo-Japanese alliance. Supporters of increased naval construction
recalled how during the last war Britain had claimed the right of search and seizure of neutral vessels on
the high seas. The British had been able to get away with this outrage, they argued, because the United
States Navy had been too small to prevent it.111 President Coolidge, in an Armistice Day speech,
offended many in Britain, not simply by contrasting American idealism with European militarism, but far
more outrageously, by claiming that the war had cost the United States more than any other belligerent.112
Some observers doubted that the crisis was serious enough to lead to war. For example, Churchill
maintained that all that was necessary was “to sit quite quiet, to be independent and cool and polite . . .
and the present ill-temper will gradually subside.” Leo Amery, the Colonial Secretary, agreed, pointing
out that the Empire was four times as large as the United States and had greater resources.” In the United
States, it was clear that the vast majority of Americans were opposed to a war against Britain. At the very
moment the Cruiser Bill was being debated, the Senate also took up the Kellogg-Briand Pact for
ratification, a bill that had overwhelming support among the American people; polls showed that some 95
percent supported its ratification. American businessmen opposed war because they believed that foreign
markets and raw materials would eventually come under American control without armed conflict.
Furthermore, even within the United States Navy and among its “Big Navy” advocates in Congress, many
saw Japan, not Britain, as the principal enemy.113
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The continued haggling about the size and number of cruisers revealed a larger, more
fundamental problem. Britain remained adamant that in any future war, it must be able to command the
seas and blockade its enemies. At the same time, the United States insisted on its right as a potential
neutral to unimpeded trade. This was the old issue of the “freedom of the seas” that had embittered
relations in 1914-1918. What gave the issue a new twist, the Foreign Office believed, was the growth of
the American navy, now approaching equality with Britain’s. In the future, the United States Navy might
well be able to force the British to accept the freedom of the seas. While the Foreign Office believed that
Britain must back down from its opposition to American demands for freedom of the seas, the Admiralty
and the cabinet refused to shift their position. They saw the right to blockade as a vital national interest
and were prepared to call America’s bluff, convinced that it would not retaliate. There was a growing
feeling that, since 1919, Britain had appeased the United States too often for too little in return. Sir
Maurice Hankey complained in 1928:
We played up to America over the Covenant of the League, abandonment of the Japanese
Alliance, Washington treaties, debt settlement, Irish settlement . . . always making
concessions and always being told that the next step would change their attitude. Yet
they are, as the result, more overbearing and suspicious against us than anyone else.114
Toward the end of 1928, therefore, as a result of these continuing suspicions, observers on both
sides of the Atlantic sought to lower the temperature.115 The most significant step toward easing AngloAmerican tensions was a change of government in both countries. In March 1929, Herbert Hoover was
sworn in as president, while Ramsay MacDonald became prime minister after elections in June. Unlike
their predecessors, Coolidge and Baldwin, the new leaders took a keen, assertive interest in foreign
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affairs. In particular, they believed that disarmament was far too important to be left to the admirals.116
Hoover, while no admirer of Britain’s class-based social structure or of the Empire, trusted the British and
regarded them as friends.117 The British welcomed his election and were further encouraged when, in a
conversation with Ambassador Esme Howard, Hoover spoke urgently of the need to improve relations.
He appointed financier Charles Dawes, a man of well-known pro-British sympathies, as the new
American ambassador to London, and immediately called for a new naval disarmament conference.118
MacDonald himself paid a very successful visit to the United States in October 1929, the first
time that a British prime minister had visited the United States while in office. Highlights of the trip
included a ticker tape parade through New York City, MacDonald’s moving address to the US Senate,
and several days of informal talks with Hoover, which culminated with a joint declaration of faith in the
Kellogg Pact and affirmed that war was no longer possible between their two countries. Perhaps just as
important, the visit also helped to improve Britain’s image in the United States, for MacDonald did not fit
the American stereotype of a British leader. He was not an aristocratic product of Eton and Oxbridge, but
rather a Scot, a committed socialist, and an outspoken opponent of the war, and he made clear his sincere
desire to end the arms race.119
The practical result of MacDonald’s visit was the decision to convene another naval conference,
to be held in January 1930 in London, once again among the world’s three leading naval powers. In talks
with the American ambassador earlier that summer, MacDonald indicated that he accepted naval parity
and agreed to reduce the number of British cruisers to a figure well below that London claimed at Geneva
two years earlier.120 Unlike the previous conference, the governments prepared with far more care. In
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particular, they managed to keep the naval establishments of both countries at arm’s length, making it
easier for the civilian delegates to reach some type of accord. Therefore, they agreed to extend the 1922
Washington ratio of 5-5-3 for capital ships to cruisers as well. The agreement was flexible enough to
allow the United States to build more heavy cruisers, and Britain to build more smaller cruisers.
Although Hoover forced the United States Navy to reduce the total number of cruisers it wanted, the
British made the biggest concession. Under pressure from MacDonald, the Admiralty accepted a ceiling
of 50 cruisers instead of the 70 it had demanded in 1927. The Labour government thus averted an AngloAmerican arms race, but only by making concessions to the United States that were deplored by many
Tories.

The US Navy was still smaller than the Royal Navy, but the British now acknowledged

America’s right, in theory at least, to a navy as large as their own.121
In the broader view of Anglo-American relations, this London Conference not only resolved the
cruiser issue once and for all, it also represented the end of the Anglo-American naval rivalry.122 The new
American Secretary of State, Henry Stimson, wrote on 23 February 1930 that the treaty had “clearly
accomplished one of our chief purposes, that of healing the serious friction which had arisen between
America and Britain over cruisers.”123 Yet, it became clear to a growing number of observers that the
power relations between the United States and Britain had shifted a bit further in favor of the former.124
In spite of this significant transformation in the Anglo-American naval rivalry, relations between
Britain and the United States did not radically improve as a whole. Many factors, after all, contributed to
the resolution of the naval rivalry. While the leadership of Hoover and MacDonald, who were both
121
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passionately committed to arms limitation, was certainly vital,125 the real key was the state of the world
economy. Within a few weeks of MacDonald’s visit to the United States, the American stock market
crash precipitated a general financial crisis in which policy-makers on both sides of the Atlantic sought to
reduce government expenditures on armaments. As the Great Depression covered the globe, however,
international cooperation began to collapse and new sources of rivalry and tension appeared.126
The Great Depression
Throughout the 1920s, ongoing economic tensions, whether over war debts, reparations, or
protectionism tended to aggravate political pinpricks and annoyances. In a similar way, the Wall Street
crash of 1929 and the onset of the Great Depression helped to undermine the political healing and good
will of the late 1920s, which had been set into motion by the rapprochement between MacDonald and
Hoover and by the resolution of the naval rivalry. The intensity of the Depression in the United States
had inescapable consequences for the economies of not only Britain but of all Europe because of the
dominance of the American economy. By the early 1930s, the United States produced almost half of the
world’s manufactured products. Therefore, it remained the world’s largest exporter, and, second to
Britain, the largest importer as well. At the same time, New York City had become the center of capital
and finance, the position previously occupied by London. The United States had become the world’s
principal source of new investment, lending $6.4 billion abroad between 1924 and 1929. Nearly half of
American new investment was in Europe, particularly in Germany, where it helped to pay for reparations
and stimulate the Weimar economy, at least until the onset of the Depression.127
With the spread of the Depression, however, Americans grew unwilling to continue lending the
dollars needed for the repayment of war debts, largely in order to meet their own financial obligations at
home. As most American investment in Europe had been private capital, not government loans, the
Hoover administration could take no action in 1930-1931 to prevent American investors from
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withdrawing funds from Europe.

Most threatening and most troublesome was a strengthening of

American protectionism. In 1930, with the passage of the Hawley-Smoot Act, American tariff rates on
imports rose to new heights, shutting out foreign goods and raw materials from the American market,
thereby intensifying the worldwide depression, and making it even more difficult, if not impossible, for
Allied debtors to repay their obligations.128
The Depression certainly exposed the absurdity of the continuing American refusal to
acknowledge the connection between reparations and international debts. Over the course of the 1920s,
Britain, France, Italy, and other former Allies struggled to keep up their payments, although Britain had
been remarkably conscientious, paying the United States close to half of what it owed. With American
markets effectively closed to the British because of American protectionism, they relied principally on
tourism and the reparations paid to them by Germany, while Germany, in turn, obtained the currency it
needed by borrowing dollars from the United States. Between 1924 and 1929, Germany borrowed
considerably more from Britain and the United States than it had paid them in the form of reparations. So
long as this cycle continued, payments could be made; if it stopped, so would the payments.129 By June
1931, the Depression made further payments impossible. In order to revive the world economy and to
sustain free-market policies, President Hoover called for a one-year moratorium on debt and reparation
payments. He made it clear, however, that this was only a temporary measure and that he expected
payments to be resumed as soon as the crisis abated.130
Hoover’s action, unfortunately, failed to stabilize the situation. In Britain, MacDonald’s Labour
cabinet tried to counter the effects of the Depression primarily by keeping interest rates low and welfare
payments high. Nevertheless, these policies contributed to the massive budget deficit of over £100
million.

As a result, an official committee, headed by Sir George May, recommended that the
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government balance the budget mainly by imposing a 20 percent cut in unemployment insurance.
Montagu Norman, the Governor of the Bank of England, and the City agreed, arguing that only such
action would revive foreign confidence; specifically, the only way Britain could continue to borrow from
the United States was to show some specific plan to restore financial stability.131
In late August 1931, although he was opposed by the majority of his cabinet, MacDonald
reluctantly conceded that Britain’s position as a financial power was more important than the well-being
of its citizens. Nearly half of the cabinet disagreed and resigned on 24 August 1931. The King persuaded
MacDonald to form a National Government, including both Tories and Liberals, which adopted the cuts,
and as a result, were able to raise loans in France and the United States. These loans, however, failed to
check the outflow of sterling. London made further requests to New York City, but at a time when the
United States was sliding into depression, further financial assistance, from either private lenders such as
J.P. Morgan or the United States government, was out of the question.132
It was easy to blame the United States for what had happened and many in the Labour movement
did so. The day after the Labour cabinet resigned, the Daily Herald denounced “the virtual ultimatum
from New York bankers” and claimed that they had been allowed to “dictate, as the condition for a
further credit to the Bank of England, the policy to be pursued in relation to unemployment benefit.”133
Faced with the sterling crisis and tighter protectionism in the United States, Britain decided to
follow the American example, thereby embarking upon a revolutionary shift away from its own hallowed
tradition, maintained since the middle of the nineteenth century, of relying upon free trade. The new
National Government, although led by Ramsay MacDonald, was dominated by Conservatives, such as
Chancellor of the Exchequer Neville Chamberlain and Foreign Secretary John Simon, who began to
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advocate tariff protection. Therefore, at the 1932 Commonwealth Conference in Ottawa, it was agreed to
establish a system of Imperial Preference; members would levy higher tariffs on goods imported from
outside the Empire, and lower tariffs from each other.
This new policy deeply offended Americans, particularly Cordell Hull, the new Secretary of
State, who denounced British policy, ironically, as protectionist. Having always argued for the open door,
except with respect to its own domestic market, Americans were furious at finding the tables turned.134 In
large part, after all, London conceived Imperial Preference in part as a way of fighting off the challenge
from the United States, by providing a secure base from which Britain could compete.135 In spite of
repeated American protests, London refused to give way unless the United States changed its own tariff
policy, which it adamantly refused to do; so far as Congress was concerned, opening American markets to
foreign competition in the depth of the Depression was unthinkable, not just economically, but politically
as well. That did not, however, stop the United States from expressing deep resentment and indignation
over Britain’s refusal to admit American exports or to allow American manufacturers easy access to the
Empire’s resources of rubber, zinc, and other essential raw materials.136
Americans may have been justified in their complaints. After all, Britain fared less poorly during
the Depression than did the United States. Banks did not collapse as in the United States and very few
wealthy families found themselves suddenly broke. Although wage earners in traditional industries like
coal mining, textiles, and shipbuilding clearly suffered, salaried workers and the middle classes fared
relatively well. Over the decade as a whole, average real income per capita rose by 17.7 percent and labor
productivity improved. Many areas, most notably the midlands and the southeast, recovered quickly and
experienced the demand for houses, automobiles, and consumer goods that had fuelled the American
economy in the twenties. Although the proportion of the unemployed never fell below ten percent, the

134

Nicholas, 84; Ovendale, Anglo-American Relations, 25; Temperley, 130-131.

135

Dimbleby and Reynolds, 92.

136

Temperley, 131.

51
workforce itself expanded as more people entered the labor market, including a large number of women,
although at significantly lower rates of pay. By the end of the decade, therefore, more people were at
work than ever before.137
In an effort to deal with the seemingly endless economic crisis, Hoover and MacDonald planned
the World Economic Conference, to meet in London in 1933, with the intention of stabilizing
international currencies. The prospects of success, however, were never very strong, as each country put
its short-term national interest first and adopted stringent protectionist policies. The Conference failed to
reach any agreement, principally due to the refusal of the newly-elected American president, Franklin D.
Roosevelt, to make any commitments that might limit future policy options. Specifically, he announced
that the United States would not support any permanent stabilization of world currencies until the
American economy was back on its feet. Roosevelt’s intransigence strengthened British frustrations
about the United States. Neville Chamberlain, Chancellor of the Exchequer, grumbled, “I should think
there has never been a case of a conference so completely smashed by one of the participants.”138
In June 1933, in the wake of the failed World Economic Conference, the British announced that
they would make a “token payment” of ten million dollars, pending a final settlement.139 In response, US
Senator Hiram Johnson revived a piece of legislation that he had sponsored back in February 1932, which
proposed to ban all loans to countries that had defaulted on previous debts. The Johnson Act, as it came
to be called, made no distinction between those who were in complete default, such as France, and those
who, like Britain, were making token payments on the debt. Although the bill immediately triggered
opposition in the Departments of State and Treasury, both of which hoped to use debt remission as a lever
to win a more favorable trade agreement from London, there was strong support in Congress and the bill
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passed easily by a voice vote. In spite of warnings by the British ambassador Sir Ronald Lindsay of
“repercussions,” Roosevelt signed the bill on 13 April 1933. In response, the British, who viewed the
legislation as a decidedly unfriendly gesture, made a few more token payments and finally defaulted in
1933. London argued that the United States had made repayment virtually impossible, by accumulating
much of the world’s gold reserves and imposing ever-higher tariffs against British goods.140
In the end, Britain had paid $2.2 billion out of an original debt totaling $4.3 billion, a far higher
proportion than was paid by France, Belgium, or any of America’s other major debtors. Moreover,
Britain’s payments mostly came primarily from German reparations, thus substantiating the connection
the United States would not recognize.141 Nevertheless, Britain’s default would long be resented in the
United States. While many Americans attributed the Depression to Britain’s failure to manage to global
economy effectively, most blamed the refusal of Europeans to pay their debts. Once again, it seemed,
Perfidious Albion was up to old tricks.142
The Growing Question of Security
The suspicions and bitterness stirred up by the Depression likewise precluded cooperation
between London and Washington as the international situation became increasingly dangerous in the
early and middle 1930s. In response to the first significant international crisis of the early 1930s, in spite
of the political good will generated by the London Naval Treaty of 1930, Britain and the United States
acted independently and ineffectually.
In the winter of 1931-1932, Japan, the third member of the naval triumvirate, and anxious to
become a great power in its own right, invaded and overran the Chinese province of Manchuria and set up
a puppet state. Under a treaty signed in 1922, the United States and Britain were the guarantors of
China’s integrity. In spite of that treaty, however, neither took any substantive action to punish Japan,
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either individually or collectively.

Both Britain and the United States, although they possessed

substantial foreign investments in China, maintained equally close commercial connections with Japan.
Therefore, at a time of anxiety over the balance of payments, both Hoover and MacDonald refused to
countenance sanctions against the Japanese.
The American Secretary of State, however, Henry L. Stimson, wanted to put forward a moral
protest. On 7 January 1932, he proclaimed the “Stimson Doctrine,” which warned that the United States
would not recognize territorial changes brought about by force. He called upon Japan to remove its
troops, invoking the Open Door agreement and the Kellogg-Briand Pact.143 The fact that the United
States had taken any initiative at all was new and aroused expectations in Britain that Stimson’s
declaration about non-recognition might be a prelude to firmer action.144
In February 1932, as the Japanese remained unmoved, Stimson called upon the British Foreign
Secretary Sir John Simon to join him in a condemnation of Japan under the 1922 treaty. At that particular
moment, however, the British were already engaged in efforts, through the League of Nations, to
negotiate Japan’s peaceful withdrawal from Shanghai. Simon, who saw little point in provoking Tokyo
gratuitously, was therefore evasive; indeed, it would likely be quite difficult to combine cooperation with
Washington and action within the League of Nations. Besides, Simon believed that the United States was
not prepared to do anything more than upbraid Japan and leave Britain to bear the brunt of any
repercussions. Recalling Wilson’s 1915 speech, Simon uttered, “I am afraid America is ‘too proud to’ do
anything.”145 For Britain to fight Japan on its own, over events in far away Manchuria was plainly out of
the question. Stimson, however, interpreted Britain’s response as pusillanimity, convinced that he had
been betrayed by what he called the “soft and pudgy” members of the British cabinet.146
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Simon ultimately pushed the non-recognition doctrine through the League of Nations, which
eventually agreed to condemn Japan’s actions. He also developed his own account of the Manchurian
crisis, which, in spite of British protests, somehow became the orthodox version -- that Britain failed to
follow the American lead and refused an offer of cooperation. The implication was that Stimson was
actually prepared to do something concrete.

In fact, the only action he contemplated was a joint

representation to Japan.147 Nevertheless, the episode became so overblown that it gradually spun its own
mythology throughout the decade. As a result, in 1939, the eminent American newspaperman, William
Allen White went so far as to claim that “Munich became inevitable when England refused to join
Stimson in the protest against the Japanese invasion of continental Asia.”148 In 1940, Lord Lothian would
complain of “the universal conviction in America that Manchuria would have been saved if it had not
been for Simon’s opposition.”149 Sir Robert Vansittart, the Permanent Undersecretary for State in the
Foreign Office and himself married to an American, later wrote that Stimson accused Simon of “blocking
a proposal never made”:
The Japanese, not Stimson, proposed a conference to legalize their gains at Shanghai, and
we in close contact with the Americans evaded the trap. Stimson later imagined that he
had in mind an embargo on Japanese goods, but that was another of his delusions. To my
knowledge he harped only on moral force, and harps are the instruments for those who
rely on it. . . . He let the public believe that he had asked us to join in a firm stand, and
that we had run out. When non-recognition proved futile Stimson used Simon as a
scapegoat.150
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Following this Anglo-American failure to respond to Japanese aggression, relations between
Britain and the United States grew even more bitter and more distrustful. While American opinion about
Britain remained condescending, British opinion grew more cynical. Since 1919, through economic and
naval rivalries, and following one disappointment after another, from the American rejection of the Treaty
of Versailles in 1919-1920, to the Geneva Naval Conference in 1927, and to the London Economic
Conference in 1933, London increasingly asserted that no faith could be placed in the United States,
particularly when its presidents exercised so little control over Congress.151 For example, during the
Japanese crisis, Neville Chamberlain noted:
We ought to know by now that the USA will give us no undertaking to resist by force any
action by Japan short of an attack on Hawaii or Honolulu. She will give us plenty of
assurances of goodwill especially if we promise to do all the fighting, but the moment she
is asked to contribute something she invariably takes refuge behind Congress.152
The British ambassador in Washington, Sir Ronald Lindsay, admitted:
I know the Americans are dreadful people to deal with -- they cannot make firm
promises, but they jolly you along with fair prospects and when you are committed they
let you down. Taking a short view it is hard to remember a bargain with them that has
been really satisfactory to us in itself.153
Sir Robert Vansittart, who had called for accommodation of the United States during the naval crisis of
1927, had come to believe by 1934 that:
we have been too tender, not to say subservient, with the U.S. for a long time past. It is
we who have made all the advances, and received nothing in return. It is still necessary,
and I desire as much as ever, that we should get on well with this untrustworthy race. But
we shall never get very far; they will always let us down.154
In 1932, Stanley Baldwin summed up conventional British wisdom:

“You will get nothing from

Americans but words, big words, but only words.” He later confessed that he came to “loathe the
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Americans so much,” he hated even meeting with them. The Foreign Secretary John Simon noted that
although “America expresses great surprise if we do not act with them . . . if we do they will leave us with
the brunt of work and the blame.”155
The feelings were mutual on the other side of the Atlantic. There occurred a powerful resurgence
of anti-British opinion within the United States, among more or less traditional quarters:

Irish-

Americans, German-Americans, American liberals, who remained hostile to the British Empire, and
Italian-Americans, many of whom were sympathetic to the regime of Benito Mussolini and therefore
outraged by British opposition to Italy’s invasion of Ethiopia.156 More significantly, however, Americans
were alienated not merely from Britain but from Europe as a whole. While it remained customary to
blame the Depression on the failure of Britain and others to repay war debts, there emerged a growing
conviction in the early 1930s that American involvement in the Great War had been a mistake. Many
argued, for example, that the United States had been dragged into war in 1917 by the so-called
“merchants of death” -- armaments manufacturers, bankers, and financiers such as J. P. Morgan.157 In
1934, a Book-of-the-Month Club selection and immediate best seller, Merchants of Death, by H. C.
Engelbrecht and F. C. Hanighen, described the role of munitions makers and arms dealers in promoting a
militarist foreign policy in general, and the chain of events leading to the First World War in particular.158
The emotions aroused by Merchants of Death led to the formation of a Senate investigation,
headed by Senator Gerald P. Nye, which sat between September 1934 and February 1936.

The

committee interrogated Morgan and his partners at length amidst intense publicity about their wartime
activities as Britain’s chief bankers and arms buyers. In addition, the committee subpoenaed the files of
the Guaranty Trust Company, taking particular interest in its loans made to Britain. The Foreign Office
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protested loudly, and the British ambassador Sir Ronald Lindsay complained that the committee was
treating his government “as a circus animal which would be made to perform tricks for the spectators.”159
Although Nye’s committee produced very little hard evidence to justify the popular claims that
Wall Street and the munitions manufacturers had dragged the United States into the war, the highly
publicized hearings sensationalized findings about the lobbying activities and profits of the munitions
industry, as well as international bankers and financiers. The conclusion was indeed that the United
States had been drawn into the war by financial interests.160
In spite of such suspicions and distrust, however, the intensification of international developments
over the course of the 1930s forced Britain and the United States to begin seriously considering the
possibility of future war and to confront the question of rearmament -- and to move closer together,
however grudgingly. In 1933, two years after Japan invaded Manchuria, Adolf Hitler came to power in
Germany. Before the end of the year, Hitler pulled Germany out of the League of Nations and the
League’s disarmament conference, and embarked upon a programme of rearmament in violation of the
Treaty of Versailles. The Italian dictator Benito Mussolini, emboldened by Hitler’s defiance of the
League of Nations, invaded Ethiopia virtually unchallenged in October 1935, in defiance of the League of
Nations. In one respect, the Italian action threatened the Suez Canal and the British position in the
Middle East. More important, however, it weakened Britain’s diplomatic position with respect to Nazi
Germany. It was clear to many that in order to confront Hitler, Britain needed a strong, united League of
Nations. Consequently, although Ethiopia was deemed not worth the trouble, and although London had
hoped to conclude an alliance with Mussolini, Britain chose to rally the League of Nations, which
condemned Italy as the aggressor and voted overwhelmingly to impose economic sanctions against Rome.
The League vote proved inconsequential, however, as a full-scale seven month war ensued between Italy
and Ethiopia, which effectively destroyed the League of Nations as a force for peace once and for all.
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More important, however, British hopes for an Italian alliance vanished, as Mussolini, enraged by the
League vote, turned increasingly to Hitler in the spring of 1936, resulting in the Rome-Berlin Axis by
November. During that same year, 1936, Hitler and Mussolini intervened on the side of Francisco Franco
and the fascists in the Spanish Civil War.161
Initially, Britain and the United States watched these events from the sidelines. Both were
preoccupied with the Depression. Both were inhibited by a popular backlash against the slaughter of the
Great War. Both shared a suspicion of the motives of the armaments industry. Therefore, in both states,
rearmament was slow, while diplomacy was hesitant and indecisive.162
Historians of American diplomacy have long acknowledged that it is almost impossible to
penetrate with any degree of certainty the intentions, reasoning, and attitudes of Franklin Roosevelt
beyond certain generalities. In the 1930s, it appears certain that Roosevelt hoped to prevent the United
States from ever descending into another world war. But it also appears that he hoped, particularly after
1935, to bring American power to bear against the armed aggression that was obviously spreading around
the world. The principal question, and therefore the principal source of uncertainty, involved the means
to be employed and the possible political risks that might restrain the president. While Roosevelt had at
his disposal a broad array of opinions about the proper course of American policy toward Europe in
general, or toward Britain in more specific terms,163 his most fundamental problem was and would always
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remain practical politics. He felt that he had to be particularly sensitive to political realities, having
watched the disintegration of Wilson’s policies in the confrontation with Congress in 1919.

For

Roosevelt, diplomacy had to be tailored carefully to the public mood. Congresswoman Clare Boothe
Luce sarcastically caricatured his political posture as an index finger wetted and held up in the air.164
Consequently, given the ongoing economic problems, his priorities were and had to remain domestic.
Moreover, the Congress was unshakably isolationist, committed to ensuring that the United States would
not be dragged into another war in the same way as it had been in 1917. During the mid-1930s, indeed, a
powerful isolationist lobby emerged in the United States, galvanized by the intensity of international
events -- most recently, the Italian invasion of Ethiopia, the German remilitarization of the Rhineland, and
the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War.165
Against this background, Congress, over the next two years, passed a series of Neutrality Acts.
The first Neutrality Act in August 1935, passed primarily as a response to the Italian aggression, banned
the export of arms to any belligerent country in time of war and permitted American citizens to travel on
belligerent passenger vessels only on the condition that they did so at their own risk; this was intended
largely to avoid any future Lusitanias. It also gave the president power and discretion to define munitions
of war and to bring the embargo into effect; but he was not, as Roosevelt had wished, allowed to
discriminate between aggressor states and victims.166
While Americans could remain aloof from international affairs, behind the comfort and protection
of two oceans, the British could not afford to take such a detached view of the growing international
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tension. For Britain, its power and wealth depended on the survival of the Empire and the protection of
trade routes. The problem, however, was that Britain no longer possessed the means for a firm policy that
would deter worldwide aggression. The Royal Navy, the principal military instrument for protecting
British trade and the Empire, was no longer adequate for its responsibilities, particularly after the
reductions of the 1920s and successive arms control agreements. Britain’s own internal domestic realities
undermined military preparedness as well. Rearmament was not popular with the British electorate, nor
with the Treasury, which feared that it would damage economic recovery.167 Consequently, British
foreign policy in the 1930s concentrated on finding a way, given strained military and financial resources,
to achieve two principal objectives: to preserve Britain’s position and defend its interests in the Pacific,
and to help preserve security in Europe.
For Britain, one of the principal lessons of the Far Eastern crisis was that its Pacific position was
weak. Even before the crisis erupted, London was aware that if the fleet had to be sent to the Pacific,
there would not be enough ships left in home waters to meet a European emergency; if the Royal Fleet
were needed in the Pacific, the Mediterranean Fleet would have to sail for Singapore, at the expense of
Britain’s position in the Suez Canal and in the Middle East. On 22 February 1931, the Chiefs of Staff
reported that their position was “about as bad as it could be . . . the whole of our territory in the Far East,
as well as the coastline of India and the Dominions and our vast trade and shipping lies open to attack.”168
Consequently, in late 1933, London concluded that, because, there appeared little it could do to
protect its interests in China, Britain should seek an understanding with Japan; not necessarily reviving
the former alliance, but restoring terms of cordiality and mutual respect. London realized, however, that
any understanding with Japan would have to overcome two substantial obstacles. First, it seemed certain
that an Anglo-Japanese understanding would arouse Chinese resentment. Thus, the inevitable damage to
British interests in China would likely outweigh the possible benefits from Japanese favor. Second, an
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Anglo-Japanese agreement was certain to stir up hostility in the United States, which remained suspicious
of Japan and anything that resembled the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. The British believed, however, that
Japanese naval policy was driven by a fear of Anglo-American cooperation, which might be eased if that
combination were dissolved.

Some British leaders, including Neville Chamberlain and Sir Warren

Fisher, Permanent Secretary to the Treasury, were prepared to sacrifice strong relations with the United
States in order to achieve accord with Japan. They maintained that the United States was always anxious
to push Britain to the forefront in the Pacific and ready to leave it to bear the brunt of Japanese hostility.
They could not, moreover, be relied upon to support Britain in Europe, in spite of what Fisher denounced
as the American “braggadocio of Yahoodom.” Others, however, including Sir Robert Vansittart, while
agreeing that the United States was not reliable, argued that recent advances in Anglo-American relations
should not be jeopardized. Some degree of American support in Europe, or at least benevolent neutrality,
was necessary and possible. Furthermore, public opinion would criticize any government that allowed
relations to deteriorate.

In the short term, at any rate, the prospect of a renewed Anglo-Japanese

understanding collapsed when Japan announced in late December 1935 that it would terminate the
Washington Treaty, the Five Power Treaty of 1922.169
By the mid-1930s, therefore, Britain faced three potential threats simultaneously -- from Germany
in Europe, Italy in the Mediterranean, and Japan in the Pacific. It was increasingly clear that Britain
simply no longer possessed the naval forces sufficient to provide a deterrent; principally, the Royal Navy
could no longer respond to a crisis in one part of the world, while retaining sufficient ships to deal with a
threat elsewhere. This unfavorable strategic position, governed Britain’s military and diplomatic options.
In 1934, for example, the Treasury opposed a tough line against Japan, citing British naval weakness as
justification. In 1935-1936, the cabinet chose not to impose oil sanctions against Mussolini over Ethiopia
on the grounds that the possibility of war against Japan made tough action against Italy imprudent.170
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Since a policy of deterrence seemed impossible, British leaders continued to pursue a policy of
appeasement. Although appeasement emerged in the early 1920s, following the war and the conclusion
of the peace treaties, driven by economic pressures for disarmament and the public’s passion for peace,171
it was most closely associated with Neville Chamberlain, who became prime minister in May 1937 and
effectively seized control of Britain’s foreign policy. He and his colleagues endeavored to reduce the
number of potential enemies by satisfying their grievances in return for guarantees of peace and
disarmament, and therefore sought relentlessly to reach personal agreements with Hitler and Mussolini.172
In one respect, and in the most fundamental terms, it was clear that the British military was not strong
enough to address threats to its interests throughout the world. On 12 November 1937, the Chiefs of Staff
warned of the “increasing probability” that a war started in Europe, the Mediterranean, or the Pacific
might extend to one or both of the other areas. They could not, however,
foresee the time when our defence forces will be strong enough to safeguard our territory,
trade and vital interests against Germany, Italy and Japan simultaneously. We cannot,
therefore, exaggerate the importance, from the point of view of Imperial defence, of any
political or international action that can be taken to reduce the numbers of our potential
enemies and to gain the support of potential allies.173
In similar terms, economic pressures also compelled the government to pursue appeasement. In the early
1930s, Germany began to rearm, forcing Britain to follow suit. British military expenditures rose to 5.6
percent of gross national product in 1937-1938, up from 2.5 percent in the late 1920s, placing heavier
pressures on the economy, already strained by the ongoing demand for social spending and the massive
trade deficit. Even that, however, came nowhere close to providing the sort of global capability required
if Britain were to meet the challenges posed by Germany, Japan, and Italy at the same time. As Sir
Thomas Inskip, the Minister for Coordination of Defence told the cabinet in early 1938:
171
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The plain fact which cannot be obscured is that it is beyond the resources of this country
to make proper provision in peace for the defence of the British Empire against three
major powers in three different theatres of war. . . . I therefore repeat with fresh emphasis
the opinion which I have already expressed as to the importance of reducing the scale of
our commitments and the number of our potential enemies.174
Appeasement also stemmed from Britain’s perception of its diplomatic isolation. Chamberlain remained
pessimistic about the chances for effective help. The British Dominions were isolationist and focused on
regional concerns, France remained paralyzed by endless political turmoil, and Russia was engulfed by
the Stalinist purges. Like most of his colleagues, furthermore, Chamberlain was particularly skeptical
about the prospect of any assistance from the United States. After the bitter experiences of the twenties
and early thirties, he observed that, “It is always best and safest to count on nothing from the Americans
except words.”175
At the same time, however, Roosevelt in fact had made specific gestures toward a policy of
appeasement even before Chamberlain rose to leadership. According to C. A. MacDonald, toward the
end of 1936, Roosevelt began trying to use the influence of the United States in order to advance peace,
stability, and the expansion of international trade, but also to stimulate domestic recovery in the United
States. Specifically, he was convinced that political tensions were closely connected with economic
problems, such as Germany’s introduction of exchange controls and autarky to stimulate recovery and to
speed rearmament. Therefore, Roosevelt endeavored to promote European peace by restoring global
trade, and thus facilitate a settlement that would satisfy the economic necessities of Germany without
resorting to war or leaving Germany paramount in Europe. In doing so, he hoped to appeal to German
moderates, who sought to solve Germany’s problems by negotiation, rather than by military action, and
who might therefore influence Hitler in a more moderate direction. Roosevelt also sought Britain’s
cooperation, which he believed essential to the success of such a settlement. The British, however,
proved less than encouraging. Their objection was not to the concept, but to the American approach. The
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United States favored reducing economic barriers, and the grievances that arose from them, in order to
reduce political tensions and the threats of violence. In Washington’s view, political stability was
dependent upon prosperity. In contrast, the British preferred to discuss political issues before considering
economic adjustments, arms limitation, or colonial concessions. In London’s view, political assurances,
such as guarantees of European security, were the necessary prelude to other concessions, in order to
prevent giving away valuable bargaining chips without any assurance of substantial return, or,
alternatively, encouraging a dangerous German belief in British weakness.176
Consequently, Anglo-American relations, even into the latter 1930s, remained somewhat
schizophrenic. In one respect, the tone did improve during 1937. To British visitors, such as Walter
Runciman, president of the Board of Trade, Roosevelt was full of friendly words and hopes for promoting
exchanges of information.

Similarly, the British ambassador, Sir Ronald Lindsay, noted that the

administration was currently well-disposed to Britain and that any offer of cooperation should not be
refused, in spite of the perennial danger that the Americans “lead you down the garden path until you are
committed, and then you suddenly find yourself left all alone.”177
At the same time, however, ongoing sources of tension continued to frustrate any improvements
in relations.

The United States, for example, remained irritated by British discrimination against

American products. In 1937, 16 percent of all the goods exported by the United States went to Britain,
making Britain America’s most valuable trading partner. For Britain, which was expanding its trade
within the Empire, the importance of the United States as a trading partner was declining. By 1937, only
11 percent of British imports came from the United States, whereas 39 percent came from the Empire.
Secretary of State Cordell Hull, alarmed by the effects of this trend on American farmers and
manufacturers, denounced Britain’s policy of Imperial Preference as unfair. For the British, building up
the Empire’s trade seemed the best way out of the Depression. Chamberlain, for one, never wavered in
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his own devotion to Imperial Preference, and many in the cabinet, the civil service, business, and finance
shared his view. Besides, they argued, they were not willing to reduce Imperial Preference until the
United States made drastic cuts in its own tariffs. The political damage from this stalemate, which
dragged on between 1934 and 1938, was considerable. It became a State Department axiom that there
could be no cooperation with Britain on other matters until a trade agreement had been reached. A senior
American diplomat, Jay Pierrepont Moffat, complained in 1936 that, “At present, [Britain] thinks she can
count on our help politically and yet hit us below the belt commercially all over the world.” At the same
time, Britain remained skeptical of America’s political reliability and its ability to follow up inspiring
words with practical action.178
This lack of Anglo-American cooperation was particularly apparent in East Asia. In July 1937,
Japan, encouraged by the lack of effective reaction to its invasion of Manchuria, once again attacked
China. Britain’s chief objective, given its economic and military constraints, and given the failure of its
efforts to affect a new Anglo-Japanese agreement, was to act in concert with the United States. The
British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, in particular, hoped to involve the United States alongside
Britain in coordinating their diplomatic and military policies. He believed, as did many in the Foreign
Office, that if this happened, Washington would almost automatically become involved with Britain in
any war in Europe. The Roosevelt administration, however, suspected a British plan to shove the United
States to the fore and to campaign for action on the grounds that Washington was already committed. As
a result, the administration refused to participate in any joint action and indicated that it would only take
parallel action. Claiming that joint action would mobilize Japanese opinion behind army extremists,
Roosevelt simply restated the sanctity of the treaties Japan had signed and refused to approve its
infringements of Chinese territory, but took no real action. In the meantime, Cordell Hull complained of
embarrassing British pressure on the United States for joint cooperation.179
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Roosevelt’s hesitation to take more vigorous action, was exclusively the result of political
considerations; specifically, by the growing strength of the isolationist movement in the United States.
The power of this movement became evident by the harsh reaction to the president’s “quarantine speech”
at Chicago on 5 October 1937. Roosevelt, believing that public opinion was ready to support a more
activist foreign policy, denounced the “present reign of terror and international lawlessness,” and called
for positive measures to preserve peace, including an international “quarantine” of aggressors. The
president even wrote the controversial paragraph:
It seems to be unfortunately true that the epidemic of world lawlessness is spreading.
When an epidemic of physical disease starts to spread, the community approves and joins
in the quarantine of the patients in order to protect the health of the community against
the spread of the disease.180
While Roosevelt’s precise intentions remained uncertain, reaction throughout the United States was
immediate and vociferous, at the very least because of his hint at potential American participation. A poll
of Congress revealed a majority of two to one against common action in the Pacific. Representative
Hamilton Fish called the speech “sheer hysteria,” and accused Roosevelt of trying to involve the United
States in an Asian war “to pull British chestnuts from the fire.” Many argued that Britain had more at
stake in the Pacific than did the United States.181 The New Republic wrote that:
What Japan is doing is merely to continue on a larger scale and with more brutal candor
what the Great Powers did in China for a hundred years. The British are not so far
removed from the Amritsar massacre that they can afford very much righteous wrath
about the bombing of Shanghai.182
Confronted with such strident public reaction, Roosevelt backtracked and, on 12 October, informed the
British government that:
(1) It should not speak or think or act as though it were possible for me to be in any way
an exponent of British foreign policy.
(2) It should never forget I cannot march ahead of our very difficult and restive
American public opinion; and
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(3) It must not try to push me in any way to the front or to thrust leadership upon me. . . .
I cannot and shall not try to impose anything upon our people or the world. I will
seek most earnestly to co-operate with all nations that are working for freedom and
for peace.183
The speech aroused mixed feelings in Britain as well. Many obviously welcomed any prospect of closer
Anglo-American cooperation, but did not seriously expect any substantive action. London was highly
conscious of Roosevelt’s political difficulties in rallying public opinion behind him. Some suspected that
having encouraged anti-Japanese enthusiasm, but especially in Britain, the Americans would pull back.
Chamberlain, although he welcomed the speech as a sign that the United States might be abandoning the
attitude of complete detachment, wrote to his sister: “Britain simply cannot afford to quarrel with Japan
and I very much fear that after a lot of ballyhoo the Americans will somehow fade out and leave us to
carry all the blame and the odium.” Moreover, he resented the American refusal to make a joint
demarche at the very beginning of the dispute, when it might have stopped the whole thing: “Now they
jump in, without saying a word to us beforehand and without knowing what they mean to do.”
Chamberlain also feared that one effect of the speech might well be to push the Germans and the Italians
closer to the Japanese.184
Frustration between London and Washington intensified in November 1937. During a conference
of the Pacific powers, which met at Brussels, Eden and the American delegate, Norman Davis,
established a rapport. Eden hoped to follow one of Davis’s suggestions that Britain and the United States
should boycott Japanese products. He proceeded to bypass Chamberlain and the cabinet in order to
pursue this directly with Sir Ronald Lindsay in Washington, in the hope that joint Anglo-American action
along the lines suggested by Davis might lay the foundation for later cooperation in Europe.185

For a

brief moment in December 1937, when the Japanese attacked the USS Panay and the HMS Ladybird in
the Yangtse River, London became optimistic that Roosevelt might agree to a joint naval demonstration
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in the Pacific. Roosevelt even spoke of a blockade of Japan. Before it could be considered, however,
Japan apologized for the incident and the crisis receded.186
In the most significant sense, the American reluctance to act firmly and aggressively in the
Pacific, in concert with Britain, reflected the power of isolationist sentiment in the United States. At the
same time, it also reflected the persistence of an underlying mistrust in the United States for Britain.
There was widespread agreement with the opinions of A. Whitney Griswold, professor of international
relations at Yale, who maintained, in his 1938 book Far Eastern Policy of the United States, that there
was no community of interests between the United States and Britain in Asia.187 Moreover, the reopening
of tension in the Pacific and the Panay incident reawakened a majority in Congress to the need for a
larger navy. While this was welcomed in Britain as a possible indication that the United States had not
abandoned all interest in the outside world, much of the debate in Congress focused on the concern that
the navy would in fact become an auxiliary of the Royal Navy, and that American foreign policy was
being directed not by the State Department but by Downing Street.188
Furthermore, American suspicions of Britain continued to increase in 1937 and 1938 due to its
policy of appeasement of Germany and Italy.

As early as the spring of 1936, following Hitler’s

remilitarization of the Rhineland, the American ambassador in London, Robert W. Bingham, wrote that
the Tory leadership was “so lacking in strong and courageous leadership” that Germany would be
tempted toward greater acts of aggression.

A visit by Lord Halifax to Berlin in November 1937

convinced the American ambassador to the Soviet Union, William C. Bullitt, that Chamberlain would
“finally, deviously, by silences and tacit approvals,” allow Hitler to take Austria and the Sudeten region
of Czechoslovakia. Numerous commentators took the position that Britain’s inclination to appease Hitler
and Mussolini was a sign that the Chamberlain government was actually sympathetic to fascism.
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Congressman Herbert S. Bigelow argued that the only difference between British and Italian imperialism
was that “Italy is less hypocritical. Italy makes no professions of democracy, while England boasts of
liberties for herself which she denies to others.”189
On 12 January 1938, Roosevelt put forward a proposal, suggested by his Undersecretary of State
Sumner Welles, for a peace conference to be held under the auspices of the United States. He hoped it
would establish the basic principles for the conduct of international relations, reduce the level of
armaments, and open up world trade and access to raw materials. He also hoped to appeal to German
moderates, such as Hjalmar Schacht, the president of the Reichsbank. In making his overture, Roosevelt
secretly asked for Chamberlain’s support, urging him to reply within a week, adding that if Chamberlain
did not express wholehearted support within five days, he would abandon it. Sir Ronald Lindsay asserted
that this presidential “initiative” was “invaluable” and that any rejection or reservations might do great
harm to Anglo-American relations that the Foreign Office had been struggling to improve. He believed
that the proposal would win the support of American public opinion, which was vital to any hope of
averting disaster. Chamberlain, however, was not impressed. He wrote in his diary that, “The plan
appeared to me fantastic, and likely to excite the derision of Germany and Italy. They might even use it
to postpone conversations with us.” He believed, indeed, that he could preserve peace without American
involvement in Europe.

Alexander Cadogan, the Permanent Undersecretary of the Foreign Office,

recorded in his diary that Chamberlain “hates R’s idea.” Consequently, in a short but polite reply sent on
13 January, he asked whether the president could not hold his hand for a short while to see what progress
the British could make in talks with Germany and Italy.190
Chamberlain drafted his reply, without consulting Foreign Secretary Eden, who was on a brief
holiday in France. Unlike the prime minister, Eden increasingly felt that it was futile to try to reach
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agreement with the dictators, and thus regarded Anglo-American cooperation and American involvement
in Europe as absolutely essential to averting war, or possibly even preparing for it. Therefore, upon
hearing the news, Eden was furious. He ultimately managed to persuade the cabinet to reconsider
Roosevelt’s suggestion, compelling the prime minister to propose that the president continue to explore
his plan for an international conference while Britain tried direct and parallel negotiations with the
dictators. By this point, however, Roosevelt’s enthusiasm for the idea had cooled, and he was willing to
let Chamberlain act alone. The president was “sorely disappointed” and took Chamberlain’s weak
proposal as an indication that he placed no great stock in cooperation with the United States.191
Largely as a result of Chamberlain’s rejection of the Roosevelt proposal and continued preference
for negotiations with Mussolini, Eden resigned on 20 February 1938. The choice, as Eden saw it, was
“either Europe or the United States.”192 While many would later condemn Chamberlain’s decision as a
missed opportunity to preserve peace through the powerful influence of the United States,193 and others
would suggest that Roosevelt’s proposal was probably not meant to be taken altogether literally,194 the
German annexation of Austria in March effectively ended any possibility of Roosevelt’s plan being set
into motion. During the Anschluss, Chamberlain and the cabinet, in formulating Britain’s position toward
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Central Europe, and Czechoslovakia in particular, did not consider the policy and position of the United
States as a factor of any consequence. They continued to assume that Washington could be depended
upon for very little, if anything at all, and was therefore best discounted.195
American opinion grew progressively more skeptical of Britain as the situation in Europe
continued to deteriorate in the spring of 1938. The resignation of Anthony Eden convinced many in
Washington that Chamberlain was the agent of selfish City interests, who were purported to believe that
Britain would benefit financially and commercially from coming to terms with Berlin. More to the point,
the Eden resignation convinced many that the City now controlled British policy -- “peace at any price.”
When the Chamberlain cabinet, along with the French government, took no action in response to the
Anschluss, irate American citizens deluged the British Embassy with letters, accusing London of
“bolstering up the European dictatorships.” Nor did the situation improve the following month, when
Chamberlain announced Britain’s recognition of Italy’s conquest of Ethiopia, in spite of Roosevelt’s
warnings of a “serious effect upon public opinion.” In Congress, Hiram Johnson claimed that the British
willingness to deal with the dictators laid bare “the realistic policy of Britain in all its nakedness.”
Oswald Garrison Villard blamed Britain, “a great empire ruled at present by cold-blooded imperialists,”
for creating an international environment in which Hitler and Mussolini were able to thrive. This antiBritish sentiment translated into even greater resistance to the idea of cooperation with Britain. There
was, for example, a growing desire on the part of some legislators to lift the arms embargo on Spain, at a
time when Britain was calling for international nonintervention in the civil war.196
Roosevelt’s attitude toward appeasement was far more ambiguous. He often seemed eager to
criticize what he called the “national selfishness” that underlay British policy. On one occasion, he
suggested to Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau that Britain and Germany had reached an agreement
for the joint domination of Europe. In an exchange of letters with the American minister to Dublin, John
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Cudahy, Roosevelt acknowledged that, while Britain’s rearmament was not far enough along to risk war,
a policy of retreat might be fatal in encouraging the dangerous activities of both Hitler and Mussolini.
On 9 March 1938, immediately before the German annexation of Austria, he wrote:
If a Chief of Police makes a deal with the leading gangsters and the deal results in no
more hold-ups, the Chief of Police will be called a great man, but if the gangsters do not
live up to their word, the Chief of Police will go to jail. Some people are, I think, taking
very long chances.197
Yet, even as he continued to fault the British for not standing up to Hitler, Roosevelt refused to consider,
much less take, any concrete action that might have encouraged them to do so. In 1936, for example, he
did not lodge a protest over Germany’s reoccupation of the Rhineland. He steadfastly refused to suggest
any modification of the neutrality laws in 1938, nor would he consider the renegotiation of war debts. He
resisted public demands for an accelerated rearmament program, and went so far as to advocate a new
round of arms control agreements.198
Anglo-American relations grew further estranged by the crisis over Czechoslovakia. Over the
summer and fall of 1938, Chamberlain sought to resolve the Czech crisis through a general settlement
with Germany, again, without reference to the United States or to Roosevelt. If war erupted, Britain was
absolutely ill-prepared to fight Germany, least of all in Eastern Europe, and might well be defeated.
Furthermore, because of the priority given to building up its own air force and navy, the British would be
able to afford France little assistance.

London, therefore, proceeded throughout the crisis without

significantly considering the United States into any of their plans. While any statement of support would
have always been welcomed, it would still have been peripheral to British deliberations and actions. For
example, as the Czech crisis intensified in August and word reached Washington of extensive German
military preparations, both Roosevelt and Hull, in well-publicized speeches, issued warnings against
international lawlessness, in an attempt to exercise at least some effect in Berlin by creating at the very
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least a condition of doubt about American policy, sufficient to help deter Germany from extreme
provocation. Chamberlain and Halifax appreciated the American gestures, but thought that the principal
usefulness of those speeches was in educating American public opinion. After all, they could not be
certain what, or if, the United States would truly do in the event that the worst occurred.199
In the United States, too, the desire to stay out of war remained virtually universal, in spite of
American sympathy for Czechoslovakia. Nevertheless, many Americans believed that Britain would sell
out Czechoslovakia. Ambassador Lindsay warned the Foreign Office in the midst of the crisis that any
new capitulation to Hitler would result in “a certain letdown of American friendliness.” Roosevelt
described Chamberlain as “slippery,” and accused him of “playing the usual game of the British, peace at
any price.” If negotiations failed, he predicted, the prime minister would find some way to blame the
United States. Roosevelt believed that Chamberlain should adopt a firmer line in the face of German
military preparations. On 31 August, he wrote: “I do wish that our British friends would see the situation
as it seems to be -- but as you know they are doing everything to stall off controversy and possible war.”
In mid-September, Roosevelt openly despaired that Hitler would simply take whatever he wanted from
Czechoslovakia, while Britain and France “washed the blood from their Judas Iscariot hands.” Even
Lindsay was impressed, noting on 12 September, that American opinion was in favor of “making a strong
stand against German aggression.” In the event of war, he believed, the United States would eventually
become involved. Roosevelt’s comments, however, made little impact in London.200
It remained clear that Roosevelt could do nothing more than offer words of support or reproach.
He toyed with the idea of mediation, issued general appeals for peace, offered to arbitrate, suggested the
convening of a conference of the interested parties at some neutral site, and assured a French visitor that
the United States could be relied upon for everything except troops and money.201 When Hitler invited
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Chamberlain, at the eleventh hour on 28 September 1938, to meet the next day at Munich, Roosevelt sent
a telegram of congratulations to Chamberlain, which contained just two words: “Good Man.” He wrote
to the Canadian Prime Minster Mackenzie King several days later: “I can assure you that we in the
United States rejoice with you, and the world at large, that the outbreak of war was averted.” American
public opinion, very much relieved, celebrated the agreement as well. A poll taken in early October 1938
showed that 59 percent of those surveyed believed that Britain and France had done the best thing giving
in to Germany instead of going to war. Even some notorious Anglophobes had nice things to say about
Neville Chamberlain. The Chicago Tribune, for example, rejoiced that Munich had removed all cause for
war in western Europe.202
American support for the agreement, however, was short-lived. After the initial relief had passed,
it became clear that Hitler would not be satisfied merely with the Sudetenland. As a result, the agreement
began to damage British prestige. On 9 October 1938, Harold Ickes, Secretary of the Interior, noted in his
diary that “the Czechoslovak solution was a totally disgraceful thing and the President may want to
dissociate himself from too close a connection before he is through with it.” Indeed, within weeks,
Roosevelt expressed embarrassment about it, and began to describe it as only a lull in a gathering storm,
which signaled an imperative need for the democracies to rearm. Assistant Secretary of State George
Messersmith called the agreement a “cynical sellout of principle.”

Claude Bowers, the American

ambassador to Spain, called it “the most shameless thing that has happened since the partition of Poland.”
Another Assistant Secretary of State, Adolf A. Berle, maintained that the United States had no choice but
to “go it alone,” since the British government obviously could not be trusted. These growing perceptions
of British perfidy grew louder and stronger when it became known in October that London was preparing
a proposal of economic cooperation with Germany, as part of an overall Anglo-German settlement. Sir
Frederick Leith-Ross, Chief Economic Adviser to the British government, told a German trade delegation
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on 19 October that Britain was interested in reaching an agreement with Berlin because Europe was in
danger of American trade domination unless the four great powers learn to work with each other.203
Roosevelt backed away from his earlier endorsement of the Munich agreement. He now accused
Chamberlain and other British leaders of suffering from an inordinate fear of communism that kept them
from appreciating the extent of the German threat, the result, he quipped, of “too much Eton and Oxford.”
He nevertheless rejected the suggestion that the United States should take over Britain’s international
role, arguing that the danger of the current situation stemmed from a lack of nerve, not a lack of power.
“What the British need today,” he wrote in February 1939, “is a good stiff grog, inducing not only the
desire to save civilization but the continued belief that they can do it. In such an event they will have a lot
more support from their American cousins.”204 He hinted that he was willing to help Britain in a war
against Germany, but would not take any action if Britain “cringed like a coward.” By late 1938, this had
become a favorite tactic of Roosevelt’s, using public suspicion of Britain as a club with which to force
London into doing what he wanted. Sometimes the tactic worked: after four years of trying to achieve an
Anglo-American trade agreement in the face of Britain’s Imperial Preference, Roosevelt’s warnings that
failure to compromise might move Americans “toward political and economic isolation” ultimately led
the British to a less intransigent position. Many in London believed that the Americans were taking
advantage of Britain’s political need for an agreement to drive an unfair bargain. Even Lindsay, who
argued that Britain’s failure to meet American terms would constitute a “first-class political crime,” grew
bitter and exasperated over American delays and equivocations. Nevertheless, they signed an agreement
on 17 November 1938. The reaction on both sides of the Atlantic was at best reserved.205
Although Anglo-American relations remained strained throughout the remainder of 1938, the
events of the following spring and summer clarified the situation considerably. Hitler’s invasion and
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occupation of the remainder of Czechoslovakia, in March 1939, removed any remaining doubts about
Hitler’s intentions. Until March 1939, while there had been extraordinarily little sympathy for the Nazi
regime in the United States, there had been, at the very least, a willingness to accept his foreign policy
goals as nothing more than a reversal of Versailles. Many Americans, as well as the Chamberlain cabinet,
saw the German remilitarization of the Rhineland, the annexation of Austria, and demands for the
Sudetenland as justified. What Hitler appeared to be doing was simply making adjustments to the Treaty
of Versailles, bringing Germans together, under German authority, which was consistent with the ideals
of national self-determination.

In March 1939, however, when Germany invaded the rest of

Czechoslovakia, a land not inhabited by Germans at all, many on both sides of the Atlantic finally
understood that Hitler was simply another German thug. The final dismemberment of Czechoslovakia
exposed once and for all Hitler’s desire to dominate, if not the entire world, at least Central Europe, and a
willingness to extend his rule over non-German populations.206
It suddenly became clear, therefore, that war was once again inevitable. This realization stirred
many people, on both sides of the Atlantic, out of complacency and over-confidence that peace could be
preserved through the appeasement of Nazi Germany. One such individual was the British ambassadordesignate to the United States, Philip Henry Kerr, the eleventh Marquis of Lothian. After a period of
almost twenty years since the previous war, during which the diplomatic relations between the two former
allies had descended into suspicion, cynicism, and distrust, it was Lord Lothian who took the first
significant steps in pushing Britain and the United States toward more open communication and a renewal
of cooperation.
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CHAPTER THREE: LORD LOTHIAN -- A DIPLOMATIC APPRENTICESHIP
In August 1938, Lord Halifax, the British Foreign Secretary, offered the post of British
ambassador to the United States to Philip Henry Kerr, the eleventh Marquis of Lothian. Lothian’s was a
curious appointment, one that provoked much consternation, among both the permanent functionaries of
the Foreign Office, and British opponents of appeasement. Not a professional diplomat, he had never
held such a high position, and was regarded as an amateur who did not possess much experience -- or
sometimes, much judgment. Yet, Lothian proved to be one of Britain’s most distinguished and effective
ambassadors. His tenure of office was relatively brief -- August 1939 to December 1940 -- but it
coincided with a crucial period in relations between Britain and the United States, the first year of the
Second World War, when Britain faced Nazi Germany essentially without allies, while the United States
remained neutral and noncommittal.

During his brief embassy, Lothian became the principal

intermediary between Winston Churchill and Franklin Roosevelt, and in that capacity, he helped to broker
the Destroyers-for-Bases deal and lay the foundations for the Lend-Lease program.1
A fundamental dedication to strong Anglo-American relations underlay much of Lothian’s career.
His public service and his varied semi-public activities were in many ways an apprenticeship for both the
job and the moment of his embassy, the pinnacle of three decades of effort dedicated to the realization of
closer Anglo-American relations.2 This chapter is not so much a comprehensive biography as a survey of
the key phases of his career, which shaped his approach to the United States.
South Africa and the Round Table
Kerr was born in London on 18 April 1882, the eldest of five surviving children of Lord Ralph
Drury Kerr [1837-1916], the third son of the seventh Marquis of Lothian, and his wife, Lady Anne Kerr

1

David Reynolds, Lord Lothian and Anglo-American Relations, 1939-1940 (Philadelphia, The American
Philosophical Society, 1983), 1.
2

Priscilla Roberts, “Lord Lothian and the Atlantic World,” The Historian , 66, no. 1 (April 2004), 103; Philip Henry
Kerr, Marquis of Lothian, The American Speeches of Lord Lothian: July 1939 to December 1940 (London and New
York: Oxford University Press, 1941), vii-viii (hereafter cited as Speeches).

77

78
[c.1857-1931], the youngest daughter of Henry Granville Fitzalan-Howard, fourteenth Duke of Norfolk.
Kerr’s father enjoyed a distinguished army career, mainly in India, but also, from 1891 to 1896, as majorgeneral in Ireland. After his retirement, in 1898, the family settled at Woodburn, on the Lothian family
estate of Newbattle, near Edinburgh, where Philip enjoyed a happy childhood with his siblings, three
younger sisters, Cecil, Margaret, and Minna, and his brother, David.3 Both Kerr’s parents were devout
Roman Catholics. Although for many years, he considered entering the Church, his studies at New
College, Oxford University, beginning in October 1900, exacerbated religious doubts.4

He also

considered joining the army, particularly while the South African War was at its height, but ultimately
was dissuaded by his parents. Following his graduation from Oxford in 1904 with a first in Modern
History, Kerr secured a civilian post in the reconstruction of the former Boer republics. Fortuitously, Sir
Arthur Lawley, who had served under Lord Ralph Kerr, and was now Lieutenant-Governor of the
Transvaal, offered Kerr a post as his assistant private secretary and aide-de-camp.5
Kerr spent the years between 1905 and 1909 in South Africa, during “a period of apprenticeship
to the causes which were to occupy him for the rest of his life.”6 He served on Lawley’s staff for only
two months before Robert Brand, whom Kerr had known at Oxford, took him on as assistant secretary to
the Inter-Colonial Council for the Transvaal and Orange River Colony.7

Here he joined the famous
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“Kindergarten,”8 a group of young men, predominantly products of New College and All Souls, who went
out to assist the High Commissioner, Lord Milner, in the reconstruction of South Africa after the Boer
War.9 Following the war and the granting of self-government to the Transvaal and Orange River
colonies, Kerr and his colleagues became passionately committed to the creation of a federal union of the
South African colonies, and subsequently drafted in January 1907 the elaborate Selborne Memorandum,
which stated the case for such a union.10
Shortly after the publication of the memorandum, Kerr left the Inter-Colonial Council to edit a
new monthly journal, The State, established to promote the unification of the South African colonies. The
first issue appeared in December 1908, by which time the four colonies in fact began moving toward
union.11 Over the next fifteen months, the Kindergarten played a considerable role in the unification of
South Africa.12 In turn, the success of the South African Union exercised an enormous amount of

8

For further information on the Kindergarten and British policy in South Africa, see Martin Meredith, Diamonds,
Gold, and War: The British, the Boers, and the Making of South Africa (London: Simon & Schuster, 2007); Walter
Nimocks, Milner’s Young Men: The “Kindergarten” in Edwardian Imperial Affairs (New York: Hodder &
Stoughton, 1970); J. Lee Thompson, Forgotten Patriot: A Life of Alfred, Viscount Milner of St. James’s and Cape
Town, 1854-1925 (Madison New Jersey: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 2007); and J. Lee Thompson, A
Wider Patriotism: Alfred Milner and the British Empire (London: Pickering & Chatto Publishers, 2008).
9

Viscount Milner was British High Commissioner in South Africa from 1897 to 1905. During that time, he tried to
bind the colonies and republics of South Africa into one dominion, independent in the management of its own
affairs, but remaining a member of the British Empire. This included the two coastal British colonies, the Cape
Colony and Natal, and two independent republics higher inland, the Transvaal and the Orange Free State, which
were ruled by Dutch-speaking white settlers known as Afrikaners or Boers. Milner was even prepared to go to war
to achieve his objective. Kerr served directly under Lord Milner for only a week before the latter returned to
England, to be succeeded by Lord Selborne. Billington, 8-9; Ingham, 20-22; Rose, The Cliveden Set, 2, 52.
10

The Kindergarten believed that the key to maintaining South Africa within the British Empire was British
immigration. The key to attracting settlers, they argued, was prosperity, which would be facilitated by the political
union of the four colonies. The Kindergarten collected evidence in order to make an irrefutable practical argument
in favor of close union and present it to the public in the form of a memorandum. Lord Selborne made some major
amendments before presenting it to the governments of South Africa in January 1907. Billington, 11-12; Butler,
Lord Lothian, 23-24; Ingham, 25-26; Turner, 3-4.
11

12

Butler, Lord Lothian, 28-33; Rose, The Cliveden Set, 53-54.

In November 1908, the four colonial governments held a convention to negotiate terms. In February 1909, the
delegates adopted a constitution drawn up by the former Boer General Jan Christian Smuts, with the help of Robert
Brand of the Kindergarten. In March 1909, the Kindergarten held a meeting of Closer Union societies in
Johannesburg that endorsed the new constitution. The four colonies adopted the constitution in June 1909 and the
British Parliament enacted it to take effect in May 1910. The resulting Union of South Africa became a selfgoverning Dominion of the British Empire. Billington, 12; Ingham, 30.

80
influence upon the Kindergarten. Their experience in South Africa convinced them that a well-placed
pressure group could orchestrate events from behind the scenes.13

It also inspired members of the

Kindergarten to think increasingly in terms of something more ambitious: a union or federation between
London and the Dominions, a bloc sufficiently powerful to ensure that Britain retained its status as a great
power.14 Just as significant, however, the Kindergarten also envisaged an Anglo-Saxon union, involving
closer ties between the United States and the British Empire.15 Kerr was particularly provoked by the
prospect of such an alliance -- the realization of which he would devote the better part of his career.
Kerr benefited a great deal from his experience in South Africa. His administrative role on the
Inter-Colonial Council sharpened his organizational abilities.

The responsibility for drafting the

statement on railway policy, which accompanied the Selborne Memorandum, shaped his rhetorical skills.
His brief role as the editor of The State introduced him to the art of journalism. Above all, he not only
sharpened his intellect and his critical faculties, but also became convinced that the notion of federation
was essential to the achievement of international peaceful co-existence.16 In particular, Kerr increasingly
grew convinced that the close association of the British Empire with the United States must be the core of
any world federalism, or at least a federation of western democracies, and that this Atlantic alliance
should be the bedrock of any international system designed to preserve peace.17
In June 1909, following the South African Union, Kerr resigned the editorship of The State and
returned to Britain, as did many of his Kindergarten colleagues. Although he gave careful consideration
to standing for Parliament,18 Kerr joined his former colleagues,19 in September 1909, in setting up the
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Round Table, principally a study group whose object was to promote a closer union within the British
Empire.20 Driven by the realization that London could no longer carry the burden of defending the
Empire alone, its members sought a federation of the four Dominions of Canada, South Africa, Australia,
and New Zealand with Britain to share the burden of defense. The alternative for each was a solitary
independence that risked defeat by stronger powers. Lionel Curtis proposed a directly elected Imperial
parliament, with an upper house to represent equally the five countries and a lower house to represent
their populations. A cabinet responsible to this parliament would take charge of foreign relations,
defense, and the dependent empire, and would support these activities through taxation. All other powers
of government would remain in the hands of each country.21 In order to publicize their efforts, the Round
Table prepared and published a scheme of union, on the pattern of the Selborne Memorandum, and issued
a quarterly journal of imperial and international affairs, The Round Table. The objective of the journal
was to strengthen, in Britain and the Dominions, a sense of common imperial identity, as a way of laying
the intellectual groundwork for a federal movement. Kerr became the editor of The Round Table, which
became his principal activity until he joined Prime Minister David Lloyd George as an assistant private
secretary in January 1917.22
Almost immediately, the Moot, as the group began calling itself,23 dispatched Kerr, Curtis, and
William Marris to Canada, Britain’s largest Dominion, in order to assess sentiment for closer imperial
19
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union. Over their travels, however, interviews with Canadians in business and professional life revealed
deep reservations about closer ties to Britain. Kerr was particularly struck by the growing strength of
Dominion nationalism. As a result, he began to doubt the possibility of an Anglo-Dominion federation,
and wrote to Robert Brand that a central sovereign authority might break up the Empire. He correctly
noted that London could not offer Canada any real incentive for union with Britain that the United States
could not offer as well. Curtis, however, continued to regard anything short of “organic union” as
apostasy from the original ideal.24 It became apparent that Round Table members in the Dominions were
deeply divided. All of the groups agreed that their countries needed to take more responsibility for their
defense and foreign relations. But, while a majority of Round Table members in South Africa, Australia,
and New Zealand endorsed federation, a significant number of the Australian groups dissented and most
of the Canadians objected to such a drastic choice of union or independence.25
In the wake of this North American trip, Kerr undertook his first significant effort to explore the
United States. In the fall of 1909, on his way home from Canada, Kerr toured the southern United States,
in large part to learn whether American race relations could serve as any guide to South Africa. He
visited the presidents of several black universities and colleges, including Howard University in
Washington D.C., the Hampton Institute in Virginia, Atlanta University in Georgia, where he met with
Professor W. E. B. DuBois, and the Tuskegee Institute in Alabama, where he met with its founder Booker
T. Washington. Kerr also met a range of black doctors, journalists, business leaders, land agents, and
clergy, as well as a range of white officials, business leaders, professors, and planters.26
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More important, the prospect of an Anglo-American alliance compelled Kerr to send a
memorandum in 1909 to former Conservative prime minister Arthur Balfour, recommending that Britain
and the United States should join together to form “an Anglo-Saxon Federation,” which would dominate
the seas, guarantee peace, and check German imperialism. He urged Balfour to forward this proposal to
former president Theodore Roosevelt, who was about to embark on a tour of the world. Kerr hoped that
Roosevelt would be “inspired to lay the foundation of an Anglo-American alliance” that would also
lessen the prospect of a German-American alliance.27 There is no evidence, however, that Roosevelt ever
read the memorandum. Kerr therefore made a second approach to the former president in 1912. From 57 August 1912, Kerr attended the Progressive Party convention in Chicago. Following the convention,
Kerr had lunch with Roosevelt at the latter’s Oyster Bay estate on Long Island, New York. The meeting,
however, appears to have been inconclusive.28
During the same 1912 visit to the United States, Kerr also met and befriended several other young
progressive Americans through Lord Eustace Percy, a British diplomat in Washington. Percy belonged to
a dinner circle that included Robert Grosvenor Valentine, the Commissioner of the United States Indian
Service, Assistant Attorney-General Winfred Denison, Interior Department aide and future Supreme
Court Justice Felix Frankfurter, Solicitor-General Loring Christie, a naturalized Canadian who would
ultimately return to Canada to serve as secretary to Prime Minister Sir Robert Borden, Herbert Croly,
whose 1909 book, The Promise of American Life, inspired the “New Nationalism” on which Roosevelt
campaigned in 1912, and Walter Lippmann, a young journalist who helped found The New Republic
magazine with Croly in 1914. The circle’s father figure, Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes,
presided over Monday evening gatherings. All were American progressives who would later support
close American ties with Britain.29
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From the beginning, there existed a fundamental conflict of opinion within the group over
whether to adhere to the rigidly esoteric methods of the Selborne memorandum30 or to mount a semipublic campaign of propaganda. Kerr’s close friend Lionel Curtis insisted on an esoteric movement,
which would proceed almost in secret to persuade more educated and influential men across the empire to
support plans for federal unity. Kerr preferred to use the journal as an organ of instruction, and thus seek
large numbers of subscriptions.
The Round Table was essentially committed to “bringing about a revolution by dinner party.”31
Indeed, they found themselves welcome in some of the great town and country houses of Britain and had
access to influential figures at home and abroad. The group also obtained connections to two of the
leading newspapers in the country. The first was The Observer, owned by William Waldorf Astor, heir to
part of the American Astor fortune, and whose editor, James L. Garvin, was an admirer of Lord Milner.
The Round Table Moot drew Garvin and Astor’s son, Waldorf, a Unionist MP, into their circle. Waldorf
and his American wife Nancy soon began having the young men to Cliveden, the Astor country home, for
weekend moots and tennis parties. Kerr formed an especially close friendship with Nancy. The Round
Table circle acquired an even more important connection to Britain’s most prestigious newspaper, when
in 1912, one of its members, Geoffrey Dawson, became the editor of The Times of London.32
The objectives and methods of the Round Table movement began to attract criticism from some
of the few outsiders who knew of its existence. On the one hand, its efforts to be politically neutral stirred
some discontent. For example, the Round Table had pledged in its first issue to be free from party
politics. For that reason, the journal did not take a position on the question of tariffs. This neutrality,
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however, antagonized the Unionists for whom an imperial trading bloc was as important as a combined
imperial defense. Moreover, Kerr’s effort to edit the journal in an unbiased manner could not entirely
suppress the Unionist sympathies of its founders. On the other hand, and far more fundamental a flaw,
the Round Table assumed that the defense needs of Britain and the Dominions were one and the same.
While Canada was completely safe and in no danger that the United States would ever try to conquer it,
Australia and New Zealand needed a defense that Britain was increasingly unable to guarantee; the two
Pacific Dominions demanded naval forces that British admirals wanted to concentrate in home waters
against Germany. Consequently, each part of the proposed federation placed the needs of its own local
defense ahead of imperial considerations.33
Kerr’s work in the Round Table movement was interrupted in the fall of 1911 by a nervous
collapse which rendered him exhausted, depressed, and unfit for sustained work for most of the following
three years. He consulted a neurologist in New York, who diagnosed “chronic overextension,” and in
September 1912, went to a German sanatorium in Bad Kissingen. When he returned home in November
uncured, Kerr consulted Sir Bertrand Dawson, a physician to the Royal Family, who recommended that
he rest at a variety of sanatoria and resorts in Europe. At one, St. Moritz, he renewed his acquaintance
with Waldorf and Nancy Astor; it was during a visit in April 1914 to Rest Harrow, the seaside house of
the Astors, that Kerr had appendicitis and only the quick action of a nearby doctor prevented
complications that could have proved fatal.34
It was during this period of illness that Kerr turned to Christian Science. His doubts about Roman
Catholicism had grown in the years since he left Oxford. He explored other faiths, including Hinduism
and Buddhism during an Asian journey in 1911-1912, but did not find them to be particularly satisfying.
Following his appendicitis, however, Nancy Astor, who had converted to Christian Science after her own
illness in 1913, gave Kerr a copy of Science and Health with Key to the Scriptures by Mary Baker Eddy,
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the founder of Christian Science. Eddy held that physical and emotional healing was possible through
faith.35 To heal themselves, Christian Scientists tried to rely on religious faith rather than on modern
medicine, and literalists refused all medical treatment for themselves and their families.

Although

conventional medicine had just saved his life, Kerr found Eddy’s prescription for his ongoing health
problems liberating and thus converted in the spring of 1914. Although his conversion did not in fact
relieve him of his intermittent bouts of fatigue, Christian Science gave new meaning to his life by
transforming his illness from a condition to be endured into a challenge to be overcome.36
Kerr returned to the editorship of The Round Table in July 1914, a month before the outbreak
of the First World War. He did not enlist, although his immediate instinct was to do so, principally
because of his medical history and the persuasion of his Round Table colleagues. The death in October
1914 of his younger brother, David, a lieutenant in the Royal Scots, affected him severely and further
increased the pressure from his parents not to serve. Over the next two years, Kerr agonized over the
issue of military service. He was troubled by the appearance of evading a duty that other men his age
were volunteering to perform.

By the fall of 1915, after all, he had recovered sufficiently from

appendicitis to begin drilling with the London Volunteer Rifles, a reserve unit. Yet, he was clearly unfit
for military service. After the introduction of national service in January 1916, when he was in fact called
up, his colleagues persuaded Kerr to seek an exemption,37 on the grounds that editing The Round Table
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was a vital contribution to the war effort, at the very least to urge support for Britain, in the Dominions, as
well as the necessity for federation. Under his wartime editorship, The Round Table reached the height of
its circulation, approximately 13,000 in September 1914. Many articles were reprinted as pamphlets for
distribution in the United States and other neutral countries.38
Kerr dedicated himself to convincing readers of The Round Table at home and abroad why the
British Empire had to fight. He described the war’s origins, Britain’s decision to enter the war, and
British war aims in highly idealistic terminology: the war was a struggle for world freedom. In December
1914, he declared that, “If Germany is defeated the vision of the democratic peoples will begin to
prevail”; in June 1915, he wrote that the “permanent cure for the evil is democracy.”39
Kerr’s principal objective, however, was to help win support for Britain in the United States. The
outbreak of the war intensified his conviction that Anglo-American cooperation must be at the core of any
plan to preserve world peace.40 He conscientiously sought to persuade American policy makers that the
United States should follow pro-Allied policies and should take a far larger role in world affairs -- in
collaboration with Britain. In November 1915, when Woodrow Wilson issued a note championing the
cause of neutral rights, Kerr warned that if the president pushed this policy of neutrality, he would “hinder
the triumph of that national liberty of which the American people are themselves among the foremost
champions.” He urged the United States to reconsider its abstention from the war, to stop screening itself
“behind the fiction of neutrality” and declare as the basis of its policy the undoubted determination of the
American people to vanquish tyranny in Europe.41 In the March 1916 Round Table, he wrote:
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Neutrality is in essence a failure of duty towards humanity. Either a war is a struggle
between right and wrong. . . . Or it is a quarrel in which no great principle is at stake, in
which case all nations ought to combine to insist on its being settled by judicial means.
In principle, there ought to be no neutrals or no war.42
In June 1916, after a German submarine torpedoed the Sussex, a channel steamer, resulting in the death of
several American civilians, Kerr applauded the tough American ultimatum to Germany and its demand
that Berlin abandon unrestricted submarine warfare against merchant shipping on the grounds that it was
inconsistent with common humanity. “It means,” Kerr wrote, that the United States “may have to go to
war to vindicate the principles for which she stands.”43
Kerr often sought to make his point more pertinent to his American readers by drawing historical
analogies. He compared the issues at stake in the Great War, as well as the domestic and international
problems it generated, with those Abraham Lincoln encountered during the American Civil War and “the
experience of the great sister-democracy in the United States in its struggle for existence half a century
ago.” In similar ways, he referred to the early state of lawlessness in the American West and the
disobedience of antebellum Americans to the Fugitive Slave Law.44
Kerr continued to advocate the establishment of a supranational organization as a means to
maintain world peace. In June 1915, he recommended “an organic union of the world” as a solution to
anticipated post-war problems. “The cure for war,” he wrote in September 1915, was “not to weaken the
principle of the state, but to carry it to its logical conclusion, by the creation of a world state.” After all,
London could pursue a more coherent and resolute foreign policy if the government’s attention was not
persistently divided between both foreign and domestic affairs.45 Although he wavered periodically from
this commitment to a world state, Kerr recommended, in December 1915, a “permanent conference of the
powers” as a peace keeping mechanism.
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international noninvolvement was selfish, and that “[t]he problems of humanity will only be solved if all
civilized powers co-operate in finding the solution.” This, he believed, “involves the establishment of a
permanent conference of the great powers.”46
Kerr urged the United States not just to support the Allies, but also to participate actively in the
postwar settlement. As early as mid-1915, the pro-Allied American ambassador to London, Walter Hines
Page, reported that Kerr was “red hot for a close and perfect understanding between Great Britain and the
United States.”47 In December 1915, Kerr appealed specifically to the United States to assume the central
role and become “a member of the Peace Conference, and of the Concert [of Nations] into which it may
grow,” warning that,
on her decision all the hopes of human unity will hang. By breaking with her long
established national tradition and assuming common responsibilities for maintaining right
and justice throughout the world she can probably save the world from another
Armageddon. By clinging to the policy of isolation she can condemn mankind to another
era of estrangement and war.48
In the summer of 1916, Kerr reiterated: “The creation of a new international order depends mainly upon
the Allies and America.” While the British Empire would still bear the heaviest burden, he stressed that it
was fundamental and essential that the United States should take part in the work of international
reconstruction. Furthermore, Kerr called for a strengthening of American and British naval power, a
theme that would recur throughout his career. In March 1916, he implicitly suggested that American and
British sea power be enhanced and restrictions upon its effectiveness removed, since “sea power is and
must be the chief sanction behind international liberty and right.”49
During these months of his editorship, in the spring and summer of 1916, Kerr met with many
important individuals, such as Arthur Balfour, Austen Chamberlain, Sir Edward Grey, and Lord Robert
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Cecil. In particular, he was closely in touch with the so-called “Ginger Group,” which brought together
several of the conservative opponents of the Liberal Prime Minister Herbert Asquith, including Alfred
Milner, with members of the Moot. The group dined together on Monday evenings with the intention of
working for “the more effective conduct of the war,” and, above all, “somehow or another, to secure a
change of government.” Their endeavors assumed a heightened sense of urgency particularly after the
disastrous offensive at the Somme River in the summer and fall of 1916.50
Kerr at Downing Street
In December 1916, the Liberal-dominated coalition of Herbert Asquith fell and was replaced a
new coalition government, dominated by Unionists under David Lloyd George.51 In order to prosecute
the war more effectively, Lloyd George established, over the regular Cabinet, a five-member War
Cabinet, composed of himself, Andrew Bonar Law, the leader of the Unionists, Arthur Henderson of the
Labour Party, Lord Curzon, former Viceroy of India, and Lord Milner. In addition, he established two
distinct secretariats. One consisted of seven assistant secretaries to the War Cabinet under LieutenantColonel Maurice Hankey, while a second smaller secretariat under W. G. S. Adams served the prime
minister directly. Milner’s influence ensured that a number of his acolytes found staff positions of some
influence, including Kerr, who was appointed in January 1917 as a member of Lloyd George’s private
secretariat, the so-called “Garden Suburb.” This “Garden Suburb” was set up to keep Lloyd George in
touch with the expanding wartime administrative system.52
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From the very beginning, Kerr’s service at Downing Street was politically controversial. Because
Kerr and another early member, his close friend Waldorf Astor, were associated with the Round Table,
Radicals in Parliament and in the British press seized on their presence to condemn the Garden Suburb as
a revival of the South African Kindergarten.53 In addition, supporters of the ousted Asquith ministry
singled out Milner and his followers as a way to attack the new regime’s concentration of power and staff
at the top:
A new double screen of bureaucrats is interposed between the War Directorate and the
heads of Departments, whose responsibility to Parliament has hitherto been direct, and
transmits to them the decrees of the Upper Five. The first is the so-called Cabinet
Secretariat, almost a ministry in itself. The second is a little body of illuminati, whose
residence is in the Prime Minister’s garden. These gentlemen stand in no sense for a
Civil Service Cabinet. They are rather of the class of traveling empirics in Empire, who
came in with Lord Milner, and whose spiritual home is fixed somewhere between Balliol
and Heidelberg.54
In this particular attack, which appeared in the The Nation on 24 February 1917, the editor, H. W.
Massingham, caricatured Kerr as “Narcissus,” upon whom “was imposed the . . . duty of rapidly
assimilating the popular ideas or tendencies of the day, and presenting them to his chief, as it were, in
concentrated pellets.”55
Lloyd George gave Kerr responsibility for advice on imperial and foreign affairs. They rapidly
developed such a close relationship that Kerr ultimately served as Lloyd George’s chief adviser and even
intermediary in foreign affairs. Consequently, Kerr rapidly ascended into a position that was, he later
observed, “almost as close to the centre of world affairs as it was possible for a man to be.”56 In this
position of unprecedented influence, Kerr endeavored to put into effect the Round Table’s wider objective
of a reformed world order. He devoted much of his effort to two fundamental concerns: the future of the
British Empire and the strengthening of British relations with the United States.
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By 1917, one of Kerr’s principal objectives was to win support for accommodating nationalism
within the Empire itself.57 Kerr took part, for example, in initiatives to share power with the Dominions.
During the spring of 1917, at the urging of Lord Milner, the War Cabinet invited the Dominion prime
ministers, who were in London for an Imperial War Conference, to join it as full members, thereby
creating an enlarged “Imperial War Cabinet.” As a step toward possible federation, Kerr and the Round
Table Moot had hoped to turn the Imperial War Conference into an annual assembly of parliaments where
opposition parties could attend. They began to move away from that goal, however, as it became obvious
that the Dominions were openly hostile to the idea. Canadian Prime Minister Sir Robert Borden, for
example, warned Kerr “in the strongest possible manner the inadvisability of trying to force any system of
Imperial Federation . . . immediately following the war.”58 Kerr thus wrote to Curtis in July that the
Dominions would come to the peace conference “in the spirit which will more and more resist the
assertion of any superior authority or influence on the part of the British Government.”59
Kerr had greater success with two subsequent initiatives. In 1916, Kerr had been part of an
Indian Moot, consisting of Lionel Curtis and several British officials from the India Office in London,
which agreed on a plan to move India closer to self-government. Their proposal called for Britain to
transfer certain executive responsibilities at the provincial level to Indians, who would be accountable in
these roles to elected Indian legislators. The nucleus of their proposal, as well as their continuing efforts
in 1917, ultimately became enacted into law in the Government of India Act of 1919.60 In addition, Kerr
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also urged Lloyd George to support the creation of a Jewish homeland in Palestine. He saw Zionism as a
way to secure an ally for Britain in the Middle East, where he and others hoped that a Jewish presence in
Palestine would block German-Turkish, as well as French and Russian, influence. Furthermore, Kerr
believed that British support for Zionism would strengthen pro-Allied sentiment in the United States.
When British leaders finally committed themselves to a Jewish homeland, although not independence, it
was Lord Milner who worded the statement, issued on 2 November 1917, known as the Balfour
Declaration, which pledged Britain to establish a Jewish national homeland in Palestine after the war.61
The unfolding of events convinced Kerr that the war should have a higher, noble purpose. He
thus persuaded Lloyd George to emphasize the moral character of the war. The overthrow of Tsar
Nicholas II in the February Revolution of 1917,62 for example, convinced Kerr that Russia was moving
toward parliamentary democracy, and prompted him to write Lloyd George that “It has been
extraordinarily difficult” for the British government to stand for democracy, “as long as it was in alliance
with autocratic Russia. That difficulty no longer exists.” Kerr also began to see evidence for the
existence of democratic peace movements in Russia and Germany. Accordingly, he thus advised Lloyd
George to make democracy in Europe a primary objective of the war, an end in itself. After all, he
observed, although incorrectly, “it was not until Abraham Lincoln added the emancipation of the slaves to
the preservation of American unity . . . that the tide began to turn.”63
By the fall of 1917, however, as it became clear that the Russian revolutionaries simply wanted to
proceed with their own internal revolution, Kerr began to descend into the “defensive pessimism” that
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characterized his advice to Lloyd George for the rest of his service as private secretary.64 In July 1917,
for example, he confided to his close friend Lionel Curtis his opinion that “having broken away from
autocracy the world is now rushing headlong toward the abyss of anarchy under the guidance of such
phrases as ‘self-determination’, ‘nationalism’, ‘Home Rule’, and so forth.”65 At the same time, Kerr
began to see Allied military problems and British political troubles as the result of German intrigue. He
thus wrote to Lloyd George on 18 October 1917 that “Germany is now transferring her attack more and
more to the internal fronts of the Allies. As her chances of military victory decline her efforts to carry on
the war by dividing the Allies, or breaking up the national unity of her enemies, increase.”66 Kerr
advocated a policy of complete victory over Germany, on the grounds that a premature peace would make
it impossible to reestablish a sound international order.67

While he maintained his core belief that the

cure for war was the creation of the world state, Kerr insisted that before a permanent conference of the
powers could be convened, Germany would have to be beaten to its knees.68 By late 1917, Kerr flatly
rejected any consideration of a negotiated peace. On 29 November 1917, Lord Lansdowne, former
Unionist Foreign Secretary, published a letter in The Daily Telegraph, calling on the Allied and Central
Powers to consider a compromise peace. In an emotional memorandum, Kerr implored Lloyd George to
“refute and break with the Lansdowne point of view.” He suggested that Lansdowne wanted a “bad peace
without victory,” which would lead to “hell for every man, woman and child for years and years.”69 In
January 1918, Lloyd George delivered an address, written by Kerr, which demanded enemy withdrawal
from Belgium, France, and Serbia, reparations for war damages, independence for the subject nations of
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Eastern Europe, and a postwar association of nations to limit armaments and prevent future conflict. Only
thorough Allied victory, the prime minister declared, could achieve these aims.70
Arguably Kerr’s most important responsibility was to facilitate Anglo-American cooperation.
During the war, his already numerous American contacts expanded dramatically, as he met with visiting
officials, bankers, journalists, and academics, with some of whom he developed lifelong friendships. He
advised Lloyd George how to fashion his speeches and public pronouncements, especially on such
matters as liberal war aims and on even more controversial issues, such as Ireland, so as best to accord
with American sensibilities. He alerted Lloyd George, moreover, to shifts in the American position. For
example, on 22 January 1917, as the Germans began to step up their submarine campaign, Wilson
stressed the American right as a neutral to trade freely. Kerr suggested to the prime minister that, because
the United States could not “possibly tolerate a murderous hold-up of the world by sea,” Wilson’s speech
should be considered a “warning to Germany” and a step to unite the American people in case war
became necessary. A few days later, Germany announced the resumption of unrestricted submarine
warfare. Later, in the spring of 1917, Kerr helped Lloyd George draft a letter to Wilson, welcoming the
American president into the war. In doing so, the prime minister celebrated the special relationship of
close cooperation between Britain and the United States, the two powers upon whom, he argued, the
primary responsibility both for winning the war and devising an acceptable postwar settlement would
ultimately rest.71
Kerr’s overriding concern for winning over American opinion did not, however, compel him to
advocate a moderation of British policy toward Ireland.72 Kerr maintained a draconian attitude toward
Irish policy for two fundamental reasons. First, he believed in the overriding moral claims of the British
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state, which excluded consideration during an emergency of the sectional interests of a minority. In the
June 1918 Round Table, he wrote:
If self-determination means that all educated citizens ought to share in the rights and
responsibilities of the village, of the county, the state, and the empire to which they
belong, it is a sound doctrine. If it means that every community has a right to think only
of itself and to set up on its own . . . whenever it chooses, it is the apotheosis of
selfishness and the highway to war.73
Second, Kerr dismissed the sincerity of the Irish resistance movement.74
In early 1917, therefore, following the British suppression of the 1916 Easter Rising, and in
response to the demands of the Irish Nationalist party for Home Rule, Kerr urged Lloyd George to assume
a conciliatory position but yield nothing. “In the long run,” he wrote, “the only possible settlement is ‘a
united Ireland in a United Kingdom, in a united Empire.’” Later, under pressure from the German
Offensive in the spring of 1918, the British War Cabinet on 8 April extended conscription to Ireland,
which had hitherto been exempt. While many opposed the decision, Kerr supported it with enthusiasm.
He argued that for Ireland to resist conscription would be tantamount to secession: “Lincoln had the same
difficulty to meet and had met it by force.”75
At the end of the war, the Garden Suburb dissolved, but Kerr stayed on as Lloyd George’s sole
private secretary. He accompanied Lloyd George to the Paris Peace Conference and remained in his
service, principally to advise on foreign policy, until March 1921. During this period, Kerr’s influence on
the prime minister reached its peak. At Paris, he saw all the official correspondence relating to the
conference and advised Lloyd George about questions that were either pressing or which particularly
interested him. He occasionally served as Lloyd George’s representative on ad hoc committees, and he
cooperated with other staff members of the British Empire delegation in advising ministers. The prime
minister’s return to London, from 10 February to 7 March 1919, to deal with domestic problems further
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enhanced Kerr’s influence. Given Foreign Secretary Arthur Balfour’s somewhat insouciant attitude to the
proceedings, Kerr was able to guide British policy on a number of occasions, although his main task was
to keep Lloyd George informed of the progress, or lack of progress, of the conference. Sir Maurice
Hankey described Kerr as being left behind in Paris as the prime minister’s “watch dog.”76
Although Kerr’s advice to Lloyd George reflected the traditional objectives of British diplomacy
and defense -- the preservation of British naval supremacy and the establishment of a balance of power on
the European continent -- his advice also reflected the priorities of the Round Table.77 Kerr advocated the
creation of a new world order, to be achieved through the “democratization of Europe.” He even tried his
hand at drafting a constitution for the proposed League of Nations, shortly after his arrival in Paris. More
important, Kerr hoped that the United States and Britain could continue to cultivate their partnership in
the postwar years. Cooperation between Washington and London, he believed, would draw the United
States into a wider peace-keeping role that Britain could no longer perform on its own.78 He also
believed, however, that it would be necessary to educate Americans to these larger responsibilities. In an
October 1918 letter to Curtis, Kerr wrote.
The extent of this work after the war . . . will be so vast that it will never be accomplished
at all unless it is shared in proportions equal to their strength by the . . . allies now united
in fighting the Germans. Yet America not only has no conception of this aspect of the
problem but has been led by shibboleths and labels to believe that the assumption of this
kind of responsibility is iniquitous imperialism.79
In more specific terms, Kerr took the lead in defining the British position on a number of vital
questions that arose during the conference. Although he had long been an advocate of a system of mutual
defense treaties, by the end of the war, Kerr and his Round Table colleagues had turned against the
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concept of binding ties and commitments. He thus warned Lloyd George against the kind of League
advocated by Woodrow Wilson, in which member states would make binding obligations to each other.
Kerr explained that the impact of including such obligations in the constitution of the League of Nations
“will be to make it impossible for any nation to join the League, for no nation will commit itself in so
vital a matter [as going to war] except . . . after an examination of the facts at the time the decision has to
be made.” Kerr thus submitted to the prime minister an outline for a more modest League, with less
extensive powers, which would reconvene the peace conference as an annual and purely consultative
gathering. Consequently, with Kerr’s memorandum in hand, Lloyd George instructed Lord Robert Cecil
on 31 January 1919 to make the draft Covenant less binding.80
Kerr also took the lead, with Lloyd George’s approval, in opposing French demands.81 Kerr
correctly observed that the French were hoping to take advantage of the temporary absence of both Lloyd
George and Wilson from the conference to force through decisions favorable to France. His suspicions of
French ambitions and obstructionism, which were shared by Lloyd George and most members of the
British delegation, increased as a result of his dealings with French officials in Paris. Kerr was not
unsympathetic to French concerns for their future security vis-à-vis Germany, and in fact proposed that
Britain and the United States should provide France with a genuine guarantee against the future renewal
of the war.82 Yet, he remained uneasy about what he considered to be the unreasonable nature of French
demands.83 He wrote Lloyd George that a less radical peace would be easier to keep:
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One of your first tasks, I think, will be to insist on a sane policy towards Germany both in
the military and economic spheres. I am all for imposing stiff terms on Germany but they
must be terms which give the German people some hope of independence.
“If the French have their way,” he maintained, the treaty will give Germany neither hope nor
independence and “we shall probably be driven to occupy the country.”84
Kerr was similarly active in economic discussions. He maintained that the industrial unrest
afflicting all countries would grow worse unless industrial production was re-started. Furthermore,
Britain could hardly forego stiff reparations as long as the United States insisted on the repayment of
Allied war debts. In his opinion, the attitude of the United States to reparations and other related
economic questions was crucial. If Washington either cancelled the Allied debts owed to the United
States, or granted a reconstruction loan to the Allies, the reparations bill could be reduced. He wrote:
I am in favour of restricting our commitments abroad until we set our country thoroughly
in order. I think that it is America’s turn to take on some of the burden of developing and
financing the backward parts of the earth. We must see that she makes her money
available for this.85
In probably his most audacious initiative, Kerr assumed control of British policy with respect to
the chaotic situation in Russia. He saw the Bolshevik Revolution as a fundamental threat to liberal
civilization: “You have now got started . . . an active, aggressive religion of social destruction -Bolshevism,” he wrote in an October 1918 letter to Curtis. “It seems pretty clear that the peoples of
South America, Africa, and China will be quite incapable of resisting these destructive forces unless the
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Western Powers help them to do so.”86 In 1919, however, he opposed Allied military intervention in
Russia, and supported Woodrow Wilson’s call for a ceasefire and a proposal for a conference of all the
Russian parties, on the Prinkipo Islands in the Sea of Marmara, in order to achieve some settlement.87 On
14 February 1919, Winston Churchill, the Secretary of State for War, and Sir Henry Wilson, the Chief of
the Imperial General Staff, arrived in Paris, claiming Lloyd George’s authority to find out what the Allies
were prepared to do if, as seemed likely, the Prinkipo talks collapsed. Kerr discovered that Churchill
favored far more dramatic action to resolve the question, namely the dispatch of Allied military assistance
and volunteers to the anti-Bolshevik forces if the Bolsheviks refused a ceasefire. Because Churchill was
proposing a course of action already vetoed by the War Cabinet,88 Kerr immediately sent a telegram
regarding the nature of Churchill’s schemes to Lloyd George: “Mr. Churchill is bent on forcing a
campaign against Soviet Russia. I am against such a policy because . . . it must lead to the Peace
Conference taking charge of Russian affairs, and if they do that it will end in revolution in the West.”89 In
response to Kerr and to two further telegrams from Churchill, the prime minister sent two telegrams of his
own to the War Secretary on 17 February opposing any increased Allied intervention in Russia, which
would involve Britain in further expenditure for a doubtful cause. Much to Churchill’s fury, Lloyd
George authorized Kerr to show copies of the telegrams to Colonel House, who joined Balfour on 17
February in securing the abandonment of Churchill’s scheme. Wilson described Kerr’s action as “a low
down trick,” and Churchill returned to London angry and bitter.90
Kerr’s role in policymaking did not diminish after Lloyd George returned to Paris. As peace
terms with Germany dominated the remainder of the conference, he encouraged the prime minister to
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resist French pressure for a harsh and vindictive peace, especially the French proposal for the creation of
an autonomous Rhineland under Allied occupation.91 On 26 February 1919, André Tardieu, an adviser to
the French Premier Georges Clemenceau, presented a memorandum that called for the return of AlsaceLorraine to France and the occupation of the Rhineland. On 11 March, in a meeting with Tardieu and
Sidney Mezes of the American delegation, Kerr objected to the stationing of British troops, even token
contingents, on German territory:
The experience of the Hanoverian connection with its experience of wars in Europe and
the separation from America was still very strong and that these national feelings would
unquestionably be aggravated by propaganda not only from within England itself but
from residents of the occupied territories in Germany, who would probably provoke
continual incidents with the object of making the position intolerable.92
Kerr insisted that French security would be adequately provided for by German disarmament and the demilitarization of the Rhineland, and argued that if the German army were limited to 100,000 troops, the
combined peacetime forces of the three Allied powers would be enough to meet any future German
challenge. Concerted action to enforce peace terms on Germany “would obtain the wholehearted support
of the public opinion of the British Empire and America.”93 Therefore, Kerr appealed to Tardieu to
recognize that the “real security of France lay in maintaining a complete understanding with Great Britain
and America,” and that the “real danger” to the preservation of peace was an Anglo-French estrangement,
resulting from additional burdens being imposed on Britain by a commitment to enforce the separation of
the Rhineland from the rest of Germany, which would not be supported by British public opinion.94
When Tardieu continued to press for at least a temporary Allied occupation of the Rhineland, and sought
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to refer the question to Woodrow Wilson, Kerr wrote to Lloyd George that “I would resist the Tardieu
proposition to the end.”95
The entire British delegation grew more alarmed by the ever-increasing harshness of the peace
terms. Lloyd George, Hankey, Sir Henry Wilson, and Kerr met at Fountainbleu on 22-23 March 1919 to
alleviate the terms of the draft treaty, which might convert Clemenceau to a more judicious and balanced
peace. This “Outline of Peace Terms,” among other things, pressed for German access to world markets
and raw materials “to enable the German people to get upon their legs again. We cannot cripple her and
expect her to pay.” It called for the disarmament of Germany as a first step to the limitation of the
armaments of all nations, an effective League of Nations, in which Germany might soon participate, the
reduction of Poland’s territorial demands on Germany, continued German sovereignty over the
Rhineland, and an equitable reparations settlement. Clemenceau, however, regarded this document as a
prime example of “British selfishness” and sent back an icy response: Appease Germany, but not at
France’s expense.96 Kerr advocated a tough, not vindictive peace. No stable peace could be based on the
“mutilation or permanent coercion” of Germany, by political, economic, or military means. Otherwise,
he feared, the new German democracy could not survive the burden and might be driven to communism.97
The secretary of the British delegation, Sir Maurice Hankey, wrote Lloyd George on 19 March 1919:
Mr. Philip Kerr has several times pointed out to you and to me that, while every exaction
on Germany can be justified on its merits, the accumulation of these will put Germany in
an utterly impossible position. Is there not the gravest danger that the Peace, as it is at
present developing, may drive Germany to desperation and force her to make common
cause with the Bolshevists?98
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In spite of his own growing concern over the vindictiveness of the peace terms, Kerr was
nevertheless closely involved in the events leading to the signature of the Treaty of Versailles on 28 June
1919. His most significant and infamous contribution was to draft a note to the German government in
November 1918, that “compensation will be made by Germany for all damage done to the civilian
population of the Allies and their property by the aggression of Germany by land, by sea, and from the
air.” This note ultimately served as the basis for Article 231 of the treaty.99 The Allied leaders also
appointed Kerr and four other secretaries to write a covering letter to accompany the Allied reply to the
German dispatch of 29 May 1919, the “German Observations,” which consisted of a litany of German
objections to the draft treaty.

Kerr, who had by this time largely reconciled himself to the draft treaty,

wrote the letter himself and summarized the Allied case against Germany. The treaty, he wrote, marked
the end of a moral conflict to defeat “the greatest crime against humanity and the freedom of peoples that
any nation, calling itself civilized, has ever consciously committed.”

Therefore, Germany had to

acknowledge sole guilt for the war and the “savage and inhuman manner in which it was conducted.”
Germany must further agree to restore the occupied territories, pay reparations, and supply adequate
guarantees of its future good conduct:100
If the German people themselves, or any other nation, are to be deterred from following
the footsteps of Prussia, if mankind is to be lifted out of the belief that war for selfish
ends is legitimate to any State . . . it will be because those responsible for concluding the
war have had the courage to see that justice is not deflected for a convenient peace.101
The Allied leaders accepted Kerr’s letter without amendment and presented it under Clemenceau’s
signature with the Allied reply on 16 June 1919.102 The German delegation signed the treaty on 28 June.
Kerr would, in time, deeply regret his role in the drafting of the treaty. Initially, however, he
defended it. When asked about the possibility of revision, for example, he countered, “Which features of
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the Treaty do you think require modification? . . . Certainly the Treaty is very stiff, but apart from the
fundamental question of reparation, I have always found it difficult to see where it could really be
revised.”103 As early as 1920, however, away from the “hothouse atmosphere” of Paris, Kerr concluded
that the Treaty was in fact full of defects.

He feared that the French would demand the most

preposterous, entirely impractical reparations demands, which might give Germany incentive to repudiate
its consent to the peace. Moreover, as an advocate of national self-determination, Kerr was disturbed by
the millions of Germans that the settlement cut off from the central German state; specifically, the
Germans in an independent Austria, Poland, Danzig, and the Sudetenland. Here, he feared, was fertile
ground for disrupting the new framework of Europe.104
In the meantime, Kerr remained in Paris for most of the summer and kept Lloyd George informed
about the progress of the peace negotiations with the other ex-enemy states. He returned to London in
the fall, and while he remained preoccupied with the unfinished business of the conference, Kerr grew
concerned, as did many other British officials, that American reservations to the Covenant would so
emasculate the League as ultimately to destroy it. He worried in fact that the entire settlement might
subsequently fall apart. As soon as the United States Senate rejected the League, Kerr drafted tentative
strategies whereby the Allies might be able to accept American entry with such reservations as the Senate
might require, even though such strategies generally involved the abandonment of British obligations
under the Treaty of Versailles, notably its obligations to the French. Such modifications, however, would
mean that the League would “sooner or later secure the whole-hearted support of American opinion,” and
thereby enhance its prospects of success. Without full United States participation, he argued, the League
had no future.105 Kerr even began to reconsider the British commitment to the organization, since Britain
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could not possibly uphold the Covenant alone. He recognized, however, that the League’s disappearance
might lead to the rearmament and to renewed division of Europe into hostile alliance systems. Therefore,
he suggested that Britain give two years’ notice to leave the League, during which time it might
reconstitute the Covenant to reflect the changed circumstances caused by the American refusal to join.106
Kerr’s service to the prime minister demonstrated quite clearly that, within Lloyd George’s
immediate circle, Kerr had considerable influence over the tone and direction of policy.107 With respect
to Kerr’s future diplomatic career, this experience had two significant results. First, the exposure to the
realities of diplomacy made Kerr more skeptical of human goodness; it gave his analyses of international
politics a more pragmatic edge and tempered his enthusiasm for idealistic solutions. He acknowledged
that there were practical limits to the kind of moral world for which the Allies had recently fought. For
example, while he loathed Bolshevism, he ultimately saw no alternative to coexistence with Soviet
Russia; hence his deflection of Churchill’s ambitions to intervene in the Russian Civil War. In a similar
way, while he agreed with the moral demands for retribution from Germany, he continued to believe that
harsh peace terms were counterproductive. Although he never altogether abandoned his interest or his
confidence in supra-national organizations to preserve peace, he emphasized idealism less and
international machinery and the use of power more.108
The second most significant result of Kerr’s service as the prime minister’s private secretary was
a legacy of distrust and friction between himself and the foreign policy apparatus, particularly in the
Foreign Office. Lloyd George used Kerr on several occasions as an intermediary and emissary, in the
process bypassing the senior Foreign Office hierarchy under Lord Hardinge, the Permanent UnderSecretary, and Sir Eyre Crowe. In the winter of 1917-1918, for example, Lloyd George dispatched Kerr
to Vienna and Berne in order to carry out secret negotiations with minor Turkish and Austrian diplomats,
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in an effort to induce those powers to make peace in return for more lenient terms. In this instance, Kerr
went with the knowledge of the War Cabinet, with formal instructions from the foreign secretary, and
with the cooperation of the British Legation in Berne.109 In contrast, Kerr’s apparent consent in late
February 1919 to a new American peace initiative in Russia, undertaken by a junior American diplomat
William Bullitt, took the Foreign Office by surprise when the news of the Bullitt mission became public
in April.110 More egregiously, in March 1921, at an Allied conference in London, Lloyd George had
called for an armistice between the Greeks and the Turks. Intercepted Greek telegrams between London
and Athens, however, made it clear to the foreign secretary, Lord Curzon, that the prime minister had
secretly encouraged the Greeks to undertake an offensive in Asia Minor against the Turks. Moreover, the
cables also revealed that it was Kerr who made contact with the Greeks, on Lloyd George’s instructions -contacts that were deliberately concealed from Whitehall.111
Senior Foreign Office officials also complained that Kerr maintained close control over the prime
minister’s official correspondence. They accused him of suppressing Foreign Office recommendations
and concealing advice from Lloyd George when it conflicted with his own views. “Since when is Mr Ker
[sic] the Prime Minister?” minuted Crowe testily on one occasion, and on another, “I gather . . . that Mr
109
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Kerr continues to withhold papers from the Prime Minister?” Relations between Kerr and Crowe further
declined when, in November 1919, Kerr insisted that the prime minister had the right to review Crowe’s
handling of British policy at the conference, where Crowe was a British representative on the Supreme
Council, without first consulting Lord Curzon. In a private letter to Crowe, Kerr condescendingly
explained that, “I am not sure you understand the Prime Minister’s attitude on the Adriatic Question.”112
The building acrimony between Kerr and the Foreign Office led to the charge that the prime
minister’s secretary had constituted himself a “second Foreign Office” to provide policy advice more
acceptable to Lloyd George than the inconvenient attitudes adopted by the real Foreign Office. Sir Robert
Vansittart noted that Lloyd George disliked advice unless it suited him, and thus often failed to consult
Balfour and Lord Hardinge.113 Consequently, Kerr figured strongly not only in the growing objections to
Lloyd George’s foreign policy, but in Lloyd George’s growing isolation as a coalition prime minister as
well. In particular, he found himself in the crossfire between Lloyd George and Lord Curzon, especially
when it was made public in March 1921 that Kerr was the prime minister’s secret go-between with the
Greeks. Unlike Kerr’s secret negotiations with the Austrians and Turks in March 1918, in this instance
the Foreign Office had been kept completely in the dark. Abandoning the Lloyd George coalition in
October 1922, Curzon noted that it was the prime minister’s “ill-judged and calamitous interference in
Foreign Affairs that brought about his doom.”114 While Curzon disagreed with Lloyd George’s handling
of the French and his strong partisanship for the Greeks, he particularly objected to his habit of
conducting policy without informing the Foreign Office. The knowledge that, on several occasions,
Curzon was not completely in the prime minister’s confidence, simply intensified his bitterness.115
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Clearly, Kerr’s activities as Lloyd George’s private secretary and foreign policy adviser inspired
considerable resentment, notably on the part of very powerful men in very high places. Curzon described
Kerr as “a most unsafe and insidious intermediary, being full both of ability and guile. He was the chosen
agent of most of his master's intrigues.” Curzon and Balfour both felt that Kerr’s role as a “second
Foreign Office” undermined their authority as foreign secretaries.116 Sir Henry Wilson described Kerr’s
influence as “poisonous.”117

Winston Churchill, whose schemes for large-scale Allied intervention

against the Bolsheviks had been halted by Kerr, also objected to Kerr’s position. In June 1920, he told
Lord Riddell, proprietor of the News of the World, and a friend of Lloyd George:
At present the P.M. is conducting the business of the Foreign Office with Kerr’s
assistance. I don’t think that any man who does not hold a leading position in the State
should be permitted to exercise so much influence on important questions as Kerr does. I
told him so the other night. I said to him, “You have no real responsibility. If things go
wrong, others have to take the consequences. All you have to do is walk out of Downing
Street.” They are formulating schemes which affect the lives of millions and the
destinies of the world, and all this is done behind the scenes.118
During the years from 1917 to 1921, Kerr’s primary role was to make sure that important matters
came to Lloyd George’s attention. The prime minister praised his service in this capacity: “I could not
have kept fully in touch with events abroad without Mr. Kerr’s intelligent and informed vigilance.”119
Moreover, he said, “the depth and the breadth of his intellectual capacity impressed some of the greatest
men” of the day, Clemenceau, Wilson, and Venezelos, who “treated him, not as a Prime Minister’s
secretary, but as if he were an emissary to the Conference, and a very important one.”120 At the same
time, he helped to manage events and he had a hand in some of the key decisions of war and peace. His
distinctive contribution was to encourage a moral emphasis in the prime minister’s public statements and
policies. His actual influence on policy, however, is more difficult to assess. While there is little doubt
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that the prime minister gave great consideration to Kerr’s suggestions, especially during and immediately
after the Paris Peace Conference, Lloyd George brusquely dismissed his secretary’s advice whenever it
did not serve his needs at the moment.121 Moreover, Kerr clearly failed in his larger ambitions to
recentralize the British Empire and to establish a peacetime partnership with the United States.
Nevertheless, while the aftermath of the Great War effectively spelled the end of the Round Table
movement, Kerr became even more convinced that, by working together with the United States, a
reformed British Empire could anchor and extend a wider liberal civilization and preserve peace. For the
rest of his life, therefore, he would work to improve Anglo-American relations and to encourage United
States’ involvement in the world.122
Kerr in the 1920s
Kerr served as Lloyd George’s private secretary until March 1921, and as the managing editor of
the Daily Chronicle and a director of United Newspapers Ltd., which Lloyd George controlled, until
February 1922, when he resigned in order to withdraw to private life, to devote himself to religious study
and practice.123 Over the next three years, Kerr maintained no permanent employment. In October 1922,
following the collapse of the Lloyd George coalition, he turned down the offer of the Unionist candidacy
for Roxburghshire, stating to his mother Lady Anne Kerr, “I don’t think the old associations would
approve of my views at all.” He supported himself principally by lecture tours at home and in the United
States, and by free-lance journalism. He resumed writing articles for The Round Table in 1924; he also
wrote for the Christian Science Monitor, The Observer, and other papers.124
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As his interest in international affairs revived, Kerr tended to see the Foreign Office as an
obstacle to the diplomacy that he and his former Round Table colleagues had wanted to implement. His
war and postwar experience deepened a sense that ordinary diplomacy was not adequate to the needs of
the new world order.125 As early as July 1920, in a conversation with Lord Riddell, Kerr criticized the
methods and the outlook of the Foreign Office, whose professional diplomats had “no conception of
policy in its wider sense.” He believed that the narrow professional training of the diplomat did not and
could not provide a grasp of the interdependent problems of peace. For that reason, during the 1920s and
1930s, Kerr would at times try to influence events informally on his own, still infused with the confidence
of the Kindergarten that he could make things happen by operating behind the scenes.126
Over the 1920s, Kerr was particularly interested in and concerned with four fundamental issues.
First, he identified France as a primary source of tension in the international arena. His suspicions of
French motives, which had emerged at the Paris Peace Conference, remained constantly near the surface.
As early as 1920, he condemned the French for “unwisdom” in their treatment of Germany, and again in
1922, for their emphasis on building up “nothing but armaments.” His suspicions of France stirred again
in 1924, when the Labour government of Ramsay MacDonald considered the Geneva Protocol to
empower the League of Nations to enforce the arbitration of international disputes. In part, Kerr saw the
Protocol as a means by which to guarantee an unjust French domination over Germany.127
Kerr’s second main concern was, therefore, Germany. Kerr increasingly believed that the former
Allies must treat Germany with fairness. In the March 1925 Round Table, Kerr argued that any new
agreement to keep Germany down would be unjust and untenable:

125

For further information about British foreign policy in the interwar period, see Paul W. Doerr, British Foreign
Policy 1919-39 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998); Alan Farmer, Britain: Foreign Affairs, 1919-39,
3rd ed. (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 2006); W. N. Medlicott, British Foreign Policy Since Versailles, 1919-1939,
2nd ed. (London: Metheun, 1968); and David Reynolds, Britannia Overruled: British Policy and World Power in the
Twentieth Century (London and New York: Longman, 1991).
126

Billington, 71-72, 73.

127

Billington, 90; Butler, Lord Lothian, 78, 111-114; Roberts, 113.

111
Germany will never submit to her present position of subordination forever. She would
not be the great nation she is if she did. Eventually she will demand the right to the free
control of all her own territory, and to deal with her neighbours on equal terms. She will
demand the evacuation of the Rhineland and that she be allowed either to bring her own
armaments up to the levels of those of France or that France bring her armaments down
to the German level. And if these demands are . . . denied her, she will begin to prepare
to recover her equality and independence by force of arms, as she did a century ago.
These words marked a striking change from Kerr’s assurances to the French at the Paris Peace
Conference in March 1919. At that time, he had assured the French of an Anglo-American counterweight
behind them; now he spoke of the need for Germany to equal France.128 In fact, he never believed that
the peace terms, as harsh as they had been, had been designed to keep Germany down indefinitely.
Although Kerr had insisted, in his letter covering the Allied reply to the German Observations in June
1919, that Germany accept moral guilt for the war and make restitution, he nevertheless assumed that, at
some point, when those terms had been fulfilled, Germany would have the right to return to the
community of nations. To Kerr, therefore, the 1923 French action in the Ruhr represented a policy of
vengeance that repudiated the idea of reconciliation.129
Third, Kerr remained sharply opposed to any binding international agreements, particularly those
that involved an obligation to go to war.130 Although he became somewhat reconciled to the League of
Nations in its weakened form, and saw the League’s Assembly as a forum in which Britain might
influence world opinion,131 Kerr nevertheless remained skeptical about its overall effectiveness.
Furthermore, he grew increasingly unsympathetic to any British involvement in the affairs of the
continent altogether. In 1922, for example, he applauded the British government’s refusal to make an
Anglo-French alliance that promised British military support in the event of any German infringement of
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the Treaty of Versailles. The League, he believed, should restrict itself to considering such issues as
armaments, the use of the high seas, the treatment of backward peoples or minorities, and any other
international questions “which must all be looked at from a world point of view.”132 Kerr also opposed
Britain’s consideration of the Geneva Protocol. In the March 1925 Round Table, as the MacDonald
cabinet considered the Protocol, he asked whether Britain intended, “automatically and perpetually, to
guarantee the existing Polish-Russian frontier?” What would happen if the United States went to war
with a League member? Britain certainly could not automatically side with America’s enemy. Kerr thus
welcomed the new Baldwin government’s veto of the Protocol in March 1925.

Kerr was equally

skeptical of the Locarno treaties of October 1925, whereby Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and Belgium
signed security treaties recognizing and guaranteeing each others’ frontiers, including the western border
of Germany. In the December 1925 Round Table, he wrote that, “Frankly we are profoundly concerned at
the possible consequences of an arrangement under which Great Britain will abandon her freedom of
choice and the advantages of her geographical position to the extent now proposed. In 1927, he declared
that the League ought to concentrate on developing both public opinion and the machinery behind the
idea “that no alteration of the existing status quo in any part of the world, and that no settlement of an
international dispute should be attempted by force,” and stressed that the League should not try to resolve
special problems: “The attempt, made in the [League] Protocol, to link up the League with special
problems, such as the stability of the Versailles settlement or the Franco-German problem, is
fundamentally unsound and destructive of the central concept of the League.”

Issues such as the

Rhineland problem and international security guarantees should, he argued, “be settled by normal
diplomatic means, quite apart from the League.”133
Above all else, Kerr was driven by his desire to strengthen Anglo-American relations. He
continued to believe that American entry into the League of Nations was critical to its success and he
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remained convinced that an Anglo-American understanding was the foundation for any workable
international order. In 1920, Kerr told the Reverend J. Morgan Gibbon:
There is no more important work than to establish a good understanding between the
American and British democracies. The future largely depends upon the co-operation of
all the great Western democracies in the colossal task of rebuilding the world on better
lines than those which crashed in ruins during the great war. It is especially on our two
countries that the responsibility rests because they have now in especial degree, the
wealth, and as I believe, the ideals, necessary to the making of a new and better world.
He maintained that Great Britain and America would be able to cooperate, in spite of “hostile and
estranging propaganda,” because “the ideals which lie at the bottom of their social, political and religious
life are fundamentally the same.”134
Throughout the 1920s, , Kerr continued to encourage the United States to break with its
isolationist traditions and, in partnership with Britain, take a more active role in running the world.135 “It
is not too much to say,” he wrote in 1922, “that if the British Commonwealth is to survive, and if the
world is to be guided towards unity and peace, it is essential that the United States and the British
Commonwealth should act in friendly co-operation.” In another 1922 essay, he warned Americans that in
any international organization, force was needed to back up the rule of law, and that “the most serious
blow” to European peace since the war had been “the withdrawal of [America’s] presence and counsel
from the consideration of post-war problems.” He also maintained that nations needed “to recognize that
they belong to the larger community of nations” and that the United States and Britain should “combin[e]
with other nations to give some kind of constitutional system to the world.” There “has been placed in a
special way upon the shoulders of the English-speaking nations in this century,” he declared,
the task of helping mankind to draw up and establish that just world constitution without
which it can have neither lasting peace, freedom, nor opportunity. No other peoples seem
so well situated to take the lead, though they can and will cooperate; and it seems to me
that America, with its high ideals, its great traditions, its immense strength, is inevitably
marked out to take a leading part in this work.136
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In 1925, Kerr became the secretary to the Rhodes Trust,137 thus providing him with yet another
opportunity to facilitate and cultivate closer Anglo-American cooperation.138 Established in 1903 under
the will of Cecil Rhodes, the Rhodes Trust was designed to foster closer relations among the Englishspeaking nations, primarily by providing funds for American and Empire students to attend Oxford
University. The principal work of the secretary was to administer the Rhodes Scholarships.139 Rhodes’s
interest in the United States was particularly appealing to Kerr. Rhodes had argued that if the United
States and Britain descended into conflict, the world would “break into pieces,” whereas if they could
combine their resources, “they were invulnerable.”140 Kerr agreed, suggesting that, whereas Woodrow
Wilson’s ideas of international organization had been too ambitious, there was much to be said for “the
Rhodes thesis that the first step towards stable world peace is the re-construction in some form of the
wartime association of the English-speaking nations.”141
Kerr’s tenure as secretary, which lasted until 1939, far lengthier than any previous secretary,
enabled him to undertake his most sustained work yet for Anglo-American relations. He used his position
to deepen his knowledge of the United States by visiting annually, traveling extensively in almost every
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state, and acquiring considerable understanding of the American political system, as well as a vast, near
legendary network of friends within the political, academic, journalistic, and Christian Science worlds.142
His goal specifically was to produce Rhodes Scholars who would someday reach positions of influence,
imbued with the ideals of liberal-democratic civilization. So vital did Kerr believe the scholarships to be
in the selection and cultivation of exceptional leaders that, in the spring of 1929, he used his political
influence to push through Parliament a bill altering the terms of Rhodes’s will. According to the Rhodes
Trust Act, scholarships would no longer rotate automatically through each American state, but be
awarded on merit in larger districts of six states apiece.143
During the mid-to-late 1920s, Kerr’s efforts to improve and promote Anglo-American
cooperation focused particularly upon a handful of generally divisive issues. One of the most contentious
involved tensions arising from the ongoing Anglo-American naval rivalry.144 Kerr devoted much time
attempting to persuade educated opinion in both countries that the naval dispute required a deeper
political solution. The solution, he wrote Lionel Curtis on 2 September 1927, was to educate American
opinion: “Personally I am convinced that the forces for righteousness are so strong in the U.S. that when
they awake to the question they will bring the U.S. into line for the world commonwealth. But they are
not awake now, and it will take a long period of education and experience to teach them about the realities
of the position.”145 Moreover, in 1927, at the height of tension preceding the Geneva conference, Kerr
corresponded with British Admiralty officials, suggesting potential strategies to allay Anglo-American
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naval suspicions. Following the failure of the conference, moreover, he published several articles on
naval policy in The Round Table, dispatching numerous copies of each to influential friends in the United
States, Britain, and the Dominions, in politics, business, journalism, and law. In the March 1928 Round
Table, he wrote that the dispute over naval parity presupposed the possibility of an Anglo-American
conflict. The only risk of conflict in any future war, he argued, would occur over freedom of the seas if
one or the other power was neutral. Therefore, the basic issue was not the rights of a belligerent at sea,
“but the question of when belligerents should be allowed to interfere with neutral commerce.” If both
sides agreed in advance on the circumstances in which one or the other could rightly close the seas, Kerr
suggested, then neither power would come into conflict.146 The reaction in the United States was
generally positive. The New Republic, in an editorial of 4 April 1928, praised Kerr’s article. “For a
while, [a quest for naval supremacy] seemed to The New Republic the most reasonable explanation of
British behavior. We are convinced . . . by the explanation in the Round Table . . . that the British did not
harbor any such intention.”147
Kerr also used public and private avenues to address the ongoing dilemma regarding the League
of Nations. Although skeptical about its overall effectiveness, he remained convinced that the League
would remain hopelessly impotent without the United States. Consequently, Kerr continued to look for
ways to make League membership more palatable to Washington. In the spring of 1928, for example,
with the conclusion of the Kellogg-Briand Peace Pact,148 Kerr promptly offered amendments that might
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allow for the United States to commit to consultations in the event of war, and thus tie Washington closer
to the League of Nations, and perhaps even accept some form of membership.149
Kerr also called for more contact among non-professional diplomats. Specifically, in his 22
March speech before the National Council for the Prevention of War, he urged both sides to “go slow on
conferences and treaties for the next few years.” Instead, he called for informal talks among bankers,
business leaders, and journalists on both sides of the Atlantic.

As venues for such contacts, he

undoubtedly had in mind two institutions, the Royal Institute of International Affairs, or Chatham House,
in London, and its American sister organization, the Council on Foreign Relations, both of which were
founded in 1919. Kerr believed that the solution to greater Anglo-American cooperation was contact and
education. In April 1928, for example, he wrote to Francis Bourdillon, secretary of Chatham House, that
“The greatest obstacle to good Anglo-American relations to-day is the ignorance and therefore the
misunderstanding and suspicion between the political classes on both sides of the Atlantic.”150
Tensions between Washington and London, however, escalated with the breakdown of the
Geneva naval talks in 1927, which precipitated talk of war, and with the Anglo-French naval compromise
of 1928. Kerr vehemently denounced the Anglo-French accord, on the one hand, because of its adverse
impact upon Anglo-American relations. Whatever London had intended, Washington no doubt saw the
agreement as a British effort to maintain its naval supremacy. On the other hand, he suspected that the
French were again trying to secure a British guarantee against Germany. Kerr told Ramsay MacDonald
in December 1928 that British statesmen “ought continuously to press upon the French . . . that they can
get the security they want through Anglo-French-German agreement . . . and that they cannot get security
by trying to draw Great Britain into an entente which has an anti-German point.”151
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Kerr therefore spearheaded efforts to alleviate the growing tensions between the United States
and Britain primarily by establishing coordinated study groups.

In 1928–1929, Chatham House

established a “Special Group on Anglo-American Relations,” chaired by Kerr, whose findings predictably
contended that close cooperation between the two powers was in the best interests of both. Britain and
the United States, he maintained, shared common political ideals and economic interests, while no
territorial disputes divided them. He argued that if Britain and the United States stood for liberty,
democracy, and the rule of law, then these values called out for a common defense: “If the United States
and Great Britain really make up their minds not only not to go to war with one another as they have more
or less done, but that they will use their whole influence and power to prevent other powers from settling
their disputes by war, at any rate on the high seas, the risk of their getting to cross purposes about
interference with one another’s trade in time of war becomes immensely less.” The Council on Foreign
Relations issued their June 1929 report, which drew substantially upon the recent articles by Kerr in
International Affairs and The Round Table. It argued that war between the United States and Britain
should be unthinkable and that, while economic concerns might cause dissension, the only reason such a
conflict might arise was potential British interference with United States shipping in a war in which
America remained neutral. As a result, it suggested that, since there was no guarantee that the KelloggBriand Pact alone would prevent future wars, Britain and the United States should coordinate their
policies toward subsequent controversies between other nations. Fearing that the Senate would not ratify
such a treaty, the group recommended that, following the precedent of the hallowed Monroe Doctrine, it
should be implemented by executive action.152
In any event, Anglo-American relations began to improve fundamentally in 1929. Following the
American ratification of the Kellogg-Briand Pact on 15 January 1929, and the passage of a new Cruiser
Bill by Congress on 13 February,153 the new president, Herbert Hoover, directed the American
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disarmament negotiator in Geneva to take a more flexible position on naval parity and begin seeking
reductions. More important, in October 1929, Hoover and Ramsay MacDonald, who returned to office
following a general election in May, met in Washington and agreed to convene a naval conference in
London, which met from January to April 1930. A five-year treaty renewed the 1922 limits on aircraft
carriers and battleships, while both sides obtained the right to build the cruisers each wanted.
Throughout all of this, Kerr’s role in facilitating Anglo-American cooperation did not go
unnoticed or unappreciated. Christian A. Herter, a future American secretary of state, thanked Kerr for
his efforts to relieve tensions between London and Washington: “It is a curious fact that you seem to be
doing more toward bringing an intelligent realization of the situation to our people than anyone else.” In
Britain, figures to the left of center, such as MacDonald, sought his advice, while conservatives and
diplomats treated Kerr as someone who might be useful, if not altogether trusted.154
Lothian the Appeaser
In March 1930, Kerr succeeded his cousin as the eleventh Marquis of Lothian.155 He also served
briefly in the government.

In August 1931, the Labour cabinet split over whether to reduce

unemployment compensation in order to close a budget deficit. To enforce austerity, MacDonald formed
a National Government on 25 August. Conservatives and Liberals joined, but almost all of the Labour
MPs refused, and the Labour party expelled MacDonald and the few who did.156 MacDonald wanted to
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include a prominent Liberal peer in the Cabinet, but not as the head of a major department. Lord Lothian
agreed to accept such a role as chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, a cabinet-level office that oversaw
the estates of the King. In the general election of 27 October 1931, however, the Liberal and Labour
parties lost most of their seats. MacDonald reconstituted the National Government, which now depended
upon a Conservative majority. Lothian stepped down, but quickly agreed to accept appointment as
undersecretary to the Conservative Sir Samuel Hoare, the new secretary of state for India.157 His service
as undersecretary ended abruptly, however, when he resigned in September 1932 to protest the
government’s decision to implement Imperial Preference.158
Over the course of the 1930s, therefore, Lothian focused on his continuing responsibilities as the
secretary of the Rhodes Trust. As the international situation began to deteriorate, Lothian became
increasingly concerned with matters of security and the prospect, however initially remote, of war. His
growing concerns about war, particularly in the absence of the United States from any meaningful
collective security arrangement, ultimately led Lothian into the most notorious episode of his career, his
support for the appeasement of Nazi Germany.159
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During the early 1930s, Lothian became sufficiently skeptical of the League of Nations that he
advocated a British withdrawal, not merely from the League, but from any further commitments to the
continent as well. As early as 1931, for example, he wrote that, should the forthcoming European
disarmament conference break down, Britain should withdraw from European affairs altogether and
consider as nonbinding any obligation to participate in a war in Europe.160 League sanctions against
nations defined as aggressors would, he feared, prove ineffective. Lothian effectively endorsed the
viewpoint of his friend, The Round Table’s editor John Dove, that Britain should avoid commitment to
any side in Europe, and above all should deliberately “take the line most likely to bring America in in the
hour of need, and to enable us even before then to co-operate.”161 Speaking in 1934 at Chatham House,
Lothian suggested that Britain restrict its European commitments to a guarantee of French and Belgian
security, and otherwise withdraw from the European system, a position he reiterated in another address in
April 1936,162 and in a lengthy personal letter of 3 June 1936 to foreign secretary Anthony Eden.163 In
1937, he told the House of Lords that Britain should emulate the American policy of “armed neutrality,”
and that the only way to prevent another world war would be “if both the United States and Great Britain
remained outside any alliance system either in Europe or in the Far East.”164
Lothian remained committed, above all else, to closer Anglo-American cooperation and
friendship. As the Depression deepened in the 1930s, Lothian tried privately to work for ways to end it,
primarily in partnership with the United States. In January 1933, President-elect Franklin Roosevelt
agreed to meet with MacDonald in Washington to discuss the issue of British war debts. In order to
prepare for the prime minister’s visit, Lothian made a three-week trip to the United States in January,
during which he tried to persuade influential Americans, including Colonel House, of the need to cancel
160

Butler, Lord Lothian, 122; Roberts, 116.

161

Roberts, 116-117.

162

Butler, Lord Lothian, 197-200; 213-217; Roberts, 117.

163

Butler, Lord Lothian, 354-362.

164

Roberts, 117.

122
Allied war debts. When MacDonald proved reluctant to visit Washington in the absence of some prior
agreement over how to resolve the question of debts, Lothian characteristically urged preliminary
meetings at a lower level before bringing the two leaders together. In a memorandum to British officials,
Lothian again noted that the key is educating the Americans: “Public opinion in the U.S.A. is still so
uneducated that the new Congress cannot be expected to ratify an agreement transferring permanently a
burden of some $250,000,000 a year to the backs of American taxpayers.” In an Observer article of 19
February 1933, he argued that lower tariffs and the remission of debts were essential to reviving the
global trade on which America’s own resources depended.165 Later, in 1937, moreover, the Council on
Foreign Relations and the Royal Institute of International Affairs each established subgroups on war debts
and trade practices that exchanged highly confidential memoranda and other documents across the
Atlantic and commented on their proposals and analyses. Lothian joined the war debts subgroup. This
group sought a settlement of British war debts (on which Britain had defaulted in 1933) that the British
could afford and Americans would accept. Lothian’s principal concern was to make such proposals
politically acceptable in both the United States and Britain. He suggested that, in the interests of
improving Anglo-American relations, Britain resume at least token payments on its debt.166
In addition to searching for ways to effect economic cooperation, Lothian also sought to encourage
greater Anglo-American cooperation with respect to military security. In the June 1930 Round Table, he
argued that if Britain were forced to choose between “a Europe drifting back to the balance of power on
the one hand, and the United States on the other, she will inevitably choose the latter.”167 Furthermore,
Lothian continued to call upon the United States, through articles, lectures, and correspondence, to
become more active in global affairs -- to join, or at least be regularly represented at, the League of
165
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Nations, and to support efforts at collective security. In a letter to Colonel House, of 11 April 1933, he
warned that much of Europe was drifting toward reaction and dictatorship. In part, Lothian reminded
House, this was due to Washington’s decision not to join the League of Nations. The American decision
deprived the states of Europe of a “neutral and moderating influence,” and forced France, deprived of the
security of an Anglo-American promise of protection, to seek cooperation in a system of military
alliances with the Little Entente, and thus making virtually impossible the “effective scaling down of
reparations” that was originally contemplated. The only solution was that the United States must become
active in world affairs:
. . . it reinforces what I am completely convinced of to-day, that unless the United States
comes right forward into international affairs now, you will in the next year or two have a
further triumph for reaction, a further war, with the Liberal nations of 1919 not
triumphant but confronted with a more formidable combination than that which they had
to meet in 1914.168
Most important, Lothian worked to avert an Anglo-Japanese agreement in 1934 that, he feared,
would have antagonized the United States government. In the spring and summer of 1934, as British
policymakers began to recognize Germany as a significant potential threat, many leading politicians and
civil servants -- most notably Neville Chamberlain, Chancellor of the Exchequer, Sir Samuel Hoare,
Secretary of State for India, Sir Warren Fisher, permanent under-secretary at the Treasury, and Sir Robert
Vansittart -- supported an Anglo-Japanese naval agreement.169 The advocates of refashioning the old
Anglo-Japanese alliance poured scorn on the United States. Chamberlain said that “we ought to know by
this time that USA will give us no undertaking to resist by force any action by Japan, short of an attack on
Hawaii and Honolulu.” Fisher, who was reported to “hate” the Americans as much as Vansittart “hated”
the Germans, remarked that the Americans “are no use to use, ,but make use of us – to our detriment –
vis-à-vis Japan.” Vansittart added: “I still desire as much as ever, that we shall get on well with this
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untrustworthy race . . . [but] we shall never get very far; they will always let us down.” He complained
that the American public and Congress were “too stupid, and, above all, too self-righteous. . . . In ageing I
have lost my wind for running after the United States Government. It is a futile paper chase.”170 In
response, a political alliance, consisting of The Times and Observer newspapers, Lothian, and General Jan
Christian Smuts, emerged in opposition to any rapprochement with Japan.171 Lothian, as part of his effort
to nudge Washington, obtained an interview with Roosevelt during his visit to Washington in October
1934. In response to a Japanese naval buildup,172 he asserted, Britain could increase its fleet at Singapore,
form a common front with the United States, or seek a new agreement with Japan; the first option,
however, was too expensive, and the third was undesirable. Roosevelt sidestepped Lothian by arguing
that, even if he agreed informally to support London against Tokyo, his successor might not; the United
States, therefore, could not guarantee British security in the Pacific. In the end, the president told Lothian
to rely on the fact “that our ideals and interests [are] fundamentally the same.” “I doubt whether that is
enough,” Lothian responded.173
Lothian’s interview with Roosevelt drew some criticism in the Foreign Office, particularly among
those civil servants who detested his “amateur meddling” or who did not share Lothian’s enthusiasm for
the United States. Sir Robert Vansittart, permanent under-secretary in the Foreign Office, wrote that
“Lord Lothian told me recently and repeatedly that we had a ‘tiger in the White House’ who ‘would do
our fighting for us in the Far East.’” Vansittart dismissed Lothian’s assurances as nonsense and replied
that there was not a tiger in the White House, but a “rabbit in the hutch.”174 A clerk in the Far Eastern
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Department, R. Allen, wrote that “Lord Lothian, to say the least of it, does not seem to have converted the
president to his ‘front line’ views.” C. W. Price, a clerk in the Dominions Office, criticized Lothian
because he did not mention a fourth alternative, a joint non-aggression pact between Washington,
London, and Tokyo, “which as a matter of fact is that now being explored.”175 British officials indeed
began separate talks with the Japanese in late October 1934. Reports began appearing in the press that
Britain and Japan were exploring a three-way pact, by which Japan would obtain naval parity but would
not actually build up to this level. On 11 November 1934, Roosevelt warned Wilmot Lewis, the Times
correspondent in Washington, of his opposition to any such agreement and to any separate AngloJapanese deal. The next week, on 18 November, following the lead of General Smuts,176 Lothian
published an article in The Observer, in which he opposed any concessions to Japan that might antagonize
the United States. William Phillips, the American undersecretary of state, conveyed Secretary of State
Cordell Hull’s approval of Lothian’s article. As a result, the effort to achieve an agreement with Japan
gradually petered out. As a matter of fact, however, while Lothian, Smuts, and the Round Table took
credit for killing the “pro-Japanese movement,” powerful forces in the government had become hesitant
about coming to any accommodation with Japan; besides, the Japanese never seriously responded to
London’s overtures.177
British anxieties regarding both Japan and Germany nevertheless continued to escalate. In a letter
of 14 December 1934, Smuts wrote Lothian that it was not just the Pacific but Europe that needed to be
addressed: “We must prevent a Japanese-German combination which will be fatal. And this can only be
done by ceasing to treat Germany as a pariah.”178 It was within this context that Lothian became
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associated with the appeasement of Nazi Germany in the mid-to-late 1930s. In contrast to his hard line
approach with Japan, Lothian supported a more conciliatory approach to Germany. Throughout the 1920s
and the 1930s, Lothian was indeed a consistent advocate of the revision of the Treaty of Versailles and
accommodation with Germany.
Lothian advocated appeasement for a number of reasons.

One of the most fundamental

explanations was undoubtedly his passionate conviction that the Allied treatment of Germany, at the Paris
Peace Conference and particularly in the Treaty of Versailles, had been excessively vindictive and unjust.
In certain respects, this might have been the result of a sense of guilt.

In 1919, adhering to the

conventional wisdom that Germany was responsible for the war, Lothian approved a severe peace and
personally drafted the uncompromising reply to the German delegates. He believed, however, that the
more discriminating items would be modified in time. Article XIX of the League Covenant, for example,
provided for the reconsideration of treaties that had become inapplicable. As time passed and they were
not modified as he thought they should be, Lothian came more and more to feel that the Germans were
being denied justice, first in the form of equality of armaments, then in the form of an economic sphere of
influence in Central Europe. The principal obstacle to the realization of justice for Germany, he long
maintained, was the attitude of the French. Intellectually, Lothian sympathized with the French demand
for security, and in fact he blamed the American and British governments for having withdrawn from
their guarantee of assistance.

Nevertheless, in their respective approaches to collective security, he

denounced the French for their uncompromising insistence on harsh sanctions, while the British
emphasized “conference and goodwill, pacific procedure and disarmament.” He wrote that the source of
the present difficulty is that “the Germans have got a case, but nobody is really willing to make the
concessions necessary to meet their claims.”179
This is not to say that he excused Nazi excesses. Lothian was under no illusions about the
character of the Nazi regime. He was quite aware through his Christian Science associates and the
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Rhodes Trust that the Nazis were belligerent, repressive, and racist.180 Nevertheless, Lothian advocated
treating the Germans with equality, particularly with respect to armaments. The problem was that the
Allies still treated Germany as a defeated subservient state, almost fifteen years after the war. For
example, after finally conceding the principle of parity in land forces with Germany, the Allies in October
1933 asked Germany to accept an inferior position for the next four years. When Hitler responded by
withdrawing from the League of Nations, Lothian defended the German action. In a letter to The Times
on 15 November, he wrote that France and Germany both had legitimate security needs: “In these
circumstances, it is essential that we should understand . . . both sides, however much we may dislike the
Nazi regime.”181 In the December 1933 Round Table, he argued that the principal German grievance was
military inferiority: “Either Germany’s neighbours . . . must bring their armaments down, or Germany’s
will come up.” In advocating a position of fairness with Germany, Lothian urged the former Allies to
emulate the diplomats at the Congress of Vienna:
It was one of the supreme merits of the diplomacy of Castlereagh and Wellington that
they did not make the mistake of trying to ‘repress’ France after the Napoleonic wars.
And the best way to help restore a more liberal regime in Germany is to remove the
legitimate grievances by the exploitation of which the Nazis have so largely risen to
power.182
In other words, Germany simply wanted a peace for Germany commensurate with its strength and quality.
Consequently, although he was quite aware of the repressive features of the Nazi regime, Lothian chose to
blame these upon the treatment defeated Germany had endured since 1919.183 Ultimately, he believed
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that if the Germans could be compelled to sit down with the British in conference, “we could influence
them, I think, to moderate the brutality of their practice.”184
There were, however, other considerations that drove Lothian toward appeasement. He favored
an accommodation with Germany in part due to his own long standing fear of Bolshevism. He was
greatly impressed that Hitler was “profoundly occupied with Russia” as a problem of foreign policy. In
May 1935, the American ambassador in Berlin, William E. Dodd, who once noted that Lothian “seemed
to be more a Fascist than any other Englishman I have met,” accused Lothian of trying to turn Nazi
Germany against Soviet Russia: “That this might lead to a war between Russian and Germany does not
seem to disturb him seriously. In fact, he seems to feel this would be a good solution.” In July 1936,
Lothian himself wrote to the Duchess of Atholl, “I am not sure that Russia is not more dangerous than
Germany,” and in a November 1937 letter to James L. Garvin, he hoped that Germany would get “a free
hand for herself in dealing with Russia.”185
An equally powerful consideration that led Lothian to appeasement was his relentless desire to
effect closer relations between Britain and the United States. The fundamental and guiding principle of
his commitment to appeasement was his conviction that Britain absolutely had to remain out of a war that
it could not win, or that it could win only with substantial external assistance; and it was clear that, in any
major conflict, Britain could not hope to prevail unless it had the assistance of the United States. Lothian
in fact never made any real effort to address German grievances until Germany became strong enough to
pose a challenge to British power. His efforts to avert war by reaching some kind of understanding with
Hitler, by offering Germany colonies in Africa, for example, arguably arose not so much from his belief
that the postwar settlement had unfairly disadvantaged Germany, but from a clear and sober calculation
that, without American support and assistance, Britain was too weak to oppose Germany alone.186
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Furthermore, over the course of the 1930s, Lothian grew more committed to the idea that Britain
should disengage from the continent in large part because of his continuing hope of drawing the United
States out of its isolation. In his Chatham House address of 2 April 1936, following the German
remilitarization of the Rhineland, he observed that an alliance between the United States and the British
Empire would have a preponderance of naval power in the world and would be “a real nucleus round
which a League of democratic nations could exist in security.” Two obstacles, however, stood in the way
of such a grouping: commitments to Europe that the United States was unwilling to make, and the fact
that the United States “has yet to realise . . . that her own security and peace may be made more certain by
partial than by total isolation.” In his 3 June 1936 letter to the new foreign secretary Anthony Eden,
Lothian urged a policy of British abstention from the continent in order to make an Anglo-American
partnership more attractive to the United States.

Although he received no encouragement from

Americans, it appears clear that he was willing to risk allowing Germany to grow stronger while he
waited for the United States to assume a greater role in the world.187
Lothian had his first significant meetings with Nazi leaders on a visit to Berlin in late January
1935. Although he went to Berlin to meet with the German Rhodes committee, the German embassy in
London urged that Lothian be given full access to Nazi leaders. Consequently, he met with future
Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop, Defense Minister Werner Blomberg, Deputy Führer Rudolf
Hess, and Dr. Albrecht Haushofer of the German Foreign Ministry.188 Most significant, Lothian met with
Adolf Hitler at noon on Tuesday, 29 January 1935.189 The interview was primarily a monologue by the
Führer, who obsessed on the Russian menace. Hitler demanded a three-way agreement that treated
Germany, France, and Britain as military equals. In response, Lothian asked if Germany would sign a
general agreement to stabilize Europe for ten years. Specifically, Lothian raised three questions:
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Lothian: (1) Germany would never endeavor to settle the Polish question except by
peaceful means, as in the Polish Treaty.
Hitler: Certainly, I agree.
Lothian: (2) Frontiers with France settled. No more resort to force here.
Hitler: Certainly. Most absolutely correct.
Lothian: (3) No intention of settling Austrian question by force, although this did not
rule out eventually changing the situation by a free plebiscite.
Hitler (passionately): Force absolutely ruled out.
When Hitler expressed the hope that Germany and Britain could together keep the peace, Lothian replied
that Cecil Rhodes had envisioned a partnership between Germany, Great Britain, and the United States,
but that Germany’s intentions were still unclear. He further expressed the hope that meetings such as this
one would help to remove misunderstanding. Hitler thanked Lothian for his kindness.190
Lothian, highly impressed, returned to London on 30 January and reported his meeting to the
foreign secretary, Sir John Simon. He pronounced himself convinced that “Germany does not want war
and is prepared to renounce it absolutely . . . provided she is given real equality.” Consequently, he urged
direct talks with Germany on the grounds that Berlin wanted to be an equal party to arms negotiations and
not just be dictated terms from Paris and London. Lothian asserted that concessions would eventually
moderate the nature of the regime, and that Hitler would behave more decently if his reasonable demands
were met, which included the ending of the punitive clauses of the treaty, the assimilation of Germanspeaking areas into Germany where plebiscites showed themselves in favor, and the creation of “a sort of
Ottawa economic mitteleuropa.”191 Lothian also wrote two articles for The Times, on 31 January and 1
February 1935, in which he argued that a ten-year peace agreement between all European powers was
possible if Germany was treated as an equal. Lothian unmistakably was charmed by the Führer: “He
seemed to me to have the qualities of a prophet, which in this country is a term of respect . . . He is indeed
the prophet of the new Germany.” He confidently told Eden that, if appropriate concessions were made
to Germany, there was “a good chance of the 25 years peace of which Hitler spoke.”192
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Lothian’s initiatives, however, were not altogether welcomed in all quarters. Many in the Foreign
Office frankly thought that Lothian had been suckered. For example, Sir Robert Vansittart described
Lothian’s unshakable faith in the sincerity of the German attitude as “unpardonable.”193 ” Ralph Wigram,
head of the Central European department in the Foreign Office, noted that the Germans wanted approval
of their rearmament in return for guarantees that they had already given in the Locarno treaties and in the
German-Polish non-aggression pact of 1934. He wrote: “What a ‘marché des dupes,’ and how it recalls
the similar methods of duplicity which our state papers show that Germany practised towards us before
the war.”194 Others, such as Leonard Montefiore, a British Jewish leader, denounced Lothian’s defense of
the Nazi regime.
Lothian countered his opponents by arguing that Nazi excesses and brutality could be moderated
by treating Germany with respect:
In some degree the brutality of National Socialism is the reaction to the treatment given
to Germany herself since the war. I believe the best way of restoring reasonable rights to
the Jews in Germany is not to counter hate with hate but to undermine the source of the
evil aspects of National Socialism by giving Germany her rightful place in Europe.195
At the same time, however, Lothian clearly understood the precarious nature of Anglo-German relations.
During the spring of 1935, for example, in response to the aggravation of international tensions
precipitated by German rearmament,196 Lothian warned Ribbentrop on two separate occasions that British
opinion was shifting against Germany. Similarly, in late June 1935, Lothian tried to impress upon
Ribbentrop how deeply the brutality of the Nazi regime was precluding closer Anglo-German relations.197
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As the Nazi regime grew more and more violent and as its armed forces grew stronger, Lothian
began privately to air reservations. He attempted to intercede on behalf of victims of Nazi persecution
and he accepted the chairmanship of the German Refugees Assistance Fund, an umbrella organization of
groups that assisted victims of the regime to emigrate. He came to rely more and more on religious faith
to sustain his hope of peace with Germany. For example, during his last meeting with Hitler in 1937,
Lothian protested the Nazi harassment of Christian Scientists and the Nazi edict of December 1936
banning Christian Science activity in Germany. When the ban ended after his return home, Lothian
credited spiritual effort with the change: “Clearly everybody concerned had done good metaphysical
work.” In July 1935, however, Lothian declined to sign a public statement denouncing Nazi brutality,
“not because I do not sympathise with it but because . . . to sign it would lessen any influence I have for
the very purpose you have in view.” As such initiatives and entreaties to Berlin typically met with
silence, Lothian saw little point in persisting with them: “I do not believe that individual protests . . . will
have any effect except to salve our consciences,” he wrote to Lord Clifford Allen in October 1935.198
While privately, he began to betray signs of lassitude, publicly, Lothian persisted in appeasement
of Germany in the belief that justice demanded removing the conditions imposed on Germany in 1919. In
an address to Chatham House on 2 April 1936, he defended the German remilitarization of the Rhineland
as a response to a Franco-Russian pact of mutual assistance, ratified on 28 February 1936.199 After all,
the Germans were, he was widely reported to have said, only occupying “their own back garden.”200
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Although Lothian remained focused on trying to moderate German policy while facilitating
conciliation, his doubts nevertheless grew. On 14 July 1936, he was the keynote speaker at a London
dinner of the Anglo-German Fellowship, an elite social group with members in both countries. Before an
audience of Nazi and British dignitaries, he declared:
Germany now has both equality and strength. Reparations have gone. Part V [the
military clauses] of the Treaty of Versailles has gone. The demilitarization of the
Rhineland has gone, and the sooner that recovery of her natural right of self-defence is
accepted without further discussion the better. [But] if Britain makes this contribution to
appeasement . . . Germany has also her contribution to make. Let me speak plainly.
There are aspects of the internal policy of the National Socialist State which are a serious
obstacle to the establishment of cordial relations between the British and the German
people. Everyone knows what they are. And the speed and extent of Germany’s
rearmament has caused a not unnatural anxiety as to the ultimate intentions of German
policy.
Lothian called on Britain, therefore, to rearm, declaring that “whether for defense or in negotiation we
must play our cards from strength and not from weakness.”201
Lothian met with Hitler a second time on 4 May 1937, during which he called attention to a
recent speech by Anthony Eden, in which the foreign secretary seemed to imply that eastern Europe was
not a British interest.202 Lothian suggested that Germany recognize the independence of its smaller
eastern neighbors in return for economic and political ties similar to those Britain had with its Dominions.
Hitler, however, was evasive.203 Upon his return to Britain, Lothian sent a memorandum and transcripts
of his interview with Hitler to Chamberlain, Eden, Jan Christian Smuts, Roosevelt, and, to the annoyance
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of the Foreign Office, to the Dominion prime ministers, presently in London for the Coronation of King
George VI. He reported that, while the situation was “both more dangerous and more soluble than he
supposed,” German demands for union with Austria and a free hand in Eastern Europe were not
unreasonable. They amounted to “adjustments” in Eastern Europe, including union with Austria and
favorable treatment for German minorities in Poland and Czechoslovakia, as well as economic and
colonial arrangements that would assure to Germany a steadily rising standard of living for its people.204
Over the late 1930s, Lothian became increasingly uneasy with the appeasement policy. In
response to the Anschluss of 13 March 1938, Lothian again defended German actions as being consistent
with the principle of national self-determination. In a 14 March letter to The Times, he declared that “at
long last it ends the disastrous period when the League of Nations Powers attempted . . . to deny to the
Germans, who were certainly not soley responsible for the Great War, their national unity.” At long last,
he wrote, “the wrong done to Germany” had been corrected. At the same time, however, while Lothian
described the Anschluss as a legitimate grievance that needed to be resolved, he expressed concerns that
Germany might go beyond what was “legitimate.”205 He therefore argued that the Allies needed to
prepare for conflict. He stressed that remaining issues could now be negotiated, but “only if we and the
other democracies show not only physical strength but moral discipline and resolution.” Therefore, he
told the House of Lords in the spring of 1938, some kind of national service was necessary. Moreover,
the government’s new programme for air expansion was quite inadequate. Britain needed parity in the
air, or conscription, and should set up a Ministry of Supply. In late May 1938, when the threat of war
became real,206 Lord Halifax, who replaced Eden as foreign secretary in early 1938, asked Lothian to
write a firm but conciliatory letter to The Times that would be read in Berlin. Lothian sent a draft but
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wrote to the foreign secretary that the time for such a letter had passed: “I confess that I do not think it
will have any modifying effect in high quarters in Berlin because what has annoyed them is that we took
action, wittingly or unwittingly, which made them realize that we had to be counted in on the other side in
the event of resort to violence.”207
The Munich crisis marked the beginning of a turning point for Lothian.208 He was out of the
country when the crisis broke in September 1938.209 Although he tended to blame the Czechs themselves,
as tools of the French, for the growing tensions, Lothian urged Halifax to warn Hitler that if Germany
invades Czechoslovakia, “it means war.” Nevertheless, he ultimately shared the widespread relief that
Britain and France had averted war by making concessions to Hitler at Munich.210 Over the next several
months, however, he began truly to appreciate the Nazi danger. After his return to London in October, he
learned of Hitler’s bullying of Chamberlain in Munich. More chilling, however, on the night of 9-10
November 1938, a nationwide pogrom erupted in Germany against the country’s remaining Jews.211 In
the Observer, of 20 November 1938, Lothian called for Allied firmness:
Will [Germany, Italy, and Japan] . . . decide to be content with the new situation they
have created? Or will they continue, alone or together, to try to alter the status quo by
mobilizing overwhelming superiority at particular points or with greater audacity decide
to challenge that predominance in the oceanic world which the democratic Powers still
unquestioningly possess, and which is the condition on which alone free institutions and
democracy can survive? The answer will depend on whether the democratic Powers can
oppose to such plans of expansion a sufficient force to make them unattainable.212
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In December 1938, Lothian declined a renewed invitation to travel to Germany for another AngloGerman discussion, which had been planned for the spring, but interrupted by the Anschluss.213
The German invasion of Bohemia and Moravia, and the final German dismemberment of
Czechoslovakia in March 1939, simply confirmed what Lothian began to realize in September 1938; the
Nazi regime was determined to wage war. The invasion of non-German territory indeed removed all
possible doubts as to German ambitions. In the meantime, he read, for the first time, the unexpurgated
edition of Mein Kampf.214 Judging from his words, he underwent a transforming experience. In a letter to
Thomas Lamont, of J.P. Morgan and Company, Lothian wrote that Hitler’s attack on the remainder of
Czechoslovakia was “very serious”:
Up till then it was possible to believe that Germany was only concerned with recovery of
what might be called the normal rights of a great power, but it now seems clear that Hitler
is in effect a fanatical gangster who will stop at nothing in order to beat down all
possibility of resistance anywhere to his will. The rapid consolidation of the democracies
so that he cannot dominate the West because its resources are effectively organised to
prevent it is the vital need of the hour.215
On 12 April 1939, furthermore, he denounced Hitler in the House of Lords:
One of Herr Hitler’s great advantages has been that, for very long, what he sought a great
many people all over the world felt was not unreasonable, whatever they may have
though of his methods. But that justification has completely and absolutely disappeared
in the last three months . . . Everything that has happened since then proves that what we
are confronted with is the most ruthless use of the most ruthless power to remake the
world according to plans which are set forth in Mein Kampf.
Lothian now endorsed the “Grand Alliance” of nations that Winston Churchill had proposed a year earlier
and described the Anglo-French alliance with the Soviet Union now “absolutely vital.” He added, most
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likely with Franklin Roosevelt in mind, that to merit the support of the Dominions and the United States,
“it is absolutely essential that we should prove to the world that we are capable of giving an effective
resistance to aggression.”216 He wrote Aga Khan that it would be necessary to resist Hitler with force:
“the organization of resistance to Hitler is the necessary preliminary to a real settlement. I have recently
studied the unexpurgated edition of ‘Mein Kampf’ and it is quite clear that his mind is fundamentally
strategic.”217 He also wrote Geoffrey Dawson, and asked him to dispel the “widespread suspicion that
The Times [is] ready to surrender Danzig.” Lothian’s position indeed represented a remarkable volte-face
from the views he had previously held. Very few, after all, had championed the pro-appeasement spirit
more fervently and campaigned more strenuously on its behalf. Although he still believed that Germany
had been grievously wronged by Versailles, Lothian believed that Hitler’s obliteration of Czech
independence meant that there could be no more concessions and no more surrendering to blackmail.218
Until the end of his life, Lothian had to answer for his commitment to appeasement and his
confidence in Hitler. He faced the criticism, however, openly and frankly. When he paid a brief visit to
the United States over the winter 1938-1939, Lothian met with American leaders, including Roosevelt, in
order to gauge American opinion in the wake of Munich. Among others, he met with his old friend Felix
Frankfurter. “I had a most intimate talk with Lothian,” Frankfurter briefed Roosevelt, and “[he] is now as
hot against Hitler as any of us, and said that Chamberlain now knows that his ‘appeasement’ policy is a
complete flop as to Hitler.”219 Similarly, shortly after assuming control of the British Embassy in the late
summer of 1939, he “admitted frankly” to Sir John Wheeler-Bennett, who became his personal assistant
in Washington, that “up to Hitler’s occupation of Prague, with its flagrant flouting of the Munich
Agreement, he had believed it to be possible that Germany was only concerned with treaty revision and
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regaining the status of a great power. It had now become clear to him that Hitler was a political gangster
who would stop at nothing, and who was determined to beat down all resistance to his will.”220
Lothian’s conversion was welcomed by many. The Duchess of Atholl, a Conversative MP, wrote
to congratulate him on coming around.221 John W. Dafoe, editor of the Winnipeg Free Press, and a
skeptic of the Round Table movement for 25 years, also approved as did the American Supreme Court
Justice Felix Frankfurter. In asking for a talk with him about general policy with regard to the United
States, Lothian wrote Sir Robert Vansittart on 11 May, “You have certainly been proved right in your
estimate of the true nature of the National Socialist regime, though if we had tried appeasement more
vigorously in the days of the Republic there might never been a Hitler after all.” “Yes, indeed,” replied
Vansittart, “how different things would have been if we had all provided the Republican regime in
Germany with greater concessions and so with greater authority and credit. We might all have lived
happily ever afterwards.”222
One obvious result of Lothian’s association with the policy of appeasement was considerable
damage to his reputation. In November 1937, the left-wing journalist, Claud Cockburn attacked the social
circle of Lady Nancy Astor, which included the Astors, Lothian, Geoffrey Dawson, James L. Garvin, and
R. M. Barrington, who wrote many foreign policy stories for The Times, dubbing it the “Cliveden Set”
after the Astor country estate, Cliveden. Although they all maintained a deep dislike for France, as well
as a conviction that Britain should establish friendship with Germany, critics exaggerated the influence of
this cabal. For example, Cockburn accused Lothian, Nancy Astor, Dawson, and other members of this
circle of trying to negotiate with Germany behind Eden’s back. It turned out, however, that on the
weekend of 23-24 October 1937, when a gathering to plot this activity allegedly took place, Eden was
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himself the guest of honor at Cliveden. Similarly, the left-wing press erred a few months later, when it
accused the Cliveden Set of having plotted in January 1938 to remove Eden. In fact, at the time, the
Astors were visiting the United States and Lothian was in India. Nevertheless, charges of a “Cliveden
Set” struck a popular chord and suggested that there indeed existed a convergence of social, political, and
intellectual influence, which perpetuated the policy of appeasement. They made no secret of their views,
nor did they hide their efforts to promote them, considering themselves a kind of self-appointed thinktank. On the contrary, they drew the widest publicity to themselves. Although it could not accurately be
described as a “second Foreign Office,” its critics saw their behavior as an amateur diplomatic, part-time
corps, entertaining ambassadors or flying off to Germany to sound out Hitler and his associates about the
chances of a European settlement. It was a natural target, a “defeatist, pampered group,” wrote Harold
Nicolson, which “prevented us from taking a strong line while it could made for peace.” Lothian, who
was seen as a “power broker among the dilettantes,” was an easy target because his access to three
powerful newspapers, The Round Table, The Times, and The Observer, at a time when print media were
the principal source of news and commentary in Britain, gave elevated prominence to his views. “Not a
very safe intermediary,” said Sir Robert Vansittart.223 Lothian thus became an object of popular ridicule.
David Low, the brilliant cartoonist of the Evening Standard, portrayed him, along with Nancy Astor,
Geoffrey Dawson, and J. L. Garvin, as the “Shiver Sisters,” dancing to the tune of Hitler's foreign policy,
choreographed by a gleeful Joseph Goebbels.224
Furthermore, much was made later about one notable weekend that seemed to suggest that
Lothian’s conversion in the spring was less than sincere. He spent the weekend of 3-4 June 1939 with the
Astors at Cliveden, where he dined with Halifax and other British political figures. The Astors’ son
David invited a friend from Oxford, the 1931 German Rhodes Scholar Adam von Trott zu Solz. Trott
was now an official in the German Foreign Office and was visiting Britain on a mission to explore British
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intentions.225 Trott privately despised the Nazis but shared the opposition of other German moderates to
the existence of the Polish Corridor that separated Germany from East Prussia after 1919. Trott therefore
hoped to learn whether the British would agree to a German withdrawal from Czechoslovakia, although
not the Sudetenland, in exchange for adjustments to the Polish frontier in Germany’s favor. Trott raised
the idea with Lothian, who opposed any trade of Polish territory. According to Trott’s memorandum to
the German Foreign Ministry, however, Lothian suggested that Germany withdraw from Czechoslovakia
unilaterally as a way to restore British trust:
[If it was possible] for the Führer to give Bohemia and Moravia their full national
independence back again, on condition of an effective limitation of their armaments and
economic co-operation with Germany, such an action would, in his view, have a
revolutionary effect on British public opinion, and consequently on the freedom of action
of the British Government and on world opinion in general. Hitler would, in one blow,
disarm his bitterest enemies abroad, restore confidence in Europe, and thereby lend to the
British desire for an understanding, which was still honestly felt, a unanimity it had never
before known. On this basis he thought that the gradual elimination of all moral and
material differences still existing between Britain and Germany was possible. . . . Any
further British distrust of, and obstruction to, German economic expansion in the SouthEast would then have to stop. If Germany led, but did not dominate, Central and Eastern
Europe, the Western European nations could then feel reassured about their political
independence. England-America (which Lothian naturally likes to regard as one!) and
Germany, as the only real Great Powers, could then jointly shape and guarantee the future
of world politics. This picture of the future had occupied his mind after his conversation
with the Führer, and he still could not believe that it was finally impossible.226
Trott’s memorandum, which did not become public until after the war, suggested that Lothian’s
repudiation of appeasement was insincere, and that he remained, as late as the summer of 1939, prepared
to make concessions to Hitler behind the back of his own government. When Ribbentrop received Trott’s
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memorandum, however, he tossed it aside.227 In addition, when asked by the peace activist Corder
Catchpool, in May 1939, to visit Ribbentrop one last time, Lothian refused:
The tragedy is that if only Germany could now go liberal, she has permanently within her
grasp everything that the most patriotic German could wish for. She would be the
inevitable leader of Europe. She would have a kind of British Commonwealth of free
independent nations about her, and she could certainly get a sound colonial deal in return
for disarmament.
Lothian had become convinced that, as much as he wanted to believe otherwise, a policy of appeasement
was a waste of time:
If Hitler’s project of partitioning Poland . . . is stopped . . . it may lead to a change of
policy or an evolution of regime in either Italy or Germany . . . which will make
negotiation for a final settlement possible. At this moment, however, I am convinced that
negotiation is useless.228
Lothian indeed called for Britain to use force. In a 6 June 1939 letter to Smuts, Lothian asserted
that if Hitler did try to destroy Poland and Romania, Britain should prepare for war. Similarly, in a 5 July
1939 letter to James L. Garvin, Lothian suggested that if Chamberlain put Churchill into the cabinet and
mobilize the fleet as soon as any further sign of action begins, there would be a good chance that Hitler
would back away from triggering any major crisis in the fall. He clung to the hope that moderates in the
Axis powers still existed, but he was ready now to risk war.229
Appointment to the United States
The British Ambassador in Washington, since 1930, had been Sir Ronald Lindsay. The Foreign
Office valued Lindsay’s services and had on several occasions tried to dissuade him from retiring. But by
May 1938, Lindsay was adamant that a successor be found. Beyond that, by the summer of 1938, the
British Embassy in Washington had fallen under growing Foreign Office scrutiny, amid mounting reports
227
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of Lindsay’s personal failure in the field of public relations. Lothian received numerous letters from
American friends, who complained about British arrogance and aloofness in its dealings with politicians
and journalists, an attitude that had driven Washington to joke about the British Embassy as “the British
Compound.” For example, in early November 1937, Lothian received a letter from Mr. James M.
Witherow, Attorney-at-Large in Moorhead, Minnesota, who complained that:
Instead of being a friendly hospitable mansion, it is built like a citadel, with high stone
walls surrounding it, suggesting the maintenances of machine gun nests and legation
guards. The result is that it has a forbidding aspect among the newspaper men and the
congressional ménage.
Beyond that, however, Witherow warned Lothian that the British were handicapped by the aloofness of
their diplomatic representation in Washington.

While Lindsay was respected as a competent and

courteous gentleman, the most serious grievances were with the embassy attachés, who received visitors
with conventional politeness, but without any friendly cooperation. The problem, Witherow suggested,
was that they were too formal. British diplomatic procedure was based upon “backstairs” operations
instead of straight-forward and open friendly exchange of views.

Other embassies in Washington

frequently sent their attachés to have friendly interviews and discussions with members of the Senate and
Congress. “But such a thing is entirely unheard of among the British. Instead either the ambassador or
the proper attaché calls upon the Department of State and occasionally the president, and presents letters
and communications and has formal discussions with either the secretary or one of the juniors in the State
Department.” Furthermore, Witherow noted that in the discussion of these précis reports, “the British
communications both oral and written are unfortunate in tone and diplomacy of argument”:
There is much egotistic assertion of the view and desires of “his majesty’s government”
with the inference that it is the duty of the American government to conform to the things
which the British desire. In the Foreign Relations Committee there is a humorous
characterization of the British précis as the “British commands”, which by reason of the
unfortunate psychology of the suggestion simply makes the members of the committee
assert their independent judgment from a patriotic standpoint [even if the British position
were more sensible].230
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Lothian argued that the source of the problem was that the embassy staff generally consisted of old public
school boys, “many of whom manifest a constitutional inhibition when dealing with the average politician
either in the Senate or the House of Representatives.”231 In August 1938, Lothian brought the complaints
to the attention of Halifax, who agreed that a new attitude was needed at the Embassy. Given Lothian’s
record of support for both appeasement and strong Anglo-American relations, he seemed to be the logical
choice to serve as Chamberlain’s ambassador in Washington.232
Although initially, Halifax favored a professional diplomat, in the end, he decided to look outside
the diplomatic service. He wanted an ambassador who would appeal beyond official circles to the
American people, someone more “of the Bryce type.”233 His first choice was his old friend, Lothian. In
early August, Neville Chamberlain and the King gave their approval, and Lothian formally, although
reluctantly, consented on 12 August, although the appointment was not announced until April 1939.234
The decision to send Lothian to Washington, however, provoked considerable controversy in
Whitehall, particularly within the Foreign Office.

Much of the Foreign Office opposition was

professional; such an important post belonged to a career diplomat. Moreover, Lothian had never held
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high political office, as had Bryce, whose traditions he was expected to follow. Furthermore, he was not,
again as Bryce had been, a man of letters. In a far more significant way, however, the Foreign Office
resented Lothian’s amateurish interventions in foreign affairs, dating back to the Paris Peace Conference.
His two visits to Hitler in 1935 and 1937, and his association with appeasement and the “Cliveden Set,”
were particularly offensive. Many observers believed that Lothian’s position would be compromised
because of his highly publicized support for appeasement.235 Lothian’s critics maintained that his attitude
to Germany in the 1930s was simply another manifestation of his chronic poor judgment and that he
would be even more well-placed to press his foolish views on those who really made decisions.236
The opposition to Lothian’s appointment notwithstanding, many commentators on both sides of
the Atlantic considered him well suited to his position. In many ways, to be sure, Lothian was the ideal
candidate for the post. “When I read the announcement yesterday,” the veteran American journalist
Walter Lippmann wrote, “it suddenly seemed as if it could not have been anyone else.”237 John Buchan,
1st Baron Tweedsmuir, the Governor General of Canada, encouraged Lothian “at all costs” to accept the
appointment as ambassador: “He knows America well, and above all he likes Americans, and there are
no people more susceptible to liking.” In the United States, Frank Aydelotte, the American Rhodes
secretary and president of Swarthmore College in Pennsylvania, stated that Lothian’s appointment had
been received in America with “a chorus of welcome” such as had greeted no ambassador from any
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nation within his memory. Lothian, he pointed out, had been “well-known and well-liked in America for
many years”:
He knows how Americans look at the world and what are their habits of thought in the
Middle West and the South and on the Pacific Coast, as well as in New York and
Washington. Since Lord Lothian likes people, since he is fond of discussion of
contemporary politician and economic problems, since he is as well a charming
companion and an excellent golfer, he has had unrivalled opportunities to learn to know a
wide circle of men of all political faiths in all walks of life. . . . Few Englishmen have
been as much entertained in as many houses throughout the country. Nor has the
hospitality been all on one side; in countless weekend parties at Blickling, Americans
have been made welcome and have learnt how good a host it is possible for a bachelor to
be.238
Even the hostile Oscar Gass of the American Treasury feared that Lothian “will be a big success in the
United States” and “as influential an ambassador as has ever been sent us by Great Britain.” Gass
suggested that Lothian would use “equalitarian,” even “Socialist” and “left-wing” rhetoric and “outdo the
State Department in the rhetorical force of his sermons,” but that, after uttering a “high-sounding prelude
in favor of world federation,” he would pursue nationalistic British goals and seek “to create the
background for American support of Great Britain should the latter ultimately be forced into a war in
defense of her imperial interests.”239
Halifax preferred Lothian for a number of reasons. Lothian knew America and Americans
probably as well as any living Briton in public life. He stressed the importance of knowledge about the
United States and was often at pains to demonstrate his own familiarity with American history and
governmental precepts.

Traditionally, British diplomats rarely ventured very far outside of official

Washington; but in the circumstances of growing tension and ultimately war, Britain needed a
representative who could secure popular as well as official American support. For this task, Lothian
appeared to be supremely fitted. He had numerous influential friends or close acquaintances, among them
Arthur Hays Sulzberger, publisher of The New York Times, Norman Davis, Thomas Lamont, managing
partner of the J. P. Morgan bank, and Felix Frankfurter. He strengthened these contacts as ambassador,
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frequently flying to New York City to dine with small groups of key men, generally returning to
Washington that night. His cousin, Mark Kerr, was an old friend of President Roosevelt, and Lothian had
himself talked with the president on several occasions.240 Although many of these contacts dated from the
1920s, following the Paris Peace Conference, Lothian also knew other circles of Americans through his
deep commitment to Christian Science, his work as The Observer’s American correspondent, and from
his work between 1925 and 1939 as General Secretary to the Rhodes Trust. In the latter capacity, he had
traveled frequently and extensively around the United States; he told reporters in April 1939 that he had
made fourteen visits, covering 44 states.

Out of these travels grew a remarkable network of

acquaintances, which tended to be strongest among academics and local newspaper editors, although it
also included business and civic leaders. All this was in striking contrast with most British policymakers,
whose experience of America, where it existed at all, was usually confined to the East Coast or to the
artificial atmosphere of the commercial lecture circuit.241
Not only did Lothian know America, he genuinely liked the United States and he liked
Americans. On his first visit to the United States in 1909, his first impression was almost prophetic: “I
like America. It is really extraordinarily like England.” In 1912, he told the architect Sir Herbert Baker
how exhilarating he found it to walk through or contemplate the skyscrapers of the business quarter of
San Francisco, the water front of Chicago, or the lower end of New York, and that, by contrast to
American literature, music, and painting, the country’s “architecture has caught the modern American
spirit of boundless material enterprise, boundless confidence and boundless energy.”242 Furthermore, one
of his major objections to inheriting his title was, it seems, his fear that this would “quite spoil the
pleasure I used to have in travelling to the New World.
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conspicuous.”243 Indeed, while many of the British elite adopted a condescending attitude to what Harold
Nicolson once called “the eternal superficiality of the American race,” Lothian was friendly and
impetuous, and found the United States open and invigorating. “I always feel fifteen years younger when
I land in New York,” he remarked in 1939. In turn, many Americans readily responded to his unaffected
enthusiasm. Americans liked his approachable, unpretentious manner, his bespectacled good-looks, his
impatience with conventions. Lothian’s liberalism, on such matters as free trade, and constitutional
reform in India, was also appealing; to many, Lothian had aristocratic charm, but democratic ideals.244
Lothian was well-qualified to take a more forward policy in public, more so than the one adopted
by Lindsay. Moreover, he understood how to deal with press -- and especially the American press.
Lothian, himself an experienced journalist and editor, knew many American newspapermen, including
Walter Lippmann and William Allen White. He understood, and even enjoyed, the rough-and-tumble of
American journalism, which contrasted sharply with the more deferential character of press-government
relations in Whitehall. Above all, he appreciated the importance of the media in helping to establish that
consensus among opinion-leaders upon which any effective American diplomacy had to be based.
Consequently, he made it a condition of his appointment that he be allowed to choose a special attaché to
deal with the Washington press and also to cultivate the contacts with non-official circles in which the
embassy was deficient.245
Finally, Lothian had long been a passionate and zealous advocate of Anglo-American
cooperation. Since before the First World War, he had considered this the essential foundation of world
peace. While his objective was world government, with regional federations on the model of a truly
federal British Commonwealth, in the mid-1930s his immediate goals were “Atlanticist” -- isolation from
European commitments and cooperation with the Empire and the United States to promote world
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peace.246 He called for a new “Monroe” system, joining the Empire with the United States in a bloc
detached from any other continental system, a bloc so strong that no other country would dare consider
attacking it, one that was “economically and politically so stable that it could stand outside a European
war, in isolating it if it broke out, and in ending it quickly and on reasonably just terms.”247
Lothian’s ultimate realization early in 1939, however, that Nazi Germany could not after all be
appeased and truly represented a significant threat to peace, strengthened his conviction that the United
States and Britain must cooperate in order to maintain the peace. He remained committed to the idea of
compelling the United States to abandon its philosophy of neutrality, in order to build an ideal global
order.

In his view, he wrote Smuts, “the only foundation for world peace was close co-operation

between the British Commonwealth and the United States.” He believed that world war in the nineteenth
century had been prevented by the supremacy of the Royal Navy on all the oceans, but that such power
and responsibility must henceforward be shared with the United States. This, he felt, would provide a
“nucleus” for a League of Nations backed by “overwhelming superiority of power behind the law.” The
dominant powers in this organization should “be able both to maintain overwhelming superiority in
armaments behind the League system and to limit the armaments of individual nations.” Preparing
himself to depart for Washington, Lothian confessed it was his “dream that in the United States I may be
able to help promote such an end.”248
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CHAPTER FOUR: LOTHIAN DURING THE PHONEY WAR
Sir Ronald Lindsay had been Britain’s ambassador in Washington since 1930. He was a career
diplomat, having served in the diplomatic service since 1899. Although he saw duty in St. Petersburg,
Teheran, Constantinople, and Berlin, his appointment to the United States was the pinnacle of his career.
Unfortunately for Lindsay, however, his ten years in Washington coincided with a series of AngloAmerican tensions, primarily over economic issues -- war debts and protectionism -- as well as
disagreements over international security. To some extent as well, Lindsay’s personality was somewhat
of a liability to Anglo-American relations. Unlike his successor, Lindsay sought to keep a low public
profile.

In one respect, this was a matter of preference. Lindsay tended to be stiff and old-fashioned,

although he nevertheless believed that he could cultivate American friendship through personal charm.
He continued to maintain, however, a patronizing attitude toward the United States. He once said to
Anthony Eden that “America is still extraordinarily youthful and sensitive. She resembles a young lady
just launched into society and highly susceptible to a little deference from an older man.”1 Although he
cultivated good working relations with the president, Lindsay never established particularly close
relations with either Secretary of State, Henry Stimson or Cordell Hull.2 He also found it enormously
difficult to tolerate what he considered to be the provincialism and ineptitude of American congressmen,
and frequently belittled the “archaic” constitutional division between the legislative and executive
branches of government. At the same time, the State Department wearied of the formal notes from the
British Embassy, which they mockingly referred to as the “British commands.”
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Lindsay tended to remain out of the public eye. He did very little speaking or traveling, and did
not give a formal press conference until May 1939. Yet, Lindsay’s low profile was a matter of policy as
much as preference. He was convinced, for example, that efforts to “educate” American opinion were
self-defeating, primarily because they exacerbated American suspicions of British propaganda -- fears
that the wily and perfidious British were trying to entangle the United States in another European war.
Lindsay believed that only events, as interpreted by the administration and the American media, and not
propaganda, would have an effect on American opinion.3
Consequently, the assumption of the British Embassy in the United States by Lord Lothian
brought a vast and profound change in style. Unlike Lindsay, Lothian sought to keep a visible public
profile.

He did much speaking, much traveling, and sought to cultivate strong relations with the

American press, convinced, unlike Lindsay, that American opinion could in fact be “educated.” Franklin
Roosevelt’s secretary, Grace Tully, noted that Lothian was “the personification of informality,
particularly when contrasted to the dignified old-school diplomat of the Lindsay type.” As a result,
Lothian brought a “freshness and vitality” to the Anglo-American relationship.4
Lothian Assumes the Position
A relatively lengthy delay occurred between Lothian’s appointment and his assumption of duties.
Halifax appointed Lothian in August 1938 and hoped that he could take up his post in the fall. Lothian’s
commitments in Australia, however, as well as King George VI’s desire to retain the more experienced
Lindsay to help oversee the royal visit to the United States the following June necessitated the delay.
Throughout the winter of 1938-1939, therefore, the appointment remained unannounced and unknown to
all but a handful of senior British policymakers.5 In Washington, although the State Department was
aware that Lindsay was due to retire, the first direct intimation came on 26 October 1938, when Lindsay
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himself told Sumner Welles, an Undersecretary of State, that his departure was imminent. In response,
the Roosevelt administration hinted a strong desire for London to appoint a new ambassador who would
be more politically savvy than a career diplomat. On 14 November 1938, Norman Davis, another
Undersecretary of State, wrote to Alexander Cadogan, the permanent undersecretary in the Foreign
Office, to say that:
While Lindsay has been a real success here in every respect, it is felt in certain quarters
that unless it is possible to get an exceptional Service man, it would be highly beneficial
to have someone with practical political experience who is or has been a Cabinet Officer
and is thus well known, and who could, on occasion, make a good speech.6
While there is little evidence of consultation with American officials, Lord Tweedsmuir, the Governor
General of Canada, made this point much more explicitly, when he told Chamberlain in January that
Roosevelt considered the choice of Lindsay’s successor “enormously important,” adding that the
president thought “that a career diplomat is not the proper choice at this time.”7
Nevertheless, Lothian paid a brief visit to the United States over the winter 1938-1939,
primarily to begin making arrangements to replace Lindsay and to gauge American opinion in the wake of
Munich.

Particularly in the aftermath of the recent international tensions, Lothian understood the

indispensability of the United States to Britain’s ability to confront the challenge of Nazi Germany. On
his departure from Britain, he thus declared: “America really holds the key to the whole future.” While
in the United States, Lothian intended to establish contacts with people concerned about international
affairs.

Driven by his own growing alarm at not only German aggression, but also American

unpreparedness, both military and diplomatic, he intended to initiate a campaign for greater AngloAmerican cooperation and for American rearmament, and to bring proposals before certain American
leaders, including the president.8
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Maurice Hankey, the cabinet secretary, to prepare a paper on the potential effect of the collapse of the
British Empire on the United States. Hankey produced a nine-page memorandum that Lothian considered
to be “extremely good and just what I wanted.” It painted an exceptionally gloomy picture of the
situation that would confront the United States should Britain collapse. Not only would France and the
French Empire surely disintegrate as well, but European democracy itself would fall, a process that would
certainly continue eastward into Asia. As a result, in the present state of international anarchy, the
balance of power lay with the United States. If adequately armed, America had “only to lift a finger to
avert all serious danger of war, as well as the threat to democracy and all ultimate menace to herself.”
The fundamental question for Washington, therefore, was “whether one of those rare moments is not at
hand when prudence, foresight and self-interest combine in rendering action desirable which may change
the history of mankind.”9
During his American visit, Lothian found himself constantly reminded of his association with
appeasement. “The Cliveden Set yarn is still going strong everywhere here,” he wrote to Nancy Astor
from Chicago. “It symbolizes the impression spread by the left and acceptable to the average American
that aristocrats and financiers are selling out democracy in Spain and Czechoslovakia because they want
to preserve their own property and privileges . . . [and that] Chamberlain is their tool.”10 Nevertheless,
armed with Hankey’s memorandum, Lothian insisted, both in his correspondence and at various private
gatherings in Washington, that Britain could not maintain international stability and peace on its own, that
the United States must assume more responsibility of policing the oceans, and that the struggle between
dictatorship and democracy would become effectively a duel between Hitler and Roosevelt. It was along
these general lines that Lothian spoke with President Roosevelt on 2 January 1939. The two men found
substantial areas of agreement. Although he had to endure considerable teasing from Roosevelt about his
commitment to appeasement and his confidence in Hitler two years earlier, Lothian now accepted that “no
one could talk to Hitler, and that the Führer must in fact be tamed, if not outright eliminated altogether,
9
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before peace could be secured.” The president, for his part, was anxious to accelerate American air
rearmament, to use United States diplomatic influence as pressure upon the dictators, and to act as
democracy’s arsenal.
In spite of their agreement over the broader perceptions of the Anglo-American relationship,
Roosevelt and Lothian fundamentally disagreed over specifics.

Lothian intimated, on the basis of

Hankey’s memorandum, that a collapse of the British Empire was a distinct possibility. Without the
“very powerful outpost line” of British military and naval defenses, he suggested, the United States would
be increasingly hard pressed to maintain its democracy and its commitment to the principles of liberty and
justice against the powerful totalitarian forces that would press down upon America. Lothian expressed
his great desire to see the United States assume Britain’s role as guardian of world peace, arguing that
Britain no longer had the power to do this itself. Roosevelt, by contrast, expected a more robust attitude
from Britain. He emphasized that, although the United States would help redress the military imbalance,
it would not be pushed into a position of international leadership or dragged into another war.
Consequently, the primary responsibility for world peace, the president suggested, still rested with
Britain. Roosevelt saw Britain’s problem as a lack of nerve rather than a lack of power, and stated that as
long as London kept up the argument now advanced by Lothian, the United States would be less inclined
to help.11

Roosevelt later complained to his associates that Lothian’s remarks were typical of the

spineless, buck-passing attitude currently taken by the British. Harold Ickes, the American Secretary of
the Interior, noted in his diary that, although Roosevelt was willing to help all he could, he would do
nothing if Britain “cringed like a coward”:
The President thinks that Great Britain is suffering from an inferiority complex. . . . She
is being out-maneuvered at the council table. Her fleet is helpless and she has neglected
to build enough airplanes. She has fooled herself with respect to Spain. The wealthy
class in England is so afraid of communism . . . that they have thrown themselves into the
arms of Nazism and now they don’t know which way to turn.12
11
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It is characteristically difficult to ascertain precisely what Roosevelt’s tantrum was intended to
accomplish. MacDonald argues that Roosevelt’s outburst was the result of resentment. The president
believed that he had done all he could and was thus unable to act, constrained by politics, but felt that
Britain should do something; Britain, according to the president, seemed unwilling to stand up for itself.
Reynolds and Rock maintain that Roosevelt hoped to stiffen British policy; they suspect that the president
anticipated that these tough words would eventually pass to the Foreign Office through his principal
conduit, the British historian George Macaulay Trevelyan.13

When Roosevelt’s former Harvard

professor, Roger B. Merriman, sent the president part of a dispirited letter from Trevelyan, Roosevelt’s
reply, of 15 February 1939, was brief but impassioned.14 He told Merriman about the meeting with
Lothian only a few days before:
I wish the British would stop this “We who are about to die, salute thee” attitude. Lord
Lothian was here the other day, started the conversation by saying he had completely
abandoned his former belief that Hitler could be dealt with as a semi-reasonable human
being, and went on to say that the British for a thousand years had been the guardians of
Anglo-Saxon civilization -- that the scepter or the sword or something like that had
dropped from their palsied fingers -- that the U.S.A. must snatch it up -- that F.D.R. alone
could save the world -- etc., etc. I got mad clear through and told him that just so long as
he or Britishers like him took that attitude of complete despair, the British would not be
worth saving anyway. What the British need today is a good stiff grog, inducing not only
the desire to save civilization but the continued belief that they can do it. In such an
event they will have a lot more support from their American cousins.15
This conversation between Lothian and Roosevelt was notable on two levels.

First, it

strengthened and accelerated Roosevelt’s campaign for not only American rearmament, but also
American assistance for Anglo-French rearmament programs. In spite all of his bluster, Roosevelt had
been impressed by the primary outline of Lothian’s argument. The president, since November 1938, had
13
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made it clear to associates, advisers, and certain congressional leaders that the United States must begin to
rearm. He had become convinced, due to reports dispatched by American ambassadors in Europe,
notably William C. Bullitt in Paris and Joseph P. Kennedy in London, that the Nazis had achieved a
fundamental psychological dominance over Britain and France. He also had become convinced that any
meaningful negotiations with Hitler were impossible, and that the Führer was a “nut,” who was driven by
“paranoia” and believed himself “to be a reincarnation of Julius Caesar and Jesus Christ.”
Roosevelt’s demands for rearmament rested in part on growing concern about possible German
penetration into Latin America. Germany in the 1930s became a far more active trading partner in Latin
America, although the United States remained the region’s largest trading partner, and German political
influence appeared to be on the increase, particularly in Argentina and Brazil. As a result, Washington
worried about a possible insurgency by the 1.5 million Germans in southern Brazil, which might then
create a base for further Nazi influence.

In response, Roosevelt called in the fall of 1938 for a

strengthening of the United States Navy in the Atlantic.16 In addition, the annual fleet maneuvers,
scheduled for February 1939, were to take place for the first time off the American east coast; this
practice exercise was designed to prevent a German fleet from assisting a fascist-led revolt in Brazil.
Even more threatening than such a revolt, however, was the possibility of German superiority in
air power. Indeed, Roosevelt believed that only German supremacy in the air could sufficiently explain
the extent of Hitler’s victory at Munich. Bullitt in particular convinced the president that the fear of
massive airborne destruction had overwhelmed Paris and London during the crisis.

Therefore,

Roosevelt’s major preoccupation over the winter of 1938-1939 was to help Britain and France redress the
air balance, but principally in order to serve the interests of American security. The advent of air power,
as Roosevelt understood it, held serious consequences for American security because it threatened the
traditional concept of a separate Western Hemisphere, protected by the Atlantic Ocean.
16
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administration believed that Germany had 1500 planes capable of crossing the Atlantic to Brazil in a day,
refueling perhaps in the Cape Verde islands. From bases in Brazil or Mexico, they could then threaten
New Orleans or Miami in a couple of hours. Roosevelt’s conclusion was that the defense of the Western
Hemisphere against a possible Nazi threat required bolstering the air power of Britain and France.
Therefore, his major preoccupation during the winter of 1938 and 1939 was to help Britain and France
redress the air imbalance, in order to serve the interests of American security.17
Accordingly, in early January 1939, Roosevelt asked Congress for $500 million in appropriations
for rearmament. Furthermore, he urged revision of the neutrality laws because, in their present form, they
“may actually give aid to the aggressor and deny it to the victim.” The president, however, had to
backtrack in the face of opposition within the War Department. The War Department wanted a balanced
program in order to build up the army and the navy, as well as the army air corps. In addition, it did not
want to sell new prototypes to foreign governments.18 Roosevelt’s conversation with Lothian, however,
renewed the president’s resolve, and prompted him, in part, to summon the entire Senate Military Affairs
Committee to the White House on 31 January 1939. Suggesting that the United States needed to take
more responsibility in the world, he set out his assessment of the Nazi threat to the Western Hemisphere,
the new challenge of air power, and the need to recognize that “the first line of defense in the United
States” was “the continued independent existence” of key nations in Europe, particularly Britain and
France. He warned that, if a European war broke out in the present circumstances, there would be a 50-50
chance that Germany and Italy would win. He was frank about his determination to build planes and get
them to Britain and France, cash “on the barrelhead,” while denying munitions to Germany, Italy, or
Japan. He admitted that his policy might be called unneutral but insisted that it was a matter of “self17
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protection” and that it would reduce, not increase, the chances of an American entry into another
European war.19 Victor Mallet in the British Embassy reported that Roosevelt told the gathering that the
United States needed “to go to all possible lengths short of war to back up European democracies.”20
While the meeting with Lothian thus nudged Roosevelt into taking a decisive early step to
implement American rearmament, the immediate effect of the meeting and of the president’s letter in
London was a minor storm within the British foreign policy establishment.

This controversy was

significant enough that it threatened to derail Lothian’s appointment as ambassador.

The president’s

letter prompted some within the Foreign Office to question the choice of Lothian for the vital position in
Washington.

Some senior officials in the Foreign Office, led by Alexander Cadogan, seized on

Roosevelt’s remarks as an opportunity to overturn, or at least undermine, Lothian’s appointment, which
they had consistently found objectionable. Many indeed saw Lothian not as an experienced, professional
diplomat, but as an amateur, a “man of affairs.” Many, such as Cadogan and Victor Perowne, disliked his
repeated interference in foreign affairs, dating back to his days as Lloyd George’s private secretary during
the Paris Peace Conference. Oliver Harvey, also of the Foreign Office, noted in his diary that Lothian’s
was a “bad appointment.” Sir Robert Vansittart had long regarded Lothian as a well-meaning innocent
do-gooder, but a dilettante toying with diplomacy, all the while undermining British interests. He once
scathingly denounced Lothian as an “incurably superficial Johnny-Know-All,” following Lothian’s first
visit to Hitler in 1935.21 Furthermore, many remained skeptical about Lothian’s fitness for the post. Sir
John Wheeler-Bennett, for example, told Vansittart that Lothian’s appointment was a “disaster,” that he
could have no possible appeal to the American public and would be suspect in official circles. He was
19
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concerned, like many others, that his well-publicized sympathy for Germany might prove an
embarrassment in the United States, where the “Cliveden Set” had become a prevalent source of
fascination.22

Consequently, on 20 June 1939, before Lothian had departed for the United States,

Vansittart, now the chief diplomatic adviser to the foreign secretary and in charge of a Foreign Office
committee that oversaw overseas publicity,23 quietly arranged for Wheeler-Bennett to become Lothian’s
personal assistant in Washington. While Vansittart engineered the appointment in order to monitor
Lothian’s activities, Wheeler-Bennett understood that, in accepting the job, he might be able to keep
Lothian’s former political inclinations in check.24 In addition, there remained serious reservations about
Lothian’s discretion and judgment. Even his own close friends and associates agreed that Lothian could
be impulsive, and somewhat of a “weathervane.” One of his long-standing friends, for example, Lord
Eustace Perry, noted that Lothian sometimes had a “mind of fine steel,” and at other times, a mind like “a
fresh pat of butter, which would take any impress and record it sharply and accurately.”25 Thomas Jones
described Lothian as a man of diverse interests, charm, and appeal, but one who tended to “be the victim
of his most recent experience”:
I remember him coming back from U.S.A. full of American mass-production; then before
going to Russia he was so convinced of property as the root of all evil that he was hardly
distinguishable from a communist; then last Sunday I walked with him in the grounds of
Newbattle Abbey and he was certain that the world could not get on without capitalists
and captains of industry.26
Robert Brand, who knew him the longest, once wrote of Lothian:
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He took colour at once from his surroundings, because he was so sensitive and
sympathetic to the arguments of those he met. I always likened him to a pendulum which
swings from one side to the other, but always tending to return to a stable equilibrium in
the centre. This characteristic was partly the consequence of being quite exceptionally
open-minded.27
Lothian himself understood the skepticism generated by his appointment. “After fifteen years as a
political free lance,” he wrote, “the discretion which is necessarily imposed on any public servant will be
my most difficult achievement.”28
Many in the Foreign Office regarded the Roosevelt-Merriman letter as a confirmation of
Lothian’s defects. As Cadogan pointed out, it made a mockery of Lothian’s brash confidence that, on his
recent visit to Washington, he was turning American opinion:
Talked about that booby Lothian who came back from U.S. very satisfied that he had ‘put
it across’ America and was ‘swinging’ American opinion. But we have a copy of a letter
from Roosevelt, showing he fairly put his foot in it.
As a result of this “dangerous delusion,” Cadogan pressed Halifax that “we must really reconsider his
appointment,” and immediately drafted a cable to Lindsay in Washington for his assessment.29 Oliver
Harvey recorded in his diary his own hope that the appointment of “that conceited ass” was now dead:
One amusing thing. Lothian, whose appointment as Ambassador to Washington when
Lindsay goes has been approved but is actually held in abeyance, recently passed through
America and went to see Roosevelt. . . . Lothian [took] the completely defeatist line that
we could not possibly stand up to Germany and Italy, that our day was done and it was
now for America to step forward and take up the torch of civilization from our drooping
fingers. Roosevelt was furious with Lothian and went for him. . . . This is, of course, just
typical of the line that conceited ass (and the whole Cliveden set) takes. If any man had
his hands dripping with guilt for the Versailles settlement it was Lothian, who was then
Lloyd George’s Private Secretary. Yet, according to himself, he knows America well and
expects to “swing public opinion there!” However, I hope and pray this fortunate letter
will kill the appointment. H[alifax] has sent it across to the P.M. who is much concerned
at it. Alec Cadogan does not think L[othian] can possibly be sent there now.30
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Even the prime minister and the king were struck by the nature of Roosevelt’s remarks, and both
expressed doubt about the wisdom of sending Lothian. Chamberlain concurred that “we had better
explore the ground further before we send him out in an official capacity.”31
The furor over his meeting with Roosevelt surprised even Lothian. In a letter to Sir Ronald
Lindsay, after Halifax showed him a couple of telegrams that passed between London, Lothian wrote that
“I am at a loss to understand that letter.”32 With respect to their meeting, he noted that “I had an hour
with the President during the whole of which he could not have been more cordial”:
We first discussed the relative aerial strength of Great Britain and Germany, and I gave
him my own estimate, which was based on very good information, of the relative rate of
production per month during 1939 of Great Britain, German[y] and France. I got the
impression that he thought my estimated figures were pretty accurate, and he volunteered
the statement that the number of men employed in the aircraft industry of the United
States was a good deal less than a quarter the number employed in the German aircraft
industry. . . . As regards the future I said that I thought that the centre of gravity of the
democratic world was now bound to pass from England to the United States, as Cecil
Rhodes had foretold, for the reason that the capital so liable to bombardment as Great
Britain could hardly remain an effective centre of the old system based on sea power
resting on the invulnerability of Britain. I added that I thought that in the long run the
United States would be driven to choose between two alternatives, of retiring in isolation
to North America, and underpinning in its own way the command of the seas which
hitherto has been maintained by Great Britain alone.
He added that “Our conversation was extremely friendly. As I left he asked me to come and see him
again when next I was in the States and in no way indicated the point of view he mentions in his letter to
Merriman. I was particularly careful to avoid anything which looked like saying what I thought the
United States ought to do because that clearly was not my business, though we discussed quite freely the
kind of world which seemed to be developing out of recent events.”33
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In the end, however, while admitting that the episode of the Roosevelt letter was “troublesome,”
Halifax stood behind the appointment.34 Lindsay, too, supported Lothian’s appointment. Back on 13
August 1938, Lindsay wrote Lothian, “On public grounds, I am delighted to think that it is you who are to
carry on my work, for you have all the requisite qualifications, especially the most important of all,
namely antennae, which the Foreign Office conspicuously lacks.”35 In response to Cadogan’s cable,
Lindsay assured the Foreign Office on 20 March 1939 that Roosevelt was remarkably even tempered,
although he tended to “exaggerate what is said to him and what he says in reply.” Beyond that, the
president did not appear to maintain lasting impressions of foolish things said to him. Since Lindsay had
received no unfavorable reactions to Lothian’s private conversations elsewhere, he believed the whole
business could be safely dismissed.36 Besides, and more important, he wrote that Lothian possessed
broad and flexible qualities that British diplomacy now needed: “Withal he has the knack of moving
about a great deal in an unobtrusive . . . manner. This is a valuable quality in a British Ambassador in
America, whose power to influence the United States Government will be impaired if he is presented by
the press or the public as an influential man. He has antennae and understands this.”37 Even Roosevelt,
guarded as ever, gave his endorsement of Lothian, more or less. When Lindsay asked the president for
his opinion of Lothian, Roosevelt made it clear on 28 March that he had nothing against him: “Look here,
there can be no possible difficulty about his agrément or anything of that sort.”38
In the meantime, Lothian’s survey of American public opinion in the spring of 1939 was
guardedly optimistic. Although initially many Americans he encountered did not yet seem to understand
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that the situation in Europe would affect the United States itself, Lothian noted that Munich had begun to
shake Americans out of their “Baldwinite complacency. . . . [They are] beginning to think out her future
in the world for [themselves], instead of waiting, critically for us to give the lead.” He stressed that
Roosevelt was taking a stronger line against fascism everywhere, and the public was beginning to listen
as it had not done before. Therefore, while the United States remained strongly isolationist, there was
nevertheless grounds for optimism in the growing public realization that American security was
intertwined with that of Britain and France.39
Public announcement of Lothian’s appointment was made on 24 April 1939. American press
reaction was highly and uniformly favorable, generally because he was considered to be a man of
intelligence who knew the United States well. The press coverage even gave Lothian a certain amount of
credit for having the wisdom to change his mind about Hitler.40 After further delays, Lothian finally took
up his post and presented his credentials at the White House on 30 August 1939.
Far from being a stuffy and forgettable affair, Lothian’s presentation at the White House set the
tone for his ambassadorship in a subtle, but distinctive manner. Lothian achieved a substantial public
relations success when, as he came out of the White House, he picked up a small black kitten and allowed
it to sit on his shoulders as he answered questions from reporters. In that instant, his spontaneous gesture
undermined the British reputation for aloof stuffiness, as the interview and the photograph appeared in
newspapers around the country. The subsequent publicity, Lothian proudly reported to London, made
him appear “human.” One journalist wrote that Lothian “looks more like an American business man than
a British aristocrat.” Time magazine wrote, “The chill is off.”41
Lothian also established a very warm rapport with the president during this presentation. Indeed,
Lothian and Roosevelt spoke warmly for almost two hours. “The President could not have been more
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friendly,” Lothian wrote. “We had a talk over the whole field for one and a half hours.” Moreover,
Lothian found “certainly nothing neutral” about the president’s attitudes. Roosevelt’s most serious
concern at that point was that nothing should permit American opinion to form the conclusion that Hitler
was maneuvering Britain and France into pressuring Poland to abandon vital interests, as had occurred in
Czechoslovakia. They spoke about the ways the United States could assist Britain in the event of
hostilities, including getting all of the American republics to help patrol the western half of the Atlantic,
thereby relieving strain on Britain’s navy and assuring safe transport of food and war materials to Halifax,
Nova Scotia, where they could be conveyed to Europe in Allied ships. The president hoped and expected
that, if war broke out, Congress would revoke the Neutrality Act; but if hostilities were represented as a
“police action,” or some equivalent interpretation, he might be able to avoid applying the act altogether.42
On 1 September 1939, two days after Lothian presented his credentials at the White House, Nazi
Germany invaded Poland.

Following an ultimatum to Berlin, Britain and France declared war on

Germany two days later on 3 September. Over the next two weeks, German panzer and armored
divisions crushed Polish resistance throughout western Poland, while, on 17 September, the Soviet Union
invaded from the east. As a result, Poland was soon overwhelmed, and the last Polish units surrendered
in early October. Immediately, Lothian’s essential mission was to secure active and material assistance
from the United States. Over the course of the next seven months, however, the first phase of his tenure
as ambassador, Lothian’s influence on Anglo-American relations was minimal and peripheral.
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The Phoney War
The first significant factor that restrained Lothian’s effectiveness in Washington was the nature of
the “Phoney War,” during which there were few notable military operations and relatively little fighting
on the ground in Western Europe.43 In spite of French and British treaty obligations and promises to the
Polish government, both London and Paris proved unwilling to launch a full-scale invasion of Germany.
Although most of the Wehrmacht was fighting in Poland, leaving the defense of western Germany to a
much smaller force along a fortified defensive line on the Franco-German border, the so-called Siegfried
Line, the French mobilized timidly and proceeded to mount only a minor, probing offensive in midSeptember 1939; the French penetrated only a few miles into the Saar before their troops withdrew to the
safety of the Maginot Line.44 Nor did the British send any significant assistance to Poland. Britain
dispatched 13 infantry divisions of the British Expeditionary Force in order to assume, with the French,
defensive positions in northern France and along the Franco-Belgian frontier, while the British Royal Air
Force launched a half-hearted and tentative attack on the German fleet at Wilhelmshafen in December
1939. This air raid inflicted virtually no damage, suffered heavy loss, and convinced London that it
would be wise not to repeat such operations until it was better prepared. As such, the raid exemplified the
futility of the Phoney War. In the meantime, Hitler began to shift his forces from Poland to the west,
instructing his generals on 23 October 1939 to prepare for an invasion of France, not to secure the
triumph of National Socialism, “but to decide the domination of Europe.” Hitler’s determination to attack
the west, however, led to a prolonged dispute with his generals that lasted throughout the winter. The
argument between Hitler and his generals, which revolved around the question of the Wehrmacht’s
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readiness, combined with poor weather well into the spring, delayed the launching of the German
offensive until May 1940.45
The nature of the Phoney War hindered Lothian’s influence because the United States was, for
the time being at least, not a priority for the British government. In strictly military terms, the conduct of
the war by the Allies was in fact confused and chaotic. In one respect, France and Britain failed to align
their strategic and military policies. Many of their efforts toward cooperation, ongoing since well before
the outbreak of the war, were half-hearted and unenthusiastic. At the same time, a core of suspicion
caused by the mistakes and carelessness of the previous two decades remained. More fundamentally,
however, Allied strategy stumbled about among an almost infinite number of committees, inter-Allied
agencies, and democratic institutions, which made it nearly impossible for the western powers to agree on
any coherent decision, policy, or action. The frankest reality, however, was that British and French
politicians simply had no stomach for war. The Allied strategy rested on the hope that they could prevail
by strangling the German economy without having to commit to actual combat operations.
The Allies sought to impose a blockade of the continent, just as they had done in the First World
War. But this policy led to fundamental disagreements between British military and civilian leadership,
which also undermined Allied policies. Many civilian policymakers argued that the only possible way to
make the blockade effective was to undertake specific and serious military operations forcing Germany to
expend scarce resources in marginal theaters. One such theater was the Mediterranean, where, in late
August 1939, Mussolini appeared poised to honor his obligations to Nazi Germany and threaten the Suez
Canal. Chamberlain thus argued that, in the event of war, Britain and France could attack the Italians at
great Allied advantage. The French army of the Levant, under Marshal Maxime Weygand, was stationed
in Syria and a smaller British force under Sir Archibald Wavell was in Egypt, while powerful elements of
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the Royal Navy waited in Alexandria. Allied military leaders, however, argued that Italian neutrality
would be preferable to its belligerency, primarily because of the continuing slowness of British
rearmament. The British army was deficient in training and equipment, especially in terms of tanks and
heavy guns, its only tank formation was still not ready for action, and the Royal Air Force remained
distressingly inferior to the Luftwaffe in total numbers of aircraft. Consequently, British military leaders
advocated the continuing appeasement of Mussolini. Their view prevailed and the result was that the
Italians remained neutral throughout the Phoney War. This successful appeasement of Italy, however,
prevented Allied forces in the Mediterranean from achieving potentially easy military successes against
the Italians at a time when the Germans were in no position to help.46
In the meantime, the only serious Allied military action took place in Scandinavia and, similar to
the British attempt to bomb Wilhelmshafen, underscored the ineffectiveness of Allied efforts during the
Phoney War. As soon as the war broke out, the French cut off iron ore exports to Germany; as a result,
the German war economy quickly needed a steady source of high-grade Swedish iron ore. During the
summer, that ore moved through the Baltic port of Lulea; in winter, however, when the Baltic Sea freezes,
it had to move through the Norwegian port of Narvik. In mid-September 1939, the new First Lord of the
Admiralty, Winston Churchill, proposed mining Norwegian territorial waters off Narvik. He ran into
opposition, however, from the Foreign Office and the chiefs of staff. The former argued that such an
operation would infringe on the neutral rights of a friendly small power, while the latter argued that such
an operation might prevent Norway and Sweden from inviting Allied forces to aid Finland, currently
under attack by the Soviet Union, and to occupy these ore fields. The result of these Allied deliberations
was inaction. British military leaders rejected virtually every proposal for action due to fears of Axis
strength and exaggerations of their own weakness.
In late March 1940, however, largely as a result of domestic recriminations over the Allied failure
to assist Finland against the Soviet Union during the “Winter War,” the British revived the plan to lay
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mines in Norwegian waters. After more delays, Allied minelaying finally began on 8 April 1940. The
next day, however, Germany invaded Denmark and Norway. The invasion caught the Allies almost
completely by surprise, and British efforts to drive back the German invasion and seize control of Narvik
descended into a fiasco. British leaders could not agree on where to land their forces and initial British
troop landings had to be withdrawn. Furthermore, because the German air force rapidly seized most of
the Norwegian airfields, British ground and naval forces operated within range of the Luftwaffe.
Although the British did manage to seize Narvik on 28 May 1940, their achievement was eclipsed by the
far more significant events in France; eventually, Britain evacuated Narvik on 8 June 1940.47 In the
United States, the swiftness and the thoroughness of German victories in April 1940 came as a serious
blow to Britain’s military reputation.

Roosevelt called the debacle “outrageous,” proof of the

incompetence of the Chamberlain cabinet.48
While it is easy, with the advantage of hindsight, to see the Phoney War as a period of inactivity,
the calm before the storm perhaps, the British were active: their activities centered on keeping the war out
of the Mediterranean. During the winter of 1939-1940, the British were far more concerned with
preserving the neutrality of Italy and the Balkan States, in order to limit the scope of a European war,
than with securing the favor of the United States, to win a world war. Some members of the cabinet,
including Churchill, maintained that London should seek to establish a full partnership with Italy. Not
only would such a partnership protect the Suez Canal, it would also enable Britain and France to bring
home several divisions from the Middle East, thereby strengthening Britain’s military and naval position
at home and in Western Europe. As late as mid-April 1940, the necessity of preserving Italian neutrality
was a primary consideration in launching British efforts in Norway. As the Italians grew increasingly
impressed with German success in Scandinavia, Sir Orme Sargent of the Foreign Office commented that,
“Mussolini’s decision may well depend on the result of the race between ourselves and the Germans to
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get to Trondheim. If we don’t win the race Mussolini will conclude that Hitler has succeeded in his
conquest of Norway.”49
Moreover, Chamberlain and other policymakers believed that the war might be over quickly.
They did not expect Hitler to launch a major offensive and believed that any protracted war of attrition
would destroy the German economy. Because British policymakers did not understand that Germany’s
Blitzkrieg strategy required fundamentally short, sharp campaigns, supplied by an only partially mobilized
economy, they convinced themselves that the German economy was already overstretched, and thus
looked for signs of an early German collapse. The British were unshakably convinced that, following the
conquest of Poland, the German economy was gasping for life; they believed that the Nazi regime had
devoted so much to the production of armaments, that Germany thus lacked most of the raw materials
necessary for war. As a result, London estimated that, if Britain could resist the initial German offensive
through bombing, blockade, and reliance upon their superior global economic resources, they might
compel the Germans to overthrow Hitler and negotiate an acceptable peace. Chamberlain said “I do not
believe that holocausts are required.”50 Britain, Halifax told Lothian, was fighting for “intangibles and
imponderables,” to show Hitler’s latest adventure to be a failure and a disaster so that the German people
would not “allow themselves to be led into such errors again.” Similarly, Chamberlain told Lothian that
Britain sought to convince the German people that, “whatever happens they cannot in the long run win the
war and that they have to face a gradually increasing restriction on their normal life. If that can be done I
should hope for a crack in the German home front.”51 Lothian wrote to Sir Samuel Hoare on 15
September 1939 that, because Germany began the war short of money and supplies, the blockade would
make it difficult for Berlin to procure large supplies from Russia.52
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Nevertheless, in significant ways, the Phoney War inflamed American public opinion, and to
some degree, Anglophobia. The military inactivity in Europe prompted numerous observers to conclude
that the conflict was really a fraud. One of the most vocal advocates of this position was Senator William
Borah, who argued on 17 September 1939 that Britain and France had declared war merely as a facesaving gesture and would negotiate peace with Hitler after a few months. “There is something phoney
about this war,” the Senator muttered. Lothian warned Halifax in late September that one of the most
significant dangers was the emerging view in the United States that Britain was simply biding its time,
while preparing another Munich at the expense of Poland.53
More important, however, was the issue of economic warfare. Anglo-American relations grew
increasingly strained over this issue, revisited from the First World War. The change in American
neutrality legislation actually reduced British demand for American manufactured goods. The Neutrality
Acts required that all war purchases be paid for in cash; hence, it was essential that Britain conserve its
limited gold and foreign exchange reserves. Consequently, the British Treasury drastically reduced
purchases of tobacco, automobiles, and agricultural produce from the United States, and cut deeply into
the $35 million spent every year to import Hollywood films. Halifax instructed Lothian in November to
explain that the restrictions were being undertaken “with the greatest regret” and intended no
discrimination “other than what is forced upon us by the exigencies of war.”
Americans complained in any event. Agricultural exchanges proved especially divisive. The
New York Produce Exchange protested to the State Department that American farmers were “being
penalized for the lifting of the arms embargo.” Southern farmers were particularly irritated that the
shortfall in British expenditures on tobacco would be counterbalanced by increased British purchases of
northern munitions.

This situation created potentially serious political problems for the Roosevelt

administration, since the support of fruit, cotton, and tobacco producers in the American South was
essential to the Democratic coalition and to Roosevelt’s effective leadership in Congress; it particularly
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angered their chief advocate within the Roosevelt administration, Secretary of State Cordell Hull of
Tennessee.54 Secretary Hull, a life-long proponent of free trade, denounced the new British restrictions of
having “distinctly adverse repercussions” on the American economy and warned of growing pressure by
business and farm interests to terminate the recently concluded trade agreement of 1938.55 On 22 January
1940, following an announcement that Britain would shift their purchases of tobacco from the United
States to Turkey and Greece, Hull called in Lothian and expressed his great concern about the growing
number of British restrictions:
Increasing tension and a feeling of resentment are steadily rising in this country due to a
multiplicity of what are considered here as excesses by the British Government in
prescribing and carrying out war restrictions on trade and finance. There’s a feeling that
your Government is ceasing to show any consideration to my Government and the people
of this country. . . . There’s a steadily increasing feeling in this country that American
commercial and other interests are being severely injured by discriminations and
unnecessary restrictions, the effect of which will extend into peacetime, perhaps
permanently, to the detriment of American interests.56
Lothian defended his government’s position by urging Hull to remember that Britain was waging a lifeand-death struggle. Besides, he reminded Hull, owing to limitations imposed by American “cash-andcarry” legislation, the British were forced to restrict the use of its dollar resources and to avoid buying, in
the United States, foodstuffs and raw materials they could buy more cheaply elsewhere. He also noted
that Britain made Turkey a large loan and now purchased tobacco there because it had become a “vital
bastion in the Allied system of defence.”57 Hull protested that that was “not the question,” but whether
the British government was doing itself more harm than good, “a fact in which I strongly believe.”
Characteristically enough, while Lothian did his best to conciliate Hull and the State Department,
fundamentally he accepted that American grievances were justified: “It is due partly to the feeling that
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we have been needlessly inconsiderate of American interests, both private and public; that we have been
trading upon her good will and, more important perhaps in the long run, the U.S.A. is beginning to feel
the old irritation against the way we use our ‘command of the seas.’ Which has been the constant source
of often unreasonable protest to us for the last hundred years.”58 He explained to London that they were
part of a subtle shift in American opinion about the war. Americans were anxious to see Hitler defeated,
but deeply wished to keep the United States itself out of the war. He wrote Robert Brand that the root of
the problem “lies in the fact that about 95% of the American population is vehemently anti-Hitler, but
99% is determined if it possibly can, to stay out of the war.” Furthermore, the initial nervousness in the
United States about being dragged into another European war had been assuaged by the inactivity in
western Europe. Now, therefore, Americans were determined to assert their rights and interests more
vigorously.

The remedy, Lothian advised, was a proper explanation of British policy, in order to

convince the American government and public that British action was “really necessary” to win the war.
Beyond simply explaining British policy, however, Lothian also called for a real change in the content of
British policy.

He advised Britain to resume agricultural purchases in the United States, if only on a

token basis, to demonstrate its goodwill. London should also give firm assurances that the wartime
restrictions were only temporary and did not mean the creation of an embryonic autarkic trading bloc.
Moreover, he proposed giving Roosevelt a full statement of the future course of British policy with
respect to purchases from the United States.
Lothian’s suggestions had limited success. Supported increasingly by the Foreign Office, he
compelled Chamberlain to restate publicly Britain’s commitment to post-war multilateral trade. The
cabinet, however, remained reluctant to spend scarce dollars in the United States. There was general
agreement that Britain must conserve her foreign exchange, and that if exceptions had to be made, the
Mediterranean neutrals were of greater importance, at least for the time being. Even Halifax, although
anxious about American opinion, took this view.
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for a potentially long war, but the persistent hope, entertained particularly by Chamberlain and his
immediate advisers, that the war could be won without major diminution of Britain’s wealth and power.59
Britain’s naval blockade proved an even more serious irritant to Americans during the Phoney
War. As in the First World War, the British considered the blockade to be their vital and decisive
weapon. On 7 October 1939, the Foreign Office announced that neutral ships carrying mail bound for
Europe would be searched for contraband of war and for “obnoxious documents.” As a result, the British
began to divert American ships into the combat zone for examination of American mails and
implemented an embargo on German exports. For example, British authorities in Bermuda began to
inspect American planes refueling at that island for mail bound for any nation except Britain and France.
In doing so, the British government resuscitated the old issue of the maritime rights of a neutral nation
under international law, the cause of the War of 1812 and the source of much tension during the early
years of the First World War. The Anglophobic Chicago Tribune published an eight-column banner
headline announcing, “BRITISH RAID ON MAIL: LETTERS SEIZED AT POINT OF GUN ON U.S.
CLIPPER.” Isolationists in the Senate loudly denounced the British: Senator James Mead charged that
the Royal Navy had been forcing American ships from neutral sea lanes into belligerent waters in the
hope that they would be sunk by German submarines; Senator Bennett Champ Clark introduced
legislation prohibiting planes carrying the mail from landing at Bermuda; Senator Ernest Lundeen even
suggested seizing the island outright. After the sinking of a Danish vessel off a contraband control port in
the Orkney Islands in January 1940, heightening international tensions over the blockade, Lothian begged
the War Cabinet to examine American shipping in the safety of the port of St John’s Newfoundland.60
For many Americans, however, it was not simply the blockade that caused offense, but the inequities in
its operation, as Britain gave preferential treatment to the Italians. Still anxious to keep the Mediterranean
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quiet, London granted preferential treatment for Italian shipping and agreed to buy Italian and Balkan
agricultural produce at a time when it was reducing such purchases from the United States.61
Efforts had actually been made relatively early in war to prevent such a buildup of American
irritation. On 4 September 1939, Cordell Hull summoned Lothian to his office, initiating a series of
meetings between the two men from which evolved an arrangement for taking up specific problems as
they arose, through quiet, informal discussions, rather than by means of strong diplomatic protests, which
might stir up public opinion and mutual tensions.62 At this specific meeting, Hull proposed to Lothian a
resumption of the Navicert program, which had been used during the First World War, in which British
officials examined cargoes before they left American ports and issued certificates that would prevent the
ships from being stopped on the high seas or taken into British ports for examination. Hull suggested that
this time, unlike the First World War, American officials participate in the inspections in order to resolve
any disagreements that might arise. In this way, Britain could prevent contraband from reaching the
enemy through these countries without triggering resentment within the United States.
On 25 November 1939, Lothian announced the resumption of the Navicert program, to take effect
on 1 December. Nevertheless, incidents occurred. British authorities, for example, sometimes refused to
certify some cargoes bound for neutral countries in Western Europe and did not explain the denials of
certification. To prevent Britain from giving preference to its own exporters or blacklisting American
firms whose foreign customers did business with Germany, American negotiators insisted that the British
explain denials of certification. The British sometimes detained American ships for as long as three
weeks, conducting extensive searches of their cargoes and censorship of mails. Although in Washington,
Lothian defended the program to the point of denying to American officials that Britain maintained a
blacklist, privately he urged his government to be more considerate of the United States. As a result, in
January 1940, Britain halted the diversion of uncertified American cargoes to British ports, which the
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United States regarded as a combat zone. While this left the British free to divert these cargoes to
Canada, in fact, the Royal Navy did not do so. Furthermore, beginning in March 1940, London agreed to
explain each denial of certification. In the end, however, this question of British economic warfare
became largely moot later in the late spring and summer of 1940, when German western offensives
eliminated Norway, Denmark, the Low Countries, and France as neutrals. Thereafter, the United States
no longer objected to British restrictions on trade with the remaining neutrals.63
Continuing British Skepticism about the United States
Lothian’s lack of effectiveness during the Phoney War rested principally on a continuing lack of
confidence in the United States, and a decided lack of enthusiasm for Anglo-American cooperation, at the
top of British government. While certainly not indifferent to the United States, and well aware that, in the
event of total war, Britain would need large-scale American assistance, Chamberlain and his immediate
advisers had little confidence that they could rely upon the United States. From bitter experience, they
had learned that the promises of American presidents could easily be repudiated by Congress or
neutralized by public opinion.
British irritation and resentment intensified because of growing disgust with the attitude of the
American ambassador to Britain, Joseph P. Kennedy. Kennedy was remarkably indiscreet. He once
astonished Lord Halifax by telling him that he did not care for the post of ambassador; he felt better in
America, where he was “as independent as a hog on ice.”64 More to the point, however, he was a
defeatist. Throughout 1938 and 1939, Kennedy had persistently predicted that war would break out and
that Britain would be crushed. The totalitarian states, he forecast, would get not only the British Navy,
but British bases everywhere and colonial areas in Africa. He predicted that the likelihood of Germany
sagging under the pressure of any British blockade was a viewpoint of an earlier era and than end to the
war by the spring of 1940 was wishful thinking. Kennedy warned of Britain’s inevitable defeat, not only
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within the confines of the American Embassy and in his dispatches to Washington, but also in public
settings, in cocktail gossip and dinner party conversation, without thought of consequence.65 Reports of
the ambassador’s loud assertions of Britain’s imminent defeat poured into the Foreign Office. Their
impropriety was such as to warrant the beginning of an extensive secret file.66 Kennedy pressed Halifax
to seek peace by diplomatic means. He even expressed defeatist views to George VI. The King was not
only disturbed that the American ambassador held such views, but worried that such an attitude might
color his dispatches to Washington.67 Cadogan described a meeting with the King, who seemed a bit
depressed, and “a little défaitiste,” a result of a talk with Joe Kennedy, “who sees everything from the
angle of his own investments.” In late November, John Colville, the assistant private secretary to Neville
Chamberlain [and later, to Winston Churchill], spoke with the Duke of Beaufort, who had been told,
presumably by the King, that Kennedy “is talking about our inability to win the war.” Colville noted
mockingly, “To the P.M. and the F.O. he poses as the greatest champion of our cause in the U.S.”68 Even
the French Embassy in London complained to the Foreign Office about “alarmist rumors” and asked
whether something could be done to restrain the American ambassador.69
In June 1938, amidst the growing tension over German threats against Czechoslovakia, Kennedy
informed American journalist Walter Lippmann that war was inevitable and the British would “be
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licked.” Lippmann’s recounting of the Kennedy conversation generated much comment at a dinner party
in London, on 14 June 1939, attended by MPs Harold Nicolson and Winston Churchill. Churchill in
particular regarded Kennedy’s forecast of British defeat as offensive; the ambassador’s comments indeed
undermined his relationship with Churchill, whose influence was on the rise in the aftermath of the
Munich Agreement.70 Even Lord Frances-Williams, editor of the anti-Chamberlain Daily Herald, and
later to become the head of the BBC, denounced “the smell of peace in the air,” some of which, he said,
emanated from the American Embassy, where:
Joseph Kennedy . . . had set flowing a constant stream of denigration of Britain backed
by the assertion that we would have no chance against the superior power and discipline
of Germany when it came to real war and had better come to terms while we could. . . .
all his personal circle seemed to take the same view. Since most of them were, like
Kennedy himself, arrogant and gauche, to meet them at dinner parties and diplomatic
receptions had become a painful matter. I remember one occasion when one of his staff
sneeringly remarked in a loud voice that Britain deserved the fate that was coming to her
for being too cowardly to resist Hitler earlier and I rose at the table and said, “While the
brave, resolute Americans were resisting Nazism at every turn, I suppose”!, and walked
out of the room my meal uneaten. I never again went to the American Embassy so long
as Kennedy was there.71
Kennedy’s gloom and doom predictions became increasingly shrill following the outbreak of the
war. He predicted that if the war continued, the result would be bankruptcy and, more important,
communism. He expressed little confidence in the British leadership. He continued to trash Britain’s
military prospects, describing the Royal Navy as “valueless.” Whenever he heard any words of defiance
or confidence, Kennedy tended to discount them.72
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By mid-September 1939, as a result of this almost endless defeatism, Lothian thought it essential,
based on evidence he was given in Washington, that Chamberlain should summon Kennedy and “state
emphatically” Britain’s determination to see the war through.73 British officials increasingly regarded
Kennedy as “a cross we must bear.” Sir Robert Vansittart noted in late February 1940: “Mr. Kennedy is
a very foul specimen of double-crosser, a defeatist. He thinks of nothing but his own pocket. I hope that
this war will at least see the elimination of his type.”74
There was more to Whitehall's policy, with respect to the United States, than this disgust with the
senior American representative in London. The British perceived that they were fighting not only for
their security against Hitler but also for their continued position as a global power. Many in London
argued that to triumph over Hitler by becoming dependent upon the United States would represent a
pyrrhic victory. British leaders recalled memories of the First World War, when the United States had
profited from its neutrality to capture Britain’s trade and had tried to force Wilson’s conception of world
order on the victors as well as the vanquished. Lord Chatfield, minister for the coordination of defense,
remarked that Americans would “fight the battle for freedom to the last Briton, but save their own skins.”

to Roosevelt, in which he predicted again that the British government could not survive the war: “They realize that a
continuation of a war or the maintenance of Government on a war basis means complete economic, financial, and
social collapse and nothing will be saved after the war is over.” He suggested that because the British government
could never accept any agreement with Hitler, “there may be a point when the President may work out plans for
world peace.” The president was outraged by Kennedy’s spinelessness and directed Cordell Hull to respond:
The President desires me to inform you, for your strictly confidential information and so that you
may be guided there without divulging this message to anyone, that this Government, so long as
present European conditions continue, sees no opportunity nor occasion for any peace move to be
initiated by the President of the United States. The people of the United States would not support
any move for peace initiated by this Government that would consolidate or make possible a
survival of a regime of force and aggression.
73
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Edward R. Murrow noted that in the opening months of the war, pointedly anti-American comments
made the rounds in London: “God protect us from a German victory and an American peace. Britain and
her Allies propose to win this one alone.”75
Chamberlain thus sought American diplomatic assistance and limited material support, but he
clearly did not want the United States to enter the war. “Heaven knows,” he wrote to his sister in January
1940, “I don’t want the Americans to fight for us; we should have to pay too dearly for that if they had a
right to be in on the peace terms.”76 The prime minister was not prepared to subordinate British policy to
the hope of American aid and was in fact prepared to act against the best interests of Anglo-American
relations. For example, in early February 1940, in spite of a warning from Roosevelt, Chamberlain and
the cabinet refused to commute the death sentences of two members of the Irish Republican Army. In
doing so, they also ignored the warnings of Lothian, who warned that the execution might sway opinion
in the United States against Britain. To the horror of Irish Americans, the two hanged.77
Even the one significant source of potential assistance by the United States did not notably
weaken Anglo-American tensions -- the repeal of the American arms embargo. The arms embargo was a
product of the Neutrality Acts, passed by Congress between 1935 and 1937, principally to prohibit the
sale of arms, ammunition, and munitions to belligerents, and hence, to prevent the United States from
being dragged into any future European war. Repeal of the embargo required a revision of the Neutrality
Acts -- which required the consent of the Congress. The driving force behind this endeavor was President
Roosevelt. During 1937 and 1938, however, domestic considerations preoccupied most of Roosevelt’s
attention and energies. Furthermore, the president faced an increasingly hostile Congress. The midterm
elections of 1938 saw the return of a significant bloc of Republicans to the House of Representatives for
the first time since 1932. The Seventy-sixth Congress, which convened in January 1939, had 164
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Republicans and 261 Democrats, a substantial number of whom were disaffected with the New Deal. The
result was a strengthening of the forces opposed to Roosevelt’s handling of foreign affairs.78 The
president, therefore, was profoundly determined to avoid international entanglements of any kind.
The Czechoslovakian crisis of 1938, however, proved to be a significant turning point in the
president’s thinking. Insider reports from the European conferences convinced Roosevelt that there could
be no negotiations with Hitler. More important, Hitler’s bloodless victory, handed to him by Britain and
France at Munich, shook Roosevelt’s assumption that the established powers of Western Europe would
stabilize the Old World. If Britain and France were subdued, he further believed, Hitler would likely turn
on the United States.

Roosevelt concluded that Germany posed a real if not immediate threat to the

security of the United States. Athough he shared the national aversion to another war, he began to
envisage a larger American role in Europe, albeit well short of war.

Specifically, Roosevelt began to

press for the United States to begin rearmament, particularly in terms of air power.79
The need for American military preparedness became even more urgent in the spring of 1939,
following the German occupation of the remainder of Czechoslovakia. Consequently, Roosevelt sought
to repeal the arms embargo by revising the Neutrality Act. He wanted a blanket “cash-and-carry” law, by
which belligerents could purchase without restriction in the United States, provided that they paid
immediately for the goods in cash and carried them away in their own ships. Not only would this enable
the United States to avoid the economic entanglements and naval incidents that, supposedly, had led it
into the Great War, it would directly enable the Allies, with their superior navies and greater foreign
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exchange, to enjoy preferential access to the American market.

Because of deep congressional

opposition, however, as well as poor leadership on the part of the White House, this effort failed; the bill
was withdrawn and any action on repeal of the embargo had to be postponed.80
American public opinion remained volatile and ambivalent. With the international situation in
the late spring of 1939 relatively calm, there seemed no clear or immediate danger to the United States.
Gallup Polls on 8 July 1939 showed that 60 percent favored the sale of arms to Britain and France in a
European war. A month later, however, 51 percent of those questioned said that Congress was right to
retain the arms embargo, while 37 disagreed and 12 percent expressed no opinion. This ambivalence
about a European war remained a consistent feature of American public opinion until well into 1941:
most Americans opposed belligerency by the United States, although their sympathies were
overwhelmingly on the side of Britain and France.81
As a result of this ambivalent domestic situation, Roosevelt began to take steps to educate and
shape American opinion. Following Kristallnacht, the wave of Nazi-inspired violence against Jews and
Jewish property that swept across Germany on 9 November 1938, Roosevelt sought to emphasize the
moral divide between totalitarian and American values.82 In his State of the Union Address on 4 January
1939, Roosevelt stressed that “Storms from abroad directly challenge three institutions indispensable to
Americans. The first is religion. It is the source of the other two -- democracy and international good
faith . . . Where freedom of religion has been attacked, the attack has come from sources opposed to
democracy. . . . We have learned that God-fearing democracies of the world which observe the sanctity of
80
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treaties and good faith in their dealings with other nations cannot safely be indifferent to international
lawlessness anywhere. They cannot forever let pass, without effective protest, acts of aggression against
sister nations -- acts which automatically undermine all of us.”83 On 14 April 1939, after the Germans
took over Czechoslovakia and the Italians invaded Albania, he asked why nations could “find no better
methods of realizing their destinies than those which were used by the Huns and the Vandals fifteen
hundred years ago?” The next day, 15 April, he invited Hitler and Mussolini to guarantee the integrity of
31 specified states in Europe and the Middle East for at least ten years. These messages, broadcast
worldwide, were ridiculed in Italy and Germany; Mussolini declared the proposal “a result of infantile
paralysis.” Roosevelt, who had in fact rated the chances of a positive response at no more than one in
five, told the Canadian Prime Minister Mackenzie King that, “If we are turned down the issue becomes
clearer and public opinion in your country and mine will be helped.”84
One of Roosevelt’s most notable opportunities to shape American perceptions was the visit, in the
first week of June 1939, by King George VI and Queen Elizabeth, to the United States, the first visit ever
by a reigning British monarch. Roosevelt conceived of the visit as a safe but effective way to dramatize
Anglo-American friendship, and as a chance to show off the British monarchy, the past symbol of transAtlantic differences, in a favorable light.85 To this end, Roosevelt effectively orchestrated the royal visit
for maximum public relations effect. For example, when the King suggested that he bring a British
minister with him, Roosevelt noted that the presence of a political minister would “excite a lot of talk
about an alliance,” which he frankly wished to avoid. News of the royal couple’s triumphant tour of
Canada, which preceded their trip to the United States, strengthened the impact of Roosevelt’s
arrangements. Anecdotes of their ignoring protocol and meeting with common people face to face had
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the American press buzzing with talk of a “people’s king.” After a brief visit to Washington D.C., the
royal couple traveled to New York City on 10 June 1939. They toured the World’s Fair and were treated
to spontaneous choruses of “Land of Hope and Glory” and “Rule Britannia.” They spent the weekend
with the Roosevelts at Hyde Park. Crowds massed by the roadside as the couple drove up the Hudson
Valley, and everywhere they were greeted by a cacophony of cheers, horns, and church bells. Stories of
the King and Queen relaxing over hot dogs and beer pleased everyone, except for the Roosevelt’s Britishborn butler, who refused to countenance such indignity and took the weekend off. London was absolutely
delighted by the American response to the royal visit.86 Sir Ronald Lindsay described the visit as a
“complete success” and asserted that the king had become “a real political asset.” “There can be no doubt
that the visit has made [a] profound impression on the whole country and has deepened and fixed already
existing feelings of friendliness.” He assured Halifax that all Americans “today feel closer to the Empire
than they did a fortnight ago, and this cannot fail to be of immense importance.” At the same time,
Lindsay was equally anxious to remind London not to expect an immediate political dividend, as it was
not yet apparent how the visit might affect legislation.87 After all, at the very moment that Americans
were cheering the royal couple, the administration’s efforts to revise the Neutrality Acts were dying in
Congress. As a result, a senior diplomat in London mourned that Britain “could no more count on
America than on Brazil.”88
More than any of the president’s efforts, however, the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact of 23
August 1939 most clearly illustrated the moral divide between democratic and totalitarian civilization.
The Soviet Union under Joseph Stalin -- the country of atheistic communism, brutal purges, the
leadership cult, and the one-party state -- had revealed itself as the true ideological partner of Adolf
Hitler’s Germany, persecutor of the Jews and conqueror of Czechoslovakia. To western commentators,
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the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany seemed indistinguishable in methods and character, and references to
Hitler’s “Brown Bolshevism” and Stalin’s “Red Fascism” became commonplace in the American press.89
It is clear, therefore, that by the late summer of 1939, President Roosevelt believed Nazi Germany
to represent a significant threat to the United States. It is also clear that he believed it necessary to
prepare the American people for the possibility of war, and to convince them that there existed a
significant ideological divide between the belligerents. On the evening of 3 September 1939, in his first
fireside chat following the outbreak of the war, Roosevelt, in contrast to Woodrow Wilson in August
1914, did not call for neutrality in thought and deed:
This nation will remain a neutral nation, but I cannot ask that every American remain
neutral in thought as well . . . Even a neutral cannot be asked to close his mind or his
conscience. . . . I have said not once, but many times, that I have seen war and that I hate
war. I say that again and again. I hope the United States will keep out of this war. I
believe that it will. And I give you assurance and reassurance that every effort of your
Government will be directed toward that end. As long as it remains within my power to
prevent, there will be no black-out of peace in the United States.90
Nevertheless, the president did issue neutrality proclamations, as required by international law and the
Neutrality Act of 1937. Norman Davis told Lothian that Roosevelt “felt very badly” about having to do
this, particularly as every instinct and every “fiber of his being” sympathized with Britain and France.
Roosevelt could not, however, give the isolationists grounds for saying he was disregarding the law. The
best way for getting the Neutrality Acts revised or repealed, the president believed, was to demonstrate to
public opinion how its enforcement denied needed supplies to the Allies.91
The outbreak of the war gave Roosevelt justification to call back Congress, which had not been
due to reconvene until January 1940, in a special session to review the Neutrality Acts. In mid-September
1939, Lothian wrote Lady Astor that the president was “very confident” about getting the embargo
removed, adding, “There is no doubt that he is not neutral about Hitler and Hitlerism.” Roosevelt had
89
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learned from the mistakes made on Capitol Hill during the summer and now had a clear strategy for
revision, substituting cash-and-carry for the mandatory arms embargo. Although he continued to work
through Democratic leaders on the Hill, he also enlisted Alf Landon and Frank Knox, the Republican
presidential and vice-presidential candidates in 1936, to rebut isolationists such as Senators William
Borah and Arthur Vandenberg. In late September, following the presentation of a draft bill to the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, hearings and debates began in both houses of Congress, which attracted
intense press and radio interest. They also became the focus of intensive propaganda campaigns. In the
final two weeks of September, members of Congress received a deluge of letters, postcards, and
telegrams, opposing repeal of the arms embargo. Some senators received four thousand each day.92
The opponents of neutrality revision did not give up easily. During the debate, isolationists and
other critics of the bill insisted that this measure patently and overtly sought to assist Britain and France.
Many argued that repeal would constitute an “unneutral” attempt to assist the Allies and would represent
a definite step toward war. Senator Arthur Vandenberg declared that, “In the long run, I do not believe
we can become an arsenal for one belligerent without becoming a target for another.” The Chicago
Tribune declared that, “This is not our war. We should not make it ours. We should keep out of it . . .
The frontiers of American democracy are not in Europe, Asia, or Africa.” Anti-interventionists in the
United States rallied around Senators Vandenberg, Borah, Bennett Champ Clark, and Gerald Nye, who,
along with the support of radio preacher Father Coughlin and celebrated aviator Charles Lindbergh, led a
spirited opposition to any repeal of the arms embargo. Borah asked rhetorically, “Was the cruel and
brutal and revolting creed of Nazism any different at Munich than it was at Warsaw?” Senator D. Worth
Clark attacked what he called Britain’s “holier than thou” attitude, describing the British Empire as “the
outstanding example of aggression that the world has ever seen.” Senator Sheridan Downey, in the
meantime, reminded his colleagues that Britain has “denied our sovereignty in the Western Hemisphere
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more than any other country.” Father Coughlin spearheaded a national campaign that brought over a
million telegrams, letters, and postcards to congressional offices over the course of days.93
In October 1939, the administration mobilized a counterattack. Building on top of opinion polls
that indicated an emerging majority for repeal and overwhelming support for cash-and-carry, William
Allen White, a highly respected Republican newspaper editor from Kansas, organized a “Non-Partisan
Committee for Peace through Revision of the Neutrality Act.”

Its publicity drive centered on

endorsements from opinion makers in religion, education, journalism, and business. In the end, the
administration’s firm leadership, together with its insistence that this was a “peace” measure, carried the
day. On 27 October 1939, the bill won a two-thirds majority in the Senate. A few days later, the bill
passed the House by 243 votes to 181. After a Senate-House conference committee resolved minor
differences, Roosevelt signed the 1939 Neutrality Act into law on 4 November 1939. Thereafter, all trade
with belligerent countries was on a cash-and-carry basis. The British government, which had watched the
proceedings with caution, was quite pleased. Lothian, in his reports to the Foreign Office, had described
Roosevelt’s confidence of success and noted that the president had told him, “We shall come right in [sic]
before long.” It was recognized in London, however, that “this was rather typical of the President’s way
of speaking loosely and optimistically in private conversation.”94 Nevertheless, London was greatly
relieved. Chamberlain wrote to Roosevelt on 8 November that the repeal of the arms embargo provided
“profound moral encouragement to us in the struggle upon which we are engaged.”95
Although the 1939 Neutrality Act minimized the dangers of the United States becoming
entangled unwillingly in another European war, Roosevelt intended it as an unneutral act. He clearly
intended cash-and-carry to benefit Britain and France -- countries with substantial foreign exchange
reserves and large merchant fleets. Within that framework, it opened up the vast material and industrial
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resources of the United States to Britain and France.

This did not mean, however, complete and

unfettered access. There remained a significant ban on loans, while the “carry” clauses frequently drove
the two countries to subterfuge.96 Furthermore, the debate over the neutrality legislation appeared to
circumscribe Roosevelt’s public position and the actions he could take to help Britain and France.
Vandenberg noted that “it is going to be much more difficult for F.D.R. to lead the country into war. We
have forced him and his Senate group to become vehement in their peace devotions -- and we have
aroused the country to a peace vigilance which is powerful.”97
Most significant, the mass of the American population remained deeply opposed to active United
States involvement in the war. Only days after the outbreak of the conflict, Lothian wrote to Halifax
about the “tremendous debate” that was going on in the public mind about what American policy should
be. Many Americans recognized and understood that a peaceful and stable world could not be organized
without American cooperation. At the same time, however, they also believed that the United States had
been tricked into the First World War by Wall Street financial interests and British propaganda, and
tended to attribute the outbreak of the current war to the follies and machinations of the rest of the world.
Lothian recognized this opinion as a “huge problem.” It was “obviously going to take a long time to
reeducate 130 million people into a truer perspective.”

This would only happen, however, once

Americans realized “that their own vital interests were in danger.”98 Over the course of the Congressional
debate, Lothian pointed out that one of the fundamental problems for Britain was the question of whether
this was America’s fight. On 15 September 1939, he wrote Sir Samuel Hoare, later Viscount Templeton:
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The consequence of the serious position in which the Russo-German pact and the
forthcoming defeat of Poland are going to place England and France is beginning to come
home to thinking Americans and instinctively the mass of Americans feel that Hitler is a
mortal enemy of all they stand for. But at the moment they are obsessed with the desire
to keep out of war -- a desire which naturally grows stronger as they feel the abyss
drawing nearer. Their moral preparedness is about that of England during the Baldwin
period. If the only issue in the Neutrality Act were whether they would allow England
and France to buy implements of war, the embargo would be lifted at once.
But the key struggle, Lothian maintained, was “more and more going to take the form of a debate whether
this war is also America’s war or not.”99
In early November 1939, in a round of letters to Halifax, Churchill, Lord Chatfield, and Hoare,
Lothian reported that the American reaction to the repeal of the arms embargo was mixed. In what would
become a consistent theme in his analyses of American public opinion, Lothian wrote that Americans
wanted the Allies to win, “partly for ideological reasons, partly because the success of the Allies will
remove the Hitlerian menace to American security, especially in South America, while their defeat would
leave the United States face to face with a totalitarian Europe.” While the United States would make
available resources of every kind on a cash-and-carry basis, however, Americans at the same time had
decided “with practical unanimity that [they are] utterly against being drawn into the war in Europe,”
until they were exposed to a direct threat to their own vital interests. Lothian stressed that one of the
biggest political problems for Britain was the perception throughout the United States that the war was
strictly an internal European conflict that did not directly affect American interests: “Public opinion,
therefore, is far more confident that it can and ought to keep out of the war than it was.”100
The skepticism about the possibility of American assistance tended to provoke growing bitterness
in Britain. John Colville wrote on 31 December 1939 that, “The U.S. is aloof, and critical of what
everybody in Europe is doing and thinking, without showing the least inclination to step in to redress the
balance of the Old World.” Halifax wondered how far the United States would go to help guarantee
British security; if American support stopped short of war, “where is our security?” Chatfield complained
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that it was odd how Washington saw the war as an internal European affair and yet feared the
consequences of a British defeat. If the United States ever came in, it would not be out of moral
sympathy but in its own self interest.101 Captain Victor Cazalet, MP, wrote Lothian on 10 February that,
among other things, public opinion in Britain was growing disgusted with the lack of response by the
United States:
It is extremely difficult to find anyone who has any sympathy for the Americans at all. I
try and maintain silence when “America” is mentioned, but the general reaction, here and
in France, to America’s attitude today is [very] disappointing. There is a sort of general
feeling that America would like a little more blood-letting before taking a real interest in
the war.102
British leaders were particularly offended by remarks made by Roosevelt in a private conversation with
Lothian in mid-December 1939. One of his great difficulties, he told the ambassador, was to get the
American people to understand the tremendous risks to the United States should Britain lose the war. It
would be helpful, the president suggested, if the British could emphasize their commitment to selfgovernment; specifically, if Halifax could state publicly that Britain had abandoned its empire-building of
earlier centuries and admit that it had “long ago learnt the lesson that the only foundation for a stable
international system was national autonomy.” Roosevelt’s point, that the British admit the errors of the
past while pointing to a change of heart in the present, was not appreciated in London. Chamberlain
rejected the admitting of past errors, and Vansittart at the Foreign Office mocked the president’s
suggestion as “simply lunacy.”103
Lothian Confronts American Public Opinion
Lothian believed that one of his principal, even vital, missions was to amend this American
lunacy. Furthermore, he believed that one of the principal, and even vital, sources of this lunacy was the
uncertain state of American public opinion. Lothian understood, as many British leaders understood, that
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well before the outbreak of the war, Americans generally mistrusted any war propaganda, primarily
because of their experiences during the First World War. He also understood the potentially immense
power that public opinion could exert over American politicians, especially the current president.
Consequently, from the moment he assumed control over the British Embassy, and over the course of his
entire ambassadorship, Lothian devoted much energy, and in fact achieved considerable success, in his
efforts to sway American public opinion increasingly in favor of Britain.
Because so many Americans confidently believed that British propaganda had lured the United
States into the war, the Foreign Office was reluctant to revive such methods in the United States, and
formally adopted a policy of “No Propaganda.” British policy was, in theory, to tell the truth, eschew
secrecy, let the facts speak for themselves, and allow American opinion to more or less evolve on its
own.104 In reality, however, the British government established the foundations for a propaganda and
public relations apparatus in the United States. This network, which evolved over the course of the 1920s
and 1930s, consisted of the following principal operations: (1) the British Library of Information, New
York [hereafter known as BLINY];105 (2) the Foreign Office News Department; (3) the BBC “Empire
Service”;106 and (4) the Ministry of Information.107
Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden raised the first significant consideration of propaganda in the
United States in March 1937, when he asked Sir Ronald Lindsay to compile a detailed report on how
Britain might “retain . . . the goodwill of the United States Government and public opinion” in the
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mounting international crisis.

In a long report, dated 22 March 1937, Lindsay made numerous

suggestions for improving American opinion of Britain. Among other things, he urged the Foreign Office
to consider American public opinion when formulating British economic policy and to woo the United
States with a liberal trade in military secrets. He cautioned, however, that such a campaign could go only
so far. He acknowledged the importance of the BLINY’s work, but emphasized the danger inherent in
expanding publicity beyond a few visiting lecturers and feature films. Therefore, he endorsed the “No
Propaganda” policy and asserted that London could do much within the confines of this policy to win
American sympathy. To this end, for example, he called for a large British contribution to the New York
World’s Fair of 1939, in the form of an exhibit focusing on Britain’s cultural achievements.108
Almost immediately, Lindsay’s suggestions began to pay dividends. Over the summer of 1939,
the British pavilion at the World’s Fair attracted over 14 million visitors and became one of the most
popular of all the exhibits. It included the finest in British ceramics and textiles, the latest streamlined
locomotive, works of art, concerts, and a technicolor film of the coronation, which packed audiences into
the pavilion’s cinema. The centerpiece of the British pavilion, however, was the “Hall of Democracy.”
Here, the British displayed an original copy of the Magna Carta, while on an adjacent panel, visitors could
find the pedigree of George Washington, showing his descent from King John and several of the signing
barons. The British maximized the propaganda potential of the Magna Carta by mailing every school in
the United States a translation and brief history of the document. Thanks to a sympathetic Congressman,
Sol Bloom, the British government did not have to pay the postage. In addition, the BLINY persuaded
The New York Times to produce a magazine feature on the document.109
Lothian contributed to the success of the British pavilion as well, largely by ensuring that it
portrayed the British Empire in the best possible light. In November 1938, Lothian had demanded an
“exhibition of the humanitarian and social services aspect of our Colonial Empire” that could effectively
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challenge the “constant prejudice in the American mind against British Imperialism.” The Colonial
Empire Marketing Board produced a magnificent exhibit that included a “talking” display stand and
dramatic photographs of soccer in a Fijian leper colony. The Colonial Office sent a British Empire
expert, Sir William McLean, on a national lecture tour of the United States, in which he thanked the
Carnegie and Rockefeller trusts for underwriting welfare schemes, thereby demonstrating America’s own
involvement in the British Empire. American newspapers responded with headlines such as “U.S. CASH
SAVING NATIVE MASSES IN BRITISH COLONIES.”110
The need to improve American opinion of Britain became even more imperative following the
Munich crisis in late 1938. Although the BLINY reported an initial surge of public sympathy, by January
1939, returning lecturers and visitors reported that “anti-Chamberlain feeling” in the United States was
intense. In addition, individual enthusiasts pressed the Foreign Office News Department, as well as Lord
Lothian, to begin active propaganda in the United States. For example, in October 1938, in a speech
broadcast over NBC, Winston Churchill urged the United States to rearm and stand shoulder to shoulder
with the English-speaking world: “We need the swift gathering of forces to confront not only military but
moral aggression; the resolute and sober acceptance of their duty by the English-speaking peoples and by
all the nations, great and small, who wish to walk with them.”111 In December 1938, Anthony Eden
accepted an invitation to visit the United States. In a long speech, broadcast nationally over CBS on 9
December, he emphasized that Britain was “neither decadent nor faint hearted” in the face of the Nazi
threat, and certainly did not seek to “lure others to pull our chestnuts from the fire.” Eden’s visit was a
tremendous success. Victor Mallet, counselor of the British Embassy in Washington, called it a “major
sensation.” Not for many years, he reported to Halifax, had a foreign visitor excited such interest and
enthusiasm.112 Lothian, still in the United States, wrote to Thomas Jones on 28 December that Eden did
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very well: “He uttered the right non-committal platitudes, was straightforward and manifestly friendly,
got on very well with the press, said that England was in no sense degenerate or defeated, did not criticize
Chamberlain, made no whines or requests, didn’t put a foot wrong anywhere so far as I have heard -- a
first rate diplomatic performance”; he even “had a success with the girls.”113
While Eden worked to convince Americans that not all the British were appeasers, more specific
efforts were undertaken in London to expedite propaganda operation. These efforts included personnel
and structural changes in the Ministry of Information and in the Foreign Office News Department. More
significantly, in the short term at least, British officials increasingly cultivated strong relations with the
American press corps in London, particularly radio correspondents. Many recognized a great opportunity
for Britain to reach out to the United States, since radio provided a common language and technical
convenience, while the glamour of such stories as the abdication crisis guaranteed London’s emergence as
the hub for such coverage. Furthermore, a large proportion of American radio correspondents, several of
whom had spent the past decade in Europe, were already hostile to Hitler and well-disposed to Britain.
While the prime minister’s office remained skeptical, the Foreign Office News Department, as well as the
circle of dissenters around Anthony Eden, strove to ensure that the journalists were well supplied with
material, especially after the Munich crisis. During that crisis, Edward R. Murrow and other American
correspondents became household names across the United States as, night after night, they interrupted
regular programming with the latest news flash from Europe. Their dramatic and incisive reporting
heightened Americans’ appetite for radio news. That lesson was not lost on British officials in the
BLINY and the Ministry of Information, who recognized that, if London could trust the burden of its war
news to American broadcasters, not only would they secure an invaluable channel of publicity, but the
British government could also avoid the charge of propaganda.114 This was the position of Ambassador
Lindsay as well. In March 1939, he wrote that:
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It would be a great mistake not to have as much broadcast from London as may be
physically possible . . . If America ever comes into a European war it will be some
violent emotional impulse which will provide the last decisive thrust. Nothing could be
so effective as the bombing of London translated by air into the homes of America.115
British officials considered such efforts to be vital and increasingly urgent because, following the
Royal Visit in the summer of 1939, American isolationists stepped up their efforts by once again raising
the alarm against British propaganda. They alleged that London was already hard at work to lure the
United States into the next war. British commentator Alistair Cooke wrote that Americans possessed an
“almost psychotic dread” of propaganda; Lothian wrote that the United States is “terrified” of it. In more
specific political terms, however, Senators William E. Borah and Gerald P. Nye seized upon a 1938 book
entitled, Propaganda in the Next War, by British public relations expert Sidney Rogerson, as evidence of
a “basic plan to involve us in the next war.” Rogerson claimed that Americans were “more susceptible
than most peoples to mass suggestion.” He further described the methods that Britain would employ in
the next war, including the exportation of “our leading literary lights . . . to put our point of view over the
dinner table” and an emphasis on film coverage. Camera crews would be permitted “to shoot pictures of
air raids, in order that a proper volume of pictorial ‘horror’ will be available in one of the few great
countries where ‘atrocity propaganda’ will still be operative.”116 Propaganda in the Next War was a
godsend for Anglophobes and isolationists; it provided, according to Lothian, “an opportune munitions
dump” for Britain’s enemies in the United States. In the House of Representatives, a committee led by
Congressman Martin Dies, Jr. of Texas, the House Committee for the Investigation of Un-American
Activities,117 claimed that the United States was now in the grip of a war propaganda campaign
comparable only to those of 1914-1917.118
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To counter American fears of British propaganda and American isolationist efforts, London
continued to expedite the implementation of its public relations operations throughout the summer of
1939. It was careful, however, to adhere overtly to its “No Propaganda” policy. Sir Frederick Whyte, in
July 1939, argued that “the less the British Government attempt by direct propaganda to justify
themselves, the better. America will judge the European powers, not by what they say about themselves
in foreign propaganda, but by what they do. It is almost certain that American reaction in our favour will
arise more from the mistakes of enemy powers, both in policy and in propaganda, than from anything we
may say in justification of British action.” Yet, Whyte wanted to expand the role of the BLINY and
appoint a British Embassy press attaché. Lothian enthusiastically agreed, but Lindsay objected. Due to
the delicate and uncertain state of American public opinion, Lindsay advised Lothian to maintain a
relatively low profile, for the time being at any rate:
I really would urge you to say and write as little as you can on foreign affairs just now,
and when you come out here, to limit yourself, at any rate at first, to the merely necessary
speeches in reply to welcomes. In two or three months you will realize the atmosphere
here as it blows into an Embassy, and will be able to judge for yourself how far you can
go and what you can say.
Lindsay added that, in all of the well-wishes he received, as he prepared to depart, American friends and
officials consistently praised him because “I have been wise never to speak in public at all. . . . I may be
wrong. I only urge you now not to commit yourself to any course as to publicity here until you can make
up your own mind on the spot.”119
When the war broke out in September 1939, the burden of developing the British case in the
United States initially fell to the Ministry of Information. In general, the Ministry understood that its
most fundamental undertaking was to establish the justice of the British cause, convince Americans that
the war was genuine and not “phoney,” counter German propaganda, and to do all this without inflaming
American propaganda phobia. With the outbreak of the war, moreover, officials in the Foreign Office
and the Ministry of Information counted on a steady supply of news that could win American sympathy;
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they assumed, in other words, that the war would be worth reporting. Instead of high drama in France,
however, there was only the “Bore War.” The early months of the war, furthermore, exposed numerous
defects in the propaganda operation, the most significant of which involved bureaucratic infighting and
the subsequent intrusion of the Chamberlain government.

Chamberlain awarded many of the key

positions in the Ministry of Information to political allies; the weakest appointment was the Information
Minister himself -- Lord Macmillan, a lawyer with no experience in publicity and public relations. He
was totally out of touch with his staff, did not work very hard, and had no seat in the War Cabinet or the
House of Commons, so that his department carried little political weight. As a result, the Ministry of
Information lost its monopoly on the news, as individual ministries established their own press offices
and publicity policies.120
During the first year of the war, therefore, with the official propaganda apparatus in London still
essentially under development, the burden of making Britain’s case in the United States itself fell
principally upon the ambassador. More than any other previous British ambassador, Lothian, as a former
journalist, understood the power of public opinion in the United States and its role in American politics.
He repeatedly warned that Britain’s fate in war and peace hinged on the “omnipotent mass” of American
public opinion. What was now necessary, Lothian argued, was mutual understanding: “What is needed is
that people on this side, especially among the so-called ruling classes, should be made to understand how
Americans think and why they think as they do, and that there is generally as good a reason for
Americans taking their view of international affairs as there is for our taking ours.”121 He had long
believed that the American people could be “educated” to a greater understanding of the international
situation and their responsibilities within it. On 13 July 1939, just before his departure for the United
States, Lothian noted in his speech to the Pilgrims of Great Britain that Britain should not assume
American sympathy and/or assistance simply or automatically on the basis of perceived Anglo-American
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unity.122 While Britain and the United States shared a common language, as well as a common political
and cultural heritage, that unity was quite deceptive. The British in particular tended to overestimate that
unity, while Americans tended to overestimate differences between the two countries. His task, he stated,
was, “not merely to represent the policy of the British Government to the Administration in Washington
and vice versa, but to increase the mutual comprehension between the two peoples, which is much better
than it used to be, but which is still by no means achieved.” To achieve such mutual comprehension, it
was necessary to understand the fundamental differences between the two states. Lothian noted that a
major cause of misunderstanding involved the differences in the working of their democratic institutions.
Whereas in Britain, “political life centres in the House of Commons,” in the United States, conflicts
between the president and the Congress are “resolved, if they are resolved at all, by an appeal to public
opinion, by a technique with which we are quite unfamiliar.” This difference was accentuated, moreover,
by the more prominent and influential role played by the American press in the United States. The result
was that the American people tended to look at the international situation from a point of view very
different from that of the British. Lothian argued that the current American perspective was comparable
to the British attitude during the period of splendid isolation: “So long as the Channel protected us as the
Atlantic protects the United States, the first instinct of our people, as it is to-day of the American people,
was to keep out of the maelstrom of the wars between the contending nations of Europe.”123
Lothian reiterated these points in a dispatch to Halifax on 28 September 1939. “Both winning the
war and the prospects for a stable free world afterwards,” he wrote, “depend ultimately on whether we
win and keep the sympathy of the 130,000,000 Americans.” He explained that public opinion had a direct
and immediate effect upon the action of the administration, to a degree unknown in Britain:
This publicity is all the more important because the American constitution with its
division of coordinate powers between executive and legislature makes public opinion
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the decisive factor in all the more controversial matters of public policy. To an extent
unknown under the parliamentary system it is public opinion as revealed in the press, the
Gallup polls, the tornado of telegrams addressed to Congress and the ordinary reports of
party and political whips and not the responsible view of the executive which decides.
Lothian concluded that it would be “a profound mistake to believe that we can be indifferent to the way in
which others play upon this sensitive but omnipotent mass.”124
Lothian, therefore, saw his delicate but essential mission as working to disperse the “fog of
complacency.” He endeavored to aid and encourage Americans, in every way possible, to understand not
only the dangers and the realities of the situation, but also the extent to which American interests were
intimately bound to those of Britain, and, more to the point, the extent to which their peace and security
depended upon the victory of the Allies. He was encouraged in this view by the British military authority
Liddell Hart, who urged him in September 1939 to emphasize in Washington the strategic dangers to the
United States of a Nazi conquest of Europe, the subsequent extension of German air and submarine bases
into the Atlantic islands, perhaps even Central and South America, and a combined German-Japanese
menace in the Pacific. Furthermore, Admiral Sir Dudley Pound, the First Sea Lord, wrote Lothian that
America’s early entry into the war would provide greater security to American trade than neutrality
because it would expedite the rounding up of enemy vessels that sought to attack Atlantic shipping.125
The correct course, Lothian maintained in numerous dispatches to London, was to provide
Americans with the facts, while never presuming to teach them their duty. He distinguished sharply
between propaganda and what he described as “prompt and intelligent publicity.” He defined propaganda
as an attempt to instruct or persuade Americans as to the opinions and actions that would be proper for
them to entertain; such an impertinence, he argued, would make Americans “see red.” London should not
be surprised, therefore, that Americans would resist British propaganda.126 At the same time, it was clear
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that Americans were also eager for genuine news about British affairs and were spending large sums of
money to secure this news.” Thus, Lothian relentlessly asserted that one of his primary functions was to
hasten Americans’ recognition of the truth, while avoiding any suggestion of propaganda:
It is essential that we should realize that the United States is going to think out these
ultimate problems for itself, and by itself, and that it is going to reach somewhat different
conclusions from ourselves. We should concede to the United States just the same
freedom and independence as we claim for ourselves.
After all, he wrote, just as “We in this country are not much influenced by foreign opinion and
propaganda,” neither are the people of the United States.127 He pointed out to Halifax that Americans
were “so used to the pernicious system of political lobbying that they are particularly ready to suspect all
and sundry of attempting to use undue influence.”128
Many British officials flatly agreed with Lothian. T. North Whitehead, a newcomer in the
Foreign Office’s American Department, minuted on one of Lothian’s dispatches that the ambassador’s
“brilliant survey” makes clear that the “close dependence of the Administration upon public opinion
accounts for the baffling phenomenon of an Administration clearly sympathetic and yet liable to object to
our particular actions whenever we have failed to retain the sympathy of the nation at large.”129 John
Buchan, Lord Tweedsmuir, Governor General of Canada, wrote to Lothian that due to “the delicacy” of
public opinion in the United States, “there should be no propaganda of any kind in America until the
situation changes, though it is most important that our Government should be kept in the closet touch with
every nuance of American popular feeling. Thank goodness they have in you someone who really
understands the country.”130 At the same time, however, the absence of any overt British propaganda
effort did not dispel the widespread conviction among many Americans that such a campaign must be
127
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under way. Moreover, many American liberals objected to the lack of clear British war aims.131 As one
Midwesterner put it, “Let God save the King.”132
Lothian’s object, therefore, was to create an American appetite for knowledge of Britain -- its
capacity to wage war, the determination of its people to see it through, and its desire that a better world
should emerge from the struggle.133 In order to better provide the American people with information,
Lothian urged London to expand the operations of the BLINY. What was not needed, however, as some
in the Foreign Office seemed to believe, was to send British lecturers to the United States. Lothian
consistently argued that lecturers were almost invariably a liability, “not so much because of what they
say but because any British lecturer is regarded from one end of the United States to another, as coming
over here for one purpose and one purpose only, to ‘propaganda’ America” into the war.134 Indeed, he
wrote David Scott on 15 January 1940 that lecturers generally do more harm than good primarily because
the newspapers routinely characterized them as “foreign propagandists and therefore inflame the still
widespread fear in America that they are going to be propaganded into the war.”

He added that

Americans ignore German propagandists “because none of them thinks there is the slightest chance of
their going to war on Germany’s side.” But they take British propaganda quite seriously “because that is
the side on which they will enter the war if they enter it at all.”135
As early as September 1939, lecture tours by numerous British speakers, including the former
cabinet minister, Duff Cooper, became the focus of an isolationist propaganda “panic.” By the time
Cooper’s tour reached San Francisco, he was met by angry protesters, waving giant lollipops emblazoned
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with the slogan, “DON’T BE A SUCKER FOR WAR PROPAGANDA.” Similar protests occurred in
Chicago, Boston, and New York City.”136 Lothian wrote Scott, Duff Cooper’s “visit I am convinced has
done much more harm than good.” Once again, it was not due to anything he said specifically, but to the
fact that very few Americans can believe than an ex-Sea Lord of the British Admiralty “could possibly
hand out anything short of propaganda.” In addition, Cooper made comments about Jews that, Lothian
complained, were “indiscreet and stupid.”137 In part, Lothian understood the venomous reaction toward
British speakers and lecturers, due to the voluminous amount of correspondence he received from
Americans from across the nation, of all political persuasions, about any variety of topics.

One

representative sample was a letter from Miss Gertrude Heyman, who complained, among other things
about British propaganda:
I seriously object to . . . your method of propagandizing the United States now, by
sending many of your best speakers over here to travel our country and get our sympathy.
You may think you are subtle, but we bit once, and altho [sic] that is some twenty years
ago, we haven’t forgotten. So get your Duff Coopers and his kind back home and put
them in the trenches, if you need their help. We’re not going to let them stand behind in
a safe place and urge our boys on to victory -- again. Only the stupidist [sic] kind of
people make the same mistake twice, so because you’re doing it don’t expect us to follow
suit. That sounds like plain language, but . . . this is no time to mince matters, and I’m
not in the government service and don’t have to use diplomatic language.138
On the basis of this hostility stirred up by British lecturers, Representative Martin Sweeney in the late
spring of 1940 pressed the Dies committee to look into the activities of “paid agents of Britain and France
in this country, led by the Marquis of Lothian,”139 while one Midwestern newspaper, the Kansas City
Times, warned on 5 September against the cunning and deviousness of Lothian:
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In a manner, Lord Lothian combines the charm of a cultivated Briton with a degree of
democracy not usually associated with his fellow countrymen. We suspect he will make
no public speeches and issue a minimum of public statements. Above all, he will be
careful never to hint that England expects every American to do his duty. The subtlety of
his propaganda will consist of the fact that there will be no propaganda. In short, a very
dangerous man.140
British efforts were also hampered by the German propaganda campaign. Unlike the British, the
Germans had very little to lose by engaging in overt propaganda; after all, few Americans seriously
favored the Germans. All the Germans had to do was to confirm Americans in their own instinctive
reactions against the war and thus reinforce that isolationism. The leading figure in Nazi propaganda in
the United States was George Sylvester Viereck, a naturalized American citizen and writer, who had
promoted the German cause during the First World War. Among other things, he wrote Lord Lothian vs.
Lord Lothian, a pamphlet that quoted some of Lothian’s pro-appeasement statements in the 1930s,
alongside his more recent statements critical of Nazi Germany. Viereck also persuaded some isolationist
members of Congress to circulate copies of anti-British writings under the franking privilege that allowed
federal legislators free use of the mails. The German Library of Information in New York City also
produced a steady stream of publications, including a volume of captured Polish documents. To the
embarrassment of the Roosevelt administration, these documents included an account of a conversation
between the American and Polish ambassadors to Paris on the eve of the war, in which William Bullitt
indicated Washington’s readiness to support the Allies in the event of hostilities.

In addition, the

Germans produced an illustrated booklet that traced the term “concentration camp” back to the British
action during the Boer War.
The German government proved highly efficient, initially more so than London, at supplying
hard news. Germans were consistently first with news of Allied shipping losses; as a result, their figures
gained acceptance almost by default and quickly became a serious deterrent to American approval of
assistance to Britain. The Germans were also quicker at providing the photographic images of war craved
by Americans; after all, the Blitzkrieg on Poland was infinitely more photogenic than scenes of
140
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Frenchmen filing into bunkers along the Maginot Line. German photographs outnumbered Allied photos
by a ratio of four-to-one.141
The antidote for all this, Lothian repeatedly stressed, was full publicity from London about
everything Britain was thinking and doing:

“If Britain and France cannot evolve a clear idea for

themselves of their purpose in the war and how it is to be won and what is to follow it, no propaganda
will do so.”142 In order to more effectively counter German claims in a timely manner, he urged London
to provide American correspondents in London with unprecedented and open access. Like many others,
including Sir Ronald Lindsay, Lothian agreed that the most effective form of propaganda at the moment
were radio broadcasts by American reporters from London. In a letter to Sir Samuel Hoare on 2 October
1939, he noted:
The really effective things . . . are broadcasts from England by really competent
American broadcasters about what is going on in England, about what we think, and our
war aims, and speeches by Ministers to British audiences, like the speech Winston
recently made to the House of Commons about the navy’s action in meeting the
submarine menace. Americans who are extremely sensitive about propaganda feel that
speeches addressed by politicians to the House of Commons are probably quite honest,
whereas speeches addressed to themselves inevitably have an ulterior purpose in view.143
On 6 October, he urged London to provide greater access to American reporters because the Germans
were providing that access to American reporters in Berlin, to the detriment of Britain’s image and
reputation. He argued that American reporters in Germany do not have to endure censorship; they were
simply told not to offend government policy “and then allowed to send what they like.” The result was
“very frank, vivid, picturesque accounts from Germany which are admittedly friendly to [the] German
Government and not always uncritical.” By contrast, he complained, American cables from Britain were
held up for hours, and mailed reports were held up for days, by British censors. As a result, two-thirds of
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the cable news was useless by the time it reached the United States because it was out of date.
Photographs, furthermore, were “still quite inadequate and seldom interesting,” whereas the Germans
were providing photos in great quantity and of high quality. That week’s edition of Life magazine, for
example, included 36 photographs of the German air force, of no military value, “but indicative of
keenness and vigor.” To counter this disparity, Lothian suggested that London publicize the blockade,
“which is provoking hardly any criticism and is looked upon favorably by many as our strongest
weapon.” London should provide American correspondents and photographers with access to facilities,
to study British operations at first hand.

London should also provide more and higher quality

photographs of the Royal Air Force and the Royal Navy, to excite more interest and confidence in
Britain’s military effort.

More to the point, he urged Whitehall to act because “most [American]

newspapers do not want to have to publish German photographs but find themselves forced to do so for
lack of competition.”144
Lothian reemphasized on 29 November 1939 that, as the continued sinking of British shipping by
German mines was “having a depressing effect on opinion” in the United States, as were reports that
British and French air production remained behind that of Germany, “the best counter propaganda would
be as full information as possible given to the United States correspondents in London.”145 On 14
December, he wrote to Halifax:
American opinion is still . . . almost unanimously anti-Nazi. In addition it is now almost
more strongly anti-Soviet. It is to a much less degree pro-French or pro-British. There
are formidable elements which are definitely anti-British which take every opportunity to
misrepresent our motives and attack our methods.
The solution, he argued, was to provide “the fullest possible publicity” from Britain and France “through
the important and high class American correspondents” about what the Allies are thinking and doing.146
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By late 1939, Lothian’s exhortations from Washington contributed to one significant change
within the Ministry of Information. The American Division under Sir Frederick Whyte, which had
escaped the chaos that bogged down the rest of the Ministry, facilitated the provision of British war
photographs. Confronted by German domination of war photography, the American Division persuaded
the MOI’s photographic section to issue all official British war photos directly to American photographic
agencies and to improve the quality of transmission procedures. By December 1939, as a result, the
German advantage was all but nullified.

Whyte also turned his attention to the military service

departments, which were rarely forthcoming with newsworthy material.

One of the most serious

offenders was the British Admiralty, particularly when it was under the new First Lord of the Admiralty,
Winston Churchill. As the bulk of the war news was being made at sea, and as most of it was bad,
Churchill actively suppressed news reports. Lothian was particularly incensed. In the end, the Admiralty
bowed to pressure from the Ministry of Information and began to release the statistics, although
Churchill’s periodic reluctance to own up to shipping losses continued to irritate Lothian. For example,
Churchill’s refusal to admit the loss of HMS Nelson and HMS Barham in February 1940 drove Lothian to
write: “I think Winston has made a fool of himself. He is always doing these things. That is why he
never becomes Prime Minister.”147
During the early months of the war, following his assumption of the Embassy, Lothian generally
followed Lindsay’s advice to maintain a relatively low profile, avoid public statements, and defer all
plans to improve publicity in the United States -- at least for the short term. Circumspection on Lothian’s
part was particularly imperative as Congress began taking up the sensitive effort to repeal the arms
embargo. He agreed that this was not an opportune moment for a vocal British ambassador to start
“educating” Americans about Anglo-American cooperation against Hitler. He wrote the Foreign Office
less than a fortnight after his arrival in Washington: “We have clearly got to go very slowly in this
country for the next few weeks.” Lothian declined speaking engagements and postponed arrangements,
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which he had already begun, to find a suitable press attaché. He confined himself to establishing warm
working relations with the president and the State Department, particularly with the Secretary of State
Cordell Hull, who shared Lothian’s devotion to free trade and abhorrence of economic nationalism, and
the Undersecretary of State, Sumner Welles.148
Yet, Lothian did not entirely abandon his efforts to promote Anglo-American cooperation. First,
he delivered a series of speeches over the fall and winter 1939-1940, in which he emphasized the
necessity of Britain’s survival to America’s own vital interests. Second, Lothian helped to advance the
scope of British public relations efforts, although he attempted to do so quietly and behind the scenes.
During the Phoney War, Lothian gave eleven speeches, all of which referred in some way to the
international situation, and all of which repeated key themes. He denounced German treachery. As the
Soviet invasion of Finland in late November 1939 triggered a wave of anti-Communism in the United
States, he peppered his speeches with attacks on Marxism. Lothian repeatedly sought to counter any
accusation that he was surreptitiously spreading British propaganda by reminding his audiences of the
American commitment to freedom of speech and information. He explained that he was only presenting
the facts, although a British interpretation of them, from which Americans could make up their own
minds. In doing so, however, Lothian deliberately defined the British position in terms calculated to
appeal to American interests and ideals. He persistently portrayed the United States as the inheritor of a
precious flame born in Greece, nurtured in Rome, and carried to the New World by the British. He
emphasized the common foundations of democracy in Britain and the United States, and thus presented
the British cause as synonymous with the American way of life. He also stressed that Britain was fighting
for the fundamental values of liberalism and democracy, and that Britain was the center, not of an oldfashioned and oppressive empire but of an evolving, self-governing commonwealth of freely associated
powers. He frequently speculated about the post-war order for which the Allies were fighting and
suggested the need for world federation on the model of the British Commonwealth.
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In making the case for Britain, one of Lothian’s most invaluable talents and one of his most
distinctive characteristics was his ability to argue on the basis of American needs and considerations; to
approach and appreciate an issue, or to propose a solution, from the American point of view. Therefore,
Lothian argued the case for Anglo-American cooperation not from sentiment or from Britain’s needs, as
many of his countrymen tended to do, but from the standpoint of America’s own security. After all, as he
reported to London, “Americans . . . like being talked to straight and made to think, always provided you
don’t tread on one or more of [their] numberless irrational prejudices.”149
Lothian’s most persistent position, which became one of the most persistent themes of his
ambassadorship, was the importance of the Anglo-American division of global sea power and the
interdependence of American security in the Atlantic with the survival of the British fleet. Since 1815,
the Royal Navy had been the ultimate guarantor of the Monroe Doctrine, preventing hostile powers from
moving out of European waters into the Atlantic. By the late 1920s and 1930s, however, it had become
clear that the era of the Pax Britannica was over. The growth of German air power threatened Britain’s
insular security, and a potential coalition of three hostile powers, Germany, Italy, and Japan, challenged
its global position. The United States, he maintained, ought therefore to share the burden of controlling
the oceans -- the American fleet in the Pacific and the Royal Navy in the Atlantic -- so that by deterrence,
or if necessary by war, the totalitarian states could be tamed and a new peace system secured.150 These
ideas owed much to Alfred T. Mahan and other American naval writers, and were popularized in the
United States in the columns of Walter Lippmann. One of Lothian’s talents, however, lay in synthesizing
specialist wisdom and using his charm and eloquence to convey it to a wider audience in a coherent and
plausible form. As one old friend, Thomas Jones, recalled, Lothian “conveyed a fallacious lucidity of one
who had done the thinking and solved the difficulties for you.”151

149

Butler, 267-268; Cull, 58; Rock, 279.

150

Cull, 58; Reynolds, Lord Lothian, 4-5, 11; Wheeler-Bennett, Special Relationships, 93-94.

151

Jones, 515; Reynolds, Lord Lothian, 4-5; Wheeler-Bennett, Special Relationships, 94.

207
While he generally approved of Lindsay’s advice to keep a low profile and to speak in public as
little as possible until he had gotten the feel of the American mood, Lothian could not avoid replying to
the traditional welcome given the new British ambassador by the Pilgrims of the United States, at a dinner
in New York City on 25 October 1939, at the very time when neutrality revision was pending in
Congress. After referring to his own longstanding interest in America, to his predecessors from Bryce
onward, and to the recent visit by the King and Queen, Lothian spoke of the concern in many quarters of
American society that his remarks would be regarded as propaganda. He thus thought it instructive to
publicly draw a distinction between publicity and propaganda. Publicity, he argued, was different from
propaganda and was essential for the working of democracy, which depended for its success on the
capacity of the informed citizen to take responsible decisions. Therefore, Lothian pointed out, “we want
to tell you the facts as we know them and our point of view about the facts. But, having done so, by our
own democratic principles, we are bound to leave you perfectly free to formulate your own judgments
about them.” He also emphasized that the century of peace following the end of the Napoleonic wars had
been made possible primarily by the Monroe Doctrine and British sea power, supported by a stable gold
currency, low tariffs, and free immigration from the Old World to the New, during which the system of
individual initiative based on private profit had raised fourfold the western standard of living. Therefore,
the real issue of the war, he argued in late October 1939, was not a contest between rival imperialisms,
but “whether there is going to be power behind the kind of world” in which the democracies on both sides
of the Atlantic believed, or the “far more relentless power behind the kind of world in which National
Socialism and Communism believe.”152
Lothian stressed similar themes two weeks later, when Frank Aydelotte, the American Rhodes
secretary and president of Swarthmore College in Pennsylvania, invited Lothian to address a gathering at
the college on 11 November 1939. Lothian emphasized that the war was becoming more and more a
struggle between the totalitarian and the democratic way of life: “We of the liberal West are quite
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convinced . . . that the ultimate foundations of our civilization are sound. . . . These foundations are the
right to individual freedom and individual responsibility, both.”

He further stressed the common

foundations shared by both states: “Our right to freedom includes those securities for immunity from
arrest except for breach of law, freedom for thought and speech and writing and so forth which are
embodied in Magna Carta, Habeas Corpus, and the Bill of Rights.” At the same time, however, Lothian
reiterated his long-standing belief that the root of political and economic rivalries, and therefore “the
reappearance of world war,” was national sovereignty:
It is, indeed, obvious that the division of Europe into twenty-six sovereignties, each with
an army and air force, a foreign policy, sky-high tariffs, and insurmountable restrictions
on migration of its own, is incompatible either with peace or liberty or prosperity, and
that this anarchy has been the main cause of the constant wars and revolutions which
have been the bane of Europe in the past.
The solution, Lothian maintained, to the relentless questions of war and peace was world federation. Lest
Americans believe that federation was a foreign concept, he argued that federalism was after all “first
discovered and successfully applied in the United States,” and was ultimately copied in Canada and
Australia. Furthermore, it could only work among democratic states. It was clearly impossible, he
argued, to include Communist, Fascist, and democratic states in the same federation: “A true federation
is necessarily the result of voluntary agreement and not compulsion. It can only be based on free
institutions in some form. One necessary preliminary is the defeat of totalitarian imperialism.” Lothian’s
address was in one sense extraordinary, in that very few diplomats would have proposed the abolition of
national sovereignty in a public address. The fundamental message, nevertheless, remained consistent -that America’s interests and ideals were indeed in the line of fire.153
Lothian reiterated these themes in his remarks on 28 November 1939, at a ceremony
commemorating the depositing of the Lincoln copy of the Magna Carta, one of the four existing copies, in
the Library of Congress. The document had been the centerpiece of the British pavilion at the 1939 New
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York World’s Fair. In order to avoid a dangerous return voyage home, the Library of Congress agreed to
keep it for the duration of the war.154 In his remarks during the ceremony, Lothian noted the common
descent of American and British liberty from the great document: “In these immortal words, and in
others, inscribed on the musty parchment before us, we see the nucleus of most of our liberties, of trial by
Jury, of Habeas Corpus, of the principle of no taxation without representation, of the Bill of Rights, and
of the whole edifice of modern democracy.” More to the point, Lothian argued that “the principles which
underlay Magna Carta are the ultimate foundations of your liberties no less than of ours”:
Samuel Adams appealed to the “rights of Magna Carta to which the colonists, as free
subjects, have an undoubted claim.” It was in their name that your ancestors threw the
tea into Boston Harbour and rejected the claim of King George III to tax the colonies for
defence. It was in their name that, after bitter sacrifices and frustration, they drew up that
constitution which Mr. Gladstone, one of the greatest champions of human freedom,
described as “the most wonderful work ever struck off at a given time by the brain and
purpose of man”. And it was in their name that Abraham Lincoln fought a four years’
war to loosen the fetters from the slaves and to preserve the Union which alone could
ensure that the anarchy of national sovereignties, the insatiable breeder of war in Europe,
should not appear on this continent.
Although “we still have our liberties,” he warned that, “at the moment they are being challenged by
totalitarian imperialism, from both the right and from the left.” Consequently, with the Justices of the
Supreme Court looking on, Lothian committed the document to a place of safety “alongside its own
descendants, the Declaration of Independence and the American Constitution.”155 In a report to the
Foreign Office, Aubrey Morgan described the widespread news coverage of the presentation. He stressed
that the significance of the newspaper reaction was not the manner in which the story was told, “but the
fact that this story was told as a news story, in pictures, and commented on by columnists and editorials in
all types of papers and in all parts of the United States of America.” He noted in particular that the
Associated Press devoted much commentary on Lothian’s emphasis on a common heritage, which thus
became the basis of numerous editorials in its 1165 member newspapers. Morgan noted that those
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editorials “showed by their comment how sympathetic a note Lord Lothian had struck in his reference to
the Charter as a foundation upon which the democratic development of both countries was built.”156
During his address to the Chicago branch of the Council on Foreign Relations on 4 January 1940,
Lothian once again addressed the ongoing assumption that he was spreading British propaganda. He
therefore began by stressing that he would present the audience with facts about the war, not “a few
meaningless diplomatic commonplaces”:
To do this is not, I think, propaganda. The free peoples, I believe, are entitled to speak to
one another, provided they tell the truth, as I shall endeavor to do. . . . Propaganda , as I
see it, is quite a different thing. Propaganda is the deliberate attempt to influence your
own countrymen, or other nations, to a particular course of action, by lies or half truths or
tendentious innuendos. The truth is never propaganda . . . The mark of a good citizen in a
democracy is his or her capacity to distinguish between truth and error.
He again described the war as one between two conflicting ways of life, democratic and totalitarian, and
he again traced the history of liberty from the ancient Israelites and Greeks, through the Magna Carta, the
English Bill of Rights, and the American Revolution and Constitution. As he did at Swarthmore College,
Lothian suggested that the prescription for most of the world’s problems was democratic federation. The
resolution of economic inequality, unemployment, and war required domestic social reform and radical
change in international relations: “The kind of world of which the democracies dreamed twenty years ago
was not a false dream. . . . But it is now clear that in 1919 none of us understood what was necessary to
do if our hopes were to be fulfilled. The ideals which lay behind the League of Nations can only
succeed,” he declared, “if all its members are democracies.” Even then, peace could not endure as long as
nations remained separate and sovereign: “The idea of federation, applied no doubt in some new way, is,
in the end, the only way out of that dilemma.” Until that time, Lothian contended, one of the most
significant and urgent requirements for preventing another world war was Anglo-American control of the
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seas, which had ensured global peace between 1815 and 1914. It was imperative for the United States to
assume its share of international responsibility:
Britain neither can nor ought to play by herself the dominant role she played in the last
century. The rise of new naval stations and the advent of air power makes that
impossible. And sea power, if it is to be used as police power, should be in the hands of
democracies collectively and not of one power. Even at this moment, if we face the facts
honestly, our present safety to-day rests upon the fact that we control the Atlantic and you
control the Pacific. Neither we nor you nor the overseas republics and dominions would
be anything like as secure if either of us had to shoulder the task of sea defence alone.
Lothian noted that all indications were pointing to a massive German military effort against France and
Britain in the spring of 1940, as soon as the weather improved. Nevertheless, he assured his audience, the
British government was not trying to drag the United States into the war: “It knows that no democracy
will accept the hideous consequences of war unless it is convinced that its own vital interests, which
include its ideals, are at stake.” If ever the United States was driven into the war, he asserted, it would be
due to the “relentless march of events,” not because of propaganda.157
Following his Chicago speech, Lothian’s friend, Thomas Lamont, sent him a copy of “Analysis
of Newspaper Opinion” for the week ending 6 January 1940, which noted that, as a result of Lothian’s
speech, “newspaper opinion concludes that the United States must very properly ask itself what part it is
to play in any coming peace.” The article also scrutinized the speech for evidence of propaganda that
might tend to entangle the United States in the war, “and the overwhelming majority clears the British
Ambassador of any such intent. It is worthy of note that a very large proportion of comment which the
British Ambassador has stimulated in recent months revolves, as in the present case, about the part the
U.S. is to play in peace, not upon the part the U.S. is to play in war.”158
In addition to his various speeches, Lothian also sought to advance the scope of Britain’s public
relations apparatus in the United States. Relatively early on, Lothian grew increasingly determined to
stretch the boundaries of the “No Propaganda” policy. Although Lindsay had urged him to adopt a low
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profile, he did not want the British case to be lost by default. On 27 February 1940, he wrote to Sir
Frederick Whyte that while “No Propaganda is still our watch word so far as the United States is
concerned, this does not mean that we are not doing our best to make accurate information on our aims
and actions available to those who are misinformed.”159
During the Phoney War, Lothian’s principal effort was to provide open access to, and cultivate
the favor of, the American media. For that reason, one of the primary objectives of his speeches was not
so much to convert his audiences as to simply get his ideas disseminated by the media. While he urged
London to give American correspondents in Britain as much freedom as possible to report events to the
American people, he began to cultivate close relations with newspapermen in the United States. He gave
them free access to the British Embassy and made himself readily accessible to ordinary journalists, both
individually and through informal press conferences. According to the Jedburgh Gazette, the day before
the war broke out, an American reporter telephoned the British Embassy in Washington. Familiar with all
the red tape and traditional stuffiness of the Embassy, he asked for a statement on the situation “with an
air of deference and hopelessness”:
“Just a moment, please,” said the operator. In a few minutes a friendly voice could be
heard by the reporter. “What can I do for you?” asked the voice. The reporter was
startled. “Who is this?” he asked. Said the voice: “It’s Lothian.”
The article pointed out that “It was mainly because Lord Lothian the aristocrat behaved more like a
democrat than any British Ambassador had ever done that . . . American newshawks like him; and
American newshawks in Washington put Lord Lothian second on the list after President Roosevelt.”160
He spoke to them with disarming frankness. In January 1940, he won accolades by speaking
informally and without notes to the Press Club in Washington and offering himself as a target for
questions, which was something not typically expected from a British ambassador. In doing so, Lothian
generally charmed the press corps. Lothian was “especially adept” at handling the press, according to his
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assistant John Wheeler-Bennett. “Whereas many of his predecessors had been ‘buttoned up’ and even
hostile to the media, Lothian was expansive and assured, knowing if by instinct exactly what to say at any
given occasion.”161 Furthermore, he made sure that copies of his speeches were printed and widely
distributed, especially in the case of the major addresses. In particular, he made sure they reached public
figures, such as his friend Walter Lippmann, but especially the leading sympathetic newspaper owners,
such as Arthur Hays Sulzberger of The New York Times, Ogden Reids of the New York Herald Tribune,
and Eugene Meyer of the Washington Post, with whom he was on good terms. All but traditionally antiBritish papers responded favorably to his speeches. They quoted from them extensively and went on, as
Lothian had hoped, to debate his comments in editorials and syndicated columns for days afterwards. His
optimism appealed to the media, which became disenchanted with the cynicism of British diplomacy in
the 1930s and were presently suspicious of the Phoney War. Lothian’s speech in Chicago on 4 January
1940 attracted particular attention and praise. The columnist Dorothy Thompson, for example, called it
“the clearest statement of British war and peace aims which has yet been made anywhere.”162
In order to further fine-tune his approach to American opinion, Lothian asked Wheeler-Bennett,
who had been serving as a caretaker press attaché,163 to be his eyes and ears in the country at large. To
initiate a reform of the British consular service and its personnel in the United States, Lothian sent
Wheeler-Bennett to visit Britain’s network of consulates throughout the country, which he found to be
hopelessly inadequate.164

He also kept discreetly in touch with anti-Nazi Germans in the country,
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including the former Rhodes scholar and Astor family friend Adam von Trott.165 Wheeler-Bennett
worked out of an office in the BLINY, but visited the British Embassy in Washington once a week for
consultation. In the early months of 1940, furthermore, he also accepted numerous invitations to lecture.
He spoke at a bewildering succession of meetings, across the country, with university groups, Women’s
Clubs, Knights of Columbus, Rotary Clubs, Lions Clubs, Kiwanis, Elks, Shriners, and even a Pittsburg
cathedral. In all of these venues, he delivered, as did Lothian, the same message of British determination
and the justice of the Allied cause. At his busiest, Wheeler-Bennett spoke eight times in ten days. After
all, Lothian noted, Americans were “an ear hungry people.”166
Lothian also initiated an effort to streamline the BLINY, which, in the fall of 1939, was
characterized by what Wheeler-Bennett described as “spirit of lethargy” and “a total inability to grasp the
idea of what to do and how to do it.” For one thing, confusion emanated from the top. While its director,
Angus Fletcher, seemed unaware that journalists lived by deadlines, its parent institution, the Foreign
Office News Department, had moved from Whitehall to the Ministry of Information building in
Bloomsbury so that no one knew who specifically was giving the orders. The major problem, however,
was that the fear of transgressing the Foreign Office directive to avoid any semblance of propaganda had
resulted in paralysis; the staff was afraid to answer even the most harmless and general inquiries lest they
be accused of propagandizing. Therefore, Lothian instructed Wheeler-Bennett to implement a program
designed to expand the scope of its activities.

Driven by their efforts, the BLINY began a modest

expansion, enlarged its staff, provided for faster and more efficient replies to inquiries from newspapers,
and built a mailing list of customers that, by February 1940, stood at 2500 names. It approached
customers through pamphlets and low-budget advertising drives in certain technical journals.167
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Lothian also actively sought out other fresh avenues of publicity. In early 1940, he attempted to
initiate propaganda efforts through Britain’s allies, such as the Canadians, Czechs, Poles, or the French,
all of whom had more room to act without offending American sensibilities. Lothian had long suggested
that Canada might serve as an invaluable propaganda proxy. Canada, however, was too wary of the
American propaganda phobia, while the Czechs and the Poles lacked the financial resources to make any
meaningful contribution. One possibility, however, was the French Information Center in New York.
Both its director, Robert Valeur, and his colleague, Raoul de Roussy de Sales, had excellent instincts for
propaganda. De Sales had many established contacts in the New York press and soon became a central
source of information on European affairs for many radio commentators and magazine writers. He also
served as the point of contact between the British and French propaganda operations, meeting WheelerBennett for lunch every Saturday. Encouraged by such contact, Lothian initiated an effort to establish a
joint Anglo-French Allied Information Agency under de Sales designed to spearhead a large-scale
propaganda drive in the United States. The fall of France, in the summer of 1940 destroyed this scheme,
but Lothian’s idea for an allied propaganda office remained alive and resurfaced later that year.168
Lothian’s superiors in London, however, advised him to tone down his rhetoric for the time being
and to be more discreet in public. In the House of Commons, his references to federalism and AngloAmerican control of the seas annoyed some senior backbenchers with long, bitter memories of clashes
with Woodrow Wilson at Paris and of the naval rivalry of the 1920s.169 Even sympathetic friends advised
Lothian to “go slow” on such questions as world federation.

For example, Sir Herbert Williams, a

member of Parliament, took exception to certain passages in Lothian’s speech in Chicago, including a
favorable reference to the concept of federal union, “whatever that may mean,” Williams protested: “I
think myself it is a form of vague nonsense which is now attracting the sloppy minds which previously
thought collective security meant something.” He concluded that “ambassadors ought not to make
speeches except of a very ceremonial nature.” He added a week later, that as a general principle:
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I always object to ambassadors, admirals and generals making speeches. As a rule they
are not very good at it, and it is always difficult to know whether they are merely
expressing their own view or are making an official speech on behalf of His Majesty’s
Government.
Within the Foreign Office, Victor Perowne conceded that “the dangers of making speeches of this kind
are considerable.”170 On 19 January 1940, Perowne also drew attention to the fact that the ambassador’s
speeches were being taken in the United States as official British policy. He wrote that the Foreign Office
was at present reviewing all of Lothian’s speeches out of a concern that the ambassador might one day
make some comment that will generate great applause in the United States, but result in “effects
undesirable or even impossible for His Majesty’s Government.”171 Others questioned whether he clearly
understood the ambassador’s role. After trying to elucidate the meaning of one “rather contradictory” and
“rather impalpable” letter in late November 1939, Alexander Cadogan dismissed Lothian as “a phrasemonger.”172

David Scott, an assistant undersecretary in the Foreign Office, believed that the

ambassador’s task was principally to “jolly along” the State Department “by emitting a pleasant odour”
and not to resort to overt pressure or public lecturing.
Although not particularly concerned, Halifax did feel sufficiently compelled to administer a
gentle rebuke, “that it would be well for you to go slow over them and especially over any suggestion that
federalism is likely to be a remedy for our present-day discontents.”173

In response, Lothian admitted

that he was merely trying to educate -- not just Americans but British audiences as well. He asserted that
his “guarded references to federalism” have not done any harm. In spite of cynicism, bred “to justify their
own abandonment of international cooperation in 1920, the American people, in fact, were “hungering”
170

PRO FO 371/24227, A289/26/45, Williams to Butler, 16 January 1940; minute by Perowne, 11 January 1940;
minute by Cadogan, who agreed, 24 January 1940. In his letter to R.A. Butler of the Foreign Office, Williams took
particular exception to Lothian’s implication that the British government would pool its naval resources “with those
of at present neutral states,” and considered asking a question in the House. He decided against doing so because it
would put the government in a bad position, either to repudiate Lothian, which would be a difficult thing to do, or to
approve of what he said, “which would be even worse.”

171

PRO FO 371/24227, A289/26/45, minute by Perowne, 19 January 1940.

172

Cadogan, 234, entry for 27 November 1939; Reynolds, Lord Lothian, 10.

173

PRO FO 800/398, US/40/1, Halifax to Lothian, 30 January 1940.

217
for idealism and “sacrifice for a constructive cause.” It was necessary to remember, at the same time, that
the postwar world would require changes in British as well as American attitudes; Americans would only
participate in a world organization when they saw that Europe was trying to regulate its own affairs
through some kind of continental federation. In a similar way, an effective system of collective naval
security required not only United States involvement but a readiness on the part of the British, including
Halifax’s friends in Parliament, to share naval power with the United States.174 Indeed, Lothian pointedly
noted that one reason why many Americans did not accept the argument that its first and best line of
defense was the Royal Navy was due to their conviction that “we will never share sea power with them -the very case that your die-hard friends put forward.”175
By December 1939, even normally pro-British elements in the United States thought that
London should tone down its efforts. For example, the Oxford University Union debate team, led by the
future Conservative prime minister Edward Heath, earned the praise of the British Embassy for its work
on American campuses, but one of Lothian’s contacts suggested that the British team should “trade off a
few gas masks for a few muzzles.” Even the Anglophile Chicago Daily News concluded an editorial by
suggesting that London back off:
Britain needs no propaganda in this country. Hitler has been the pluperfect British
propagandist in America, and his unpopularity shown by every poll and test represents a
finished job. Only Britain herself can spoil it, by the stupidities of her censorship and by
boring us to death with more war books and British lectures. Call off your lecturers, John
Bull, or we will begin to think your last name means what it says.176
Neither Lothian nor the Ministry of Information, however, was troubled by such editorials, as the bulk of
British propaganda efforts had largely escaped the isolationists’ notice.177
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Before the Storm
By the late spring of 1940, Lothian believed that one of the most significant dangers for Britain
was the sustained mood of complacency within the United States, which was punctuated periodically by
irritation over British maritime policy. The root of this complacency lay principally in the American
perception of the strategic situation in Europe. Although most Americans hoped for an Allied victory,
very few believed that their assistance was necessary to achieve it. Consequently, throughout the winter
of 1939, and into the spring of 1940, Lothian’s analysis of American public opinion stressed one basic
and fundamentally unchanging theme -- the overwhelming majority of the American people were about
90 percent anti-Hitler, but equally determined to keep out of the war.
Yet, Lothian repeatedly emphasized that the American people appeared to be waking up to the
real danger posed by Nazi Germany. On 15 September 1939, for example, he wrote Sir Samuel Hoare
that “the consequence of the serious position in which the Russo-German pact and the forthcoming defeat
of Poland are going to place England and France is beginning to come home to thinking Americans and
instinctively the mass of Americans feel that Hitler is a mortal enemy of all they stand for.”178 Similarly,
on 2 December 1939, he wrote J. A. Spender that, although American public opinion had become
complacent in the absence of a major German offensive in the West, the United States appeared to be
waking up: “the invasion of Finland by Russia on 30 November and the prospect of acute tension between
the United States and Japan at the beginning of next year is making it begin to think seriously again.”179
At the same time, however, he persistently and relentlessly reemphasized, frequently in the same
breath or sentence, that hatred of Germany in the United States did not imply an equal and opposite
reaction in favor of Britain. Whether driven by historical antagonisms, lingering disgust at British
appeasement, the traditional fear of entanglement in the affairs of the Old World, or above all, by the
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almost hysterical suspicion of being dragged into another European war by British cunning, Americans
remained apprehensive of Britain.
Lothian emphasized that the majority of Americans saw the war as a strictly European affair that
did not directly impact vital American interests. Lothian pointed out in letters to Churchill, Halifax,
Chatfield, and Hoare in early November 1939 that there was not a sufficient amount of danger that would
compel the United States to enter the conflict:
But there seems, from here, to be much less probability of an attempted blitzkrieg against
the Allies than there was a month ago. The weather seems likely to prevent an attempt at
a decision this winter, though there will probably be continued attacks by air and
submarine on the fleet, and in the spring, with the improved allied defences and a steady
stream of armaments beginning to cross the Atlantic from the United States, and with
Japan, Italy and Spain determined neutrals, Hitler may well have to decide that the
blitzkrieg then also is too dangerous to attempt, with Russia waiting in the East to profit
from the exhaustion in the West.180
On 18 December 1939, he wrote an old friend in South Africa, B. K. Long, that while American
opposition to any intervention in the war was due in large part to an overwhelming wave of pacifism, the
war had unfolded along lines different from those Americans had expected: “For instance, Japan, Italy,
and Spain are not in it, and the United States now feels that not only is the war a purely European
concern, but that its own security is assured because the Russian agreement is evidently going to ruin
Hitler.”181 In addition, in a letter to Halifax on 27 January 1940, Lothian noted that, while Americans
were growing more and more confident that the United States would not be dragged into the war, they
were becoming increasingly irritated by British maritime policies and the feeling that Britain had been
needlessly inconsiderate of American interests.182
On top of all this, the hope for a negotiated peace between the Allies and Germany, a hope that
swelled with Sumner Welles’s mission to Europe in March 1940, further compounded American
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complacency.183 Unlike his superiors in London, Lothian considered the Welles mission to be part of the
president’s effort to exert American influence on European events within the limits imposed upon him by
the Neutrality Act and isolationist public opinion. The ambassador after all had been preaching to his
American audiences that an early peace “really depends upon the neutrals.” If the neutrals stood aloof, he
argued, a fight to the finish could not be avoided; but if they associated themselves in some way with the
war aims of the Allies, Germany might be compelled to consider a negotiated peace.184
In any event, whether or not anything substantive resulted from the Welles Mission, Lothian
nevertheless continued to maintain that the United States was fundamentally hell-bent on staying out of
the war, and that the only occasion that would compel the United States to enter the conflict was a direct
attack on its vital interests.
Taking all of this into consideration, Lothian argued, it was difficult to foresee what action the
United States would take. The present boredom with the “Phoney War,” which amounted in some places
“almost to resentment that the expected ‘drama’ of world war would not be played out,” would likely
focus popular attention back to domestic affairs, namely the presidential election campaign of 1940 and
the question of whether Roosevelt would seek a third term. He noted, moreover, that no politician,
especially in an election year, would dare “to incur the consequences of being assailed as pro-British,
which is much the same as being pro-war, by raising some of the fundamental questions which are
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constantly propounded in private.” Yet he also noted the possibility that, as the fear of war lessened, the
United States might move toward a more forward and assertive foreign policy.185
It had become clear to Lothian, as he noted in a dispatch of 10 April 1940, that the evolution of
American opinion vindicated the “No Propaganda” policy.

Britain had built an effective working

relationship with American reporters. British war photographs now outnumbered German photographs
by a ratio of twelve-to-one. The Gallup opinion polls from the previous week showed that 84 percent of
the American people were in favor of the Allies, approximately the same percentage as in the previous
October. It appeared that the worst of American propaganda phobia had passed. Yet, the Phoney War
had also demonstrated the limitations of the policy. Britain needed a steady supply of war news to satisfy
the American press; without such news, British publicity efforts atrophied. It grew increasingly clear in
the late spring of 1940 that, until American attitudes changed, Lothian’s influence on British policy would
remain inevitably peripheral. In May 1940, however, Hitler’s invasion of France and the Low Countries
furnished the raw news materials and strategic urgency necessary to sweep away the complacent
foundations of American isolationist sentiment.186
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CHAPTER FIVE: THE DESTROYERS DEAL
In May 1940, Lord Lothian began to assume a far more prominent and central role in the conduct
of Anglo-American diplomacy. In part, this new importance was due to his own relentless efforts during
the Phoney War to win the confidence of the Foreign Office and the Roosevelt Administration. By the
spring of 1940, many of Lothian’s earlier critics had begun to conclude that their initial reservations about
Lothian had been wrong. Sir Ronald Lindsay, for example, wrote Alexander Cadogan in May 1940 that,
according to William Bullitt, Roosevelt’s friend and ambassador in Paris, “Lothian is doing magnificently
in Washington. The President likes him and was always pleased to see him, which was rare as he found
most people bores.”1 Many British officials, moreover, increasingly considered Lothian’s dispatches
about American opinion to be models of analysis. The Foreign Office, for example, described a dispatch
from Lothian on 1 February 1940 as “an excellent survey,” while the King’s private secretary, who had
read a great many such missives, described it as “the best I have ever seen from an ambassadorial pen.”2
With some continuing exceptions, most Foreign Office officials were impressed with the ambassador’s
speeches. In May 1940, a senior Foreign Office official, Sir Frank Ashton-Gwatkin, who had recently
spent several weeks in Washington, reported that while Britons should generally avoid speechmaking in
the United States, “in the case of Lord Lothian’s speeches, both big and small, I have heard nothing but
praise. It is not every British speaker who knows how to address American audiences.”3 American
observers as well began to note and praise Lothian’s unique abilities to grasp, even embrace, the
American character. In February 1940, Dr. Herbert Bayard Swope, editor of the New York World, wrote
to Lord Camrose, of the Daily Telegraph, that Lothian “is doing a very good job over here. He has
approached his problems intelligently and worked them out effectively.

1

He has succeeded in
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understanding the American viewpoint. I should say he were doing a far better job over here than some
of our Ambassadors abroad.”4
Primarily, however, it was the dramatic events of May and June 1940 that fundamentally elevated
Lothian to a more central and vital position. On 10 May 1940, the Germans launched with shattering
force their long-anticipated offensive in the West. Over the next several weeks, they surrounded and cut
off the Allied forces in the Low Countries, easily overran the feeble armies of France and compelled the
surrender of its government on 22 June 1940. In the United States, the speed and dispatch with which the
armed forces of Nazi Germany overwhelmed the Western Allies suddenly aroused many Americans to the
now very real possibility of German domination of Europe and its consequences to America. The fall of
France, in particular, forced the United States and Britain closer together. Until June 1940, British and
American policy rested on the assumption that the French army was their first line of defense. After the
rapid collapse of France, therefore, Britain, almost defenseless, recognized immediately that its survival
would depend upon United States assistance, while many American leaders began to recognize that their
first line of defense was now Britain.5
Just as important as the military developments were the changes in the British leadership. On 10
May 1940, the same day the Germans launched their attack in the West, Winston Churchill replaced
Neville Chamberlain as the British prime minister. Although not immune from American doubts and
suspicions, Churchill was and had long been far more enthusiastic than most of the British leadership,
certainly more than his predecessor, about an Anglo-American alliance. To this end, he brought into his
coalition Cabinet several prewar advocates of closer Anglo-American relationship.6 Moreover, he was
much more inclined than Chamberlain to interfere in the detailed handling of foreign policy, particularly
4
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with respect to relations with the United States. Gradually Churchill, the Foreign Office, particularly the
American Department, and Lothian established an effective working relationship, which brought AngloAmerican issues to the center of British policymaking. Indeed, as Europe fell under German control and
the United States remained the crucial neutral power, the American Department assumed a greater
importance within the Foreign Office.7 Furthermore, Churchill was and remained supremely confident
that he would compel the United States to enter the war. In his letter to Benito Mussolini of 16 May
1940, in which he implored the Italian dictator to remain at peace, Churchill asserted that Britain would
have the whole-hearted support of the United States: “It is idle to predict the course of the great battles
now raging in Europe, but I am sure that whatever may happen on the Continent, England will go on to
the end, even quite alone, as we have done before, and I believe with some assurance that we shall be
aided in increasing measure by the United States, and, indeed, by all the Americas.”8 Two days later, on
18 May, as France continued to face overwhelming German attacks on land and air, he boldly told his son
Randolph that he would drag the United States into the war.9 In the meantime, Churchill endeavored to
impress on President Roosevelt the urgency of British needs, largely through the informal method of
correspondence he had initiated in September 1939. Over the course of the war, between May 1940 and
April 1945, Churchill sent Roosevelt a message, on average, once every thirty-six hours. “No lover,” he
wrote after the war, “ever studied the whims of his mistress as I did those of President Roosevelt.”10
Consequently, given the disquieting and dramatic escalation of the war, the growing threat to
Britain, and Churchill’s own commitment to strong Anglo-American relations, the change in the Cabinet
7
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marked the end of the reticence that had characterized Chamberlain’s relations with the United States. It
also freed Lothian from the constraints that had circumscribed his influence during the Phoney War.
With German military success in the Low Countries and France, it grew profoundly and unmistakably
clear that Britain had no real alternatives: there was no longer any realistic chance that the British
blockade would starve Germany into submission; nor was there any longer a question that London could
or should hold the United States at arms length to ensure the integrity of the British Empire. The only
prospect for the survival of Britain rested in the hope of American support. As a result, Lothian
understood the absolute and desperate urgency of securing weapons and material assistance -- and as soon
as possible. In doing so, however, he also well understood that the president could only go as far as
American public opinion allowed. Consequently, he saw his primary mission as fundamentally two-fold:
to persuade the president to comply with Churchill’s requests, and at the same time, to influence
American public opinion, either in his public addresses or in private conversations, to adopt an attitude
that would respond to the president’s initiatives. Specifically, he sought to convince the American
people, as he had since the war broke out, that their safety and security depended on Allied victory, and
that it was in the interest of the United States to actively support Britain, although not necessarily to send
an army to Europe.11
Over the course of the next four months, Lothian made two significant contributions as
ambassador. First, he played a central role in facilitating the Destroyers-for-Bases Deal, concluded on 2
September 1940, after months of negotiation. The United States agreed to provide Britain with fifty
relatively obsolete American destroyers in return for 99-year leases of land on eight British possessions in
the Western Atlantic and the Caribbean, on which the United States could construct naval and air bases.
Second, Lothian also intensified the establishment of a public relations-propaganda apparatus in the
United States, which helped to win greater and greater popular support for Britain. As a result, by the fall
of 1940, the majority of the American people, although still determined to stay out of the war,
nevertheless saw the survival of Britain as fundamental to American security.
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Churchill and Lothian Begin the Dialogue with Washington
Fundamental to Britain’s diplomatic efforts to win American support and material aid was the
relationship between Churchill and Lothian. When the war began in September 1939, Lothian welcomed
Churchill’s return to power as First Lord of the Admiralty. For some time, he had favored bringing
Churchill into the cabinet, not least for the effect this would have on opinion in the United States. Similar
to many in the British government, however, his feelings about Churchill were initially ambivalent. In
September 1939, for example, he told J. Pierrepont Moffatt, an official in the State Department, that “nine
days out of ten Churchill was magnificent, but the tenth day during a crisis he was apt to lose his head,
close his ears, and refuse to listen to reason.” Lothian believed, moreover, that Churchill’s periodic
follies had prevented him from attaining the premiership. Nevertheless, Lothian felt that Churchill
possessed the “exuberance, drive and leadership which England craved.” Therefore, during the political
crisis of early May 1940, he saw no obvious successor to Chamberlain, although he had concerns, like
many in Whitehall, that the new prime minister would accept no advice and would become “a dictator.”12
At the same time, it is clear that Churchill’s opinions and feelings about Lothian were equally
ambivalent. In his war memoirs, Churchill noted that throughout their association, “we had differed much
and often from Versailles to Munich and later,” and that Lothian “had given me the impression of high
intellectual and aristocratic detachment from vulgar affairs.”13 They had clashed at the Paris Peace
Conference over Allied intervention in Russia, and during the 1930s over India and, above all, Germany.
More recently, however, new tensions emerged during 1939 and 1940 as a result of Churchill’s secret
correspondence with Roosevelt. During the Phoney War, the messages had actually been relatively few
in number and confined to naval affairs; after Churchill's assumption of the premiership, however, they
quickly evolved into a more wide-ranging and crucial line of communication. In the summer of 1940,
Churchill wanted to keep this correspondence personal and private, preferring to send messages through
12
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Joseph Kennedy and the State Department, rather than through the Foreign Office and Lothian. By doing
so, Churchill apparently felt that his correspondence with the president would thus seem like ordinary
diplomatic traffic.14 Neither the Foreign Office American Department nor Lothian, however, were aware
of some of the earlier messages. As a result, the ambassador periodically was embarrassed to find the
State Department treating telegrams of which he was unaware as authoritative statements of British
policy.15 Over the crucial summer months of 1940, therefore, Churchill and the Foreign Office reached
agreement on a workable solution that would keep Lothian in the information loop. Furthermore, Lothian
would ultimately play a vital role in this correspondence, interpreting and reinforcing London’s messages
to the president and to the State Department, and reinforcing back to London the attitude of the American
leaders and policy makers.

His familiarity with American policymaking processes, as well as the

friendly relations that he had established in Washington, were invaluable, and stood particularly in
contrast to the overwhelming distaste for Joseph Kennedy on both sides of the Atlantic.16 Nevertheless,

14

Leutze suggests that Churchill may have preferred to send messages to Roosevelt through Kennedy precisely
because so many in London considered Kennedy to be unreliable. If Kennedy was that unreliable, he surmised,
would it not be advantageous to have the Germans learn that Churchill and Roosevelt were maintaining such closer
personal contact? Leutze, 50.

15

On 19 October 1939, for example, Lothian reported that Sumner Welles had shown him a message, of which he
had not previously heard, from Churchill to the president on the subject of the American plan for a “security zone.”
The Foreign Office made inquiries at the Admiralty, and obtained copies of two messages, dated 5 October and 16
October 1939, both of which had been seen by Halifax before they were sent to the United States ambassador.
Copies of the messages were then sent to Lothian by diplomatic bag on 15 November 1939. Before those messages
reached him, however, he telegraphed on 16 November that he had been considerably embarrassed to hear from Mr.
Welles of the message of 5 October, which appeared to conflict to some extent with his own instructions from the
Foreign Office. Halifax wrote to Churchill on 8 December that Lothian ought to be kept informed of any messages;
he thus asked Churchill to send in advance to the Foreign Office, drafts of his messages, so that Lothian could be
told of them, and the Foreign Office could ensure that the messages were consistent with their own instructions.
Churchill concurred. On 25 December 1939, the Admiralty gave the Foreign Office a copy of a message sent on
that day to Roosevelt through the United States Embassy in London. Before the Foreign Office wired it on 26
December to Lothian, however, he had already heard of the message from the Argentine ambassador in Washington,
who had been told of it by Mr. Welles. Halifax, therefore, wrote Churchill again on 6 January 1940, asking that the
messages should be sent through the Foreign Office and Lothian, rather than through the United States Embassy and
the State Department. Churchill replied on 12 January that he thought it a mistake to close down the Embassy
channel, and that he had assumed that the Foreign Office had informed Lothian at once of his message of the
previous day. He thus suggested that the messages should be sent to Lothian simultaneously with their dispatch
through the United States Embassy in London, “thus keeping Lothian fully informed while giving the President the
feeling that he has a special line of information.” Lash, 65-66, 68; Leutze, 48-50; L. Woodward, 334-335.
16

Butler, Lord Lothian, 280-281; Lash, 66.

228
until the early fall of 1940, relations between Churchill and Lothian would remain professional, although
somewhat cool and still mutually suspicious of one another’s judgment.
In the meantime, Lothian, followed soon thereafter by Churchill, opened the dialogue with the
Roosevelt administration they hoped would lead to American military and material aid. On the evening
of 13 May 1940, Lothian met with Roosevelt, who described his administration’s representations to
Mussolini and explained that the tenuous state of American public opinion would not allow him to do
more. Lothian immediately telegraphed London that, although it would be a mistake to press Roosevelt
for further action, Churchill should nudge the president by presenting those British requirements that
could be met within the limits set by the neutrality legislation and by American public opinion.17
Based on this communication, on 15 May 1940, as the German army broke through French
lines at Sedan, and five days after becoming prime minister, Churchill wrote to Roosevelt. Among other
things, he explained that German power was overwhelming and that Mussolini was likely to enter the
war. Moreover, he anticipated that France would soon be driven out of the war and that Britain would
have to carry on the fight against Germany alone: “We expect to be attacked here ourselves, both from
the air and by parachute and air-borne troops in the near future, and are getting ready for them. If
necessary, we shall continue the war alone, and we are not afraid of that.” Nevertheless, he emphatically
stressed, Britain could resist the Germans, but only with American assistance: “But I trust you realise,
Mr. President, that the voice of force and the United States may count for nothing if they are withheld too
long. You may have a completely subjugated Nazified Europe established with astonishing swiftness,
and the wait may be more than we can bear.” He thus asked the president to proclaim “non-belligerency,
which would mean that you would help us with everything short of actually engaging the armed forces.”
Specifically, Churchill presented Roosevelt with essentially a “shopping list” of specific British needs: an
American loan, “to bridge the gap between what we have now and the large new construction we put in
hand at the beginning of the war,” several hundred of the latest types of aircraft, anti-aircraft equipment
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and ammunition, American steel, the visit of the American fleet to Singapore and ports in Ireland. At the
top of the list, however, was a “loan of 40 or 50 of your older destroyers,” in order to bridge the gap
between Britain’s present shortage and the new construction to be completed by the spring of 1941.
Throughout, the prime minister took pains to emphasize that British requests and the American response
was urgent, and added that “We shall go on paying dollars for as long as we can, but I should like to feel
reasonably sure that when we can pay no more, you will give us the stuff all the same.”18
Two days later, on 17 May, Roosevelt dispatched a cordial telegram to Churchill, but declined to
grant the prime minister’s most urgent requests.

For one thing, the United States needed all of its

destroyers for patrolling the American coasts. More to the point, however, he explained that a loan of
destroyers would require the authorization of Congress, and Roosevelt was “not certain that it would be
wise for that suggestion to be made to the Congress at this moment.”19 While he promised to try to
facilitate the sale of anti-aircraft equipment, ammunition, and steel, for now, at any rate, in place of
destroyers, the president could only offer Churchill “the best of luck.”20 On the same day, however,
Roosevelt asked Congress for increased appropriations for defense and military equipment.

While he

emphasized the need to shore up American security, he also strongly urged them not to delay the delivery
of aircraft to nations that had already ordered them or might order them in the future.21
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This initial exchange of messages between Churchill and Roosevelt very quickly established the
Royal Navy’s fate should Britain be defeated, as a central concern among Americans, one that would
dominate discussions between London and Washington throughout the summer of 1940. Many believed
or anticipated that even if British resistance collapsed, the British fleet, or what remained of it, would still
be available for the defense of the Western Hemisphere. This hope was encouraged, in part, by remarks
made by Churchill to Joseph Kennedy, on the evening of 14 May 1940, that Britain would not surrender
even if Germans overran the island: “Why, the Government will move to Canada and take the fleet and
fight on.” From London’s point of view, however, such talk was dangerous. The British government did
not want Washington to be too certain that the Royal Navy would take refuge in the west and thus write
off resistance to Hitler in Europe, expecting the vanquished British to give them “posthumous support.”22
It was along these lines that Lothian, on 17 May 1940, began to make Britain’s case for
destroyers and arms in a conversation with the president. He argued, as he had so many other times, that
it was imperative for American security, as well as for the security of the British Empire, that the British
fleet remain the dominant force in the Atlantic, and therefore in possession of bases in the British Islands
and at Gibraltar. He further stated that if Britain fell for want of American help, it would generate a
tremendous naval crisis for the United States. With the main American fleet stationed at Pearl Harbor to
deter Japan, while only a weak Atlantic squadron patrolled the East Coast, the United States would have
to face naval threats in both oceans in the event of a British defeat. If the United States navy were held in
the Pacific, Germany and Italy could establish themselves in Brazil with the help of German and Italian
“fifth columns” already in the country and rapidly developing. They could then be within bombing
distance of the Panama Canal.

Therefore, Lothian asserted, the United States should do everything

possible by supplying food, destroyers, and aircraft, and by putting pressure on Spain not to enter the war,
thus helping Britain maintain command of the navy and allowing the United States navy to maintain its
predominance in the Pacific.
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In response, Roosevelt agreed with Lothian’s position but insisted that he could not move beyond
the point at which Congress would consent; besides, public opinion, he believed, had not yet grasped the
strategic equation. In the meantime, Roosevelt suggested that if the worst happened, the Royal Navy
might cross the Atlantic Ocean to Canada or the United States. Lothian replied that this would probably
depend on whether the United States had entered the war, as he could not truly imagine that the British
people would entrust their fleet to a neutral America. The president, Lothian reported to London on 18
May 1940, “seemed impressed by this possibility.”23
This conversation established the framework for British and American tactics over the next
several weeks. Roosevelt and his officials emphasized the importance of preserving the French and
British fleets whatever happened in Europe; the loss of the fleet became, according to Lothian, the
president’s “paralyzing illusion.”24 In response, Lothian maintained the pressure, generally reiterating his
warning that Britain was unlikely to entrust its navy to a neutral America. On 21 and 23 May 1940, for
example, he discussed with Sumner Welles the position that his government might take in the event of a
German invasion of Britain that either forced London’s submission or caused extensive destruction from
the air. Lothian told Welles “in very vigorous terms . . . that it was his positive conviction that so long as
the Britain and French fleets remained intact and out of German hands and so long as the United States
fleet remained in the Pacific, and the Allied fleets therefore controlled the Atlantic and the United States
was able to act as counterpoise to Japan in the Pacific, Germany could not eventually win the war.”
Lothian maintained that no British government would surrender the fleet, and that the high ranking naval
officers in command of the fleet would never agree to surrender it even if ordered to do so. Furthermore,
even if a majority in the House of Commons voted into power a new government that would agree to
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surrender the fleet, the present British government would refuse to acquiesce in any such decision and
would remove to Canada, where the British fleet could at least in part be based, while other portions of
the fleet would likely be based in the British West Indies or perhaps South Africa. Welles got “the very
definite impression from the positive terms in which the Ambassador spoke that he had received some
communication upon this subject recently from Mr. Churchill -- presumably after the Ambassador’s last
conference with the President.”25
In a similar way, on 25 May 1940, the president, still anxious about the fleet since their 17 May
conversation, suggested to Lothian that in the last resort, all available ships should be transferred to
Canada or even Australia before they could be captured or surrendered. He even suggested that if it
became necessary for the King and Queen to leave Britain and for the institutions of the British
government to be moved out of the country, it might be better to establish a temporary capital at
Bermuda, and not in Canada. The Canadians, after all, might balk at the transfer of Downing Street to
Toronto, and American republicans might be “restless at monarchy being based on the American
continent.”

Lothian asked whether the United States would be in the war, “if such a catastrophe

impended, because that fact would probably exercise a profound influence on the British decision.” Once
again, Roosevelt replied that such a decision would not rest with himself but with the Congress and
therefore could give no definite answer.26
In London, the president’s attitude began to annoy Churchill, who grew impatient and frustrated.
During a meeting of the War Cabinet on 19 May 1940, Halifax read a telegram from Lothian, reporting
his conversation with Roosevelt. Halifax noted that while the president showed himself to be very
friendly and emphasized to Lothian the efforts made by Washington to keep Italy from entering the war,
he could not yet provide even the minimum of destroyers:
He had, however, said nothing which showed that he recognized our pressing need for
immediate aircraft supplies; nor had he mentioned the suggestion that the United States
25
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Government should let us have aircraft at once from their own supplies, to be replaced
later from orders already placed in the United States.27
Churchill said that, under the circumstances, he proposed to send Roosevelt a telegram that would make
clear Britain’s immediate needs. Consequently, shortly after his radio address to the nation that evening,
19 May 1940, Churchill drafted a letter to the president, in which he set out to address the concerns raised
by Lothian’s telegram of 18 May. In it, the prime minister said that he understood the president’s
difficulties and was very sorry about the destroyers. “If they were here in six weeks, they would play an
invaluable part.” More to the point, however, he painted his darkest portrait yet of the dangers he faced,
referring to Roosevelt’s discussion with Lothian about the future if the Germans carried the day.
Specifically, Churchill strongly asserted that his own ministry would fight to the end. If Britain fell,
however, and the United States was not an ally, a new peacemaking government might surrender the fleet
as the only bargaining counter in order to secure better terms from Berlin, in which case Americans would
have no grounds for complaint:
Members of the present Administration would likely go down during this process should
it result adversely, but in no conceivable circumstances will we consent to surrender. If
members of the present Administration were finished and others came in to parley amid
the ruins, you must not be blind to the fact that the sole remaining bargaining counter
with Germany would be the Fleet, and, if this country were left by the United States to its
fate, no one would have the right to blame those then responsible if they made the best
terms they could for the surviving inhabitants. Excuse me, Mr. President, putting this
nightmare bluntly. Evidently I could not answer for my successors, who in utter despair
and helplessness might well have to accommodate themselves to the German will.
However, there is happily no need at present to dwell upon such ideas.
Finishing the letter, however, Churchill betrayed his frustration with the president. His private secretary,
John Colville, wrote: “Considering the soothing words he always uses to America, and in particular to
the President, I was somewhat taken aback when he said to me, ‘Here’s a telegram for those bloody
Yankees. Send it off tonight.’”28
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In their appeals to the United States, both Churchill and the American Division of the Foreign
Office followed Lothian’s initiative. Both quickly noted the value of the ambassador’s argument that the
destination of the British fleet depended upon the state of American belligerency. Consequently, the
British position, although admittedly described in the Foreign Office as “rather like blackmail, and not
very good blackmail at that,” was that its fleet was a prize, and that unless the United States were a
belligerent, Britain should “probably elect to send our fleet to Australia and New Zealand.”29
Roosevelt did not directly respond to Churchill’s message, but Lothian informed London on 23
May 1940 that, according to Sumner Welles, the administration was giving urgent consideration to British
requests. The extent of American action would depend on the willingness of Congress to make a “radical
departure” from the policy embodied in the Neutrality Act, and from their interpretation of international
law. The next evening, therefore, on 24 May, Lothian telegraphed a suggestion that London might allow
the United States government to construct airfields and naval stations on British islands that Washington
regarded as significant from the point of view of their defense. He pointed out that the United States was
concerned primarily with Trinidad and Newfoundland; an air base at Trinidad would enable the United
States to deal with possible German air threats through Brazil to the Panama Canal, while a base in
Newfoundland would be useful to defend against a German attack on Iceland, which was at present
undefended.
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Furthermore, in his opinion, the American government would eventually ask for those bases anyway, so it
would be wiser to appear generous and offer them simultaneously, although he was not suggesting that
this involve any change in sovereignty. While Lothian did not suggest that the agreement be connected
with the question of British war debts, or of its current material needs, he believed that a public
announcement of Britain’s readiness to help the United States organize its defense would make a deep
impression, and would contribute to goodwill and a more active cooperation in naval and air defenses
between the British Commonwealth and the United States. Moreover, if London pursued this proposal, it
was possible, Lothian intimated, that Congress should vote the necessary appropriations before its
adjournment in early June.31 This proposal would ultimately serve as the template for what would
become the celebrated “Destroyers-for-Bases” agreement.
Lothian made this suggestion because anxiety in the United States about its security had recently
begun to move the question, of British and French islands off the eastern coast of America, into the
foreground of public discussion. For the United States, bases on these islands would greatly strengthen
American defenses at the Panama Canal and along the East Coast. They would also help to prevent these
colonies from falling into German hands as the result of any European peace settlement. One of the key
problems, as Lothian pointed out in his telegram of 18 May, was that there was little faith in Washington
about Britain’s ability to withstand a German attack; even the president had expressed the concern.
Although it appeared that Roosevelt wanted to help Britain, he found himself hindered by several
institutional constraints. For one thing, he had to face significant opposition from American isolationists.
Not only did the president have to carry public opinion, to say nothing of the United States Congress
when legislation was required, he had to do so in a presidential election year.32 For example, on the same
day as Churchill’s broadcast of 19 May, celebrated American hero Charles Lindbergh delivered his own
address over the CBS Radio network. He expressed the feelings of millions of isolationists when he said,
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We need not fear a foreign invasion unless American peoples bring it on through their
own quarreling and meddling with affairs abroad. . . . The only reason that we are in
danger of becoming involved in this war is because there are powerful elements in
America who desire us to take part. They represent a small minority of the American
people, but they control much of the machinery of influence and propaganda. They seize
every opportunity to push us closer to the edge.33
Joseph Kennedy reinforced such sentiments with characteristically apocalyptic telegrams from
London. He wrote Cordell Hull on 15 May 1940 that if Washington granted Churchill’s request for a
loan of about 40-50 American destroyers, the United States would “[hold] the bag for a war in which the
Allies expect to be beaten.”34 On 27 May 1940, he wired Hull that “only a miracle” could save the British
army from annihilation:
I suspect that the Germans would be willing to make peace with both the French and the
British now -- of course on their own terms but on terms that would be a great deal better
than they would be if the war continues. . . . I realize that this is a terrific telegram, but
there is no question that it’s in the air here. The result of that will be a row amongst
certain elements in the Cabinet here; Churchill, Attlee, and others will want to fight to the
death, but there will be other members who realize that physical destruction of men and
property in England will not be a proper offset to a loss of pride.35
While many in the Roosevelt administration were by this point placing less and less stock in their
ambassador’s opinions,36 or flatly ignoring him altogether, Kennedy and his tactless public
pronouncements of Britain’s impending demise continued to find favor among isolationists. At the same
time, public opinion polls in the United States continued to indicate strong American unwillingness to
enter into the war. Only 7.7 percent of the population was in favor of entering the war at once and only
19 percent believed that the United States should intervene even if the defeat of the Allies appeared
certain. At the same time, 40 percent were opposed to American participation under any circumstances.37
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Roosevelt had to face powerful opposition not only from isolationists, but also from influential
American circles that, while traditionally friendly to Britain, believed that its defeat was almost inevitable
and that Britain was finished as a great power. For example, in early March 1940, William C. Bullitt, the
American ambassador to France, came in from Paris and gave a gloomy report to party guests at the home
of Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes. Ickes noted that, “Bill has no use for Chamberlain, and almost
none for Churchill. He thinks that the British Government is in a bad way. There are no real leaders, as
he sees it, in all of England in this time of grave crisis.” He further noted that, “Bill is not at all sure that
England and France may not be utterly defeated in the present war.”38 In addition, many remained
suspicious of Churchill, that he might not be up to the job. Sumner Welles had met Churchill in London
a month before, where he talked for nearly two hours, “a cascade of oratory, brilliant and always
effective, interlarded with considerable wit.”

Yet, his drinking bothered Welles, who told Henry

Morgenthau, Secretary of the Treasury, that Churchill was a “drunken sot” and a “third or fourth rate
man.”39 Similarly, Joseph Kennedy worried about Churchill’s drinking and bellicosity. Churchill was
not particularly popular among many Americans, who remembered him as the chief spokesman for the
“Big Navy” forces in Britain during the Anglo-American naval rivalry of the 1920s. Nor was Roosevelt a
great admirer. When King George VI mentioned Churchill as a possible successor to Chamberlain during
his visit in 1939, Roosevelt indicated his disapproval. Churchill drank too much, the president noted on a
number of occasions, and was “tight most of the time.” Indeed, reflecting the tendency in Washington, as
well as Whitehall, to question the new prime minister’s sobriety and balance, Roosevelt told his cabinet,
according to Ickes, “that he supposed Churchill was the best man England had, even if he was drunk half
the time.” Moreover, as a staunch conservative, Churchill had been fiercely critical of the New Deal.40
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In the early summer of 1940, even the president grew doubtful that Britain could survive alone as
America’s front line. When the German offensive began in May, Roosevelt hinted to close associates that
the United States might be in the war by mid-August. By late May, however, with the British army
apparently trapped in Flanders, and the French about to collapse, Roosevelt “doubted if England would be
able to bear up” against the Lutfwaffe’s five-to-one superiority and feared that the British would accept a
German peace offer involving the surrender of the fleet. If Britain fell, any American aid could be turned
against the United States by the victorious Germans within the year. His personal estimate of Britain’s
chances of survival fell to as low as one-in-three.41
Furthermore, and perhaps most significantly, there also existed a fundamental lack of confidence
among American military service chiefs, who proved extremely reluctant to risk selling munitions to the
British, particularly as Britain faced the possibility of conquest and defeat. Specifically, they faced the
dual dilemma of providing Britain with military hardware that the United States itself might need, or that
might be captured by Germany and subsequently turned against American forces, if Churchill fell and a
new government in London made peace with Hitler. As a result, in mid-June 1940, the joint planners of
the War and Navy Departments informed Roosevelt that “further release of war material now in the hands
of our armed forces will seriously weaken our present state of defense.” Army Chief of Staff General
George C. Marshall, who had been assigned the task of transforming America’s unprepared military, told
the president that, “There was no doubt that we had sold so generously to the Allied Powers that our own
stocks were below the safety point. One could argue that by giving more aid to Britain and Canada we
would be increasing our own defensive strength. That might be true, but it was not provable, and if
Britain were defeated the Army and the Administration could never justify to the American people the
risk they had taken.” Moreover, the War Department would “naturally and rightfully be subject to the
most adverse criticism if it were to dispose of modern equipment which it needed to a foreign country.”42
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Far more than the Roosevelt administration, the British were in an apprehensive mood during late
May and early June 1940. Obviously in one respect, the military situation gave cause for immense
anxiety. On 14 May 1940, German armored forces broke through the Ardennes region and advanced
rapidly to the west, toward Sedan, then turned northwards to the English Channel. After a series of Allied
counter-attacks failed to sever this German spearhead, the Germans broke through Sedan and reached the
coast on 20 May 1940, separating the British Expeditionary Force [BEF], the French First Army, and the
Belgian army, all further to the north, from the majority of French troops south of the German
penetration. Upon reaching the Channel, the Germans turned further north along the coast, threatening to
capture the ports and trap Allied forces before they could evacuate to Britain. Faced with no alternatives,
General Lord Gort, the commander of the BEF, decided to evacuate British forces. From 25 May to 28
May 1940, therefore, British troops retreated about 30 miles northwest into a pocket along the FrenchBelgian border, near the coastal town of Dunkirk.43
Compounding the nervousness created by the military situation, the British sought desperately for
any way to press the Americans into action.

London, after all, maintained a deep and ingrained

skepticism about the United States and believed that only with difficulty would the Americans be moved
to effective action. There emerged, furthermore, a slow growing sense in Whitehall that Britain was
fighting America’s battle and that the United States was doing virtually nothing to help. Roosevelt’s
belaboring the future of the Royal Navy only increased British resentment. On 27 May, for example,
while the British army was trapped around Dunkirk, the War Cabinet complained that Roosevelt “seemed
to be taking the view that it would be nice of him to pick up the pieces of the British Empire if this
country was overrun. It was as well that he should realize that there was another aspect of the question.”44
In this context, of growing British despondency and American diffidence, the “miracle of
Dunkirk” momentarily relieved the anxiety on both sides of the Atlantic. Over nine days, from 26 May to
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4 June 1940, the Royal Navy, the Royal Air Force [RAF], and a handful of civilian volunteers rescued
approximately 338,000 soldiers from Dunkirk and the surrounding beaches. The British interpreted the
outcome as a “miracle” and the British press presented the evacuation as a “Disaster Turned To Triumph”
so successfully that Churchill found it necessary to remind the country, in a speech to the House of
Commons on 4 June 1940, that “we must be very careful not to assign to this deliverance the attributes of
a victory. Wars are not won by evacuations.”45 Nevertheless, the rescue of a trained army, at a moment
when hope had all but disappeared, restored confidence and provided a psychological boost to British
morale. In the United States, the dramatic rescue led to the first wave of the “Dunkirk Spirit” to pass over
the country. In the days that followed, Britain carefully nurtured the Dunkirk myth in the United States.
The War Cabinet, for example, in order to head off any criticism in the United States about Britain’s
apparent abandonment of France, agreed to explain that the retreat was preliminary to its rejoining the
battle in France, south of the German advance, “even though such a statement might represent an
economy with the truth.” Lothian suggested to Charles Peake of the Foreign Office News Department
that Britain should play up the “Little Ships” to excite the American public46 and subtly direct attention to
American dependence upon the survival of British sea power.47 Such measures appeared increasingly
critical because, in strictly military terms, the evacuation of Dunkirk was a disaster: the British had
abandoned much of their equipment and weaponry. Hence Britain’s need for immediate American
material aid was even greater than before, especially in terms of destroyers and other small craft.
Consequently, with his proposal of 23-24 May 1940, Lothian effectively took the position that the
time had come for him to be authorized to offer the United States a carrot. Specifically, he suggested that
he be given authority to inform Roosevelt that London recognized the seriousness of the new threat to
45
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American security, and that while Britain was not prepared to discuss modifications of sovereignty, it was
prepared to consider immediate leases of areas to the United States for the construction of airfields or
naval stations on any of the islands that Washington regarded as significant for its defense. Lothian’s
proposal generated a diversity of opinion in Whitehall. The Colonial and Dominions Offices flatly
opposed the suggestion on the grounds that bases would be the first step to United States domination in
the Caribbean. In the meantime, however, the Foreign Office and the Chiefs of Staff supported it. The
War Cabinet considered the suggestion on 27 and 29 May 1940, and perceived several significant
difficulties.48 Churchill, however, opposed Lothian’s proposal, and refused to consider such an offer
unless it was part of a specific deal: “The United States had given us practically no help in the war,” he
told the War Cabinet, and now that they perceived the imminence of danger, if not disaster, “their attitude
was that they wanted to keep everything which would help us for their own defence.” Therefore, the War
Cabinet telegraphed Lothian on 2 June 1940 that Britain could not consider any such arrangements unless
there was a quid pro quo, some “definite assurance of concrete results sufficiently advantageous to us.”
In that respect, they asked Lothian to explain his reasons for thinking that, if the political objections could
be overcome, Britain could obtain substantial advantages.

Although Lothian did not reply to this

telegram until the middle of June, it was clear that London would proceed with caution, as the offer might
presumably imply panic on the part of Britain and thus encourage Washington to concentrate exclusively
on American defenses rather than assist Britain.49 Nevertheless, over the summer of 1940, Lothian
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consistently and repeatedly urged London to woo the United States with attractive offers of cooperation,
on the grounds that such cooperation would encourage reciprocal generosity and promote a spirit of
Anglo-American amity he believed was essential for the future of the world.
France Collapses
In the meantime, amid the ongoing Anglo-American dialogue, the situation in France itself
continued to disintegrate. On 28-29 May 1940, amidst fears that Italy was about to enter the war on the
German side, the French Premier Paul Reynaud proposed that the Allies make an appeal to Roosevelt, for
the dispatch of an American fleet to European waters, which might serve as a restraint upon Mussolini.
The War Cabinet thought Reynaud’s proposal entirely inexpedient and instead favored an approach
suggested by Jan Christian Smuts -- an appeal to Washington on the basis that Britain was continuing the
war in any event and sought nothing but to defend liberty in the world against Nazi domination. The War
Cabinet therefore sent a telegram to Lothian, on 28 May, describing the various proposals and requesting
an assessment of Roosevelt’s opinion as to the effectiveness of either. Lothian responded on 29 May that
Roosevelt would not move the American fleet to the Mediterranean, and did not regard an appeal as
desirable for the present. Lothian further noted on 31 May, that Roosevelt telegraphed William Bullitt in
Paris, reiterating his strong disapproval of such an appeal, on the grounds that it would become more
difficult to procure materials for the Allies; it would also be taken as an attempt by foreigners to influence
the United States in the direction of war, thus stirring up American public opinion.50
In the midst of the French breakdown, and efforts to secure American aid in the early summer of
1940, Churchill found it increasingly necessary to strike and maintain a delicate balancing act. On the
one hand, in view of London’s skepticism about American assurances of goodwill, which were generally
affirmed by Lothian’s reports, Churchill continued to play upon Roosevelt’s fears about the fleet. It was
clear that the German victory in northern France had greatly intensified American interest in the fate of
the Royal Navy. He sought to make clear that the vital battle was taking place in Europe, and that if
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Americans did not provide adequate support for Britain and France, there would be no British fleet to help
defend the Western Hemisphere. If defeated, a new cabinet in London, if not altogether pro-German but
at least willing to accommodate the Nazi regime, might be compelled to hand over the fleet.51 In making
this case, Churchill tended to restrict his gloomy warnings about the future of the fleet to private messages
for American leaders, in order to ensure that Washington explicitly understood London’s position. On the
other hand, in public, he maintained a mood of indefatigable optimism, primarily to maintain morale at
home, but also to show Americans the grounds for Britain’s “reasoned optimism.” For example, in his
speech of 4 June 1940, following the “miracle of Dunkirk,” he assured the House of Commons and the
world that, in the unlikely event that Britain fell, the Empire would fight on, guarded by the Royal Navy,
until the New World came to the aid of the Old. In this address’s most famous passage, Churchill also
suggested that if the island were subjugated or starving, the Empire overseas might carry on the struggle
“armed and guarded” by the British fleet:
Even though large tracts of Europe and many old and famous States have fallen or may
fall into the grip of the Gestapo and all the odious apparatus of Nazi rule, we shall not
flag or fail. We shall go on to the end. We shall fight in France, we shall fight on the
seas and oceans, we shall fight with growing confidence and growing strength in the air,
we shall defend our island, whatever the cost may be. We shall fight on the beaches, we
shall fight on the landing grounds, we shall fight in the fields and in the streets, we shall
fight in the hills; we shall never surrender, and even if, which I do not for a moment
believe, this island or a large part of it were subjugated and starving, and our Empires
beyond the Seas, armed and guarded by the British fleet, would carry on the struggle,
until, in God’s good time, the new world, with all its power and might, steps forth to the
rescue and the liberation of the old.52
While Churchill’s speech did indeed stir emotion and raise morale on both sides of the Atlantic,
Lothian feared that the prime minister might also be raising the wrong types of expectations, especially in
North America. When William Mackenzie King, Prime Minister of Canada, suggested that, in the event
of a British defeat, the Royal Navy should be transferred to Canada, Churchill replied caustically on 5
June that the United States should not be allowed to become complacent:
51

52

Reynolds, Lord Lothian, 19-20.

Churchill, 102-104; Davis, Into the Storm, 554; Dimbleby-Reynolds, 125; Gilbert, War Papers, 247; Lash, 148149; Leutze, 80; Meacham, 58.

244
We must be careful not to let Americans view too complacently the prospect of a British
collapse out of which they would get the British fleet and the guardianship of the British
Empire, minus Great Britain. If . . . America continued neutral, and we were
overpowered I cannot tell what policy might be adopted by a pro-German administration
such as would undoubtedly be set up.
Churchill ended his message, which he fully expected would be passed on to Roosevelt, with a complaint
that, while Roosevelt is “our best friend,” the United States has yet to send any practical help:
We have not expected them to send military aid, but they have not even sent any worthy
contribution in destroyers or planes, or by a visit of a squadron of their Fleet to Southern
Irish ports. Any pressure which you can supply in this direction would be invaluable.53
Nevertheless, in Washington, Lothian became increasingly alarmed that Churchill’s stirring
words, particularly those of 4 June, may have made American leaders more complacent. He feared, for
example, that some Americans were becoming overly confident about Britain’s ability to resist. At the
same time, and more significantly, he feared that many more were counting on getting the British fleet in
the event of Britain’s defeat: “Unfortunately many Americans including some in the Administration try
to persuade themselves that somehow or other the rest of the Empire is going to get the fleet for the
United States even if Britain is overrun and that the U.S. need not face war until after this has taken
place.”54 Although undeniably, Churchill directed many of his great speeches of that summer principally
at American audiences,55 a few days later, on 9 June, Churchill assured Lothian that his words were
largely for enemy consumption “to whom the idea of a war of continents, and a long war are at present
obnoxious,” and to encourage the Dominions. The United States, in the meantime, must not expect to
“pick up the debris of the British Empire” while remaining neutral. Consequently, he urged Lothian to
continue taking the line that he, the ambassador, had initiated -- the idea that if Britain goes down, a proGerman government might give up the fleet:
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If Great Britain broke under invasion, a pro-German Government might obtain far easier
terms from Germany by surrendering the Fleet, thus making Germany and Japan masters
of the new world. This dastardly deed would not be done by His Majesty’s present
advisers, but, if Mosley were Prime Minister or some other Quisling Government set up,
it is exactly what they would do, and perhaps the only thing they could do, and the
President should bear this very clearly in mind. You should talk to him in this sense and
thus discourage any complacent assumption on United States part that they will pick up
the debris of the British Empire by their present policy.56
On the contrary,” Churchill told Lothian, “they run the terrible risk that their sea-power will be
completely overmatched.” The Nazis would almost certainly claim Atlantic islands and naval bases to
hold the United States in awe. “If we go down,” Churchill stressed, “Hitler has a very good chance of
conquering the world.”57
Not all the news reaching London from the United States, however, was disagreeable. For one
thing, the United States was beginning to accommodate British requests for material aid. On 30 May
1940, following an appeal for the urgent purchase of 12,700 tons of steel bars, Churchill learned from
Arthur Purvis that the British Purchasing Commission58 had purchased 4,300 tons for shipment to Britain
in June, July, and August, with a further 8400 tons to come by the end of August.59 Furthermore, in early
June, his confidence in Britain partially revived with the evacuation of Dunkirk, Roosevelt ordered the
service chiefs to “scrape the bottom of the barrel” and determine how much of the United States Army’s
own arms and ammunition could be declared surplus and therefore legal to sell back to their
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manufacturers for resale to Britain. The president soon authorized the dispatch of a substantial quantity
of American “surplus” war supplies, including almost 900 field guns with a million rounds of
ammunition, 80,000 machine guns, and half a million rifles manufactured in the First World War with
125 million rounds of ammunition. Within two weeks, beginning on 11 June 1940, the first American
supplies began making their way across the Atlantic. Churchill later wrote: “All this reads easily now,
but at that time it was a supreme act of faith and leadership for the United States to deprive themselves of
this very considerable mass of arms for the sake of a country which many deemed already beaten.”60
Beyond that, Roosevelt also initiated the process by which the United States began to strengthen
its defenses and better prepare for war. Because American armed forces remained pitifully small -- the
United States Army could field fewer than one-third the number of divisions that Belgium had mobilized
to meet the German invasion -- Roosevelt began to place large-scale military appropriations before the
Congress. On 16 May 1940, the day after Churchill’s first plea for material assistance, he asked Congress
for an increase of $1.4 billion in national defense expenditures over and above the amount he originally
requested in his budget message.61 At approximately the same time, in mid-May 1940, he supported the
first steps toward national compulsory military training -- steps that would culminate in the BurkeWadsworth Selective Service Act, the first peacetime conscription program in American history, passed
by Congress in September 1940. In the meantime, Congress approved plans to expand the Army Air
Corps to 84 groups and 7,800 combat aircraft, and in June, alerted National Guardsmen for active duty.62
The collapse of France and the early German attacks on Britain gave new urgency to these efforts. In
July, Congress approved an emergency and expansionist “Two Ocean Navy” program in order to double
the tonnage of the Navy’s combatant fleet. In mid-June 1940, in order to broaden the appeal of his
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administration, Roosevelt brought two leading Republicans and ardent proponents of interventionism,
Henry Stimson and Frank Knox, into the cabinet, to administer the War and Navy Departments,
respectively. Knox, in particular, was convinced that the United States would be involved in the war
within the year and thus believed that “the sooner we declare war the sooner we will get ready.”63
The president’s rhetoric became more belligerent as well. In a “fireside chat” of 26 May 1940, he
warned Americans of the “Fifth Column” danger. Far more heartening, however, Roosevelt delivered an
inspiring statement of America’s position in his speech at Charlottesville, Virginia on 10 June, the day
Italy entered the war by attacking France. In a commencement address at the University of Virginia Law
School, he warned the graduates that the United States could not be permitted to “become a lone island in
a world dominated by the philosophy of force.” But he also scornfully denounced the Italian attack:
On this 10th day of June, 1940, the hand that held the dagger has struck it into the backs
of its neighbor. On this 10th day of June, 1940, in this university founded by the first
great American teacher of democracy, we send forth our prayers and our hopes to those
beyond the seas were maintaining with magnificent valor their battle for freedom. In our
American unity, we will pursue two obvious and simultaneous courses: we will extend to
the opponents of force the material resources of this nation; and, at the same time, we will
harness and speed up the use of those resources in order that we ourselves in the
Americas may have equipment and training equal to the task of an emergency in every
defense. Signs and signals call for speed -- full speed ahead.64
Listening to the speech on the radio, Churchill was ecstatic. In his war memoirs, the prime
minister recalled that, when the president uttered the scathing words about Italy, “there was a deep growl
of satisfaction. I wondered about the Italian vote in the approaching Presidential Election; but I knew that
Roosevelt was a most experienced American party politician although never afraid to run risks for the
sake of his resolves. It was a magnificent speech, instinct with passion and carrying to us a message of
hope.” He immediately cabled the president:
We all listened to you last night and were fortified by the grand scope of your
declaration. Your statement that the material aid of the United States will be given to the
Allies in their struggle is a strong encouragement in a dark but not unhopeful hour.
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Everything must be done to keep France in the fight and to prevent any idea of the fall of
Paris, should it occur, becoming the occasion of any kind of parley. The hope with which
you inspire them may give them strength to persevere.
Churchill further concluded that this presented a fortuitous moment to once again put Britain’s immediate
needs before the president, telling him that aircraft and flying boats were essential “in the impending
struggle for the life of Great Britain.” But even more pressing, he reiterated, was the need for destroyers,
since Italy had just declared war on the Allies:
The Italian outrage makes it necessary for us to cope with a much larger number of
submarines, which may come out into the Atlantic and perhaps be based on Spanish
ports. To this only counter is destroyers. Nothing is so important as for us to have the
thirty or forty old destroyers you have already had reconditioned. . . . If while we have to
guard the East Coast against invasion a new heavy German-Italian submarine attack is
launched against our commerce, the strain may be beyond our resources; and the ocean
traffic by which we live may be strangled. Not a day should be lost. . . .65
Churchill’s optimism was short-lived, however, and almost entirely dashed by the events of the
next ten days: the final collapse of France and the absence of any meaningful response from the United
States. On 11 June 1940, shortly after Roosevelt’s Charlottesville address, which had so inspired the
prime minister with visions of American aid, Churchill informed the president, through Lothian, that
France was about to collapse.66 He requested that Roosevelt make a public profession of support for the
French: “Anything you can say or do to help them [the French] now may make the difference.”67 The
next day, 12 June, when Roosevelt did not reply, Churchill sent another message to the president, giving
him a “full picture” of the existing situation, and pleading for him to make a public statement of support,
which might stiffen the resolve of the French ministers, some of whom were already talking of making
peace with the Germans: “If there is anything you can say publicly or privately to the French, now is the
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time.”68 The president, perhaps emboldened by his day at Charlottesville, perhaps swept up in the spirit
of Churchill’s latest cable, sent a message to French Premier Paul Reynaud:
As I have already stated to you and to Mr. Churchill, this Government is doing
everything in its power to make available to the Allied Governments the material they so
urgently require, and our efforts to do so still more are being redoubled. This is so
because of our faith in and our support for the ideals for which the Allies are fighting. . . .
It is most important to remember that the French and British fleets continue mastery of
the Atlantic and other oceans; also to remember that vital materials from the outside
world are necessary to maintain all armies.69
Roosevelt’s reply to Reynaud, however, inspired the British with a false sense of confidence that the
United States was about to enter the war. Churchill told the War Cabinet that the president’s message
“came as near as possible to a declaration of war and probably as much as the President could do without
Congress. The President could hardly urge the French to continue the struggle, and to undergo further
torture, if he did not intend to enter the war to support them. If the President were not disavowed by his
country, then it was clear that he would bring them in on our side in the near future.”70 As no expression
of support emerged from Washington, however, and as the situation in France became increasingly
desperate, Churchill begged Roosevelt on the evening of 13 June 1940 to publicize the text of his
telegram to Reynaud, which might stiffen the resolve of the French government.71 The only possibility of
continuing French resistance, Churchill wrote Roosevelt, was if Reynaud could give his people the hope
of ultimate victory; and such a hope “could only be kindled by American intervention up to the extreme
limit open to you.” The publication of Roosevelt’s reply to Reynaud would be the decisive factor in this
regard: “Mr. President, I must tell you that it seems to me absolutely vital that this message should be
68
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published tomorrow 14th June in order that it may play the decisive part in turning the course of world
history.” Roosevelt, however, refused permission to publish his reply to Reynaud.72
The result in London was immense disappointment. John Colville noted that, “It seems the Prime
Minister’s expectations . . . of immediate American help were exaggerated.”

The United States,

furthermore, appeared to be slow and ineffectual: “Roosevelt has got to proceed cautiously, but the plain
truth is that America has been caught napping, militarily and industrially. She may be really useful to us
in a year; but we are living from hour to hour. . . . America’s attitude is of vital importance to French
morale; but America is the slowest to act of all the democracies, and that is saying much.”73 Churchill,
unable to accept the American response as final, wrote to Roosevelt on the evening of 15 June 1940,
pleading with the president to intervene in order to save France. Otherwise, he suggested, Britain would
be placed in peril; and if Britain were conquered by Nazi Germany, the prospect increased that the Royal
Navy would be lost to the United States.

Events, he emphasized to the president, were “moving

downward at a pace where they will pass beyond the control of American public opinion when at last it is
ripened.” But, he maintained, only a word of support from the United States would save the situation
from catastrophe:
A declaration that the United States will if necessary enter the war might save France.
Failing that, in a few days French resistance may have crumbled and we shall be left
alone. Although the present Government and I personally would never fail to send the
Fleet across the Atlantic if resistance was beaten down here, a point may be reached in
the struggle with the present ministers no longer have control of affairs and when very
easy terms could be obtained for the British Islands by their becoming a vassal state of
the Hitler empire. A pro-German Government would certainly be called into being to
make peace and might present to a shattered or a starving nation almost irresistible case
for entire submission to the Nazi will. The fate of the British fleet . . . would be decisive
on the future of the United States, because if it were joined to the Fleets of Japan, France
and Italy and the great resources of German industry, overwhelming sea-power would be
in Hitler’s hands. . . . This revolution in sea-power might happen very quickly and
certainly long before the United States would be able to prepare against it. If we go down
you may have a United States of Europe under Nazi command far more numerous, far
stronger, far better armed than the New World.
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Churchill’s draft ended with another plea to Roosevelt for the immediate dispatch of 35 American
destroyers, to “bridge the gap” until Britain’s naval construction “comes in at the end of the year.”74
Momentarily lost in the chaos over the imminent French collapse was indeed the question, raised
once again by Churchill on 11 June 1940, of Britain’s need for American destroyers.

The prime

minister’s appeal for destroyers crossed with a telegram from Lothian, who raised serious questions of
how Roosevelt might respond.75

On 12 June, the ambassador urged Churchill to make his appeal for

destroyers with facts, to illustrate the true dimensions of Britain’s growing crisis:
Have just learned from authoritative source that the President is not convinced that our
need for destroyers is serious, and is therefore concentrating on the Allies’ other needs. I
think it imperative that the Prime Minister should as soon as possible inform him
confidentially through me of the numbers, types and tonnages of destroyers lost, the
number damaged and time needed for repair and any other information necessary to
convince him of our case. The press has been carrying statement here that we have
already made good all destroyers lost.76
Sir Robert Vansittart agreed with Lothian. He wrote the Cabinet Secretary Sir Edward Bridges that
“Lothian’s telegram No. 967 proves that Roosevelt has not sufficiently understood the urgency of our
need of the destroyers . . . I think this is because we have not put the appeal to the President urgently or
dramatically enough.”77
Due in large part to Lothian’s appeal, Churchill included a paper on destroyer strength, prepared
by the Naval Staff, in his first telegram to Roosevelt on 15 June: “Here is a definite practical and possibly
decisive step which can be taken at once and I urge most earnestly that you will weigh my words.”78
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Britain needed these destroyers, Churchill stressed, to escort convoys across the Atlantic. The month of
June 1940 had been disastrous in the toll of British merchant ships sunk by the Germans. The figures
were 140 ships lost, of 585,496 tons, more than double the tonnage lost in May and far more than in any
previous month. Moreover, the losses of destroyers in the Norwegian campaign and off Dunkirk had
been heavy. The obsolete American vessels would be invaluable as escorts during the fall and winter of
1940, while the ships Britain had ordered at the outbreak of the war were being built.79
In the meantime, Lothian followed Churchill’s lead in Washington. In one respect, he continued
to impress upon the president and his advisers the British determination never to surrender. In public, he
stressed Britain’s confidence and determination, while he reserved his warnings about the fleet for the
Roosevelt administration and small groups of opinion-makers. On 11 June 1940, Cordell Hull reiterated
the administration position that the United States expected the British to wage all-out war against the
Nazis: “Any friend of Great Britain like myself would expect her to fight to the last dollar, to the last man
and to the last ship, if necessary.” Lothian responded that the Churchill ministry would never surrender
the fleet; the only danger would be the emergence of “some successor government of the Mosley . . . or
Communist type,” a point he reiterated on 24 June.80
At the same time, however, and more critically, as the French government teetered toward
collapse, and the possibility of a German invasion of Britain appeared imminent, Lothian lamented that
the United States Congress still did not grasp the seriousness of the British situation. Therefore, he
strongly believed that the Roosevelt administration ought to speak out publicly and forcefully, and lay out
Navy only had the 68 mentioned; only ten small-type new construction destroyers were due to be completed within
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the truth in its “stark brutality.” To this end, Lothian and the French Ambassador, René Doynel de SaintQuentin, saw Roosevelt and Hull on 15 June. Lothian asked what response the president might be able to
make to Reynaud’s last appeal.

Roosevelt reiterated that the question of entering the war rested

exclusively with Congress and that it would be useless to initiate a campaign “by radio and platform” in
favor of a declaration of war. Both Roosevelt and Hull were adamant that for the president to do so at this
point would be to commit political suicide; at the very least, it would involve the “political destruction of
the authority” of Roosevelt’s government. The president emphasized particularly the importance of not
allowing Hitler or Mussolini to get hold of the French fleet, since the possibility of an Allied victory, and
the restoration of France would then be much less likely. As long as Britain, France, and the United
States controlled the oceans, the blockade would eventually be effectual.81
Lothian responded that, while the case of France was most urgent, that of Britain might soon be
analogous. Britain would fight desperately, but in the end, the question about peace and the destiny of the
British fleet, like that of France, might depend on whether “the United States had thrown its heart and
soul into the business of resisting Hitler’s aggression or not.” What were the chances, he asked the
president, that the United States would enter the war “before these final and critical decisions had to be
made?” Roosevelt stated that no one could answer the question, since the answer depended on the
movement of American opinion, and, even more so, whether the dictators “had taken some action which
compelled the United States to go to war” in self-defense. Lothian noted that if Britain were overrun, and
the United States were not in the war, and if Hitler “threatened torture” unless the British fleet were
surrendered, the fleet would sink itself either at sea or in a hopeless attack on Germany. If, on the other
hand, the United States were in the war, then France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Britain might be
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willing to submit to a period of violent repression by Germany in the hope of ultimate victory. Congress,
therefore, had to decide whether it could grapple with this issue in time or drift to disaster.82
That evening, 15 June, Lothian wired the Foreign Office that the Roosevelt administration felt
almost helpless to do anything at the moment to impact the French decision, “beyond sending supplies as
quickly as possible to help France and ourselves in the present juncture.” He maintained, as he had
throughout the spring, that American public opinion was almost unanimously pro-Ally, but that owing to
the constitution, nothing except a direct challenge to vital American interests and honor would drive the
Washington “across the Rubicon.” The United States, he wrote, “has not yet faced the fact that the only
way in which it can save itself from being confronted by totalitarian navies and air forces three or four
times as powerful as its own in the near future is by setting the situation in all its stark brutality in front of
Congress without delaying and inviting it to go to war with all its resources in the hope of saving Britain
and France while there is still time.”83 Cadogan commented rather fatalistically, “U.S. looks pretty
useless. Well, we must die without them.”84
Lothian saw the president again on the evening of 16 June 1940, after Roosevelt had learned of
Paul Reynaud’s resignation and the formation of a new government under Marshall Pétain. The president
praised Churchill’s telegrams to Reynaud, urging the French fleet to sail forthwith to British harbors
pending negotiations with Germany, as “perfectly grand,” and added that if he were asked to act as an
intermediary, he would make the transfer of the French fleet to Britain a condition of his mediation. He
expressed the hope that as many French airmen, sailors, and others as possible would help to carry on the
war in Algiers or in Britain, and that, if ever a similar crisis arose in Britain, the war would be carried on
overseas and the British fleet would not be surrendered. Responding to the president, Lothian reiterated
his position from the previous evening that Britain could not be expected to transfer its fleet across the
seas and associate it with any country that was not going to use it, as well as its own resources, to the
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limit in order to rescue Britain from conquest. Roosevelt told Lothian that in the event of Britain
becoming useless as a naval base, the Fleet ought to be withdrawn to Capetown, Singapore, Aden, and
Sydney, while the main American navy reinforced the Atlantic and undertook the defense of Canada and
other British possessions. He added that, if the crisis reached this point, the United States would certainly
allow British ships to use American facilities for reforming and supply, and that, while they might not
have formally declared war on Germany because of its constitutional difficulties, the United States would
in effect be a belligerent, “assisting the Empire in every way and enforcing the blockade on Germany.”85
Lothian’s report of this conversation to London crossed with a message from Churchill for
transmission to the president. On 16 June 1940, when France asked the Germans for an armistice,
Churchill made yet another appeal for the immediate dispatch of 35 destroyers: “The most effective thing
he can do is to let us have destroyers immediately. Our need of them is vital, and their addition to our
fleet might be decisive. It is most important that not a day should be lost.” When Lothian presented this
appeal to Roosevelt on 17 June, however, the president once again rejected it. Roosevelt said that he was
presently having great difficulty in persuading the Senate Naval Affairs Committee to release motor boats
requested by London, and that, in the present anxiety about American defense, it was proving impossible
to get Congress to consent to a release of the destroyers. Lothian repeated his suggestion that, because up
until this point the realities of the situation had not been brought home to the American public, perhaps
the time had come for the president to make a full and completely frank statement to Congress about the
gravity of the naval situation and the consequences for the United States of Britain’s defeat, in order to
convince the American public that assistance to Britain was the best line of defense. Roosevelt was
noncommittal, however, and promised only to consider a press statement for the next day.86
Lothian also asked the president whether he did not think that staff talks should take place to
consider how the British and American fleets and, if necessary, air forces, should deal with the various
85
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situations that might arise in the near future. Roosevelt agreed with Lothian’s proposal, and suggested
that the talks should begin at once. Although influential parties on both sides of the Atlantic had long
seen staff talks as a minimal prelude to collaboration, there was little unanimity. Cordell Hull, for one,
was not enthusiastic about staff conferences, even though Lothian suggested that they cover that issue that
so intrigued the Americans -- the movement of the British fleet. Consequently, in the end and once again,
Roosevelt would take no immediate action.87
In mid-June 1940, therefore, the prevailing position in Washington was disengagement and
detachment. In part, Roosevelt was receiving depressing reports from his military advisers. Major
General George Strong, chief of army war plans, reported on 17 June 1940 that Germany might be
capable of launching an attack on South America within sixty days. Captain Alan G. Kirk, the American
naval attaché in Britain, wrote on 11 June 1940 that the Allies were short of aircraft, tanks, antiaircraft
weapons, motorized transport, and all other supplies needed to wage modern warfare. He noted that,
from where I sit here in London . . . the Germans will be all around and all over these
Islands before the first of August. . . . [Britain] will be mined in, torpedoed by
submarines, harassed by the air and hamstrung by political considerations. This Island is
no more fortified or prepared to withstand invasion in force than Long Island, New York.
There will be plenty of grief, and a great deal of destruction of historical monuments but I
just don’t see what is going to stop this German machine.
Therefore, Kirk advised, before rushing to the assistance of the beleaguered democracies, the United
States should attend to its own strategic interests.88
The American refusal to publicly support the French was highly distressing to London. In part,
Churchill recognized that American detachment from Allied resistance to Hitler might potentially
undermine his efforts to maintain a unified front at home. The imminent fall of France, for example,
confronted Churchill with the possibility that Roosevelt might agree to mediate. Specifically, the prime
minister feared that Roosevelt might “issue an appeal to all belligerent Governments to call the war off.”
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Churchill told the War Cabinet that such an appeal “might to some extent shake some sections of British
public opinion, the whole of which was at present united and inflexible”:
At the present juncture all thoughts of coming to terms with the enemy must be dismissed
so as far as Britain was concerned. We were fighting for our lives and it was vital that we
should allow no chink to appear in our armour.89
Unity and steadfastness, Churchill believed, were even more necessary, given the relentless challenges
and dangers that increasingly confronted Britain, including the possibility of a German invasion of Ireland
and the prospect that Spain might enter the war against Britain.90
Furthermore, the fact remained that, although American military hardware to Britain was just
beginning to cross the Atlantic,91 up until this point, Roosevelt had done really very little to assist Britain.
Lothian pointed out, however, that the United States had little surplus equipment available and that new
legislation, the National Defense Act, passed by Congress in late June, contained a clause forbidding the
transfer of any ship or other war material belonging to the United States unless the professional head of
the service concerned had certified that it was “not essential” to the national defense. Furthermore,
Roosevelt, a lame-duck president trying to engineer a third term, was in an unprecedented and extremely
delicate political position. More significantly, Lothian reported on 27 June 1940 that the president had
been affected by the “wave of pessimism” about Britain’s chances of survival that had passed over the
United States since the French collapse: “a wave of pessimism . . . to the effect that Great Britain must
now be inevitably defeated, and that there is no use in the United States doing any more to help it.”92
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Moreover, it was clear that not all Americans considered the prospect of a British defeat to be a
necessarily negative or traumatic result. Shortly before his death, Senator Borah pondered the possibility
and concluded, “Would it be a serious catastrophe if the three hundred and odd million Indiamen were
given their freedom? Or, if the possessions scattered all over the earth passed under the control of the
people who possess them?” Senator Sheridan Downey of California asked, “Why not be realists? For
years the greatest historians and philosophers of England and of the world have been declaring that the
British Empire is crumbling.” Senator Gerald Nye sunk even further by claiming that not only was the
British Empire doomed, but that its demise ought not cause Americans “due alarm”; after all, he
suggested, a German victory might help American trade “by removing our chief competitor.”93
The military situation, however, became dramatically more clear and more stark when, at 3:00
p.m., on 22 June 1940, French officials signed the armistice in Ferdinand Foch’s railway car at
Compiègne. The terms were not made public, but it quickly became known that the Germans demanded
surrender of the French fleet. Some ships, however, were seized by the British, others made for colonial
ports such as Oran, Mers el Kèbir, and Martinique, while those in mainland ports remained under French
control. The final French collapse, although it had been almost entirely expected by the middle of June,
nevertheless sent seismic waves through the governments of Britain and the United States.

In

Washington, pessimism deepened, while in London, many engaged in brave talk about how much easier it
would be to defend Britain now that they were relieved of continental responsibilities.94
Lothian Takes the Offensive -- Reopening the Destroyers Question
With the fall of France, efforts to establish greater Anglo-American cooperation assumed a new
sense of urgency. The issue was no longer one simply of alerting Roosevelt to the dangers; he was
already quite alive to them. Instead, Britain’s ability to secure American support depended increasingly
upon the professional assessments of British chances of survival. In London, while some talk continued
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about how the fall of France probably simplified its problems, attention focused more immediately upon
winning material support from, and closer cooperation with, the United States. Certainly, there were
considerable differences regarding how best to win over Washington; some called for open-handed
generosity, while others called for hard bargaining.95 In Washington, over the next six weeks, Lord
Lothian pursued two parallel lines of attack: he reopened the issue of offering British bases in the
Western Hemisphere to the United States and he accelerated his efforts to win over American public
opinion, principally by selling the bases proposal.
Lothian’s immediate response to the collapse of France was to reopen the question of offering
British air and naval facilities in the Western Hemisphere to the United States. On the evening of 22 June
1940, in a telegram to the Foreign Office, he argued that the immediate national defense requirements of
the American army and air forces included the right to land aircraft at Trinidad, Georgetown in British
Guiana, and Jamaica. Lothian’s fundamental position, therefore, was that Britain should endeavor to
control the nature of the bargain by acting with apparent generosity. Providing the United States with
arrangements to operate out of British bases, he maintained, would not only stimulate “defensive
collaboration” and good will between the two countries, it would also “cut away part of the ground from
under [the] growing demand in [the] popular press that the United States should take over all islands off
[its] coasts.”96 Lothian also encouraged some form of agreement on technical and scientific matters,
reporting several days later that Roosevelt favored such agreements. Although the United States might
well get the “better bargain,” he urged that the British government unilaterally should consider making a
“generous offer.”97
Lothian’s suggestions generated favorable comment in London, especially in the Foreign Office,
which thought it would be the “height of folly” to ignore his proposal. Moreover, at an interdepartmental
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meeting, called on 1 July 1940 to discuss the suggestion that bases be granted to the United States, the Air
Ministry and the War Office expressed no objections, and even the Colonial Office took a “wait and see”
approach. The Admiralty, however, favored a quid pro quo. It strongly opposed Lothian’s proposal to
make a “generous offer,” and argued that no offer should be made to the United States except as part of a
more balanced arrangement in which the United States would offer something in return; namely,
destroyers. In his message of 2 July, Lothian continued to urge London to take the initiative due to a
popular demand in the United States that favored taking over all the Caribbean islands in the interest of
American defense.

The demand, he noted, was gaining force, particularly as Americans began to

understand the risk to themselves from the French collapse and the impending attack on Britain. For the
time being, the Foreign Office on 6 July 1940 advised Lothian that the provision of bases might best be
considered at the staff conferences to which the Americans had agreed, where a wider range of AngloAmerican issues might be addressed at one time.98
Churchill in particular did not like Lothian’s suggestion of a unilateral “generous offer,” but
favored some sort of quid pro quo instead. He was aware, through Lothian, that Americans had at last
begun to realize that the United States might lose the British fleet if they remained neutral and the war
went against Britain, while a number of influential people thought that the United States should enter the
war at once or at least give more effective help over the next critical months. At the same time, however,
Lothian telegraphed another message to Churchill, on 5 July, and tried to impress upon the prime minister
that it would be hard to get public opinion to consider American belligerency without an assurance that
the British fleet or what was left of it would cross the Atlantic if Britain were overrun. Lothian urged
Churchill to give Washington a guarantee of the Fleet. If Britain was formally asked, “we should give
such an assurance because the problem of winning the war would take a new aspect with American
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participation.” In spite of considerable prodding, he could only compel Churchill to draft a telegram to
Roosevelt on 5 July. In the letter, Churchill urgently appealed for more ships and material aid:
It has now become most urgent for you to give us the destroyers and motorboats. The
Germans have the whole French coastline from which to launch U-Boat attacks upon our
trade and food, and in addition we must be constantly prepared to repel threatened
invasion by sea action in the narrow waters and also to deal with a break-out from
Norway towards Ireland. Besides this we have to keep control of the exits from the
Mediterranean . . . and prevent war spreading seriously into Africa. I know you will do
all in your power. The consequences to the United States of our being hemmed in or
overwhelmed are so grievous, [it seems to me very hard to understand why] this modest
aid [is not given at the time when it] could be perhaps decisively effective. Pray let me
know if there is [no] hope.99
The telegram, however, was never sent, apparently due to disagreements over the wording. The
decision might have reflected Churchill’s continuing reluctance to channel his correspondence with
Roosevelt exclusively through the British Embassy.

Since January, under pressure from Halifax,

Churchill had dispatched messages to Lothian simultaneously with those sent through Joseph P. Kennedy.
This arrangement lasted until late May when, following a major security leak in the United States
Embassy in London, Churchill agreed to communicate exclusively through Lothian.100 After two weeks,
however, when the prime minister reverted to the former procedure, Lothian protested anew, pointing out
that the president was so busy that unless there was a message from Churchill to deliver, it was frequently
difficult for him to gain access. Eventually, Churchill once again agreed in July 1940, and again under
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pressure from Halifax, that some cables should be sent via Lothian and some via Kennedy, the method of
transmission to be determined by Churchill in each case.

This practice remained in place for the

remainder of Lothian’s ambassadorship.101
Churchill’s obstinate opposition to a British lease initiative notwithstanding, Lothian continued to
explore possible avenues of Anglo-American cooperation. A significant opportunity presented itself,
when, on 8 July 1940, Lothian met with the new Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox, who suggested that
Washington might cancel Britain’s war debt in return for Britain’s Caribbean possessions. Knox’s
suggestion provided Lothian with an ideal springboard to once again press London about offering base
facilities to the United States. He wrote on 11 July 1940 that American public opinion and the Roosevelt
administration were growing more deeply concerned with the question of defense and were anxious to
organize communication with South America in order to intervene there in the event of “fifth column” or
any other German action in Brazil. Furthermore, he anticipated that in the upcoming Havana Conference,
the Pan-American nations would likely raise the issue of European possessions in the Western
Hemisphere.102 Consequently, reiterating his position from 23 May, Lothian argued that Britain could
most effectively counter any possible American demands for rights in British possessions if London had
already made a generous offer simultaneously.103
Once again the Foreign Office received Lothian’s proposals with enthusiasm. In forwarding the
ambassador’s suggestion to the Chiefs of Staff, John Balfour wrote on 10 July that Britain should take
action promptly that would “minimize the possibility of our being confronted with demands of a more
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extensive character and [would] show a forthcoming attitude towards America’s defense requirements.”
The Admiralty, however, as well as the Colonial and Dominion Offices, which opposed the proposal on
the grounds that base rights might represent the first step toward American assumption of sovereignty,
sought a quid pro quo such as destroyers or financial credits. Although there was some minimal dissent
within the Foreign Office,104 Halifax favored Lothian’s proposal, arguing that the effect would be to
“bond the Americans closer to us by giving practical evidence of our unity of interests.” The Chiefs of
Staff agreed that it was desirable to meet the American requirements.

The governors of Jamaica,

Trinidad, and British Guiana also gave their approval, as did the governments of Canada and
Newfoundland. Nevertheless, the issue became bogged down in interdepartmental bickering through
much of July, in spite of repeated pleas from Lothian. Eventually, the Foreign Office’s American
Department forced it before the War Cabinet on 29 July 1940. While the Colonial Office still feared
American designs in the Caribbean, the War Cabinet decided to deal with the United States on the basis
of Lothian’s limited proposal: Britain should offer to lease to the United States those facilities that
Lothian had proposed, without suggesting any quid pro quo. It agreed, therefore, to offer Pan American
Airways, as agents for the United States government, leases of land to build a small store and radio station
on Trinidad, and airfields in British Guiana and Jamaica, as well as giving the United States landing rights
for military aircraft in those three colonies. Nevertheless, the War Cabinet’s decision remained tied very
closely to Britain’s continued pressure for United States destroyers.105
Lothian Takes the Offensive -- Selling the Drama
While not otherwise engaged in private consultations with American policymakers or on the
telegraph with his superiors in London, Lothian continued to monitor and analyze the currents of public
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opinion in the United States. He found it generally volatile and difficult to pin down with any degree of
precision. On May 20, for example, he wrote to Lady Astor that the prospect of Britain’s collapse has
shaken up many Americans and finally opened their eyes:
The U.S.A. is at last profoundly moved and frightened. It had been dreaming on that it
could keep out and that the allies would keep the tiger away. And now the spectre has
suddenly arisen that the British fleet may disappear and then [what is] to happen to itself?
It has only one navy. Is it to keep it in the Atlantic or Pacific? If it keeps it in the Pacific,
Germany and Italy will be able to take Brazil, and the Monroe Doctrine [sic] and threaten
the [Panama] Canal. If it keeps it in the Atlantic the Japanese will take over the Pacific.
If it divides its fleet it will be impotent in both oceans. It has only a very small air force
and 400,000 badly equipped soldiers. If we went could it protect Greenland and Alaska,
and Hawaii and S. America and the Canal -- obviously not. So there is very grave heart
searching. The old isolationism is dead.
Most people, he added, agreed that a vast armament programme would not be ready for years. As a
result, Washington should give the Allies everything possible to keep them fighting. He pointed out
again, however, that although Britain will “doubtless get what help we want, short of war,” the United
States would not enter the war “unless its own vital interests are affected and that, I think, Hitler and
Goebbels are too clever to do, for the present.”106 Following the evacuation of Dunkirk, Lothian observed
that, while the “tide of opinion is running very fast towards intervention,” Americans remained “volatile”
and unpredictable: “When the allies get a success they say, Well, that’s fine. They can win without us.
When Hitler is winning they say, It’s all over. There’s nothing effective we can do so we had better stay
out.” Furthermore, while he reiterated his position that nothing “but a direct challenge to U.S. honour or
vital national interests will make them take the plunge as they did in 1917,” the Roosevelt administration
was too sufficiently timid to take any measures that might stir up public opinion:
The President is afraid that if he goes too fast you will get another “battalion of death”
in the Senate like Wilson did over the League of Nations -- a group which will exploit the
natural human reluctance to war, excite the women (saying they are going to keep their
boys out of the war) and get the Senate so balled up as to produce complete paralysis of
action in any direction.
For that reason, he expressed the hope that people in Britain would remain circumspect about the United
States, so as not to stir up American isolationists:
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Hardly a critical word of U.S.A. has been cabled over to the press, though there has been
plenty of bitter correspondence. Please prevent people from saying things in public -- not
because lots of criticism isn’t warranted, but because U.S.A. is coming along and one
doesn’t want to do anything to give a handle to isolationists over here. Generosity of
spirit is a powerful persuasive, and really the British haven’t much ground on which to
attack U.S.A. because they are only doing today what we did yesterday.107
On 12 June, however, amidst the excitement and outrage generated by Italian entry into the war, Lothian
wrote that the Americans feared that if the British fleet went down, so too would the Monroe Doctrine,
leaving the United States defenseless. Consequently, he noted that “the change has been staggering in the
last fortnight” and that it would take very little to carry the United States into the war now -- “any kind of
challenge by Hitler or Mussolini to their own vital interests would do it.”108
The fall of France, however, seemed to paralyze American public opinion. In early July, Lothian
wrote two old friends, Sir Abe Bailey and Captain Victor Cazalet, that opinion in the United States was
badly divided. On one side, isolationists see no point in helping Britain, which cannot now possibly
prevail; therefore, they ask, should not the United States better prepare the defense of the Western
Hemisphere? On the other side, interventionists reply that Britain and its fleet is America’s Maginot Line
and “if the United States lets it go, it will only be a short while before she is imprisoned herself.”109
Far more important, furthermore, the collapse of France seemed to paralyze the United States
government into even greater inaction and passivity. Lothian reported on 24 June that the fall of France
was producing a “stream of defeatist articles,” generally stimulated by German propaganda agencies, to
the effect that the Allied cause was hopeless, that Britain faces inevitable defeat, and that the United
States “should not burn its fingers” by intervening in the war. The solution, he continued to maintain,
was to stress, through American news correspondents in London, Britain’s determination to fight on.110
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Beyond that, however, Lothian decided to take matters into his own hands, in order to push American
public opinion, overtly as well as covertly, toward a deeper appreciation for Britain’s growing crisis. He
understood that in order to secure material aid to Britain quickly, Congress, and therefore public opinion,
had to be cultivated and won. Therefore, one of his most significant achievements in the summer of 1940
was not only his role in helping to broker the destroyers agreement, but also his activities in building a
stronger and more widespread base of popular support for Britain throughout the United States. This was
principally the result of his efforts to “sell” the agreement to the American people. In the end, Lothian’s
efforts helped to condition public opinion to the idea of a destroyers-for-bases deal and, thereby, to create
a political environment that made the terms of the agreement acceptable and justifiable.
In one important respect, he began to take every available opportunity to lay the facts and their
implications, as he saw them, before the American people. In June 1940, he made two important
speeches, in which he proceeded to pound away on a now-familiar theme. In a speech to Columbia
University alumni on 4 June 1940, he said that one reason why the democracies were in “this present
confusion and distress” was that they had failed to live up to their own moral standards and were
“unwilling to abate their own sovereign selfishness sufficiently to create any effective unity or law among
themselves.” The other reason was that they had “lost the heroic self-discipline of their early ideals and
lost those soldierly qualities which are essential to any healthy society.” He warned that “there is not now
the slightest doubt” that Nazi Germany intended to dominate “not only Europe, but the world.”
Consequently, just as he swallowed up seven previously independent states, “Hitler is now bent on doing
exactly the same thing, probably with the assistance of Italy, to France and England.” With a nod to
Abraham Lincoln, Lothian explained that, because “We do not think that it is going to be possible for the
world to remain for long half Nazi and half free,” the British meant to fight on until they were either
conquered or until they had won victory over this latest despotism:
You may ask, do we want your help. My answer is, “of course we want your help, any
help in munitions you can give us. And without delay.” But what you do about this is
for you yourselves to decide . . .
What Hitler is now after, of course, is the British fleet. For if he can seize that, he steps
from the domination of Europe to the domination of the world. The free world was
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protected for a century after Napoleon by the power of the British Fleet, because Britain
for all its mistakes has been a liberal power. Since 1920 that control of the seas has been
exercised by you and us jointly. We have controlled the Atlantic, you the Pacific. If
Hitler were to get our fleet, possessed, as he and his associates would then be, of many of
the resources of Britain, France, Holland, and Belgium, as well as of most of the rest of
Europe, he would have made a most formidable breach in that naval Maginot line which
has hitherto defended us both. Our control of the seas has hitherto kept that defence line
at the borders of Europe and Asia and not at the borders of the Americas and the British
Dominions. . . . He means to get control of the British and French fleets and the naval
bases which are essential to world power, or to destroy them, this year, if he can.
Lothian concluded with a direct appeal to the United States. Napoleonic tyranny, he maintained, had not
been defeated by British naval strength alone, but was ultimately crushed because “there remained
somewhere a free country which would not give up the fight, which could not be conquered, which kept
afloat the banner of liberty. This it was that gave to the oppressed the hope and the will to resist and
which undermined Napoleon’s support among his own exhausted and disillusioned compatriots and in the
end won the victory of 1815. And so it will be again -- so long as we resist.” The free and the unfree
alike, Lothian suggested, plead for American leadership.111
At Yale University, on 19 June 1940, after the French request for an armistice, Lothian again
focused his remarks on the naval situation, emphasizing the danger to the United States should Hitler
secure or destroy the British fleet. After all, “so long as we were superior at sea . . . no hostile fleet or
army could approach our shores. . . . That sea system of security is now under challenge, because of the
development of air power, and because Hitler seeks to capture the British and French fleets”:
The outcome of this grim struggle will affect you almost as much as it will affect us. For
if Hitler gets our fleet, or destroys it, the whole foundation on which the security of both
our countries has rested for 120 years will have disappeared. Hitler . . . will then control
the sea communications between Great Britain and its dependencies, which will be the
end of the British Commonwealth as we have known it. . . . You will then have only one
navy to protect a two-ocean front.
In particular, Lothian tried to alert his audience that, in spite of the impression they might have been given
by Churchill’s remarks on 4 June, they should not be so complacent or confident in British victory. He
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warned that the United States, in planning for its own future defense, should not expect the Royal Navy to
be available to defend North America. That, he suggested, might well prove “an illusion” -- and for two
reasons. First, as he had emphasized in virtually every speech since his appointment as ambassador, it
would “make a very great difference on which side of the ocean the British Fleet was based.” The Royal
Navy was far more effective in controlling the exits from Europe into the Atlantic, as it had done during
the nineteenth century to America’s great benefit, than in trying to patrol a vast seaboard on the other side
of the ocean. Second, most of the fleet would probably be lost in defending Britain. Only if Britain had
been beaten down, and the greater part of the fleet sunk in action would the remnants of the navy leave
for overseas ports to defend the other parts of the Commonwealth: “Quite apart from the difficulties
which would arise, if you were neutral, of handing over a fleet designed to protect the British
Commonwealth to a power which could not use it for that belligerent purpose, there would be little left
over for you.” In essence, Lothian, maintained, the only way to insure the transfer of the British fleet to
American waters was for the United States to enter the war as a belligerent. He stressed that, while he
was not pessimistic about the outcome of the impending German attack on Britain, nor was he trying to
tell Americans their business, he was simply being truthful, in order to prevent any later misconceptions
or misjudgments; that if the worst came to pass, Americans would not turn to Britain and ask, “Why did
you not warn us about these facts . . . before it was too late?”112
Lothian told Duff Cooper that he had “put the realities . . . as nakedly as it is possible for an
Ambassador to do.”113 After all, he wrote Helen Ogden Reid of the New York Herald Tribune, he needed
to “do something to correct the wishful thinking which so many people here were beginning to entertain
about the future of the British fleet.”114 The newspapers, both British and American, gave wide coverage
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to his remarks and British leaders were full of praise; both Halifax and Churchill wrote him to convey
their approval and congratulations.115
At the same time, however, Lothian’s Yale speech might have undermined the political
credibility of Roosevelt’s diplomacy, on two levels. For one thing, it became harder for Roosevelt to
maintain the existing division between the American fleet in the Pacific and the Royal Navy in the
Atlantic. The president in fact had warned Lothian of this possible consequence. On 17 June, when the
ambassador urged Roosevelt to speak out about the naval consequences for the United States if Britain
fell, the president pointed out that such a statement “might produce a demand for the removal of the
American fleet from the Pacific to the Atlantic which would have disastrous effects in the Pacific
Ocean.”116 Lothian, therefore, was fully aware in principle of the American fleet’s value as a deterrent
against Japan. He apparently did not realize, however, the extent of the political pressure currently on the
president to do just that -- move the American fleet back to the Atlantic. Roosevelt was in fact under
considerable pressure from some senior State Department officials, as well as the Army and Navy chiefs,
to abandon the Pacific and move most of the fleet back through the Panama Canal to defend the Atlantic
coast. The immediate crisis was resolved in early July, however, when the British boldly neutralized the
French fleet at Oran.117
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In the second place, although Lothian had merely hoped to point out that Britain was America’s
first and only line of defense, his remarks very well may have made the president more hesitant about
actually providing the destroyers that Britain continued to request. Because Roosevelt needed the consent
of Congress for such a deal, significant criticism, even from a handful of determined senators, could
undermine the domestic consensus on which such a policy absolutely had to be based. Consequently, a
public statement by the British ambassador that the British fleet might not come to the United States in
the event of Britain’s defeat, as well as any suggestion that, if Britain fell, those destroyers might be
surrendered to Hitler and possibly used against the United States, made it politically more difficult for the
Roosevelt administration to sell the deal to Congress. Lothian’s Yale speech was thus very likely one
reason why the president became so insistent through the summer and the subsequent negotiations that, as
a prerequisite for the transfer of the destroyers, Churchill must affirm that his comments on 4 June, about
the fleet fighting on, if necessary overseas, were in fact official British policy.118
In spite of the attention generated by these two public addresses, Lothian understood that
speeches would never be enough. During the summer of 1940, particularly following the collapse of
France, he conscientiously set out to sell the deal to the American public, primarily through a more robust
public relations and propaganda campaign in the United States. He did so, furthermore, frequently on his
own initiative, without the approval, or sometimes the knowledge, of the War Cabinet. Principally and
fundamentally, Lothian believed that British publicity and propaganda policy should follow the lead of
American opinion. Therefore, he helped to shape that opinion and thereby sell the deal to the American
people through unofficial, non-party, pro-British, pro-interventionist, but American, pressure groups.119
Since late June 1940, he and members of his staff had been in touch with pro-British pressure
groups, notably the William Allen White Committee and the Century Group. The better known of these
groups was the White Committee, founded by William Allen White, a widely respected editor of the
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Emporia (Kansas) Gazette. White, a Republican but an old friend of the president, formed a grassroots
movement during the fall of 1939 in order to support revision of the neutrality laws. The German
invasion of the West, however, prompted him to organize a new movement in May 1940 called the
Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies. The group, which became known as the White
Committee, quickly made itself the leading advocacy group in favor of American aid to Britain. On 21
May, the Chicago Daily News quoted White: “Here is a life and death struggle for every principle we
cherish in America: For freedom of speech, of religion, of the ballot and of every freedom that upholds
the dignity of the human spirit. . . . Here all the rights that the common man has fought for during a
thousand years are menaced.”

Taking their lead from White, numerous local chapters quickly formed

across the country – so many that, by the end of May, the American press began to note the emergence of
an “Aid For Allies Tide.” On 1 July 1940, there were 300 local chapters; by November, the total would
be 750, in every state, with about 10,000 active members. The White Committee tended to concentrate
on direct and overt publicity in the country at large, working through local chapters, newspaper ads, and
radio addresses, and usually with the blessing of the administration. Its objective was to “fill the radio
and the newspapers and the Congressional mail with the voice of prominent citizens urging America to
become the nonbelligerent ally of France and England.” During the Senate confirmation hearings for
Knox and Stimson, for example, White arranged for a deluge of telegrams in support of the nominees
from the home states of key senators; the result was a disappearance of any significant opposition.
Similarly, in July, when the Committee came out strongly for the release of 50 or 60 old destroyers to
Britain, they ran advertisements in major eastern and midwestern newspapers declaring that the British
fleet was America’s first line of defense: “Between Us and Hitler Stands the British Fleet.” It further
encouraged readers to write Washington to request the sale of destroyers to Britain. The Committee was,
however, perturbed at the president’s inaction in this matter and thus encouraged a large number of
members and supporters to send telegrams to the White House urging Roosevelt to act.120
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A smaller group, which ultimately came to be known as the Century Group, emerged at
approximately the same time and proceeded to operate on parallel lines. It emerged out of a June 1940
meeting in Virginia at the home of Colonel Francis P. Miller, a former Rhodes Scholar,121 although it did
not formally organize until 11 July 1940. Unlike the White Committee, the Century Group tended to act
more covertly in order to rally elite opinion in Washington D.C.122 Its members typically endeavored,
individually and specifically, to influence other national leaders to speak or act for aid and intervention.
Thus, they conducted a “private” propaganda campaign, dispatching copies of meeting memoranda,
speeches, columns, and editorials by Group members to journalists and influential public figures on a
private mailing list, on the grounds that time was too short to make a successful direct assault on the
isolationists in Congress who were obstructing aid to Britain.123

They went so far as to declare

themselves in favor of immediate belligerency; the United States, they argued, should enter the war
immediately on the Allied side. The Group recruited thirty distinguished citizens124 to join them in
signing a “Summons to Speak Out,” which urged the United States to join the war alongside Britain and
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France.

It declared that “the survival of the British Commonwealth is an important factor in the

preservation of the American way of life,” and called for the United States to act “in weeks not years.” It
urged the Roosevelt administration to provide war credits, arms exports, and the loan of American ships
for convoying evacuated children and transporting food, in return for a guarantee that London would not
surrender the fleet to the Germans. Newspapers across the country printed or reported the Summons on
10 June, but news of Mussolini’s invasion of France drowned out the story. Nevertheless, the Century
Group on 25 July drew up a memorandum urging that, in the interest of its own national defense, the
United States should transfer 100 destroyers to Great Britain at once.125 In return, Washington should ask
for some guarantee that the British fleet would be neither scuttled nor surrendered, and in the case of a
successful German invasion, would operate thereafter from Canadian or American bases. Otherwise, in
return for the destroyers, the United States should receive immediate naval and air concessions in British
possessions in the Western Hemisphere.126
Over the summer of 1940, Lothian met and worked with both interventionist groups, although his
actual contacts with their members were rather minimal prior to the collapse of France. For example, he
secretly conferred with White, at the end of May, regarding British needs and requirements. Shortly after
this meeting, Lothian prevailed on Churchill to promise that Britain would continue to fight Germany
“whatever the issue of the battle in France.” The prime minister obliged by pledging that Britain would
“fight on the beaches.”127
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Lothian indeed firmly maintained that British publicity and propaganda policy should
complement the work of American pro-interventionist groups. One of his most significant obstacles,
however, was in fact the prime minister. In contrast to Lothian, Churchill saw only limited value in
propaganda. He felt that words were worth nothing without a determined display of resistance, and he
relentlessly resisted appeals to cultivate American newspaper reporters and radio correspondents. During
his tenure as the First Lord of the Admiralty, Churchill had been unfailingly uncooperative in providing
information to the media, whether British or American. Many American reporters, including Edward R.
Murrow, routinely complained about stonewalling and obstruction on the part of the Admiralty under
Churchill.128

His assumption of the premiership, morever, did not fundamentally alter Churchill’s

perspective, as American reporters continued to plead for a relaxation of restrictions on their access to
information and news.129 Therefore, when a War Cabinet colleague urged him to take twenty minutes off
to speak to the American press, the prime minister angrily replied: “I am sure that only events will serve
to turn opinion in the United States. We have a Minister of Information and I cannot consume my limited
life and strength in the task you set before me.”130 Churchill consistently maintained faith and trust in
what he considered the two principal and natural arguments on Britain’s side. The first argument was the
United States dependence on the Royal Navy, and the second was the intrinsic heroism of the Allied
stand; the more heroic the stand, he argued, the greater the Allies’ chance of winning American
sympathy. For example, upon rejecting Mussolini’s offer to mediate peace on 28 May 1940, he assured
the French Premier Paul Reynaud that, if Britain and France maintained “stout hearts and confidence,”
they would strengthen their negotiating position and “draw the admiration and perhaps the material
support of the United States.” Following the fall of France, Churchill sharpened this argument. On 20
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June, he informed a secret session of the House of Commons that nothing would stir American opinion
“like the fighting in England” and that the “heroic struggle” offered the “best chance of bringing them in.”
If Britain could hold off Hitler until Roosevelt had been reelected, he believed, “the whole English
speaking world” would shortly “be in line together.”

131

Even later, on 21 August 1940, at the height of

the Battle of Britain, while the British government desperately awaited material assistance from the
United States, Churchill wrote to Sir Archibald Sinclair, Secretary of State for Air, that he did not see the
point or value of allowing American newspaper correspondents access to the air squadrons. He continued
to maintain that only events will impress and drive the United States into the war and therefore expressed
frustration with the constant effort and energy expended on appealing to American public opinion:
The important thing is to bring the German aircraft down and to win the battle, and the
rate at which American correspondents and the American public are convinced that we
are winning, and that our figures are true, stands in a much lower plane. They will find
out quite soon enough when the German air attack is plainly shown to be repulsed. . . . I
should be more inclined to let the facts speak for themselves. There is something rather
obnoxious in bringing correspondents down to air squadrons in order that they may
assure the American public that the Fighter pilots are not bragging and lying about their
figures. We can, I think, afford to be a bit cool and calm about all this. . . . I must say I
am a little impatient about the American skepticism. The event is what will decide all.132
Lothian, however, refused to be deterred.

He urged Churchill to make a short news reel

statement, as soon as possible, with regard to Britain’s determination to carry on, since “Prime Minister is
very popular with American news reel audiences.”133 Moreover, on 26 June 1940, he warned the War
Cabinet about a “wave of pessimism passing over this country . . . to the effect that Great Britain must
now inevitably be defeated,” an opinion that was even beginning to affect the president himself.
Therefore, Lothian urged the prime minister to make a “resolute and cheering broadcast to the Empire
with arrangements for it to be relayed to the United States.” This would, he argued, have far more effect
on American opinion than any direct broadcast. The War Cabinet shared Lothian’s concern and, on 28
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June, commissioned Halifax to report on the “arrangements for propaganda in the United States.”134
Churchill, however, remained unmoved. In a letter of 28 June, he told Lothian that, “I don’t think words
count for much now”:
Too much attention should not be paid to the eddies of United States opinion. Only force
of events can govern them. Up till April they were so sure the Allies would win that they
did not think help necessary. Now they are so sure we shall lose that they do not think it
possible. I feel good confidence that we can repel invasion and keep alive in the air.
Instead, Churchill reasserted his continuing faith in the power of events to bring the United States into the
war. Furthermore, he instructed Lothian to remind Roosevelt that, in the event of defeat, the British Fleet
would be a bargaining chip with Germany:
Never cease to impress on President and others that if this country were successfully
invaded and largely occupied after heavy fighting, some Quisling Government would be
formed to make peace on the basis of our becoming a German Protectorate. In this case
the British Fleet would be the solid contribution with which this peace government would
buy terms.
After all, Churchill reminded Lothian, “We have really not had any help worth speaking of from the
United States so far. We know President is our best friend, but it is no use trying to dance attendance
upon Republican and Democratic Conventions. . . . Your mood should be bland and phlegmatic. No one
is downhearted here.”135
By early July 1940, however, as the Germans began to intensify their air attacks on British
shipping in the English Channel, Churchill’s attitude began to change, and he ordered the Ministry of
Information to develop its American plans “with all speed.” But the initiative in the United States itself
remained with Lothian -- and in July 1940, Lothian went on the offensive. He began to outline plans to
outflank American isolationists by stressing that Britain needed material, not human, aid -- that “machines
not men are the Allies’ primary need.” Both Lothian and the War Cabinet hoped that “by depriving
isolationists of their main argument . . . Congress would thus be able to move faster over measures
134
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designed to help us.” In one respect, Lothian continued to make public appearances and speeches, in
which he continued to focus on the theme of Anglo-American sea power. In his private conversations and
consultations, however, he emphasized the uncomfortable truth that it was “extremely unlikely that either
Great Britain or the Dominions would ever hand over the fleet to a neutral America.”136 Lothian was, to
be sure, at his most effective in private conversation, both at the lunch and dinner table, and in the
interviews that he granted unsparingly. Having made himself so approachable and so accessible to
newspaper reporters and Americans of all sorts, they often came to him directly for information. They
knew that he would not consciously mislead them, and he knew whom he could trust. Some of them,
such as Walter Lippmann, were friends of long standing.137
More important, however, in the weeks following the French capitulation, Lothian intensified his
contacts with members of the interventionist groups. On 4 July 1940, he met with the interventionist
theologian Dr. Henry Pitney Van Dusen, a professor at the Union Theological Seminary in New York
City, and member of the Century Group, which was in the early stages of organization. As the Group
wished to arouse all-out assistance and support for Britain, Van Dusen asked Lothian how they could
help.138 The ambassador replied that Britain badly needed American destroyers. London expected a
German invasion of Britain to cross where the English Channel narrowed, and a supply of small and
maneuverable warships was crucial to British defense. Van Dusen returned to New York and reported to
his associates that the British ambassador intended to cooperate with them. For his part, Lothian wrote
hopefully to Churchill on 5 July of “encouraging” new developments in “informed American opinion.”139
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On 22 July 1940, Lothian gave a broadcast interview with Drew Pearson and Bob Allen of the
National Broadcasting Corporation [NBC] “Blue” network. He dealt honestly, openly, and adroitly with
questions about his support for appeasement in the 1930s and Britain’s current unpreparedness. He said
that Britain did not act more vigorously in Manchuria, Ethiopia, and Spain because of the British people’s
determination to resist aggression, but only by means short of war, adding that, “You must understand
that policy well enough, because it is precisely your own policy to-day.” At the same time, however,
Lothian strongly asserted Britain’s determination to hold out against Germany. When asked what type of
war material Britain would like to get from the United States, he replied that “most urgently we needed
destroyers and armed motor-boats to assist in preventing the invasion of Britain and to deal with
submarines. A hundred of these now might make the difference between success and failure.” In doing
so, he suggested that it was in the interest of the United States to do everything possible to keep Great
Britain going: “It is for you to decide what is in your own interest. But I should have thought that it was
vital to you that Britain and the British Navy should stay in being until your own rearmament, your twoocean navy, your 50,000 airplanes, and your big army were ready. To-day we are your Maginot line. If
that goes, there is nothing left between Hitler and his allies and yourselves in one ocean or the other.”
When asked if there was any chance of the British fleet crossing the Atlantic and fighting for America, he
answered that, in the last resort, the Royal Navy, officers and men, would never go to American ports if
that meant their becoming neutral and thereby debarred from continuing the fight. All in all, Lothian’s
skillful conduct of this interview won much praise in the American Department of the Foreign Office.
Even Victor Perowne of the Foreign Office, who habitually complained of Lothian’s language, “entirely
approved” of the ambassador’s performance:

“a very courageous and successful effort.”

One

unidentified Foreign Office official further minuted: “I think this is excellent stuff: it was favorably
reported on at the time in the U.S.”140
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This interview, which Lothian gave on his own initiative, effectively kept the issue before the
American public. More important, however, as a result of this interview, members of the Century Group
approached Lothian for a full statement of Britain’s situation and needs, for dissemination to editors,
columnists, and radio commentators, as the basis for a new campaign to secure release of the destroyers.
Francis P. Miller of the Century Group later wrote that it was felt that “in order to secure the most
authoritative statement of British needs certain questions should be put directly to the Ambassador”:
These questions were carried to Lothian by my wife, Helen Hill Miller. This was done to
protect both the Ambassador and the Century Group. Our Group had no authority
whatever for dealing with the British Government and charges that we were doing so
could, in the climate of July, 1940, have been very damaging to our cause.141
On 25 July 1940, therefore, Lothian cabled London for the information. He did not, however, mention
precisely who wanted the data; he referred ambiguously to a request from “authoritative quarters,”
implying that he was asking on behalf of the administration.

Two days later, Churchill sent the

ambassador an Admiralty memorandum explaining in detail Britain’s needs and setting them in the
context of the overall strategic situation. The memo stated that in 1918, Britain had 433 destroyers in
service, while in September 1939, Britain had 176, of which 133 were in home waters. By mid-June
1940, however, the latter figures had been reduced to 68 serviceable destroyers, with the prospect of no
more than ten new ships in the next four months. Since the collapse of France, furthermore, Britain had
to patrol both the Atlantic and the Mediterranean on its own, at a time when Italian patrols were
increasing in the Mediterranean, and Germany controlled the Baltic and the Channel ports.142
On the basis of the Admiralty memorandum, Lothian prepared a detailed “Private and
Confidential Memorandum on British Defense,” in which he requested 40 to 100 destroyers and 100
flying boats. He also asked that America’s diplomatic status be shifted from formal neutrality to non-
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belligerency, not that it would “imply any military action,” but that it would give “great moral
encouragement” to the British people. On 28 July 1940, he sent copies, or versions of it, to members of
the Century Group, the White Committee, Henry Luce, publisher of Time and Life magazines, and to
influential friends such as Norman Davis, an influential adviser to Roosevelt and Hull, and John L.
Balderston, a Hollywood screen writer but former London correspondent of the old New York World -- all
apparently without the permission of London.143 In addition, through the British Embassy’s legal adviser,
John Foster, Lothian also leaked accounts of Churchill’s appeals to Roosevelt for aid. This had the effect
of strengthening the Century Group’s frustration with the president’s intransigence.144
There is little doubt that Churchill and the War Cabinet would have disapproved had they known.
Lothian had to be circumspect because Churchill continued to insist upon an almost pathological control
over information, if not outright secrecy. Moreover, while the Foreign Office approved of the pressure
groups, it nevertheless believed that the embassy should keep its distance from them, for fear of reviving
the American phobia about British propaganda. The official British view, as expressed strongly by
Churchill on several occasions, was that “only events will serve to turn opinion in America” and that “it
would be wiser to leave the President to manage his own public in this matter.”145
Lothian strongly believed that the urgency of the situation justified this calculated risk.
Nevertheless, in providing this information, he asked his various correspondents not to use the exact
figure of 68, apparently to prevent London from guessing who had leaked the information. Lothian wrote
Whitney Shepardson, an old friend and member of the Century Group, and one of the individuals to
whom he sent the memorandum, “Please keep the source of this information confidential”:

143

NAS, GD40/17/516/4-5, “Confidential Memorandum on Needs of Great Britain,” 28 July 1940 [Miller added the
initials “PK” to the memorandum to indicate the source]; NAS GD40/17/516/1, Miller to J. R. M. Butler, 21
September 1956; PRO 800/398, Lothian to Luce, 28 July 1940; PRO 800/398, Lothian to Shepardson, 28 and 30
July 1940; Butler, Lord Lothian, 292-293; Chadwin, 100-101; Cull, 78; Langer and Gleason, The Challenge to
Isolation, 748; Reynolds, Lord Lothian, 32; Miller, 97-98.
144

NAS GD40/17/516/1, Alsop to J. R. M. Butler, 28 June 1956; Cull, 78.

145

Reynolds, Lord Lothian, 32.

281
Provided the use of the substance of it is likely to lead to the need being met I would take
a chance on publicity. You may bet that the Germans know the position pretty
accurately. The only people who don’t are the great American and British publics who
are going to get it in the neck because they are never told facts. Why America sits by and
watches its own front door being taken while all top people realise that if it is taken this
year America itself is doomed, and that it can save that front door for the matter of 100
destroyers or so, is a mystery to me. No, it is not a mystery because I have dwelt
amongst politicians all my life.146
As Lothian recognized, during the summer of 1940, there appeared a substantial gap between the
Roosevelt administration and the general American public, with respect to their awareness of America’s
stake in Britain’s survival. The basic problem, as Lothian understood it, was the lack of hard data about
Britain’s strength in destroyers, even among informed military commentators and congressmen. Raw
statistics, however, failed to distinguish between the Royal Navy’s total nominal complement of
destroyers and the number fit for service in home waters around Britain. The latter was the crucial figure
in Britain’s defense against invasion; and it was this statistic that Lothian’s memo provided. Respecting
Lothian’s request to approximate all figures and statistics, the material circulated by the Century Group
and the White Committee quoted a rough figure of 60 to 70 serviceable destroyers.147
Assisted by the material information provided by Lothian, the interventionist groups initiated
their campaign to drive home the gravity of Britain’s position to opinion leaders in the United States.
Journalists Walter Lippmann and Joseph Alsop argued powerfully for the sale of American destroyers to
Britain in their syndicated columns. The Century Group persuaded the retired General John J. Pershing,
the commander of American forces in France during the First World War and American hero, to
broadcast a speech on 4 August 1940, written by Lippmann, in favor of American rearmament,
conscription, and the transfer of American destroyers to Britain. “By sending help to the British,” the
general asserted, “we can still hope with confidence to keep war on the other side of the Atlantic Ocean,
where the enemies of liberty, if possible, should be defeated.” Pershing’s speech was the first major
public discussion of the destroyer issue and, coming from a national hero, it commanded nationwide
146

PRO 800/398, US/40/18, Lothian to Shepardson, 25 July 1940; Reynolds, Lord Lothian, 32.

147

Butler, Lord Lothian, 293; Langer and Gleason, The Challenge to Isolation, 748; Reynolds, Lord Lothian, 33.

282
attention.148 In a similar way, Joseph Alsop wrote a radio address that Admiral William Standley, retired
chief of naval operations, delivered on 10 August. In the meantime, the White Committee took out
newspaper advertisements and held rallies in favor of the destroyers agreement, while the Century Group
enlisted a number of Britons to present their case directly to the American public. For example, Henry
Van Dusen arranged, through the ambassador, a series of trans-Atlantic Sunday broadcasts by leading
British clergymen, Catholic as well as Anglican, beginning on 4 August 1940. Furthermore, and again,
with the cooperation of Lothian, Van Dusen initiated a program that brought representatives of various
segments of British society -- the Church, labor, women, educators, Catholics -- to the United States on
speaking tours.149
Furthermore, in late August 1940, the two groups established a joint information service, which
was administered by John L. Balderston, another old American friend of Lothian. Balderston provided
material information about Britain’s needs to selected daily newspapers outside Washington and New
York, which had a total circulation of over 100,000, but lacked easy access to the information themselves.
Lothian was one of his principal sources of information. On 24 August, in his telegram to the fifty
newspapers, Balderston stated elliptically:
British now have only about sixty destroyers available [in] their home waters and it
would be useful [to] print this fact without indicating [the] source. . . . great numbers [of]
light ships have been damaged [by] . . . under water explosions at some distance . . .
[The] British hoped [that the] Germans wouldn’t find out and now when figures have
reached such alarming proportions British [are] unwilling [that the] home public learn[s]
truth. [The] British [are] now losing hundred thousand tons [per] week [of] merchant
shipping by planes and submarines . . . due [to a] lack of destroyers for convoy. . . .
Without our help . . . until [the] new crop destroyers [comes in] service most serious
situation will develop which might be fatal even without successful invasion.
148
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By this point, although the negotiations for the destroyers-bases deal were in their final stages, the editors
were most appreciative of Balderston’s material and used it immediately in columns and editorials.150
At the same time, and perhaps most significant, Lothian became increasingly committed to the
development of a British news service in New York City. Over the spring and summer of 1940, when the
staff of the BLINY pressed for a more assertive publicity campaign, Lothian made it a priority to secure
the appointment of a press officer for the BLINY.151 In letters to Halifax and David Scott of the Foreign
Office, Lothian argued that, because the isolationist “no-meddling-in-Europe-brigade” remained
formidable, especially within the Republican Party, “We can afford to lose no opportunity of reinforcing
the present trend of opinion toward aiding the Allies as America’s first line of defence.

Such

opportunities occur daily,” he argued, “and we should be equipped to take every advantage of them and to
cut off each Hydra-head of argument on the other side as it appears.”152
In addition to laying the foundations for a British news service, which would not be put into
operation until the fall of 1940 with the establishment of the British Press Service, Lothian gave his
support and encouragement to the British Secret Intelligence Service [MI6], which enlarged its office in
New York City over the summer of 1940 under the direction of a Canadian businessman Sir William
Stephenson. Lothian, who could still take very little effective action to solicit American aid openly
without stirring up the isolationists, fully endorsed the need for such an organization that, although
independent of the embassy, essentially constituted a covert counterpart of it. For his part, Stephenson
described his work as “covert diplomacy inasmuch as it was preparatory and supplementary to
negotiations conducted directly by H.M. Ambassador.”

Taking the name “British Security

Coordination,” Stephenson’s office recruited a mostly Canadian staff in order to prevent sabotage of
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British munitions purchases in the United States, combat German propaganda and influence, and assist
pro-interventionist groups.153
While Lothian’s attitude continued to concern some in the Foreign Office, the new Minister of
Information, Duff Cooper, welcomed it. On 8 July 1940, Halifax informed Churchill that he and Cooper
had agreed that, with respect to British publicity in the United States, “the time has come to adopt a more
positive policy.” Cooper, in particular, firmly believed in the need for an all-out propaganda campaign in
the United States. He was not only prepared to finance such an expanded campaign, but also expected to
play a major role in directing its policy. Within a week of his appointment, therefore, Cooper launched an
effort to create a more active role for the Ministry of Information in the United States.154 When rumors of
a new British initiative began to spread, however, Edward R. Murrow included a call for London to retain
its “No Propaganda” policy in his evening news report. Alarmed by this broadcast, Lothian asked
London to confirm that no change of policy would be inaugurated “without first giving me an opportunity
of commenting on it.” He stressed that influential Americans, who were presently making demands for
unlimited help to the Allies and demands for American intervention, were being denounced as
warmongers. Therefore, London should be very cautious about embarking on any propaganda operation;
otherwise, he argued, it will “undermine their influence if we give Isolationists the excuse to say they are
inspired or paid by Britain.”155 T. North Whitehead of the Foreign Office minuted that “There could be
no better evidence of the futility of sending British propagandists over, to add their mite of grit to this
well-oiled ‘100% American’ propaganda machine.”156
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Cooper’s initiative, however, set off bureaucratic infighting within the British Government -specifically, between the British Embassy in Washington and the Ministry of Information -- that
threatened to undermine its publicity efforts. His plan called for the establishment of a New York press
office, with branches to be added eventually in Chicago and San Francisco, and insisted that the new
office fall under his own jurisdiction.157 As early as 1 June 1940, Cooper complained to Halifax that in
every other neutral state, there were branches of the Ministry of Information working quite well with the
embassy or legation, but that only in the United States did no such system exist. He thus urged Halifax to
allow him to press on with the work, although Lothian and the American Department in the Foreign
Office would likely discourage the enterprise.158 The ambassador, indeed, expressed serious reservations
about the plan. Lothian wired London on 9 June that opening a small branch of the Ministry of
Information in New York “fills me with alarm,” principally because it would be “universally interpreted
as the commencement of an underground campaign to get America into the war.” He strongly urged the
continuation of efforts to influence the United States through American press correspondents and
broadcasters on Allied fronts and in Allied capitals, in one respect, because it “comes through as news.”
Far more important, however, “because it comes through independent Americans, it is not unduly
suspected of being propaganda.”159 He reminded Cooper that London had to work particularly hard and
be particularly careful not to even appear that they were trying to inveigle or intrigue the United States
into the war; after all, “Americans for historical reasons are more sensitive about being given advice by
Englishmen than by anybody else.” In a telegram to the Foreign Office, Lothian insisted that he must
have direct control of press relations: “Any idea that Ministry of Information [sic] were establishing a
sub-agency which could not be concealed from the press, would be extremely harmful at this time.”160 He
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feared, most significantly, that a Ministry of Information office would soon “get at cross purposes” with
the British Embassy and the BLINY, and thus subsequently provide ammunition for the isolationists:
“But if only [Cooper] would help to get us the assistance we propose and improve the arrangements for
the press in London he will do a thousand times more than by opening an office in New York.”161
Lothian reiterated to his old friend Robert Brand that the best way to influence the United States
was to disseminate the British message through the American media and that the real place in which the
British needed to state its case and put forward its views was in London, not the United States. The
British government needed “to supply the American correspondents and broadcasters in London with the
fullest possible information about British policy, action, and personalities, of its operations by land, air
and sea, and so on”:
This information which includes speeches of notable personalities comes through
channels which are not suspect and which themselves are extremely anxious to retain
their reputation for independence. But everything they write or say is printed or heard all
over the United States by practically all newspapers or radio stations of repute.
Otherwise, Britain risked the very real danger of reawakening the habitual American suspicion of British
propaganda. Lothian intimated, furthermore, that Cooper did not seem to appreciate that Americans
tuned out, and will continue to tune out, the plethora of British lecturers sent over to tell the United States.
For some reason, he complained, Cooper, as well as the average Briton “seems to think that what is
needed in the U.S. is a flood of British speakers”:
That of course, you will understand, is both futile and harmful. Duff Cooper spent four
or five months lecturing in the U.S. So far as I can make out, the lectures, as lectures,
were quite good, but the effect of his visit was, on the whole, definitely harmful, for the
reason that he was represented constantly to 130 million people as being a paid British
agent sent over to get America into the war.
The problem, Lothian argued, is that it takes Americans a long time to process the facts. Even after
respected American journalists, such as Walter Lippmann and Dorothy Thompson, have made the issues
crystal clear, it still “takes a terribly long time for these considerations to force their way into the public
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consciousness. . . . The public does not pay much attention to publicists and Ambassadors because it
prefers wishful thinking.” Thus, Americans dismiss foreigners who say too much as propagandists.162
Lothian therefore attempted to head off the Information Minister with his own long-planned
initiative to expand British publicity efforts in the United States, primarily through the establishment of a
British press service. Earlier, in May 1940, he dispatched Sir William Wiseman to London. Wiseman, a
prominent figure in Anglo-American intelligence cooperation during the First World War, sounded out
Churchill and the Foreign Office on the matter.163 Cooper, however, denounced Lothian’s scheme on 14
June as “underhand and indirect work”:

“He is against anything for improving our contacts with

American opinion beyond sending one journalist to the British Library of Information.” Four days later,
Cooper complained again that Lothian seemed “quite determined to ignore the existence of the Ministry
of Information and to undertake the work of it himself.” He argued that the embassy was not sufficiently
equipped to assume the task and that he had received complaints from individuals in the BLINY, who
deplored “in the strongest terms the inadequacy of our efforts.”164 In late June, Cooper successfully
prevailed upon Halifax to consent to the establishment of a Ministry of Information bureau in New York
and, in the process, reject Lothian’s nomination of Mr. Keith Officer as “chief press officer” in New York
City.165 Instead, Halifax appointed Cooper’s nominee, Mr. Stephen Lawford Childs, to oversee the
founding of a Ministry of Information office in New York. Not long after arriving in the United States,
however, Childs promptly adopted Lothian’s vision of a British Embassy press agency in New York.166
Increasingly, planning ground to a halt, with the British Embassy in Washington and the Ministry of
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Information “alarmed” by and “gloomy” at the behavior of the other. Each believed that it alone knew
how to manage British publicity in the United States.
Nevertheless, in early July 1940, Cooper began implementing his program to expand the
operations of the Ministry of Information in the United States.

Among other things, he recruited

journalists to his staff in order to attune the ministry to the needs of the American press.167 This
represented a clear break with tradition and proved too progressive for traditionalists, such as Sir
Frederick Whyte, the head of the Ministry’s American Division; when he complained, Cooper fired him.
In a letter of 4 September, Whyte wrote Lothian that Cooper “is apparently unconscious of the ironical
inappropriateness of making a change at this moment, just when we are getting from the United States
almost all we could possibly expect in the circumstances.”168 In response, Lothian noted that he “always
felt a sense of security” knowing that Whyte headed American operations at the Ministry. The loss of
Whyte, however, sharpened the ambassador’s concern that the Ministry of Information might become a
loose cannon, and thus fortified his determination to ensure that the British Embassy controlled all British
propaganda within the United States.169
In the meantime, Lothian continued to observe and monitor the ongoing evolution of American
public opinion. On 7 August 1940, he wrote Lady Astor that, with the party conventions over, public
opinion is “warming up again”:
It is getting very concerned with the possibilities opening up in the battle for Britain.
Americans are at last beginning to realize that if Britain were to go this autumn, they
would immediately lose the Pacific to Japan, South America to Hitler, and that Hitler
would have 3 or 4 times the airplane and naval building power as themselves and could
therefore paralyse their rearmament. Hence the growth of the demand to send us 50
destroyers etc. now. You’ll see from the papers how the debate goes in Congress. It
cannot be done without legislation. Tempers too are rising as the war comes nearer.170
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A week later, on 16 August, as the Battle of Britain was intensifying, he again noted that American public
opinion was changing, but that it was “paralysed at the moment, partly by the fact that it has no armament
and therefore no means of effective intervention and partly by the Presidential election.”171
Lothian Leads the Roosevelt Administration to Water
During the summer of 1940, Lothian directed his most significant and most strenuous efforts
toward one principal objective: the British acquisition of 50 obsolete American destroyers. Toward the
end of July, as he intensified his public relations efforts to create a more favorable political atmosphere in
Washington, Lothian also took more specific diplomatic initiatives in order to move his superiors in
London and the Roosevelt administration toward a resolution of the destroyers’ issue.
In part, Lothian began to accelerate his efforts in late July due to the political environment in
Washington. In June and July 1940, the two major American political parties held their nominating
conventions for that fall’s presidential election. The Republicans nominated Wendell Willkie on 28 June,
while the Democrats nominated President Roosevelt on 18 July to run for an unprecedented third term.
Lothian welcomed the Republican selection of Willkie, gratified that they chose not to nominate an
isolationist. Willkie, a former Democrat who still supported the New Deal, had no real experience in
politics, especially with respect to international politics. “That’s his charm,” Lothian wrote London.
Most important, Willkie essentially shared Roosevelt’s position with respect to the war. Willkie, Lothian
noted, was “personally in favour of doing everything possible to see that Great Britain did not get beaten
in the war.” He endorsed the Burke-Wadsworth bill and even referred to Britain as “our first line of
defense and our only remaining friend.” Consequently, Lothian did not think it would make much
difference to Britain which of the two won in November; the United States would not enter the war until
its own vital interests were attacked in any event, and it was a point of common agreement between the
parties that they would fight if and when the time came.172 As it turned out, however, although initially a

171

Ibid, 297.

172

Butler, Lord Lothian, 290; Goodhart, 108; Moser, 134.

290
critic of isolationism, Willkie’s need for isolationist votes made his position on material aid to Britain
increasingly uncertain. In particular, as he began to lag behind Roosevelt in the polls, Willkie sought to
bolster his support among isolationists by accusing Roosevelt of planning to bring the United States into
the war. He claimed that American boys were “already almost on the transports to be shipped abroad, and
declared that if the president were re-elected the U.S. would be in the war by the following April.”173
As the domestic political environment in the United States began to heat up toward the end of
July, Lothian decided to accelerate his own efforts. On 22 July 1940, he cabled London that, with the
conventions over and Roosevelt's nomination secured, American attention was turning back to the war.
He noted that when asked by various Americans what action the United States should take, he had
generally replied that the United States should send 100 destroyers, some flying boats manned by
Americans, who, if necessary, would be volunteers. Assistance of this kind would be decisive against
attacks on the fleet and on merchant shipping, and would enable Britain to hold Gibraltar and Suez
indefinitely, while maintaining a fleet around its home waters. The American fleet could then be kept in
the Pacific, and the United States could carry on its rapid production of armaments behind the shield of
the two navies. A refusal to send these reinforcements, however, would risk the betrayal of vital
American interests. If Britain was defeated in the fall, the United States would be unable to defend South
America or to complete its rearmament because Hitler would control resources for building ships and
aircraft on a scale three times greater than the resources of the United States.174
Now was the opportune moment, he stressed in several messages, for the British government to
push for a settlement of the destroyers’ question. In order to do so, Lothian, along with other officials in
the Foreign Office, implored Churchill to send a personal and urgent plea to the president that clearly laid
out Britain’s military and material needs. For example, on 25 July, he wired London that he had
broadcast a statement referring to Britain’s need of destroyers and seaplanes.

Unfortunately, the
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American press also quoted an Admiralty statement that Britain had as many destroyers as at the outbreak
of the war and had thereby given the impression that Britain was not worrying about the problem.
Therefore, Lothian asked whether Churchill could make a statement that would clarify British needs.175
The prime minister, however, was hesitant to write the president. For one thing, he and Roosevelt had not
been in touch for six weeks. More important, perhaps, Churchill was reluctant to write about the
destroyers because, weeks earlier, Joseph Kennedy had warned against further rhetorical appeals that
might seem like emotional blackmail. Kennedy told the prime minister that “the President had all the
information in regard to destroyers and that he would settle it in his own way in his own time and that to
try to give him the ‘hurry up’ or to put out again the dangers to America was not likely to influence him
much.” Churchill, therefore, proved willing to do little more than make yet another appeal to Roosevelt
that emphasized the urgency of British needs.176 In a letter of 27 July 1940, Churchill ordered Lothian to
reactivate the request for American destroyers:
Need of American destroyers is more urgent than ever in view of losses and the need of
coping with invasion threat as well as keeping Atlantic approaches open and dealing with
Italy. . . . There is nothing that America can do at this moment that would be of greater
help than to send fifty destroyers, except sending a hundred. The flying-boats are also of
the greatest importance now and in the next two months. As I have repeatedly explained,
the difficulty is to bridge the gap until our new war-time production arrives in a flood.
On 30 July, however, Lothian telegraphed Churchill: “Strong pressure is being brought on the President
to reconsider possibility of supplying us with destroyers. Now is the moment to send him most moving
statement of our needs and dangers in respect of destroyers and flying boats you can, if you have not
already done so.” Largely on the basis of this telegram, Churchill decided to appeal directly to the
president. Now was the time “to plug it in,” he told Halifax.177 Therefore, in a long telegram to
Roosevelt on 31 July 1940, Churchill set out Britain’s naval predicament in detail, listed its recent
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destroyer losses, and explained that 50 American destroyers could tide the Royal Navy over the next few
critical months, thereby possibly deciding “the whole fate of the war”:
It is now become most urgent for you to give us the destroyers, motorboats and flyingboats for which we have asked. The Germans have the whole French coastline from
which to launch U-boats and dive-bomber attacks upon our trade and food, and in
addition, we must be constantly prepared to repel by sea action threatened invasion in the
narrow waters. . . . Latterly the air attack on our shipping has become injurious. In the
last ten days we have had the following destroyers sunk . . . total ten. All this in the
advent of any attempt which may be made at invasion. Destroyers are frightfully
vulnerable to Air bombing, and yet they must be held in the Air bombing area to prevent
sea-borne invasion. We could not keep up the present rate of casualties for long, and if
we cannot get us a substantial reinforcement, the whole thing of the war may be decided
by this minor and easily remediable factor. I cannot understand why, with the position as
it is, you cannot send me at least 50 or 60 of your oldest destroyers. I can fit them very
quickly with Asdics and use them against U-boats on the Western Approaches, and so
keep the more modern and better gunned craft for the narrow seas against invasion. Mr.
President, with great respect I must tell you that in the long history of the world this is a
thing to do now.178
This represented a distinct shift in British tactics, summarized by Lord Beaverbrook in a conversation
with Joseph Kennedy that same day, 31 July. Beaverbrook told Kennedy that until recently, British
policy, in seeking American aid, had been to make things look “as black as possible;” now, London was
trying to make things look “as good as possible.” On the surface, Beaverbrook’s comment to Kennedy
defies the litany of nearly crippling problems outlined by Churchill. Nevertheless, the prime minister and
the War Cabinet did not refer, as they tended to do since May, to the ever-present threat of a German
invasion, the possible assumption of power in Britain by a pro-German cabinet, or the possibility of
having to dispatch the entire Royal Navy to the ports of the Empire.179
An equally significant shift in American tactics, however, was occurring at approximately the
same time. Specifically, by the time Churchill’s message arrived, the Roosevelt administration was
considering an offer to the British -- American destroyers in return for the bases. The chief impetus for
this shift emerged out of the personal contact between Lothian and pro-British elements inside and close
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to the Roosevelt administration. Lothian had been in close contact for several weeks with Anglophile
leaders in the Cabinet -- the Cabinet “hawks” -- Henry Morgenthau, Secretary of the Treasury, Frank
Knox, Secretary of the Navy, Henry Stimson, Secretary of War, and Harold Ickes, Secretary of the
Interior.180 With respect to the question of destroyers, the driving force was Knox, who had long
advocated that the United States should enter the war at the earliest possible date, and had long sought
acquisition or access to British bases in the Caribbean. Lothian had been in touch with Knox since the
latter’s appointment in late June, reminding him of the need for destroyers and relaying to London Knox’s
interest in bases. On 20 June, Knox wrote the ambassador following Lothian’s speech at Yale University
and noted their common position that “those in America who are counting on the British fleet to patrol the
Atlantic even if Britain is defeated are possibly ignoring what many of us know will happen, and that is,
that before England surrenders, the fleet will be gone”:
I made as strong an appeal as I know how for immediate aid of every description to
Britain in the present grave hour of danger. It is simply unthinkable that the American
people will not comprehend the danger to us of permitting Hitler to achieve mastery of
both land and sea in Europe. In that event, the ocean which we now regard as a bulwark
of defense will become merely an avenue of attack.181
On the basis of these conversations, Lothian reported on 1 August 1940 that Roosevelt’s principal
advisers wanted to sell 50 to 60 destroyers to Britain but that legislation would be necessary. This
legislation, however, would be opposed by isolationists, of both parties, in a Congress that did not yet
understand the strategic dangers of the present situation. Hence the issue might be brought into the
election campaign and so cause “complete paralysis.”182
On the evening of 1 August, Knox found Lothian “almost tearful in his pleas for help and help
quickly.” In response, Knox suggested, as he had done before, that Britain should transfer her Western
Hemisphere bases to the United States. This time, however, Knox’s argument was different. If Britain
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transferred those bases, it would make it easier to get a bill through Congress concerning the destroyers:
The administration could argue that the bases were of greater value than the ships and therefore that the
administration had struck an advantageous bargain: “If you could do this, we could point out to Congress
that what we are receiving from you was of greater value for defense purposes than the fifty reconditioned
destroyers that we would be surrendering to you.” Lothian, not revealing that his own government had
already agreed to offer the bases, said he would query London about such a trade.183
In his report of this conversation to London, Lothian strongly endorsed Knox’s suggestion of
selling to the United States naval and air bases in Newfoundland, Bermuda, and Trinidad. As he pointed
out, the principal objections to such a sale, which had been previously raised in London, had involved the
unilateral nature of such an offer to the United States. Knox’s suggestion, Lothian emphasized, resolved
that dilemma. Although the British proposal of 29 July 1940 involved admittedly fewer facilities than the
current American suggestion,184 the United States was nevertheless offering destroyers in return. In
London, where the need for the American destroyers was growing more acute, the War Cabinet
responded favorably on 3 August, although Churchill insisted that “we prefer that it should be on lease
indefinitely and not sale. Go ahead on these lines,” he instructed Lothian, “and full steam.”185
Knox, in the meantime, concerted tactics with Stimson and Ickes for the cabinet meeting of 2
August 1940; they also had the support of Henry Morgenthau. It is quite likely that their pressure helped
to prod Roosevelt into action. During the meeting, Knox reported his conversation with Lothian and
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proposed that Britain be allowed to sell some of its Western Hemisphere possessions to the United States
in exchange for 50 or 60 destroyers. The cabinet agreed to pursue negotiations with London. Ickes noted
that if Britain went down, the American people would want to know why American destroyers had not
been sent to help prevent an invasion. Shortly after the cabinet meeting, he wrote the president, and made
use of a metaphor that Roosevelt would later adopt and employ with great effect in connection to the
Lend-Lease program: “It seems to me that we Americans are like the householder who refuses to lend or
sell his fire extinguisher to help put out the fire in the house that is next door, although that house is all
ablaze and the wind is blowing from that direction.” The cabinet also agreed that legislation would be
necessary, but recognized that Congress was not in a mood to pass it at present. Therefore, in order to
sweeten the proposal and thus win congressional support, they believed that London should give an “ironclad” assurance that the Royal Navy would not be permitted to fall into German hands. Such an
assurance, they believed, would be far more important than the offer of bases in convincing Congress that
the arrangement would enhance United States security. Although Lothian was not mentioned by name, it
seems likely that his unsettling Yale speech was much in the cabinet’s mind. The cabinet agreed,
therefore, to find out through Lothian whether the British government would be prepared to give a
satisfactory assurance about the fleet for the information of Congress.186
On 3 August 1940, Roosevelt informed Lothian of the administration’s offer -- American
destroyers in return for air and naval facilities -- and that legislation would be necessary. Because
Congress, however, did not appear inclined at the present moment to pass a measure with such far
reaching consequences, the president emphasized that London would have to offer Congress some
“molasses” to sweeten the proposal; specifically, a public assurance by His Majesty’s Government that,
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“if things went badly, in no circumstances would the British fleet, or such of it as remained in tact at the
end of the summer, be handed over to Germany but would, if necessary, leave British waters and continue
the fight for the British Empire overseas.” It became clear to Lothian, therefore, that the Roosevelt
administration placed the greatest significance upon the assurance about the British fleet; the air and naval
bases were highly desirable, but were largely intended to be a sop for public opinion. The president
expressed great concern about the possibility of filibustering by 15 or 20 determined isolationists in the
Senate, which might wreck the project until after the election; hence the “molasses.” Still, Roosevelt
realized the urgency of Britain’s situation and indicated that he wanted to introduce the bill by midAugust.

In his report to London, therefore, Lothian asked for authorization to state that, on the

understanding that the destroyers would be speedily available, the president could inform Congress of
Britain’s willingness to provide the facilities and an assurance about the future of the fleet.187
Lothian believed that time was of the essence and thus decided to take the initiative. He was by
this point intimately acquainted with the forcefulness of Churchill’s objection to offering British base
facilities without equal compensation. Lothian, however, had little sympathy with Churchill’s objections.
For months, he had been pressing the Roosevelt administration for destroyers, and, at the same time, his
own government to make an offer of bases. He firmly believed that the deal would resolve several
political problems for both sides and thus lay the foundation for the sharing of naval responsibilities that
he had long believed was essential for Britain’s survival. His growing sense of urgency, therefore,
compelled him to take initiatives and to make assertions, some of which he was not authorized to take or
make.

On the morning of 3 August 1940, for example, he seized enthusiastically on Roosevelt’s

proposed destroyers-bases-assurance idea.

Although circumspect about the fleet assurance, he told

Roosevelt that he had been authorized to say that the naval and air facilities would be made available as
soon as Britain got the destroyers. It is possible that Lothian may have simply anticipated Churchill’s
approval, since the War Cabinet made the bases offer of 29 July partly in the hope of nudging the
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Roosevelt administration toward providing Britain with American destroyers. At this point, however,
London had not given Lothian any such authorization.188
Lothian’s sense of urgency also compelled him to reverse his position on the fleet assurance. In
early July 1940, he had been prepared to give assurances to Washington that the British fleet would cross
the Atlantic to American waters, but only in the event that the United States had committed to the war.
By August, however, when the negotiations began to stall, Lothian became increasingly prepared to give
the Roosevelt administration the assurance it wanted, rather than conditionally tying the movement of the
Royal Navy to American belligerency, especially as there remained popular support for an outright
American seizure of all the Caribbean islands in the interests of American defense. While the prime
minister stuck to his original position and still wanted to retain the fleet as a bargaining counter, Lothian
was flatly ready to give the fleet assurance in order to get the destroyers.189
During the first week of August, Lothian’s haste to conclude the deal as quickly as possible also
contributed to confusion over the contents of the transaction.190 In one respect, the ambassador’s lack of
clarity resulted from the almost interminable confusion that infected the Roosevelt administration. For
example, on the morning of 4 August, Lothian met with Cordell Hull and Sumner Welles at the State
Department to discuss the possible transfer arrangement.

Hull, however, knew little about it and

suggested that the whole arrangement sounded illegal; moreover, legal or not, Hull thought the chances of
188

PRO FO 371/24241, A3670/131/45, Tel. 1606, Lothian to Foreign Office, 4 August 1940; Leutze, 108;
Reynolds, Lord Lothian, 29. Reynolds suggests that Lothian either confused certain telegrams or else anticipated
Churchill’s approval of a simple destroyers-for-bases transaction. He also suggests that, in early August, Lothian
was suffering from one of his periodic bouts of depression. The “almost tearful” pleas to Knox on 1 August were
not contrived. Overworked, troubled by rheumatism and by the Washington heat, Lothian was again pessimistic
about Britain’s chances of survival. Leutze, 286, n. 70; Reynolds, Lord Lothian, 29.
189

190

Butler, Lord Lothian, 294; Reynolds, Lord Lothian, 30.

Roosevelt tended to be secretive and something of an enigma, even to his closest associates. Harold Ickes once
told him that, “You are one of the most difficult men to work with that I have ever known. You keep your cards
close up against your belly. You never put them on the table.” This was a deliberate policy. Roosevelt once told
Henry Morgenthau, “You know, I am a juggler, and I never let my right hand know what my left hand does.”
General Douglas MacArthur would put it more bluntly in 1945, when he referred to Roosevelt as “a man who would
never tell the truth when a lie would serve him just as well.” This secretiveness was particularly acute with respect
to his conduct of foreign policy. He put very little on paper and tended to rely on individual associates, to serve as
his eyes and ears, such as Sumner Welles and Harry Hopkins. Reynolds, Munich to Pearl Harbor, 32-34.

298
congressional approval almost “nil.” Welles, however, who supported the plan, urged Lothian to make a
straightforward guarantee that the fleet would sail to North America if necessary. The entire exchange
left Lothian frustrated; when he met a member of the Century Group for lunch that afternoon, he appeared
“haggard and worn.”191 It is likely, indeed, that Lothian’s emotional state probably contributed to the
confusion. His message to London on 5 August about this meeting with Hull and Welles was sloppy, his
spelling and syntax garbled. He noted that, in order to satisfy Washington, all that was needed was a
simple declaration that the fleet would go on “fighting for the Empire even if it is compelled to evacuate
Great Britain if and when the President asks for it.” Lothian’s construction and lack of punctuation led
Churchill to understand that Roosevelt wanted the right to decide when the fleet should leave British
waters. The prime minister hit the ceiling, and it took several days to clear up the misunderstanding.192
Beyond the confusion caused by Lothian’s rushed telegrams, by the middle of August, political
considerations were beginning to outweigh the military considerations on both sides of the Atlantic. As a
result, negotiations descended into stalemate. The British government had initially agreed to offer bases
without asking for destroyers. The United States government, before learning of that initiative, had
offered destroyers in return for bases and a guarantee of the fleet. In London, Churchill could not give
assurances about the fleet that would probably appear defeatist and thus risk undermining British morale
and his own position of leadership. At the same time, however, the prime minister badly needed the
American destroyers, not only for their strategic value but also as an indication of American commitment.
In Washington, Roosevelt confronted equally powerful and equally dangerous political perils.
Because the cabinet initially accepted that legislation was necessary, the president became most
concerned about the political ramifications of the exchange. For one thing, he was in a reelection
191
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campaign and, therefore, could not appear too eager to assist Britain. Furthermore, under American law,
the transfer of the destroyers could only be made against a quid pro quo that represented such an obvious
increase in American security that the administration could safely transfer part of its naval forces to a
foreign power. Such a transfer on a narrow interpretation of international law, however, might still be
taken as a breach of neutrality. Therefore, Roosevelt had to proceed cautiously so as not to arouse
significant obstruction in the Congress. As a result, the negotiations would be prolonged and would
require the settlement, in Lothian’s words, of “endless difficulties about a matter on which there is
complete agreement of purpose on both sides.”

He attributed most of the difficulties “to the

consequences of a written constitution and a system of government in which legislature and executive are
equal and co-ordinate powers.” Consequently, Roosevelt needed a public guarantee concerning the fleet
that would disarm his critics, and until he got that guarantee, the president would continue to stall.193
Beyond the purely domestic political considerations, the president at this point was still largely exploring
the feasibility of the destroyers-for-bases concept, with respect to its potential military impact. In spite of
the powerful and stirring rhetoric from 10 Downing Street and the British Embassy in Washington D.C.,
Roosevelt remained fundamentally uncertain that, if Britain were defeated, American destroyers would
not fall into German hands.
Over the next ten days, however, Roosevelt became increasingly confident about Britain’s
prospects for survival. Several factors ultimately helped convince the president to take action. First, he
was supremely impressed by the British attack in early July on the French fleet at Oran, in Algeria.
Lothian, forwarding the daily military report to the president, wrote in longhand at the bottom, “You will
see that Winston Churchill has taken the action in regard to the French fleet which we discussed and you
approved.” As a matter of fact, very few actions as much as the destruction of the French fleet convinced
Roosevelt that Churchill was indeed prepared to “fight them in the streets” and “never surrender.”194
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Second, two professional military assessments, undertaken in July and August 1940,
fundamentally confirmed the capacity of Britain to hold out against Germany. Roosevelt dispatched the
fact-finding missions in order to gauge the chances for British survival, following the traumatic military
developments of the summer of 1940 -- the surrender of France and, in early July, the commencement of
German air attacks on Britain. In spite of assurances and reassurances by Lothian that Britain could hold
out if given American aid, the Roosevelt administration and congressional leaders proved reluctant to
send military assistance to Britain, particularly in the face of continually pessimistic reports from Joseph
Kennedy. In early July 1940, Kennedy wrote Roosevelt that “England is fighting for her possessions.
They are not fighting Hitler . . . They will spend every hour figuring how to get us in.” He warned
American businessmen that Britain was broke and lacked even gold to pay for American arms. In
London, furthermore, he told Chamberlain that “everyone in the United States says” Britain would be
beaten “by the end of the month.” On 2 August, he reported to Washington that, if the Germans
possessed the air power that they claimed, they could certainly put the Royal Air Force “out of
commission,” after which a British surrender “would be inevitable.”195 Therefore, in the second week of
July, Roosevelt sent Colonel William “Wild Bill” Donovan, head of the Office of Strategic Services to
Britain for a full and candid estimate of not only that nation’s survivability, but its will to resist. The
British were hopeful that his report would offset Kennedy’s pessimism,196 and were immediately cheered
by the colonel’s evident sympathy for the British cause. The British therefore went all out in showing
Donovan the most secret installations, hidden air fields, and coastal defenses. He visited aircraft and
munitions factories, and saw first hand the use of the new British technological discovery, radar. He
observed industrial output. He conferred at length with British army, navy, and air officers, including Sir
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Admiral Dudley Pound, the first sea lord, and the director of naval intelligence, Rear Admiral John H.
Godfrey. He interviewed cabinet members, members of the loyal opposition, and street corner civilians.
Donovan conferred with the American military attachés at the embassy and found that they were in the
process of filing reports that differed radically from the ambassador’s overly negative views. Lt. Colonel
Carl Spaatz, later the Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force, said that “American Air Corps
observers were convinced that the Germans could not beat the Royal Air Force.” General Raymond E.
Lee, the newly arrived army attaché, told Donovan that the conclusions of military attachés were expected
to be quite independent of the Ambassador and the Embassy staff; Lee in particular found Kennedy
depressingly defeatist. Most important, Donovan met with Churchill, who stated that “if worst came to
worst, he, after defending Britain to the last, would send the Fleet and the Air Force to Canada and fight
from there.” Consequently, when Donovan returned to Washington in early August, he reported to the
president that Britain would hold out. The British army and navy were ready to fight and morale was
excellent. Defense preparations and production, of aircraft and munitions, were making good progress,
and the British were planning retaliatory bomber attacks on Germany. In effect, Donovan affirmed what
Lothian had been arguing all summer, that Britain was indeed America’s first line of defense, that the
extreme depression in Washington was not justified, and that the United States should accelerate military
aid to Britain.197
No sooner had Donovan left London in early August than a General Staff mission arrived, which
included Admiral Robert L. Ghormley, Assistant to the Chief of Naval Operations, Brigadier General
George V. Strong, Deputy Chief of the General Staff, and General Delos C. Emmons, Commanding
197
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General, General Headquarters. Their mission was not only to retrace and expand the military area
covered by Donovan, and thus reassure the American General Staff, but also to hold the first staff
conversations between senior military personnel on both sides. Their report fully corroborated Donovan’s
and added new information on the relatively small loss of British aircraft and the comparatively small
damage done by German air bombardment, in spite of Kennedy’s efforts to place a heavily negative
accent on the findings.198 Since the Germans could not permanently ground the RAF, Strong concluded,
they would not be able to invade Britain.199
The third and perhaps most critical factor that helped stir American sympathy, if not sell the deal
to the president, was the publicity generated by the Battle of Britain. In London, since the outbreak of the
war, when the British government imposed strict military censorship,200 Minister of Information Duff
Cooper struggled against Whitehall’s continuing obstruction to provide the American media with access
to the British war effort.

Similarly, within the Foreign Office News Department, deputy-director Sir

William Ridsdale argued that, in order to win American support, it was essential to allow American
reporters to see the Royal Air Force in action:
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To see British planes getting back, but only just getting back because they have been
battered and riddled by the enemy, would provide the material for an impressive picture
of the drain on our resources. These American correspondents would know the delicacy
of such a position; they would not worry weary pilots; they could provide invaluable
evidence of our spirit and our needs. And they are straining at the leash to give this help,
which lies within their power, for a cause for which they have intense sympathy.
T. North Whitehead of the Foreign Office American Department was even more blunt. He said that
Britain was not very likely to win this war without the whole-hearted cooperation of the United States.
“We shall not obtain this unless we demonstrate in a manner vivid and convincing to the Americans that
we can not only resist but can also attack”:
The only way to make our power for offensive vivid to Americans is 1) to attack as often
and as dramatically as possible, and 2) to let the Americans see us doing it through their
countrymen. This involves a constant appreciation of their own importance as political
instruments on the part of the fighting services.201
As a result, Halifax pressed Anthony Eden at the War Office and Archibald Sinclair at the Air Ministry to
allow increased American news coverage.202
From Washington, Lothian continued to appeal for greater access by American correspondents
covering the British Expeditionary Force. On 1 June 1940, he urged the War Office to relax restrictions
because the “reporting by American correspondents of recent fighting,” notably the evacuation from
Dunkirk, “has produced an excellent effect on opinion here.” Furthermore, American correspondents did
not want military secrets or statistics; they wanted human interest accounts of the fighting, crashed
aircraft, stories of heroism and valor, “all of which awakens human sympathy.” Halifax agreed with
Lothian’s argument and thus appealed to War Minister Anthony Eden and Air Minister Sir Archibald
Sinclair on 6 June. Halifax stated that the success or failure of Britain’s efforts to secure destroyers and
additional aircraft “may depend upon the response of the United States to our appeal.” While the
Roosevelt administration appeared willing to help, “the final say lies with public opinion.”203
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Largely for that reason, Lothian suggested that, because human interest might promote American
confidence in the RAF, one or two real ace fighter pilots should visit the United States. He found his
ideal candidate in an American pilot named Billy Fiske, a 29-year-old officer in an RAF fighter squadron
based on the southern coast of Britain. He was the son of a leading New York banker, a gold-medal
winning member of the United States Bobsled team in the 1928 and 1932 Winter Olympic Games, and
ultimately a partner in Dillon, Read and Company of New York. He married an Englishwoman, Rose
Bingham, and, on the eve of the war, moved to Britain. In March 1940, he enlisted in the RAF volunteer
reserve. In June, Lothian requested that Fiske be given leave to visit the United States and speak with
“influential Senators, editors and others, in order to convince them as to the quality of our air force and its
ability to deal with the German air force.”204 The ambassador agreed, however, with the Air Ministry’s
insistence that Fiske see combat first if he was to have any credibility with the American press. On 13
July, therefore, Fiske was assigned to the 601 City of London Squadron, and very soon saw combat,
particularly as the Battle of Britain intensified in early August 1940. By the middle of August, Fiske had
several enemy kills to his credit and was described by his commanding officer, Sir Archibald Hope, as
“unquestionably . . . the best pilot I’ve ever known” and “a natural as a fighter pilot.”205
As a result, the concept of using Americans in the RAF for propaganda gained momentum.
Lothian wired the Air Minister Sir Archibald Sinclair that, “If you have one or two real ace fighters who
need a rest and who could impress people here by their confidence through actual experience and
superiority of our Air Force, it would be a good thing to send them over for a fortnight.”206 On 17 August
1940, the Foreign Office circulated a secret memo that “publicity of exploits of individual American
pilots in our service, even if exaggerated, would have an excellent effect, and would give the heroworshiping public of the United States a feeling of identity with the conflict; and that interviews,
204
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photographs and newsreel shorts etc. might also be followed up.” In Washington, Lothian envisioned
Fiske as an attractive dinner guest on the Washington social round and the “next hero of every American
schoolboy.” On 17 August, however, the same day that the Foreign Office memo began to circulate,
Fiske suffered horrific burns during a skirmish against a pack of German Junkers 87 fighters. Hours later,
he was sitting up in his hospital bed wisecracking with his squadron adjutant, who described him as
“perky as hell.” Nevertheless, very rapidly, his condition worsened and he died shortly before dawn the
next morning, the result, his doctors maintained, of post-operative shock.207
In spite of Billy Fiske’s death, the Battle of Britain began to clarify the British predicament in the
United States. In one sense, the battle began to stir the emotions of Americans in a way that academic
debates over bases and destroyers could not. Fiske’s death and funeral provoked tributes on both sides of
the Atlantic. Most significant, perhaps, more and more Americans were following the battle. As the
British government increasingly relaxed its censorship and control of information during the summer of
1940, American reporters such as Edward R. Murrow of CBS and Quentin Reynolds of Collier’s
Magazine thrilled huge radio audiences and readers with stories of dogfights over the White Cliffs of
Dover and live reports from the rooftops of London.208

Britain’s ability to withstand the German

onslaught, and therefore, its chances of survival, suddenly could be expressed in a simple statistic: the
ratio of the losses suffered by the Luftwaffe to the losses suffered by the RAF. Consequently, Americans
grew increasingly confident in Britain’s chances as early reports indicated that the RAF was shooting
down greater numbers of German aircraft than it was losing. They became quickly aware, however, that
there existed marked disparities between British and German news accounts. In spite of efforts to loosen
the official control over military information, Churchill persisted in his almost incomprehensible inability
to see this as a significant problem, and therefore continued to see no utility in working to answer
American doubts by opening up Air Ministry calculations to press scrutiny. “I must say,” he minuted to
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Sinclair, “I am a little impatient about the American skepticism. The event is what will decide all.” He
argued that, “The important thing is to bring the German aircraft down and to win the battle, and the rate
at which American correspondents and the American public are convinced that we are winning, stands in
a much lower plane. They will find out quite soon enough when the German air attack is plainly shown
to be repulsed. . . . There is something rather obnoxious in bringing correspondents down to air squadrons
in order that they may assure the American public that the fighter pilots are not bragging and lying about
their figures.”209
Lothian, however, emphatically urged London to authenticate the credibility of British figures.
He knew that American officials, such as Ed Stettinius of the National Defense Commission in
Washington, had noted the discrepancy between the losses declared by Britain and those estimated by
United States Military Intelligence. The result, he warned, was that Americans began to distrust the
reliability of British communiqués: “Claims of aircraft destruction are now so wildly contradictory that
juxtaposition of communiqués and news stories produces the impression that both sides are lying
wholesale.” Therefore, Lothian emphasized, it was absolutely necessary to assure Mr. Stettinius “that the
figures for losses given out by the Admiralty and Air Ministry are as accurate as possible and that no
British losses are being purposely concealed.”210 Lothian’s alarm compelled Halifax to write directly to
the Air Ministry: “Whatever you can do to give the American correspondents an inside view of your
organization and personnel may, I firmly believe, have the most important and influence on the help we
get from the United States in the near future.”211 As a result, in late August, Sinclair arranged for
American correspondents to visit two RAF fighter bases and witness at first hand the compilation of
British and German losses. The Americans were impressed to note that the British counted only the
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“confirmed kills” -- the German aircraft actually seen to have crashed in flames. In this way, the British
finally convinced the American press corps in London of the accuracy of their figures. Very soon, the
Admiralty followed suit and also began providing the American press, for the first time, with reliable
statistics on British shipping losses.212
The fourth and final factor that helped convince Roosevelt to take action was a shift in the
political atmosphere in Washington.

It appeared that Wendell Willkie, although still critical of

Roosevelt’s foreign policy and hesitant to take any public position in favor of the deal, might be
persuaded to express approval of the destroyers-for-bases negotiations, which would likely defuse adverse
reaction by Republicans in Congress.

On 17 August 1940, during his acceptance speech for the

Republican nomination, Willkie stated that “We must admit that the loss of the British fleet would greatly
weaken our defense”:
That is because the British fleet has for years controlled the Atlantic, leaving us free to
concentrate in the Pacific. If the British fleet were lost or captured, the Atlantic might be
dominated by Germany, a power hostile to our way of life, controlling in that event most
of the ships and shipbuilding facilities of Europe. This would be a calamity for us. We
might be exposed to attack on the Atlantic. Our defense would be weakened until we
could build a navy and air force strong enough to defend both coasts.213
At the same time, it grew increasingly clear that American public opinion supported the deal. The bill
received the unexpected endorsement of the reliably isolationist Chicago Tribune, which had been
demanding the acquisition of bases from the British since the 1920s. In addition, the results of two public
opinion polls taken in the middle of August were highly encouraging. In one poll, 61 percent of those
surveyed favored selling the destroyers to Britain; in the other, 62 percent supported the deal.214
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Furthermore, and perhaps decisively, the administration’s legal and constitutional concerns began to clear
up. On 11 August 1940, a letter appeared in The New York Times, signed by Dean Acheson, a member of
the Century Group, and three other distinguished lawyers.215 This long and closely reasoned letter argued
persuasively that, since time was of the essence and since congressional action would delay matters, the
president had the legal authority to dispense with legislation and transfer the destroyers. Roosevelt,
although still relatively hesitant to circumvent Congress, quickly converted to this view, provided that the
Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Harold Stark, would certify that the destroyers were not essential to
the defense of the United States.216
The Destroyers-for-Bases Agreement
By late August 1940, therefore, as a result of Britain’s ability to withstand sustained aerial
bombardment, along with the German failure to follow up their conquest of France with an all-out
invasion, Roosevelt increasingly came to the conclusion that Britain might not be such a lost cause after
all. It appears clear that the accumulating evidence of Britain’s capacity and will to fight, along with
increasing indications of tacit Republican support, convinced the president that it was now politically
safer to take action.217
In spite of the Roosevelt administration’s decision to proceed with negotiations, the primary
obstacle to an expeditious settlement was in fact Winston Churchill. Having for months advocated a quid
pro quo approach to Anglo-American cooperation, and having accepted in early August the idea of a
limited bases-for-destroyers deal, the prime minister began to have reservations as the scope of the
American proposal became apparent. He feared that the American proposal, which demanded far greater
British concessions, would be politically unacceptable in Britain. After all, the United States would
receive the far greater value in the proposed deal; in return for a few dozen obsolete warships from the
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period of the First World War, Washington would receive a number of strategically placed base facilities
with a monetary value of hundreds of millions of dollars. Of course, the prime minister noted, there was
“no comparison between the intrinsic value of these antiquated and inefficient craft and the immense
permanent strategic security afforded the United States by the enjoyment of the island bases.”218 More
important, Churchill remained adamantly opposed to the requirement that London give any assurance
about its fleet. He was particularly perturbed by a telegram from Roosevelt asking for a public guarantee
that if Britain were overrun, the Royal Navy would neither be surrendered nor sunk; he was equally
annoyed by an American suggestion that Britain transfer its ships to Canada in the event of defeat.
Churchill believed that such assurances were quite out of the question, partly because it gave the United
States too much, but primarily because he feared that further public mention of the matter would unsettle
domestic morale at a crucial moment. “Only a war alliance,” he wrote, could justify “any stipulations
about the disposition of the fleet.” Under any circumstance, Britain must be the sole judge of when the
fleet should cross the Atlantic. Any other course of action, particularly at the moment when the War
Cabinet anticipated a German invasion, would be “disastrous on British morale.” He was therefore averse
to any public statement that might create “the impression that the Government had in mind the collapse of
Britain as a possible contingency.”219
Consequently, when the War Cabinet considered the American proposals on 6 August 1940,
Churchill was, according to Colville, “in a nervous and irritable frame of mind.” Although he was willing
to accept the American insistence on full bases on seven sites, he insisted that, since the deal was clearly
to the United States’ benefit, the two elements should not be explicitly related and should be treated as
mutual gifts, offered in a spirit of friendship and cooperation.220
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A new message arrived from Lothian early in the morning of 7 August 1940, that Roosevelt
wanted an immediate answer to the question about the fleet. The ambassador stressed that “It is evident
that this argument is the one which has the most effect on Congress in the matter of destroyers.” As the
prospects for legislative action were steadily increasing, Lothian asked whether a reply could be
telephoned as early as possible.221 Churchill, however, remained firm. In letters to both Lothian and
Halifax, on 7 August, Churchill reemphasized the need for destroyers, but that His Majesty’s Government
would under no circumstances surrender the British Fleet to the United States. He would not consent to
any discussion of the fleet that might give the Americans a blank check that they could present for
collection, saying “we think the time has come for you to send your Fleet across the Atlantic”:222
We were, as you know, very ready to offer the United States indefinite lease facilities for
naval and air bases in West Indian islands, and to do this freely on grounds of inevitable
common association of naval and military interests of Great Britain and the United States.
. . . But all this has nothing to do with any bargaining or declaration about the future
disposition of the British fleet. It would obviously be impossible for us to make or agree
to any declaration being made on such a subject. I have repeatedly warned you in my
secret telegrams and those to the President of the dangers United States would run if
Great Britain were successfully invaded and a British Quisling Government came into
office to make the best terms possible for the surviving inhabitants. . . . We have no
intention of relieving United States from any well-grounded anxieties on this point. . . . I
have already several weeks ago told you that there is no warrant for discussing any
question of the transference of the Fleet to American or Canadian shores. I should refuse
to allow the subject even to be mentioned in any Staff conversations, still less that any
technical preparations should be made or even planned. Above all, it is essential you
should realise that no such declaration could ever be assented to by us for the purpose of
obtaining destroyers or anything like that. Pray make it clear at once that we could never
agree to the slightest compromising of our full liberty of action, nor tolerate any such
defeatist announcement, the effect of which would be disastrous.223
Halifax wrote to Lothian on 8 August, at Churchill’s request, and stated that there was great
difficulty in making any statement more specific than the one the prime minister had made on 4 June
1940; any other declaration on the matter would provoke rumors of irresolution and timidity in Britain.
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He instructed Lothian, therefore, to inform Roosevelt that Britain would provide the facilities as soon as it
received the destroyers. Otherwise, Halifax advised the ambassador to find a way to reconcile British
difficulties and American desires, but to make as few concessions as possible. Lothian replied on the
evening of 8 August that he presented a letter to Sumner Welles, which outlined Churchill’s position, that
“if Great Britain were overrun, the present Government would certainly send the Fleet . . . to defend the
Empire overseas and would neither sink nor surrender it.” He reiterated the prime minister’s view that
any public statement in Britain or America regarding the fleet would stimulate unhealthy fears, and thus
confined himself to the offer of a lease of bases to Pan American Airways. In return, he asked for twelve
flotillas of eight destroyers, twenty motor torpedo boats [MTBs], five Flying Fortresses [heavy bombers],
fifty Catalina flying boats and 250,000 rifles with ammunition.224
Nevertheless, on 13 August, Roosevelt made up his mind once and for all to proceed with the
negotiations. He met that afternoon with Welles, Stimson, Knox, and Morgenthau, who all agreed that
Britain’s chances were growing slimmer and that the destroyer exchange, “while a very serious step,” had
to be undertaken. They collaborated on a message to Churchill that suggested a reduced list of items that
the United States might offer, but noted that this equipment could be furnished only “if the American
people and the Congress frankly recognized that in return therefore the national defense and security of
the United States would be enhanced.” In order to convince the American people that such a deal would
enhance their security, however, the president still wanted, first and foremost, an unequivocal fleet
assurance. He also insisted that the British give more bases than they had originally offered, as well as
more explicit and more encompassing rights to their use. To make things easier for Churchill, he changed
his mind about the type of fleet declaration. Therefore, in his message to the prime minister, Roosevelt
wrote that a “reiteration to me of your statement to Parliament on 4 June”225 would be sufficient.226
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The War Cabinet met on 14 August to discuss Roosevelt’s offer: the United States would furnish
Britain with at least 50 destroyers, motor torpedo boats, and certain aircraft, provided that the British
government take the following steps. The first was an assurance that, if at any time the waters around
Britain became untenable for British ships of war, the latter would not be turned over to Germany or sunk,
but would be sent to other parts of the Empire for the continued defense of the Empire, as Churchill had
stated in his address of 4 June 1940. The second was an agreement that the British government would
authorize the use of Newfoundland, Bermuda, the Bahamas, certain West Indian Islands, and British
Guiana as naval and air bases by the United States in the event of an attack on the American Hemisphere
by any non-American nation. In the meantime, the United States should have the right to establish bases,
the land for which should be acquired by purchase or through a lease. The American terms, Churchill
noted, represented a significant step toward American belligerency; because the sale of the destroyers was
a blatantly unneutral act, it would go a long way toward bringing the United States into the war. The War
Cabinet added that the deal might be the first step toward constituting an “Anglo-Saxon bloc.”
There was nevertheless substantial concern that Washington was driving an exceptionally “hard
bargain,” particularly the question of moving the British fleet to American waters. Churchill reiterated
that his comments of 4 June had been made partly in order to reassure public opinion immediately
following the collapse of France, and that nothing must be said now that might disturb morale or lead
people to think that we would not “fight it out here.” Therefore, the War Cabinet agreed that, while
Britain should make a favorable response to Roosevelt, Churchill should also make it absolutely clear that
it was London’s firm resolve to fight it out, and that “even if, contrary to our belief, we should find
ourselves being overwhelmed, we should retain, entirely unfettered, the right to decide when (if ever) we
should send the Fleet away from these waters to defend our kith and kin overseas.”227 Nevertheless, the
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War Cabinet understood that the time had come to make worthwhile concessions to the United States.
Cadogan noted that “We must give a very easy quid for the quo, and I understand Winston now
agrees.”228 In his letter to Roosevelt on 15 August 1940, Churchill stated that while London could “meet
both the points you consider necessary to help you with Congress and with others concerned,” the
president should understand that the British “willingness to do so must be conditional on our being
assured that there will be no delay in letting us have the ships and flying boats.”

He asserted,

furthermore, that it was not in America’s interest to emphasize the possibility of British defeat. He wrote:
“I am of course ready to reiterate to you what I told Parliament on June 4. We intend to fight this out here
to the end and none of us would ever buy peace by surrendering or scuttling the Fleet.” Then with
apparent resentment, he added:
But in any use you may make of this repeated assurance you will please bear in mind the
disastrous effect from our point of view, and perhaps also from yours, of allowing any
impression to grow that we regard the conquest of the British Islands and its naval bases
as any other than an impossible contingency. The spirit of our people is splendid. Never
have they been so determined. Their confidence in the issue has been enormously and
legitimately strengthened by the severe air fighting in the past week.229
Churchill remained obstinate although the military situation was growing more dangerous. On
12-13 August, the Luftwaffe launched significantly more powerful and concentrated aerial assaults
against British radar stations and coastal airfields, which marked the beginning of a new and more
dangerous phase of the Battle of Britain. These assaults, which the Germans intended as the prelude to
their invasion of Britain, caused considerable anxiety throughout Britain. In the context of national
emergency, Churchill felt it absolutely vital to maintain unity and morale. It was bad enough having to
accept such an appallingly lopsided deal in order to give Roosevelt political cover; but to give a public
assurance about the fleet, which implied the possibility of defeat -- and which might thus undermine
national morale -- was unacceptable. Thus, Churchill hesitated to commit fully to the American proposal.
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Nevertheless, the president considered Churchill’s message of 15 August “entirely satisfactory”
and discussed the matter at his press conference the next day, 16 August. Lothian was pleased and wired
London, “I think the trick has been done. At least the President told me on the telephone this morning
that he thought it was.”230 The State Department quickly prepared letters to be exchanged between the
British and American governments, which provided for a fleet guarantee, stipulated the nature of the
leases, and made the connection between the bases and the destroyers explicit. Welles told Lothian on 19
August that the exchange of these letters would overcome all of the difficulties because it was at present
impossible for the president to send the destroyers without legislation, except in exchange for a definite
consideration, and unless the Chief of Naval Staff, Admiral Harold Stark, certified that they were not
essential to the national defense of the United States.231 Lothian, however, pointed out that Churchill
could not make a statement about the British fleet in a letter intended for publication. He also objected to
the description of the transaction “as a deal in which we made these far-reaching and tremendous
concessions” in exchange for 50 old destroyers. From London’s point of view, it was essential that its
part of the transaction be represented as a contribution, to the security of North America, including
Canada. Otherwise, British public opinion, and possibly opinion in the United States, would think that
Washington “had driven an intolerably hard bargain at the moment of our greatest difficulty.”232
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Before those letters could be exchanged, however, Churchill addressed the agreement in the
House of Commons on 20 August 1940. He offered the bases to the United States as a gift separate from
the destroyers, with no strings attached, and gloried in the promise of cooperation to come:
We have to think not only for ourselves but for the lasting security of the cause and
principles for which we are fighting and of the long future of the British Commonwealth
of Nations. Some months ago we came to the conclusion that the interests of the United
States and of the British Empire both required that the United States should have facilities
for the naval and air defence of the Western hemisphere against the attack of a Nazi
power which might have acquired temporary but lengthy control of a large part of
Western Europe and its formidable resources. We had therefore decided spontaneously,
and without being asked or offered any inducement, to inform the Government of the
United States that we would be glad to place such defence facilities at their disposal by
leasing suitable sites in our Transatlantic possessions for their greater security against the
unmeasured dangers of the future. . . .
Presently we learned that anxiety was also felt in the United States about the air and
naval defence of their Atlantic seaboard, and President Roosevelt has recently made it
clear that he would like to discuss with us, and with the Dominion of Canada and with
Newfoundland, the development of American naval and air facilities in Newfoundland
and in the West Indies. There is, of course, no question of any transference of
sovereignty -- that has never been suggested -- or of any action being taken, without the
consent or against the wishes of the various Colonies concerned, but for our part, His
Majesty’s Government are entirely willing to accord defence facilities to the United
States on a 99 years’ leasehold basis, and we feel sure that our interests no less than
theirs, and the interests of the Colonies themselves and of Canada and Newfoundland will
be served thereby. These are important steps. Undoubtedly this process means that these
two great organizations of the English-speaking democracies, the British Empire and the
United States, will have to be somewhat mixed up together in some of their affairs for
mutual and general advantage. For my own part, looking out upon the future, I do not
view the process with any misgivings. I could not stop it if I wished; no one can stop it.
Like the Mississippi, it just keeps rolling along. Let it roll on full flood, inexorable,
irresistible, benignant, to broader lands and better days.233
For all of the glorious rhetoric of this address,234 Churchill exacerbated the divide between
Washington and London over the destroyers-for-bases question, which was now almost entirely driven by
political calculations. From the perspective of the War Cabinet, which discussed the proposed exchange
of letters on 21 August 1940, the bargain proposed by Washington was hardly a fair trade. Britain was
offering base facilities and a fleet assurance that were worth far more than 50 obsolete destroyers. It
233
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might be asked why, therefore, London was not obtaining a more substantial consideration, such as the
cancellation of its debt to the United States. Moreover, Britain had originally and freely offered the
United States limited base facilities before Washington offered a quid pro quo. Beyond that, if Britain
were to give the bases to the United States, then they could determine the extent and nature of the gift; if,
however, the bases were part of a deal, the United States might assume some prerogative over what they
received in return for their destroyers. Therefore, in his speech, Churchill described the offer of bases in
more politically defensible terms, as a gift graciously given to the United States.235
While Churchill attempted to overcome these problems with rhetoric, his speech only served to
sharpen the key political problem for Roosevelt; namely, that the United States could not accept the bases
on those terms.

The only way, legally and politically, for the Roosevelt administration to secure

congressional and military support for the deal was to maintain an explicit connection between bases and
destroyers, and to demonstrate, more to the point, that American security would be enhanced by the
receipt of the bases. In its efforts to sway Congress, the administration had to argue that the United States
was actually getting the better of the deal. On 22 August, for example, Roosevelt wrote Senator David
Walsh, chairman of the Naval Affairs Committee, and an inveterate Anglophobe, that the deal was of
“utmost importance to our national defense. After explaining what a great handicap America’s lack of
off-shore bases was to national security, he suggested that the deficiency could be “largely cured” by
trading the 50 destroyers, which were, the president stated, “on their last legs” for base rights in
Newfoundland, the Bahamas, Bermuda, St. Lucia, Trinidad, and St. Lucia.236
That same day, 22 August 1940, Churchill wrote the president, through Lothian, and made his
point equally explicit, that London wished to keep the two principal objects, the bases and the destroyers,
separate. The British government, he wrote, would like to “give you the facilities mentioned without
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stipulating for any return,” and opposed the exchange of letters that Lothian and Welles had discussed,
“or in admitting in any way that the munitions which you send us are a payment for the facilities.” He
concluded that he trusted the Americans to be generous in their provision of war matériel and saw no need
to bargain.237
That same afternoon, however, Sumner Welles told Lothian that the exchange of letters was the
only course, given the existing legislation requiring the Chief of Staff and the General Board of the Navy
to certify that the ships were not essential to American defense. Without such a certificate, Welles
reiterated, the transfer could not be made legally except in return for a definite assurance from London
that could be certified as adding to the security of the United States. He further implied that more delay
might doom the whole project. Consequently, on 23 August, Lothian sent five telegrams to London,
reporting that the Americans did not like Churchill’s proposal to separate the two objects and insisted that
they stick to the exchange of letters idea. Lothian supported the American argument and described
Welles’ view as representative of “realities.” From the American point of view, it was no longer
politically possible to separate the questions of the bases and the destroyers; they were now inevitably and
indelibly connected.

Furthermore, Churchill’s speech now made public the fact that Britain had

considered the question of giving naval and air bases to the United States. The exchange of letters,
therefore, would be regarded more or less as a legal appendage. He further urged Churchill to agree,
since otherwise, Britain might lose the destroyers. In the long run, Lothian stressed, Britain and the
United States were now beginning to organize the joint defense of North America. Most significant, the
United States was beginning to help in the defense of Britain by the transfer of the destroyers, although
such a transfer was technically an act of war. Lothian pressed upon Cadogan that there was no alternative
to Roosevelt’s proposed method of procedure: “this was the only possible course.”238
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Churchill, however, remained adamantly opposed to an exchange of letters. He feared that if
Britain agreed to provide the United States with ambiguous rights to British bases, the Americans might
expect more than Britain was prepared to give. Churchill was sufficiently incensed that the Americans,
who had made Britain a “definite gift, [were] haggling over the extent of ours,” he claimed that “if
necessary he could do without the American destroyers.” After all, by the end of the year, with its
accelerating naval construction, Britain would be in a perfectly safe position. “Dare say he is right,”
Cadogan noted in his diary.239
The Foreign Office put these considerations to Lothian, with orders to make no reply until he had
received a message that Churchill was drafting for the president. The prime minister, however, remained
hesitant to draft his response. Lothian therefore pressed Churchill on the urgency of replying to the
president, who was, at the same time, becoming increasingly annoyed by London’s inaction.240 On 24
August, Lothian wired Cadogan, “fussing for P.M.’s message.” Cadogan explained that there was a hitch
and that Churchill in fact had decided not to send the message that night.241 The next day, 25 August,
after Lothian sent another telegram, “urging P.M. to send reply,” Churchill finally agreed to give way to
the Americans on procedure; Cadogan telegraphed the prime minister’s response to Lothian that
afternoon.242 In his own telegram, however, Churchill continued to object to the contractual nature of the
American proposal, and continued to insist on defining the British offer of bases as a “gift” lest he
provide the United States with what he referred to as a “blank cheque on the whole of our Trans-Atlantic
possessions.”243 The reality, however, as Lothian recognized and Churchill did not, was that by this point
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Britain was no longer in a position to bargain. If Britain wanted the destroyers, it had to conclude a
fundamentally lopsided agreement.
Lothian met with Hull and Roosevelt on the same day Churchill sent his wire and, reflecting the
spirit of the prime minister’s message, suggested that the matter be treated as a mutual gesture of
friendship with gifts exchanged all around. Hull explained that the president could not accept gifts, and
Roosevelt stated flatly that, in order to appease Congress and the Navy, the administration would need
something more precise than a “bare declaration” that Britain intended to provide some bases to the
United States. He also rather indelicately pointed out that there might be a “change of Government in
Britain,” which would presumably render the base declaration meaningless. After reiterating that there
would have to be some connection made between the destroyers and the bases, the president turned the
matter over to Hull.

The next day, in fact, 26 August 1940, one of Hull’s advisers in the State

Department, Green H. Hackworth, proposed what would become the ultimate solution: split the deal and
make some bases a gift and trade the rest for the destroyers. This would enable the Americans to claim
that they were making a great hardheaded bargain, and the British to claim that they were being generous,
while at the same time maintaining the fleet assurance, which was of primary importance to the United
States government.244
On the evening of 27 August 1940, the same day that Attorney General Robert Jackson officially
ruled that the president had the legal right to act by executive order, thereby removing the final potential
legislative roadblock, Lothian met with Hull and Knox, and tried to revise the draft agreement. Hull
wanted to conclude the deal with the least possible delay, before isolationists and congressional critics
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realized that Britain would have offered the bases without the destroyers. He told Lothian that Admiral
Stark was disturbed “at the possibility of being summoned before Congress to explain why he had given
his certificate that the destroyers were not necessary for the defence of the United States when he is
transferring them at once as against a promise to deliver naval bases and facilities at some time in the
future.” Although he suggested to Lothian that a storm of protest was brewing over its dubious legality, it
took more than an hour of argument to convince the ambassador that the United States government could
not accept gifts. Lothian finally agreed to urge London to accept the American draft.245
The War Cabinet discussed the new drafts at their meeting on 29 August 1940. Although
Churchill continued to argue for describing all the bases as gifts, given “in friendship and good will,”
Halifax ultimately prevailed upon the prime minister to see that the real benefits from the arrangement lay
in the intangible demonstration of solidarity between the two nations. Consequently, Churchill finally
accepted the drafts of letters that Lothian had prepared, and thus the American plan. The War Cabinet
wrote to Lothian that, while they would have preferred a transaction on the “no deal” basis, they
understood the difficulties on the American side and greatly appreciated the efforts made by the
administration to meet the British point of view.246
With the receipt of the War Cabinet’s acceptance, Lothian, Hull, and Knox met on 29 August
1940 and quickly reached final agreement. Churchill formally offered 99-year leases for naval and air
bases in Newfoundland, Bermuda, the Bahamas, several West Indian islands, and British Guiana. Britain
presented two bases as gifts, and the rest as quid pro quo for the destroyers. An exchange of aidemémoire made public between 29 August and 2 September formalized the vital fleet assurance, in which
Lothian pledged that Britain would never sink or surrender its fleet. Lothian and Hull signed the essential
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documents regarding the bases at seven o’clock on the evening of 2 September 1940, and Admiral Stark
signed the release for the destroyers the next day.247 The ceremony having been completed, Lothian and
Derick Hoyer Millar, the Head of Chancery at the British Embassy and who had been very closely
involved in the negotiations, returned with some sense of satisfaction to the Embassy, where they
received a delayed telegram from Churchill, directing that certain verbal changes be made in the text of
the agreement. Wheeler-Bennett recalled that Lothian, “with what I conceive to be a certain relish, for he
considered that the negotiations had already been dragged out too long,” sent the prime minister a short
response: “Sorry: too late.”248
Significance: Lothian Helps to Bake the “Sugar Cake”
The successful conclusion of the destroyers-for-bases exchange inspired varying interpretations.
Sir Frederick Whyte, the former head of the Ministry of Information’s American Department, suggested
that the deal justified the value of Britain’s publicity policy. On the other extreme, Max Beaverbrook, the
Minister of Aircraft production, asserted that the deal demonstrated London’s capacity for hard
bargaining in the face of an American talent for extortion.249

Many in Britain very likely shared

Beaverbrook’s cynicism, given that, even in this moment of Anglo-American accord, President Roosevelt
maneuvered for political advantage. After some last-minute discussion about how to handle the public
announcement of the fleet assurance, Lothian and Hull apparently agreed that they would not disclose the
assurance until after the destroyer transfer was made public, lest any mishandling of the matter affect the
presidential election. Lothian, therefore, strongly urged the prime minister not to say that he intended the
transfer of bases to be a free gesture of goodwill because this statement might trigger partisan political
attacks, on the grounds that Roosevelt had acted without obtaining the consent of Congress, and that the
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transfer of the destroyers was an act of war calculated to involve the United States in the European
conflict.250 At approximately the same time, however, as Lothian and Hull were signing the documents in
Washington, the president held a press conference, during which he made the connection explicit.
Although London had hoped that the president would not emphasize that aspect of the deal, Roosevelt in
fact pointedly called the fleet assurance to the reporters’ attention. The New York Times dispelled any
anticipation that the American media would soft-pedal the announcement by proclaiming in bold
headlines: “ROOSEVELT TRADES DESTROYERS FOR SEA BASES / TELLS CONGRESS HE
ACTED ON OWN AUTHORITY / BRITAIN PLEDGES NEVER TO YIELD OR SINK FLEET.” The
article further reported that the United States had received a “solemn pledge” from the British government
“not to scuttle or surrender the British Fleet under any conditions.”251
Initially, neither side gained much from the agreement. It took months of argument to specify the
sites for the American bases, and by the end of 1940, only nine of the 50 aged destroyers were fit for
active service with the Royal Navy.252 In the meantime, while Britain’s needs remained dire, Lothian and
Arthur Purvis of the British Purchasing Commission in Washington D.C. realized that there would be
virtually no realistic hope of any further American aid that year.253
Nevertheless, the consummation of the destroyers-for-bases exchange fundamentally tied Britain
and the United States closer together. In spite of the haggling over points of detail, and in spite of the
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atmosphere of cooperation that the agreement ultimately fostered, perhaps the most important
consequence of the transaction was the process of bargaining itself. After four months of negotiations, in
which both London and Washington engaged in considerable maneuvering to gain advantage, both sides
realized that they were not playing a zero-sum game; something gained by one side did not automatically
detract from the other’s security. For most Britons, the agreement represented a decidedly unneutral act
by the United States; a fact of life that was perfectly understood by most. “It would be impossible,” the
New York Times reported from London, “to overstate the jubilation in official and unofficial circles
caused today by President Roosevelt’s announcement that fifty United States destroyers were coming to
help Great Britain in her hour of peril.”

The process and the agreement, therefore, represented a

significant step away from the formal, detached, and periodically adversarial nature of the AngloAmerican relationship, and toward a closer, integrated wartime alliance.
At the same time, the Axis powers also understood the deal as an unexpected military turning
point. Hitler, who had long discounted the participation of the United States, wrote Mussolini that they
had to regard American intervention in the war “as a possibility to be faced any day now.” The German
navy was particularly concerned, and appreciated that the acquisition of British bases advanced the air
and naval frontiers of the United States “along a wide arc into the Atlantic Ocean.” Grand Admiral Rader
therefore urged Hitler to launch pre-emptive moves into Gibraltar and the Canaries, fearing that the
United States would soon enter the war and occupy the Spanish and Portuguese islands in the Atlantic,
“in an attempt to influence and if necessary take over the French West African colonies.”
Consequently, Churchill thought the deal could be presented as a British victory worth far more
than its face value. As he told his colleagues, they had exchanged “a bunch of flowers for a sugar cake.”
He likely considered the destroyers-for-bases exchange as a down payment on further aid, as he
presumably was not referring to the 50 decrepit destroyers, some of which barely made it across the
Atlantic, when he spoke of a “sugar cake.”254
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Lothian also described the destroyers-for-bases agreement as an event of historic significance. In
spite of the one-sided nature of the agreement, he wrote, it would nevertheless strengthen the defensive
security both of the United States and the British Commonwealth: “The fifty destroyers will help the
British Navy to prevent invasion and the blockade of Britain and to keep Hitler’s and Mussolini’s fleets
out of the Atlantic. The transfer of bases provides a final line of defense for the Americas in the
extremely improbable event of the British navy’s no longer being able to plug the exits from Europe into
the Atlantic.”255 With the conclusion of the deal, Lothian asserted, the United States at last accepted the
argument that the British Fleet represented America’s outer line of defense; in order to strengthen this
line, Washington contributed destroyers. In a similar way, Britain at last recognized that the British
transatlantic islands represented a significant line of America’s defense; in order to strengthen this line,
London offered base facilities. Moreover, he maintained, the deal would make for excellent propaganda
on both sides of the Atlantic, particularly after the Admiralty decided to name the destroyers after towns
common to both countries.256
Lothian played a vital role in forging the agreement. Roosevelt and Churchill clearly preferred to
work through Lothian rather than Joseph Kennedy, who was not only defeatist and pessimistic, but whose
embassy had undergone a security breach in May 1940.257 Roosevelt indeed provided only a minimum of
information during the negotiations to Kennedy, who did not learn the full details until after the
conclusion of the deal. Kennedy was furious and complained to Roosevelt:
When I consider the amount of information that the British Government has made
available to Lothian and the paucity of background information furnished on matters of
vital importance to me, I can find no common sense explanation. If it were not for the
fact that the Prime Minister has seen fit to send some cables . . . I would have no
knowledge of the matter whatsoever.
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If the situation in Britain were not so desperate, Kennedy suggested, he would have resigned his post
immediately and returned home.258
While Lothian tended to be at his best in helping to smooth out difficulties, as well as interpreting
the motives and views of the two parties, he nevertheless assumed a central role in facilitating and
expediting the negotiations. It was Lothian, after all, who took the initiative following the collapse of
France, by revisiting his own 23 May 1940 proposal to offer the United States base facilities on British
possessions in the Western Hemisphere. It was Lothian who worked, through his contacts with prointerventionist and pro-British pressure groups in the United States, to shape a political atmosphere that
made it easier and safer for the Roosevelt administration to take action -- especially his surreptitious
providing of sensitive naval information to the Century Group, apparently without the knowledge or,
presumably, the approval of Whitehall. The data provided by Lothian undoubtedly helped to focus
attention on the real gravity of Britain’s predicament. In the end, the information likely helped to create a
far more favorable reception when the deal was announced on 3 September 1940. It was Lothian who
relentlessly pushed Churchill to write the president, on 31 July, the “most moving statement of our needs
and dangers.” It was Lothian who hammered out the final details with Sumner Welles and Cordell Hull.
After all was settled, the War Cabinet complimented Lothian on his handling of the whole affair.
Sir Frederick Whyte wrote a letter of congratulations “on your handling of the matter, and . . . everyone
here is delighted at the result and the manner you have paved the way for it [sic].”259 In a personal minute
to Halifax, on 5 September 1940, Churchill praised Lothian and asked, “Would it not be well to send a
telegram to Lord Lothian expressing War Cabinet approval of the manner in which he handled the whole
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destroyer question, and paying him a compliment?”260 Consequently, the next day, 6 September, Halifax
wired the ambassador:
On behalf of the War Cabinet I desire to express to you the warm appreciation of His
Majesty’s Government at the successful outcome of the negotiations which terminated on
the 2nd of September. The credit for this agreement, so important for the future of AngloAmerican relations, is due in no small measure to the skill and patience which you have
displayed throughout the negotiations, as also to the unique position which you have
succeeded in establishing both as regards the United States Administration and public.261
Lothian’s activities, particularly those that were designed to sell the deal to the American public,
demonstrated again his awareness of how American policy-making operated. While he intended his
public addresses to initiate “ripples of discussion” among opinion-leaders, and while he sought to
cultivate strong relations with the American media to unwittingly do London’s publicity, by the summer
of 1940, Lothian appreciated that Britain would not get American help simply through emotional appeals
and warnings. Moreover, because many Americans remained suspicious of “perfidious Albion” and its
inevitable propaganda, Lothian continued seeking to convince Americans by hard objective facts that
assistance was really needed.262
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CHAPTER SIX: LAYING THE FOUNDATIONS FOR LEND-LEASE
The fall of 1940 brought a momentary lull to the Second World War. By early October, it
became increasingly obvious that the Royal Air Force had repulsed Germany’s attempt to establish air
mastery over Britain. In one respect, German air losses continued to be prohibitive. Furthermore, instead
of the anticipated disintegration of British morale, Londoners demonstrated that they could “take it.” As a
result, in the middle of September 1940, Hitler decided to abandon the Battle of Britain and postpone
Operation Sea Lion indefinitely, although, as the Luftwaffe shifted to night bombing, German bombing of
British cities continued on, also indefinitely. At the same time, the autumn likewise brought a lull to
Anglo-American diplomacy. In the United States, as it appeared less and less likely that Hitler would
order an invasion of Britain that year, Americans turned their attention back to domestic politics, namely,
to the impending presidential election on 5 November 1940. It gradually became clear to the British,
therefore, that unless Japan forced the issue, no decisive action or initiative could be expected from the
United States until after the election.
Yet, Britain remained in great danger. Britain, alone, was still on the defensive, and its survival
still in question, dependent upon its ability to repel what London believed to be an inevitable German
advance into the Mediterranean and, more immediately, to counter the continuing U-boat assaults on
British commerce. Indeed, in the fall of 1940, Nazi Germany began moving the war to the peripheries,
the Atlantic Ocean in particular. This move, in the long run, posed an even greater threat to the survival
and security of Britain. If Germany could deny Britain essential imports of food, raw materials, and
munitions, it might defeat Britain without the need for a direct invasion. Over three days in October, for
example, 33 ships, including twenty ships out of one convoy, were sunk by U-boats in their approaches to
the British Islands. Irish neutrality, which denied the Royal Navy the use of ports and bases in southern
Ireland, exacerbated this situation by forcing the British to route their convoys to the north of Ireland.1
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In the fall of 1940, Britain had only one realistic hope of survival and of victory, and that lay with
the United States. Because the United States had become Britain’s major external source of material help,
supply and finance became the critical issues in Anglo-American relations over the winter of 1940-1941.
Like many other British leaders, Lothian grew increasingly concerned about Britain’s impending inability
to continue paying for the munitions and essential civil supplies that it had to purchase from the United
States. Consequently, he initiated steps to address the supply and finance questions. In doing so, Lothian
helped to push the Roosevelt administration toward the Lend-Lease program.
Selling the Drama, Continued
By the late fall 1940, American public opinion had become increasingly pro-British. The nation’s
hatred for Hitler had gradually become transformed into an increasingly overt sympathy for Britain, a
transformation borne out by public opinion polls. In May 1940, when Gallup asked, “Do you think the
United States should keep out of war or do everything possible to help England even at the risk of getting
into war ourselves?” a majority favored continued isolation. In November, however, American opinion
evenly divided on the question. By December, a full 60 percent were willing to risk war.2 Therefore, on
21 October, Halifax informed the War Cabinet of “an almost miraculous change of opinion in the United
States after it had become clear that the country was effectively resisting the German air attack.” A
month later, Lothian wrote Lady Astor that there was “an overwhelming sentiment for giving us all
immediate assistance short of war.”3
In part, this transformation was due to the efforts and the courageous bearing of the British
leadership. When Harold Ickes and others listened to Churchill on 15 September, following a devastating
German attack on London that day, he noted that there was no sign of weakness in Churchill’s voice as he
warned Britons that, although the worst was still to come, Britain would defend itself: “I am more and
more impressed,” Ickes wrote, “that Churchill is a really great leader.” He attended a dinner at the British
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Embassy that same evening and was “tremendously impressed with the self-control of these Britishers.
One would not have realized from their talk and actions that London was being subjected to the most
terrible bombardment in its history and that England was fighting for its very life. . . . Lothian remarked
that two of his houses had been destroyed by bombs that day or the day before and [another guest Lord
Melchett, a British industrialist] took it as if reference had been made to the loss of a game of cricket.”4
More important, however, much of the credit for the “miraculous change of opinion” involved the
power of popular culture. The medium of radio significantly helped to transform American opinion,
particularly as Whitehall liberalized its broadcasting restrictions. The stirring broadcasts of American
radio correspondents, including Edward R. Murrow and Eric Sevareid, who were ultimately allowed to
provide live commentary during German air raids, presented the American people with the genuine
sounds of war; as Sevareid later recalled, they “chilled the spine of America.”5 Radio news broadcasts
alone, however, did not fuel greater American sympathy for Britain. Although many radio stations in the
United States banned war songs, British patriotic music could be heard almost everywhere. In December
1940, Sir William Ridsdale, the deputy-director of the Foreign Office News Department, noted such a
marked increase in pro-British feeling running through the United States, that “even strip-tease dancers
discard their brassieres and what-have-yous to the tune of ‘There’ll always be an England.’”6 Likewise, a
long published poem, “The White Cliffs,” by Alice Duer Miller, achieved phenomenal success. It
described an American’s love for Britain, its villages, people, and history -- and of her willingness to send
her only son to die to preserve it.7 The dramatic news from the war coincided with a wave of pro-British,
interventionist movies. The most powerful and influential was Foreign Correspondent, co-produced by
Walter Wanger and Alfred Hitchcock, which opened the same week that Murrow gave one of his most
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dramatic live broadcasts from Trafalgar Square, and reached most theaters in early September, the very
week that the Germans began the Blitz on London. As a result, these films provided a fertile cultural
environment for the news reports from Britain. American audiences frequently watched such movies
with the latest newsreel from London fresh in their minds, and returned home to hear the same war live on
their 9:00 radio news.8
This evident upsurge of American popular support for Britain, however, did not translate into
significant material assistance.

In spite of growing donations and contributions made by private

American citizens and relief organizations, such as “Bundles for Britain” and the American Red Cross,
the United States government sent no further aid. Even after the Battle of Britain, there persisted serious
doubts in Washington as to Britain’s ability to survive. While Roosevelt’s leading cabinet advisers
became convinced that the time had come more aggressively to provide Britain with material aid, they
nevertheless hesitated to take firm action because of lingering doubts about Britain’s survival.
Administration doubts, moreover, reflected doubts expressed elsewhere. From London, Joseph Kennedy
remained outspoken in his belief that the British could not withstand the German attack and predicted that
even if they did, they would be so weakened, that they would be unable to help the United States against
the Axis. He further asserted that Britain had neither the leadership nor the productive capacity to
withstand the punishment continually meted out by the Germans. Breckinridge Long, an Assistant
Secretary of State, wrote in his diary that he expected Britain to give in to Germany. Former president
Herbert Hoover and Republican Senator Robert Taft proposed that the United States provide enough aid
to enable Britain to negotiate a better peace with the Germans.9
From the perspective of London, American remoteness was not simply frustrating; it was also
difficult to understand. In part, the British blamed the Roosevelt administration’s reticence on the
8
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impending election. Some, however, pointed to a sense of complacency that began to spread as it became
clear that the Germans were not going to invade Britain. Many more, however, attributed Washington’s
continuing detachment to the limits of the American public’s understanding of the war. While some
admitted that part of the blame rested with the British government, which had never clearly specified its
own war aims, others argued that the American press had either ignored or forgotten the broader issues of
the war. Lothian in particular believed this to be a side effect of the new and much looser reporting
restrictions. The American media’s license to cover the Blitz, he argued, as well as the experience of
being caught up in it, had ensured that Americans were fixated on nothing but the bombing of London:
“As a matter of fact we are suffering a little from the greater freedom they have been given at the moment
because most of them have become so obsessed with the bombing of London . . . that they cable about
nothing else.” He concluded that “It gives a wonderful reputation for courage but tends to put the war out
of perspective.”10
Consequently, during the fall of 1940, amid American inactivity, British officials began to take
steps to launch a more full-scale publicity and propaganda campaign in the United States. Specifically,
London began to establish the institutional machinery necessary to expand such publicity efforts.
Although official efforts initially bogged down in the continuing interdepartmental rivalry, Lothian
played a central role in the creation of the two most important institutions: the Inter-Allied Information
Committee [IAIC] and the British Press Service [BPS].
Lothian had tried to launch the IAIC in the spring of 1940 -- when he sought to fund and direct
the propaganda efforts within the United States of the smaller Allied nations. In late September 1940,
Lothian resurrected this idea. He sought to make use of fresh voices, those of Britain’s allies, such as the
Czechs and the Poles, which could promote the Allied cause within the United States without offending
American sensibilities. In Lothian’s view, the IAIC would enable London to counteract the danger posed
by anti-British propaganda currently emanating from France. Lothian had noted the establishment of a
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French section within the German consulate in New York, and he suspected that Britain’s former ally
would soon be “reading from a German script.” In order to offset that possibility, he proposed that
Britain direct the Free French news and propaganda through the IAIC:
Essential that we should maintain an Allied publicity front as the Germans are losing no
time in exploiting Anglo-French differences and certain Americans are taking every
opportunity for their own political reasons of decrying British ability to speak for the
other Allies.
Lothian added that any loss of contact between Allied groups in the United States would therefore place
Britain at a grave disadvantage.”11
Lothian’s initiatives, however, drew a mixed reception in London. Duff Cooper, who still felt
that he should control all publicity activity, argued that it would “a mistake” to set up such a bureau.
While he worried, for one thing, that the expense for the bureau would fall on the Ministry of
Information, Cooper was more concerned that he would not be in control: “Such assistance we may
obtain from such allies as remain might prove more embarrassing than helpful. . . . If it were to be really
inter-Allied, it would, I suppose, necessitate consultation with the governments of Poland, Norway,
Holland and Belgium -- an obvious waste of time.” In the meantime, while Halifax found the notion of
cooperating with the Free French rather appalling, he nevertheless did not want to rule out close
collaboration with the Dutch, Poles, and Czechs, who, he pointed out to Cooper, would not necessarily
“require previous consultation with their Governments.”12
The Foreign Office, however, approved,13 and the Inter-Allied Information Committee began
operations on 24 September 1940 under Michael Huxley, formerly the British Embassy press attaché.
Lothian had originally hoped to use the Allied representatives to address their own national minorities
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within the United States, quietly turning the Polish-Americans of Pittsburgh, for example, into a fifth
column for the British cause. Huxley nevertheless proceeded to transform the IAIC into a steady public
news office and center for its member states to address their common concerns for the future of Europe.
In such a way, the IAIC helped to defuse the image of Britain fighting alone and exclusively for its
Empire. By 1941, it provided an ever-widening stream of information on the resistance movements in
Europe and began working directly with the interventionist groups, helping the White Committee, for
example, to launch its own news service devoted to Allied issues.14
In addition to the IAIC, Lothian played an equally central role in the establishment of the British
Press Service, which also effectively promoted Britain and its cause within the United States. On 6
September 1940, at approximately the same time that the Blitz was beginning, the Ministry of
Information held meetings in London in order to discuss a proposal for a new propaganda bureau in New
York City, which presumably would enable Cooper to maintain control over British propaganda activities
in the United States. Duff Cooper presided and Wheeler-Bennett flew in from New York to represent
Lothian’s position. The proposal had been developed in August by Stephen Lawford Childs, Cooper’s
original choice to oversee the founding of a Ministry of Information office in New York.15 Lothian, as it
turned out, exercised much influence on the formulation of Child’s proposal. First, while the Foreign
Office had appointed Childs to oversee the bureau, theoretically under the direction of the Ministry of
Information, in fact, his functions came under the control of the British Embassy. Second, although
appointed by Cooper, Childs had quickly embraced the ambassador’s vision of a British Embassy press
agency in New York City; he quickly took charge of the embassy’s dealings with the Ministry of
Information in London, as well as with the American press corps in Washington D.C. The outstanding
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feature of his proposal was the establishment of an office in New York City, as an annex to the British
Embassy in Washington, under Child’s direction, which would oversee British publicity organization and
activity in the United States.16
The result was the birth, in October 1940, of the British Press Service. Lothian envisioned the
BPS as the nerve center of British publicity in the United States. It would cultivate connections and
relationships with American newspaper and radio commentators, issue “hot news” and features, refute
enemy propaganda, and build links with religious organizations and organized labor. He took particular
care that even the title of the new organization fit these objectives. For example, he consciously avoided
the word “relations,” which, he argued, had “fallen into some disrepute when used in connection with
these sorts of activities,” and principally because the word reminded Americans of their own
government’s “rash of public relations departments.” He chose, instead, “service,” explaining that “the
word ‘service’ produces a benevolent reaction in America. We do not wish to be accused of making overt
plans to ‘influence’ the press; although of course it is quite understood that the organisation will specialise
in ‘relations’ rather than acting as a spot news agency.”17 Furthermore, Lothian intended that the BPS
would avoid secret “whispering campaigns” in order to introduce subversive rumors into the population at
large, which had been a practice long favored by British agents, mingling in bars and thoroughfares.
Instead, the BPS would primarily be responsible for surveying the American press. In order to do so,
Lothian used the former BLINY Survey Section as the core of the BPS, whose staff he recruited
wholesale. Because it was made up of personnel who already knew and were familiar to the New York
press establishment, and because it opened an office on the forty-fourth floor of the RCA Building, 30
Rockefeller Plaza, near the offices of NBC, CBS, numerous New York City newspapers, and wire
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services, the British Press Service very quickly became a popular institution for the conduct of British
public relations in the United States.18
In deference to the impending presidential election, work began cautiously. From the beginning,
the BPS sought to provide reference material for editors, correspondents, and radio commentators. It
prepared information bulletins based on Ministry of Information material and arranged transport to
Britain for Americans seeking to cover the war. Equally significant, the office came to serve as the
primary point of contact between the British government and the American pro-interventionist movement.
Aubrey Morgan and Wheeler-Bennett maintained close contact with their opposite numbers in the
Century Group at least once a week by telephone, providing them with a steady stream of BPS news
releases, as well as confidential briefings on the latest material from London.19
In the meantime, the BPS confronted bureaucratic delays and interdepartmental rivalries. For
example, the Foreign Office reacted unfavorably and the Treasury inevitably raised obstacles. The most
important difficulties, however, came from the Ministry of Information. Neither Duff Cooper nor Angus
Fletcher, the director of the BLINY, was entirely happy with the BPS. Fletcher did not appreciate being
outflanked by Lothian and refused to help the new office. Cooper in the meantime still wanted to bring
the entire publicity and propaganda operation under his control from London and, if necessary, impose his
views on “local representatives,” prompting T. North Whitehead of the Foreign Office to quip that
George III made the same mistake.20 On 18 September 1940, therefore, even before Lothian had set up
the BPS, Cooper announced his intentions to establish a Public Relations Officer and a Press Relations
Office, both in New York City, and ensure “that these officers . . . should have a large measure of
independence.” In response, Lothian testily cabled the Ministry of Information that, while he certainly
appreciated Cooper’s concern for quick action between London and New York, he nevertheless insisted
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that it “be understood that in all questions of policy or in matters of political importance the New York
organisation must be under my general guidance and control.”21 On 24 September, however, Lothian
received a copy of telegram sent to Childs by Douglas Williams, the new director of the Ministry’s
American Division, announcing that the Ministry intended to send certain journalists to New York City to
serve as “our direct press contact.” Consequently, on 26 September, Lothian acerbically reiterated that
“no person, journalist or otherwise, be sent with such mission without my approval,” stressing that
Cooper’s designs threatened to create confusion, through overlapping and divided responsibilities:
It is most important at this juncture to avoid misunderstanding, confusion and criticism,
which will inevitably ensue if during the election period persons are sent out to this
country whose activities do not form part of properly co-ordinated controlled and agreed
scheme.22
The Ministry assured the ambassador on 30 September that “nothing will be done without fully
consulting your views,” and that, in fact, they intended to send only one journalist to New York.23
Specifically, Cooper appointed René MacColl as “Chief British Press Relations Officer in the United
States.”24 Lothian responded with another furious telegram. He complained to Cooper on 4 October that
“I had asked that at this stage and during the electoral period, every effort should be made to avoid
publicity about the new organizations to be set up here in fulfilment [sic] of the plans agreed to between
us. I had also asked that the use of the word ‘relations’ in any description for public consumption of New
York organization should be avoided. Furthermore, it had always been agreed that no appointments
21
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should be made without my being consulted.” And now, that same day, 4 October, Lothian wrote that he
had received a telegram from Douglas Williams, requesting that the ambassador approach William Allen
White in order to establish a telephone link between his committee and the Ministry of Information.
Lothian angrily asserted that, “It would be most disastrous to the William Allen White Committee were it
ever to be established that it was communicating and collaborating with any branch of His Majesty’s
Government.” This was a charge currently being made by German propagandists and isolationists: “The
enemy is already organizing the ‘America First’ committee to counter [the] William Allen White
movement.” Lothian indicated that this recent volley of telegrams had ever more alerted him to prevent
London from taking any measure that would cause “further damage” to British publicity. He asked the
Ministry to postpone MacColl’s arrival until after the election and to instruct him to accept duties under
the acting director, Alan Dudley.25
Perhaps taken aback by the aggressiveness of Lothian’s response, Cooper apologized for the
misunderstanding caused by the telegraph transmission problems and the timing of announcements.
More important, he conceded the ambassador’s principal points; primarily, he reappointed MacColl to
serve as “assistant director” of the BPS, with responsibility for the supply of news to the American press
and broadcast networks -- although not without at first receiving a nudge from Halifax.26
In this growing bureaucratic turf war between the ambassador and the Minister of Information,
the Foreign Office clearly came down on the side of Lothian. According to John Balfour, the head of the
Foreign Office’s American Department, the underlying objective of the Ministry of Information was
presumably to acquire as much and as complete control of publicity in the United States as they could,
and for this purpose, dissociate Childs from Washington and the BLINY from the Foreign Office. “This
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tinkering about with the machinery whilst the blitzkrieg is in full progress makes one despair of the
Ministry, who would be much better advised to fall in with Lord Lothian’s plans.” Six weeks later,
Balfour noted that the whole episode “savors of an amateurish intrigue” on the part of the Ministry of
Information and Duff Cooper to “set up a rival channel of communication” to Lothian and Childs: “I fear
that Mr. Duff Cooper has all along wished to establish such an independent channel of communication
with the Ministry and wishes, in spite of professions in the Ministry’s telegrams to the contrary, to ignore
the views on this subject of the man on the spot.” It is obvious, as Lothian had pointed out, that “the
presence in the United States of persons engaged in British publicity whose activities are not subject to
centralised control” can only lead to misunderstanding and confusion, overlapping and divided
responsibility.27 On 9 October, Balfour met with Williams who spoke somewhat bitterly about the whole
incident, pleading that he had only tried “to get a move on as a journalist in arranging that a qualified
journalist should be appointed in New York, which Lord Lothian himself recommended months ago.”
Balfour, in no uncertain terms, scorched Mr. Williams:
I said that, whilst fully appreciating his zeal, I had formed the conclusion from combing
through the past correspondence that he had handled matters with a lack of precision and
in a way which certainly justified Lord Lothian’s vigorous reaction . . . I pointed out that
he had proceeded in a way which gave the impression that the Ministry were attempting
to set up an independent channel of communication regardless of the wishes of the man
on the spot and without consulting him, and that the announcement of Mr. MacColl’s
appointment on the 18th September, which he attempted later to explain away . . . was a
particularly inept performance. I also left him in no doubt that he had been extremely
amateurish in even suggesting to Lord Lothian that the Ministry should be allowed to
establish a direct channel of communication with the Allen White Committee.28
In a further minute to Halifax, David Scott asserted that the Foreign Office should back Lothian:
In the hope of getting their own way, [the Ministry of Information] eventually sent out
Mr. Childs; but he is regarded by them as having gone over to the enemy because he has
decided to have his headquarters in Washington instead of New York. They therefore
now wish to send out another man, Mr. McColl [sic], whom they want to put at the head
of the whole of Mr. Childs’ organization in New York. Lord Lothian is unwilling to
agree to this, because it would not fit in with Mr. Child’s carefully planned scheme,
27
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would create difficulties with the people already working in New York, and would be
misrepresented in the United States as the first step in the creation of a new propaganda
organization. We should support Lord Lothian strongly against the Ministry of
Information on this question.29
By this point, indeed, Lothian was in a very strong position. He had used Ministry funds to set up
the IAIC. He commanded the loyalty of Childs and Wheeler-Bennett, as well as an expansionist faction
within the BLINY, which wanted to streamline its organizational structure, expand its staff, and thus
provide for rapid and efficient replies to enquiries from American newspapers and radio.30
In the meantime, MacColl arrived in the United States on 19 November 1940, believing himself
empowered to take charge of the BPS. He discovered very quickly, however, that the staff at the BPS did
not acknowledge Duff Cooper’s authority to have appointed him; Lothian himself also saw MacColl,
momentarily at least, as a threat to the BPS. As a result, the situation became “increasingly delicate on
account of phraseology in MacColl’s letter of introduction.” MacColl endured about two weeks of
frustration during which his new colleagues withheld telegrams addressed to him as the “Director of the
BPS.” Consequently, on 30 November, Lothian wired Cooper and suggested that the Minister back off:
I now feel very strongly that press and publicity questions are at this juncture so
important that it would be unwise to do anything to disturb the smooth working of the
BPS and its satisfactory development. It would not, I feel, be part of wisdom to confide
its direction to a new arrival, however brilliant his journalistic gifts, who has not had time
to familiarise himself with the very complicated local situation involved, and who,
moreover, has had not in my view had the administrative experience to enable him to take
full charge of this organisation.
He asked Cooper to accept this arrangement as being in the “best interests of our cause.”31 As it turned
out, MacColl warmed to his responsibilities with style and dispatch. He established cordial relations not
only with the New York press world, but within the BPS as well. His humor, commitment to the BPS,
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and disregard for Foreign Office procedure quickly won over his office mates. As a result, British
relations with the New York press began to prosper as never before. By early 1941, the BPS was stable
and a popular organization for the conduct of British public relations in the United States, functioning
effectively as a news agency, providing reliable, free, and generally British stories and photographs, and
working to create, as Lothian had envisioned, an ever-growing demand for its services.32
The ultimate reason for the success of the BPS, however, was Lothian. According to WheelerBennett, not only did Lothian take the initial step to establishing “this compact and smoothly functioning
machine,” which effectively “served the interests of Britain in America . . . for the remainder of the war,”
he also rescued it from the bureaucratic quagmire:
On his own initiative and authority, and disregarding the objections of London, he gave
instructions to rent new office premises and engage staff, cutting the Gordian knot of
finance by drawing upon official funds at his own immediate disposal. Faced with a fait
accompli, Whitehall capitulated unconditionally.
At a moment when it appeared that the BPS might disintegrate before it was fully functional, Lothian
took the type of action, which “made him such an inspiring chief to work for.”33
London Awaits the Fifth of November
From London’s perspective, arguably the most significant consideration that explained the
temporary lull in Anglo-American diplomacy during the fall of 1940 was the impending presidential
election on 5 November.

As a result of the campaign, the Roosevelt administration’s attention to

questions of American assistance to Britain became increasingly sidelined during the fall of 1940.
Although Churchill wrote the president several letters over the course of September and October,
appealing for further American aircraft, shipping, and munitions,34 and although Lothian appealed
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repeatedly for the initiation of staff talks, many aspects of the British war effort slid into a position of
suspended animation -- not just the major problems of supply and finance, but also plans to improve
British publicity and propaganda in the United States -- primarily because of the election.
For Lothian, therefore, the time seemed opportune to return to Britain for a brief working
vacation. He left Washington on 15 October 1940, arrived in London on 20 October, and remained in
Britain until 11 November. Although the United States army attaché in London, General Raymond Lee,
suspected that the ambassador had deliberately and cleverly arranged to be out of Washington during the
delicate election period,35 Lothian was simply taking his annual leave, which had been delayed by the
successive crises and tough negotiations of the previous months.36 Whitehall in fact would have preferred
him to have remained in Washington during the election. The Foreign Office wrote that the “present
situation in [the] Far East is so fluid and perhaps so critical that your absence from Washington at this
moment might be seriously embarrassing.” Sir Walter Layton, who had been in the United States since
September on the business of the Ministry of Supply, said that in the weeks before his return Lothian was
“at the very height of his powers. Everyone commented on the great job he was doing for England --even
those who in normal times would have been his political critics.” Even Victor Perowne had by this point
come to recognize Lothian’s value: “His direct advice will be most valuable to H.M.G. of course, but his
value to us in the U.S. is I venture to think even greater.” Commenting on the hazards of contemporary
air travel, Perowne suggested that Lothian take his vacation in America, on the grounds that it would be
“disastrous if anything were to befall” the ambassador on his journey, because he had become “our
greatest asset in our dealings with the one and only friend who can be of real use to us.”37
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Nevertheless, Lothian badly needed a vacation, having had only six days of real holiday since
taking up his post. In addition, Lothian also wanted to tend to his business affairs; he thus managed to
pay short visits to his estates at Blickling and Monteviot, as well as a weekend visit at Cliveden.38 The
principal reason for his visit, however, was to confer with the prime minister and to brief the Foreign
Office on American policy. He hoped to acquaint himself with the situation and mood in Britain, as well
as the current state of official policy. Consequently, he met not only with Churchill and Halifax, but with
the Chiefs of Staff, the Ministry of Economic Warfare, and the North American Supply Committee.39
The ambassador’s visit generally proved a great success. Although some in Whitehall continued
to maintain a relatively low opinion of him, skeptics were now in a distinct minority. Lothian was
welcomed home as a hero and a master of diplomacy at the highest level. The War Cabinet honored him
personally and Churchill recommended his name to King George VI for appointment as a Knight of the
Thistle, Scotland’s proudest order.40 To be sure, while many were struck by a profound change in his
character and outlook, Churchill in particular took notice:
I had known Philip Kerr, who had now succeeded as Marquess of Lothian, from the old
days of Lloyd George in 1919 and before, and we had differed much and often from
Versailles to Munich and later. As the tension of events mounted, not only did Lothian
develop a broad comprehension of the scene, but his eye penetrated deeply.41
It seemed to the prime minister that the events of the summer and fall of 1940 had matured Lothian. For
example, Churchill observed that, upon his return to London, the ambassador was deeply moved by the
bomb damage and by the courage of the British people. In his hotel room, indeed, he felt first-hand
experience of the Blitz, when a bomb blast blew the furniture across the floor of his bedroom. As a result,
Churchill later wrote, “Lord Lothian seemed to me a changed man”:
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In all the years I had known him, he had given me the impression of high intellectual and
aristocratic detachment from vulgar affairs. Airy, viewy, aloof, dignified, censorious, yet
in a light and gay manner, he had always been good company. Now, under the same
hammer that beat upon us all, I found an earnest, deeply stirred man. He was primed
with every aspect and detail of the American attitude. He had won nothing but goodwill
and confidence in Washington by his handling of the Destroyers-cum-Bases negotiations.
He was fresh from intimate contact with the President, with whom he had established a
warm personal friendship.42
Lothian in turn expressed a deeper respect and admiration for the prime minister: “Your speeches
have been magnificent,” he wrote in July 1940.43 Undeniably, the events of the summer and fall of 1940
reconciled Lothian and Churchill.
During their meetings, Lothian and Churchill spoke at length over a wide range of transatlantic
matters, from Ireland to the Far East, from propaganda to Latin American trade. In one respect, Lothian
was strongly in favor of doing everything possible to encourage the United States to enter the war. He did
not believe, as others did that an American entry into the war would necessarily diminish the supply of
American munitions to Britain, owing to Washington’s military requirements. Lothian maintained that,
as long as the United States remained neutral, American industrial output would remain limited;
American entry into the war, however, would certainly generate a dramatic explosion of American
industrial output, which implied a corresponding increase of Britain’s share of American supplies.
Therefore, he argued, the only way to be absolutely certain that the United States would provide Britain
“all the help in her power” was to always influence Washington “towards the more vigorous course.”44 In
addition, Lothian was also highly interested in pursuing the idea of a standing council in Washington
D.C., comprising the United States, the American republics, and the British Empire, which would seek to
maintain political and economic cooperation in war and peace.45
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Primarily, Lothian and Churchill focused upon the most fundamental and interconnected
problems of supply, shipping, and finance. First and most obviously, Britain continued to need a large
and guaranteed share of American raw materials and manufactured goods. In the second place, there
remained the question of how supplies could be safely transported to Britain. Over the summer of 1940,
Britain suffered a disastrous increase in merchant shipping losses, particularly as the Royal Navy became
responsible for patrolling the whole Mediterranean and the western approaches to the British Isles, as well
as the defense of home waters. Therefore, it was increasingly unable to provide anti-submarine escorts
for Atlantic convoys, except at the very beginning and the very end of voyages.46
In the third place, without question, Britain’s most supreme problem was finance. It had long
been understood, in official quarters on both sides of the Atlantic, that the time would ultimately come
when the British government would no longer have sufficient gold or dollars to pay for the munitions that
they were ordering under “cash and carry.” While Britain was not yet facing imminent or wholesale
bankruptcy,47 it was rapidly approaching a point where it would be unable to continue financing
purchases from the United States. From the outbreak of hostilities, through the Phoney War, Britain
financed its very limited American purchases by using its gold reserves. Following the German invasion
of the West, however, Britain had little choice but to abandon such caution and begin using up gold and
dollars in order to procure the utmost supply of arms from the United States. “We shall go on paying
dollars for as long as we can,” Churchill wrote Roosevelt on 15 May 1940, “but I should like to feel
reasonably sure that when we can pay no more you will give us the stuff all the same.”48
Over the summer of 1940, British payments of gold and dollars to the United States steadily
increased. For Whitehall, this became doubly troublesome, since an excessive drain on its gold and
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dollars threatened to eliminate the convertibility of sterling and, at the same time, badly disrupt British
supply lines within the Empire and to the neutrals. Therefore, on 3 July 1940, Lothian presented a formal
note about supply to the State Department. The note stated that Britain would pay as long as it could, but
that the British government felt that they should “in all frankness inform the United States government
that it will be utterly impossible for them to continue to do this for any indefinite period in view of the
scale on which they will need to obtain such resources from the United States.” In mid-July, however, he
reported to London that he had been given assurances in Washington that there was no need “to worry too
much” about dollars.49
Nevertheless, Sir Frederick Phillips, a senior Treasury official, visited Washington in July 1940 to
provide evidence of Britain’s tenuous financial situation. Over the course of four days in mid-July, in
meetings with Roosevelt and Henry Morgenthau, the Secretary of the Treasury, Phillips explained that
probably within six months, Britain would need significant help in realizing cash on its securities, and,
certainly not later than mid-1941, “massive assistance” in the form of American credits.50 Morgenthau,
who handled the bulk of the negotiations for the United States, never challenged Britain’s basic
conclusions and statistics. He did, however, ask Phillips to provide a balance sheet that precisely outlined
Britain’s financial relations with the rest of the world,51 and suggested that London should sell direct
British investments in America, such as Shell Oil, Brown and Williamson Tobacco, American Viscose,
Lever Brothers, and Dunlop Tire. He noted that this would not only bring in badly needed dollars, but
would also convince the American public of Britain’s good intentions.

Phillips, however, proved

reluctant to provide such material, especially fixed foreign assets that could only be sold in the United
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States.

Morgenthau, whose position was entirely supported by Roosevelt, noted that he had a

responsibility to American business, which had grown concerned about the ability of Britain to meet its
contracts. When Phillips complained that such forced sales of British-owned American investments
would severely damage Britain’s post-war economy, Morgenthau responded that it was no time to worry
about such matters.52 Although London endeavored to restrict spending in the United States only to
absolutely vital needs until the Roosevelt administration’s position was clear, Churchill and his supply
ministers agreed that Britain had no choice but to gamble that American aid would be more open and
forthcoming, and that Washington would help when British dollar resources were finally exhausted. By
late summer, large British orders for aircraft and tanks further depleted the reserves, and by mid-October,
the Treasury calculated that Britain would not be able to pay for its purchases after December 1940,53 a
position that Lothian reiterated in conversations with Stimson and Morgenthau in late September.54
By the fall of 1940, then, many in London began to conclude that that time had come to appeal to
the United States, for all-out assistance, once and for all. This group included Lothian, who subsequently
endeavored to take up the matter with Churchill while he was in Britain.55 In doing so, furthermore,
Lothian endeavored to push the prime minister to take action right now, in early November, in the midst
of the prevailing and seemingly interminable American inertia caused by its presidential election. During
the previous months, it had become patently clear that no significant political action would, or could, be
undertaken by the United States with respect to Britain’s supply needs, until after the election. After all,
both parties chose to play down evidence of close Anglo-American cooperation due to the election
campaign. Although Wendell Willkie was personally in favor of aid to Britain, any attempt to propose
more assistance than the Roosevelt administration was already giving would have undermined the
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tenuous unity of the Republican Party. This Republican opposition to more widespread aid virtually
guaranteed Roosevelt the support of the interventionists without having to promise bigger and better
programs of assistance to Britain. Furthermore, Morgenthau insisted that the Roosevelt campaign play
down Anglo-American cooperation for fear that the American public might learn the actual extent of
Britain’s money problems. Consequently, the president could -- and characteristically did -- assume a
safe, but conspicuously ambiguous position on aid, which enabled him to avoid alienating those who
preferred him to go slow.56
Within the British government, this American silence became a source of aggravation with the
United States, particularly after the frustrating negotiations over destroyers that summer. As a result of
the continuing detachment in Washington, the British responded in part with pin-pricks. For example,
London chose to curtail their sharing of secret, technical information, a process that had been initiated
only in the late summer. Accordingly, Lord Beaverbrook, the Minister of Aircraft Production,57 told the
Defence Committee on 29 October that Churchill was “inclined towards a stiffer attitude” with respect to
passing sensitive technical information or intelligence to the United States, on the grounds that “It will
almost certainly get back to Germany through indiscretion or some lurking enemy.”58 In a similar way,
Churchill told the War Cabinet on 21 November that the British government should proceed cautiously
with respect to the disclosure of secret information to Washington, as long as the United States remains
neutral. When Halifax said that it would be disastrous if the United States “got it into their heads that
London was treating them with a lack of confidence,” and suggested that Lothian discuss the position
quite frankly, Churchill responded by pointing out that “We should say that we did trust them,” but that
they must come to appreciate that “we were fighting for our lives, and that it followed that there was
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certain secret information which we could not possibly divulge.”59 Therefore, the British government
began to restrict the circulation of intelligence collected from the Enigma machine. Colville later recalled
that “The Free French, who were notoriously liable to leak, were not told the secret; nor, until shortly
before they came into the war, were the Americans who were thought to be only marginally better at
keeping secrets.”60
While many vented their frustration with the United States by favoring pin-pricks, many others
simply did not understand the American political process, which they found antiquated and confusing. In
the Foreign Office, for example, Alexander Cadogan sarcastically noted that “The Constitution is a
disaster,” while David Scott pointed out, almost incredulously, that “for the better part of a year the
functioning of the [American] political machine is hampered by election activities and no action can be
taken in the political field without very full consideration of its effect on the election.”61 Churchill
referred to it as America’s “quadrennial madness.”62 Even Lothian, who shared this irritation, described it
as “the most unreal election the world has ever seen.” Nevertheless, he conceded, London had no choice
but to await its conclusion.63 Therefore, on the significant question of finance, the British restrained
themselves from publicly requesting credits. For example, in a speech to the Associated Industries of
Massachusetts, in Boston on 17 October 1940, Sir Walter Layton64 made no references to money.65
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Privately, however, Lothian told Morgenthau that Phillips would like to return to Washington in order to
“raise the red light signal in connection with our finances.” Roosevelt and Morgenthau were willing and
ready to talk, but suggested that Phillips wait until after the election.66
As a result, in psychological terms at the very least, 5 November 1940 became a magic date for
British policymakers. Many convinced themselves that, as soon as the election was over, American
assistance would be forthcoming, almost automatically. This would be true, many believed, whichever
candidate won; after all, Wendell Willkie, Roosevelt’s Republican opponent, had made clear his support
for the Allied cause. The overwhelming majority of Britons, however, anxiously hoped that Roosevelt
would prevail. “It will be a disaster, I think, for us if he does not,” Halifax noted tensely in his diary late
in October. Many preferred Roosevelt on the grounds that, since the inauguration was not until 20
January 1941, it would take at least six months before a newly-elected Republican administration began
to find its feet. Furthermore, and far more important, many British policymakers believed that Roosevelt
was in fact ready to take the ultimate step and enter the war. As early as June, this was most certainly
Churchill’s position, as well as many in the Foreign Office.67 In a letter to Jan Christian Smuts on 9 June
1940, Churchill expressed confidence that the United States would enter the war once Roosevelt won
reelection: “I see only one sure way through now, to wit, that Hitler should attack this country and in so
doing break his Air weapon. If this happens he will be left to face the winter with Europe writhing under
his heel and probably with the United States against him after the Presidential election is over.”68 On 14
June, Colville wrote in his diary, “If we can hold on until November we shall have won the war. But
holding on is going to be a grim business.” Harold Nicolson added a few days later, “I think it practically
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certain that the Americans will enter the war in November, and if we can last till then, all is well.”69 On
20 June, speaking to the House of Commons, Churchill stated that if Britain could hold out until after the
American elections that November, “I cannot doubt the whole English-speaking world will be in line
together.” Hitler would then have against him “the Oceans and the Air” and all the continents except for
Europe.70 By early November, he remained convinced that Roosevelt would win the election by a far
greater majority than was supposed, and that, therefore, America would come into the war.71 Roosevelt
himself contributed to this growing British confidence in the inevitability of American belligerency. On
30 October 1940, only a few days before the election, he delivered a speech in Boston, in which he
announced a new administration plan designed to assist Britain on a scale hitherto unimagined -- the
provision of 12,000 more aircraft and an unspecified amount of ordnance [artillery, tanks, rifles, machine
guns, ammunition, and other equipment] -- on the grounds that it would stimulate both American
industrial production and rearmament.72 Thus, even habitually cautious officials in the Foreign Office
believed that, within two weeks of Roosevelt’s reelection, American policy would begin moving toward
belligerency, while Treasury officials anticipated a decision on credits within the same time span.73
On 5 November 1940, Roosevelt was reelected to a third term as president of the United States,
by 449 electoral votes to 82, with a margin of victory in the popular vote of almost five million. The
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president’s victory triggered great jubilation in Whitehall, Westminster, Fleet Street, and throughout the
country at large. Nicolson wrote that although he had originally believed that it did not really matter who
won, “my heart leapt like a young salmon when I heard that Roosevelt had won so triumphantly, which
showed me that underneath I had been hoping for his victory. . . . It is the best thing that has happened to
us since the outbreak of the war. I thank God!” King George VI wrote to Roosevelt that “I feel I must
take advantage of Lord Lothian’s return to Washington to send you a personal message saying how glad
the Queen and I are to think that you are to be the President of the United States of America for a third
term. . . . In these grave and anxious days it is a great relief to feel that your wise and helpful policy will
continue without interruption.”74 Oliver Harvey, formerly the private secretary to Eden and Halifax, went
so far as to call 5 November:
Perhaps the most important date in the war . . . It will ring a bell throughout Europe. Our
enemies will know that henceforward, even if they could succeed in wearing us down in a
long war, there is a man across the Atlantic who would certainly bring America to our
rescue, and would carry on the fight if we failed. A whole new continent ready to fight
Hitler. I believe it will prove in the end to have broken the German morale.75
Not surprisingly, after the election, British leaders expected that the floodgates of materiel aid
would now open. Such expectations, however, about the certainty of American policy were inevitably
exaggerated.

While the election did in fact provide Roosevelt with greater freedom for political

maneuver, the British quite clearly overestimated his readiness to enter the war. In part, this was due to
the president’s own prior actions. Since before the Munich crisis, Roosevelt often assumed a bellicose
position -- at least to the point of encouraging the British to stand firm against German threats and
bullying, often holding out the possibility of American help.76
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In addition, the British did not understand the significance of Roosevelt’s reelection principally
because they did not truly understand the American political system and its traditions. More to the point,
they tended to interpret American politics through a British perspective. They assumed, for example, that
the president’s overwhelming electoral victory represented a clear cut “mandate” and a legislative
majority with which to execute it, in the same way that a British prime minister took office with a
working majority in the House of Commons. They were used to a centralized political system with firm
party divisions and tight discipline, and thus found it difficult to grasp the concepts of separation of
powers, loose party authority, and modest White House control over the Federal bureaucracy. Nominally,
the election provided the president with Democratic majorities of 268 to 167 in the House of
Representatives, and 66 to 30 in the Senate. Such figures, however, had little meaning for the Roosevelt
administration, which still faced significant political opposition, particularly among conservative southern
Democrats. Roosevelt remained fearful that congressional opposition might still obstruct policy and
subsequently undermine national unity as it had done to Woodrow Wilson’s efforts in 1919-1920. The
president, therefore, had to sustain the slow and difficult effort of creating a foreign-policy consensus
among key groups in Congress, the bureaucracy, and opinion-leaders.77
Far more than most British policymakers, Lothian understood these facts and developed a
diplomatic strategy to address them. He did not entertain the same exaggerated hopes about Roosevelt as
most British leaders. If anything, he was perhaps too dismissive about the election results. In the weeks
before the election, for example, he tended to play down the urgency of a Roosevelt victory. He felt that
over the long run, it would not matter much to Britain who won the election, because Willkie, like the
president, supported Britain’s war effort. Consequently, the only significant advantage of a Roosevelt
victory, he argued, was simply that it would avoid the “lame-duck” status that would inevitably precede a
Republican administration.78
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Unlike many of his countrymen, then, Lothian had no expectation of an imminent American entry
into the war. In mid-June 1940, Lothian had expressed confidence that, due to the “staggering” change in
American opinion over the previous few weeks, it “would take very little to carry them in now -- any kind
of challenge by Hitler or Mussolini to their own vital interests would do it.”79 At the end of August,
however, he told Churchill that “unless there is a manifest attack upon American soil or its most vital
interests are [sic] such that the United States is likely to find herself fighting under cover in different parts
of the world long before formal belligerency is recognized.”80 In mid-October, Lothian again asserted
that the United States would remain formally neutral until there had been two further developments in the
war. One was a direct attack on vital American interests. Only such an attack could make possible the
internal unity necessary to secure a declaration of war; after all, Roosevelt and Hull had assured the
ambassador on several occasions that the only possible way to ensure a declaration of war was to secure
unanimity within the Congress and public opinion.

The other was the development of American

rearmament to a point where the United States had effective weaponry. This, he believed, would not take
place before 1942.81
Lothian thus did not see the election as a sort of magic date. He argued that, eventually, the
United States would provide the necessary assistance, but that it would require far more proactive British
pressure on the Roosevelt administration and the American public. For the time being, the election
permitted Britain to renew its efforts to “educate” American opinion. Britain could not, in other words,
sit back and wait. He made clear his proposal for a more energetic policy in a telegram of 21 September
1940, in which he told the Foreign Office he wished to come home,
to discuss with you the formidable question we shall probably have to submit to United
States Government immediately after Presidential election, and to obtain other
information to enable me to present British case in speeches I shall have to make this
Autumn and Winter. Public opinion here has not yet grasped that it will have to make far
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reaching decisions to finance and supply us and possibly still graver ones next Spring or
Summer unless it is to take the responsibility of forcing us to make a compromised peace.
Yet owing to size of country and its constitution it is usually impossible to get important
decisions taken without at least six months preparation.82
Precisely because of his observation that it takes six months for the American government to
translate decisions into action, Lothian urged Churchill that Britain must take the initiative immediately.
Indeed, after the election, as Lothian suggested, while London waited expectantly for the United States to
act, it did so in vain. On 6 November 1940, the day after the election, Churchill wrote to congratulate the
president on his victory. He did not mention Britain’s continuing need for American aid, but hoped that
Roosevelt might reply with a new initiative:
I did not think it right for me as a Foreigner to express any opinion upon American
politics while the election was on, but now I feel you will not mind my saying that I
prayed for your success and that I am truly thankful for it. This does not mean that I seek
or wish for anything more than the full, fair and free play of your mind upon the world
issues now at stake in which our two nations have to discharge their respective duties. We
are entering upon a sombre phase of what must evidently be a protracted and broadening
war, and I look forward to being able to interchange my thoughts with you in all that
confidence and goodwill which has grown up between us since I went to the Admiralty at
the outbreak. Things are afoot which will be remembered as long as the English
language is spoken in any quarter of the globe, and in expressing the comfort I feel that
the people of the United States have once again cast these great burdens upon you, I must
avow my sure faith that the lights by which we steer will bring us all safely to anchor.
It was a brilliant, generous, and eloquent note, but to the prime minister’s surprise, and ultimate
consternation, the president did not reply.83 As a result, ten days later, at the conclusion of another
telegram thanking Roosevelt for his support with the French,84 Churchill wrote, “I hope you got my
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personal telegram of congratulation.” Again, the president did not reply. And again, in a telegraph to
Lothian, two and a half weeks later, Churchill asked, “Would you kindly find out for me most discreetly
whether President received my personal telegram congratulating him on re-election. It may have been
swept up in electioneering congratulations. If not I wonder whether there was anything in it which could
have caused offence or been embarrassing for him to receive. Should welcome your advice.”85
From London’s vantage point, it appeared that the Roosevelt administration was taking no action
of any kind to address Britain’s dollar crisis, let alone consider intervention in the war. The only action
appeared to be the alacrity with which several administration leaders departed the capital for much needed
vacations. Behind the scenes, however, the president’s key advisers in fact began to address the dilemma
of how to relieve Britain’s dollar problem. During the election campaign, they had deliberately avoided
important decisions about the scope and pace of needed American aid to Britain, but in the weeks
immediately following the election, as the Battle of the Atlantic began to intensify, the president’s
advisers became increasingly resolved to take action, in order to get war matériel to Britain. The
president himself, however, continued to move slowly.86 On 7 November, for example, Morgenthau
proposed a plan to provide Britain with the new Liberator B-24 bombers. It was possible, he believed, to
make a case that would permit Chief of Staff General George Marshall to certify that the planes were not
essential to the national defense. The plan won the support of his cabinet colleagues Stimson and Knox.
Even more importantly, however, Roosevelt’s advisers agreed that the time was approaching
when all such problems would have to be resolved by going through Congress; specifically, by requesting
Congress repeal the Walsh Amendment.87 Roosevelt, however, was not yet ready to take that step,
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believing that the continued strength of isolationists in Congress made such a step prohibitive. Instead, he
continued to delegate the task of discovering ways and means of surmounting the legal and other political
obstacles. During the meeting on 8 November 1940, when the cabinet discussed Britain’s increasing peril
on the oceans, the president stated that he favored a fifty-fifty division of war materials between Britain
and the United States: “In other words, we take half; they take half.” In doing so, he reverted to an idea
that had been raised after the Munich crisis about selling or lending planes to Hitler’s enemies.
According to Ickes, Roosevelt observed “that the time would surely come when Great Britain would need
loans or credits”:
. . . one way to meet the situation would be for us to supply whatever we could under
leasing arrangements with England. For instance, he thought that we could lease ships or
any other property that was loanable, returnable, and insurable.88
When his advisers quickly noted the difficulties presented by the Neutrality Act, Roosevelt dismissed
most of those points as mere details, suggesting that the Attorney General might somehow solve these
problems, or that General Marshall might hit upon some scheme that would enable him to certify that B17 bombers so desperately needed by the British were not so essential to American security. Similar
obstacles overtook nearly every other attempt made by the president’s advisers, both civilian and military
to find the ways and means, within the law, to help Britain resist the mounting German pressure. More to
the point, they were now convinced that the time had come to stop relying upon stopgap devices, half
measures, and evasions for implementing administration policies without recourse to Congress. Yet,
Roosevelt showed little disposition to do so, and publicly disavowed any intention even to revise the
Johnson and Neutrality Acts, much less ask Congress to get rid of them altogether.89
There were other vital areas in which the president’s reluctance to take immediate advantage of
his reelection caused anxiety and consternation to his advisers. They believed that the time had come for
the American economy to begin a transition to a war footing, in order to step up American production to
88

Davis, The War President, 48-49; Ickes, 3: 367, entry for 9 November 1940; Kimball, 93; Lash, 259-260;
Reynolds, Lord Lothian, 53; Reynolds, Munich to Pearl Harbor, 105.

89

Davis, The War President, 46-47, 48-50, 65; Langer and Gleason, The Undeclared War, 215-220.

357
the point where it would prove adequate for both its own and Britain’s needs. The president, however,
remained devoted to the old assumption that rearmament could somehow be achieved without significant
sacrifices by labor, management, or the public.90 In a similar way, the president’s advisers also wanted to
initiate staff conversations with the British on a more formal basis; Lothian had been agitating for such
talks for months. The president had been officially unresponsive to such a request prior to the election,
and remained equally resistant to a new proposal by Admiral Stark on 12 November, in spite of the
approval by the Secretaries of War and Navy.91
Throughout November, therefore, so far as the American public and the British government were
concerned, it was hard to detect any acceleration in either American rearmament or aid to Britain, both of
which had been so widely anticipated after Roosevelt’s reelection. The government of the United States
appeared to be asleep: there was no hint that daring measures or major innovations were afoot to meet the
developing crisis in the Battle of the Atlantic, and there seemed no likelihood that the president would
make a dramatic appeal to Congress or the people. Instead, the public learned that Roosevelt was about to
take a cruise.92 As a result, the administration’s doubts, hesitations, and confusion, with respect to
providing aid to Britain, appeared to become more pronounced rather than diminished.
By late November 1940, this silence from Washington increasingly worried British leaders and
compounded London’s uncertainty. Britain could not wait much longer. The country’s dollar reserves
were all but exhausted, and the Treasury began to take preparations to liquidate all British assets in the
United States. Furthermore, in the middle of November, the British noted a sudden loss of American
confidence in their shipping reports. Sections of the American press alleged that the British were

90

Davis, The War President, 54-55; Langer and Gleason, The Undeclared War, 220-221.

91

On 12 November, Admiral Stark forwarded to the president a memorandum that advanced the “Plan Dog”
concept, which concluded that America’s best hope for the successful defense of the Western Hemisphere lay in the
survival of Britain. Hence, military planning should proceed on the assumption that all measures, including if
necessary military measures, would be taken to avert Britain’s defeat. Stark, therefore, recommended to the
president that he authorize secret and formal staff conversations with the British, for which Lothian had thus far
been pressing in vain. Davis, The War President, 55-57; Langer and Gleason, The Undeclared War, 221-223.
92

Langer and Gleason, The Undeclared War, 225.

358
concealing the scale of U-boat successes, which offered an obvious index with which to monitor Britain’s
chances of survival. As Germany lost no time in exploiting this controversy, the Battle of the Atlantic,
like the Battle of Britain before it, therefore became a battle for American headlines.93
It was Lord Lothian who filled this vacuum in British policy. With no expectations of automatic
American aid or belligerency after 5 November 1940, he pressed his superiors in London to take action.
In the wake of the president’s reelection, he maintained, it was urgent to outline Britain’s requirements
comprehensively, “and present them, whether or not we expected them to be met at once and in toto. . . .
We should strike while the iron was hot.” Specifically, Lothian proposed two parallel foreign policy
initiatives, which essentially provided the catalyst that forced the Roosevelt administration into action.
First, he encouraged Churchill to write Roosevelt a long letter in which he would put Britain’s entire
position -- strategic, economic, and logistic -- to the president. It was clear to the ambassador that Henry
Morgenthau’s suggestion that Britain sell its foreign investments demonstrated the British failure to
convey the urgency of its financial situation.94 Lothian therefore believed that the time had come for
Churchill to “lay it all on the line” for Roosevelt -- this took the form of the celebrated letter of 8
December 1940, which Churchill later described as “one of the most important I ever wrote.”95 Second,
Lothian sought to provoke widespread popular discussion, and thus force the Roosevelt administration’s
hand, by making calculated and more public reference to Britain’s problems, especially its financial
plight. The forum at which he chose to initiate this public discussion would be an impromptu press
conference upon his return to the United States on 23 November 1940. Taken together, Lothian’s two
initiatives, which represent the two final actions and thus the culmination of his diplomatic career, laid the
foundations for the Lend-Lease program.96
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Meet the Press
Over the course of November, Britain’s mounting financial crisis strained Anglo-American
relations. In light of the rapid diminution of Britain’s ability to pay in dollars for American aid, the
Roosevelt administration remained frustrated by London’s reluctance to provide full and precise financial
data that they demanded as a basis for American action, while the War Cabinet remained frustrated by
Washington’s reluctance to believe that Britain’s financial situation was as dire as it claimed.
Furthermore, for political reasons, the Roosevelt administration proved reluctant to pursue actively any
specific course of action, lest they provoke isolationists, such as Senator Gerald P. Nye of South Dakota,
who was threatening to call for a congressional investigation to determine how much property in the
United States, real and otherwise, was owned by Britain and the British Empire. As a result, London
announced that it was sending Sir Frederick Phillips of the British Treasury to Washington in December,
in order to discuss Britain’s financial situation. Because presumably Phillips would be armed with the
full and precise information that Washington demanded, the administration chose to postpone any action
until after his arrival. The president explained his position in a letter to the King on 22 November 1940.
Had he gone to Congress with a proposal to give those obsolete American destroyers to Britain the
previous summer, as “legalists” demanded he do, the proposal “would still be in the tender care of the
Committees of the Congress.” Consequently, Roosevelt remained hesitant to go to the Congress until it
became politically safe and until he had in hand some means that was virtually certain of being
congressionally approved.97
Lothian, however, audaciously forced the president’s hand. During his return visit to Britain, the
ambassador took the opportunity to urge Churchill to broach the question of American aid with
Roosevelt, in a letter that outlined the true depth of Britain’s need, fully and comprehensively. The prime
minister agreed and resolved to write the president in the strongest possible terms. Consequently, Lothian
and Churchill began to draft the letter over the weekend of 9-10 November 1940, while Lothian was
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visiting with the prime minister at Dytchley Park. It took the better part of the next four weeks to
complete and dispatch the letter to the president. Throughout the entire process, while Lothian, who was
supported by the Foreign Office, repeatedly pressed the prime minister to take forceful action, Churchill,
who retained his faith in Roosevelt as Britain’s “best friend” and the inevitability of American
belligerency, obstinately dragged his heels. He did not want to rush the president; he preferred instead to
wait for the right moment to send his request to Roosevelt.98
Lothian, however, had other ideas. The ambassador departed from London on 11 November and,
following a delay of approximately ten days in Lisbon, flew back to the United States, on a Pan American
Airways “Clipper,” landing at LaGuardia Airport in New York City on Saturday, 23 November 1940. A
group of assembled reporters were present and Lothian read from a brief, but unauthorized statement.
Because his comments to the American press immediately provoked a firestorm of controversy, and
ultimately action, there emerged considerable uncertainty and misunderstanding as to what the
ambassador actually said on this occasion. According to some accounts, Lothian allegedly told the
reporters, “Well, boys, Britain’s broke, it’s your money we want.” It is clear, however, from press reports
and from the account that Lothian sent to the Foreign Office that he said far more than this. It is, in fact,
questionable whether he ever used those notorious words at all.99 On arrival at La Guardia Lothian made
this brief statement:
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The first half of 1940 was Hitler’s year. The second half, we think, is ours. He failed in
his plans to smash our fleet and perhaps invade England. There is no doubt of its being a
hard war. Two hundred lives are lost daily in the bombing raids and 300 are injured.
Next year, too, we know will be long and hard. England will be grateful for any help.
England needs planes, munitions, ships and perhaps a little financial help.100
As Lothian completed his statement, unexpected but spontaneous applause broke out through a group of
about 40 airport visitors standing on a second-floor sightseers’ gallery. He later expanded on this
statement and answered further questions in the airport building. Among other things, Lothian told
journalists that, although the British people “were not stupidly optimistic and everybody realized that the
year 1941 would be hard and difficult,” there was no doubt there that Great Britain was going to win the
war. He also assured reporters that Britain definitely did not need or want men, and refused to be drawn
into the question of how the United States should respond to Britain’s plight. When asked how Britain
would obtain the needed money, and whether the Johnson and the Neutrality Acts would have to be
repealed or modified, Lothian would not or could not say. He simply asserted that this was for Americans
to decide, and announced that Sir Frederick Phillips from the British Treasury was coming to Washington
to discuss such financial matters. At the same time, however, reporters quoted him as saying that the
matter was “becoming urgent,” and that “Available gold and securities had been virtually used up and that
this factor figured in the calculations for 1941.” In his report to the Foreign Office, Lothian wrote that
1941 would be a difficult year, and “obviously your American assistance would be of the greatest
possible importance.” He stressed, however, that he “mentioned no figures of any kind but indicated that
the question of how to pay for munitions would be one of the problems which would come up certainly in
the next 6 months, as our resources including gold and securities, were running low.”101
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It appears that Lothian made these remarks on his own initiative, without the permission of his
government. Lothian admitted as much to Morgenthau when, on 2 December, following a dressing down
by the secretary, the ambassador stated that he had spoken on his own authority.102 Moreover, it is also
certain that this was a premeditated act. According to his biographer, J. R. M. Butler, Lothian decided to
drop this “calculated indiscretion” on the American press while he was delayed in Lisbon for a week, en
route to the United States.103 Furthermore, according to Wheeler-Bennett, Lothian knew that Churchill
was about to write the president on the topic of finance. Understanding the character of the president, the
ambassador also knew that Roosevelt would need some demonstration of popular support before he took
any politically risky action, and that this could only be achieved by “shock tactics.” Therefore, as
Wheeler-Bennett asserted, just as in the case of the destroyers deal, Lothian “took it upon himself to
condition the mind of the American people.”104 Balfour minuted on 28 November:
Lord Lothian pointed out to us during his visit that it takes the American public, on
whom the Executive depend for getting their policies approved, at least six months to
demand action on an idea from the time it is mooted. I am convinced that he had this
consideration in mind when he made the remarks for which he is now reproved.105
Sir Walter Layton, who had spoken with the ambassador in early December, later wrote that Lothian
deliberately intended to stir up a bit of “excitement”:
That statement was deliberate. He knew it would create excitement but during his stay at
Lisbon [where Lothian had to wait a week for the plane to New York] he made up his
mind that the American public must get used to the idea that Great Britain needed
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financial help. He meant to bring the matter to a head for he felt it would not be honest to
go on pretending that we could pay.106
In any event, upon arriving back at the Embassy, Lothian told his staff, “Oh yes, I know that I shall get
my head washed for it both in London and in Washington, but it is the truth none the less.”107
It is also clear that Lothian did not intend for his statement to serve as a direct appeal for
immediate credits. He believed, instead, that “the public initiative in asking for a discussion” should
come from the British in an informal way. Two days after his return, he reminded Morgenthau of his
warning, just before his departure to Britain that “the red light had gone up about finance.” Consequently,
he made the airport statement in order to prepare the American public for the imminent arrival of Sir
Frederick Phillips in early December. It appears, therefore, that Lothian primarily wanted to set the
public debate into motion, particularly the financial question, so that the necessary measures would be
taken in time, given the slowness of the American political policy making process.108 Arthur Krock of
The New York Times even recognized as much:
The probability is that Lord Lothian expected these things to happen and is well content
to have put the subject on view for public and official comment, inquiry and reflection.
In some quarters in Great Britain he was criticized for saying anything the Axis might use
to persuade wavering neutrals that conditions in England are very bad. In some quarters
here he was criticized for making his statement to the press instead of waiting to impart it
to the President and the State Department. But the consensus seemed to be that if the
Ambassador had been indiscreet, his was a “planned indiscretion,” a bit of diplomatic
strategy well considered in advance.109
There is absolutely no doubt that he succeeded in this objective. Lothian’s remarks generated
front-page headlines in newspapers all across the country, which generally shocked the American public
that Britain’s economic circumstances were so dire. For the next several days, press coverage became
consumed with Britain’s financial plight and the Roosevelt administration’s intentions, or proposals, to
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address it. On 25 November, The New York Times noted that Lothian’s statement had come only twentyfour hours after Roosevelt had told reporters in Hyde Park that the United States was not considering any
specific aid programs for Britain. “Informed quarters,” it further reported, suggested that “it would be
difficult, if not impossible, to extend needed financial aid to Britain without modifying or repealing
existing restrictive legislation.” The following day, 26 November, Senator Alben Barkley of Kentucky
told the press that the question of credits for Britain would not come up in the current session of
Congress. Senator Hiram Johnson of California announced that he would “fight to the last ditch” any
effort to repeal or modify “the act bearing his name.” Senator Gerald P. Nye introduced his longthreatened resolution in the Senate calling for a formal congressional investigation to determine how
much property in the United States was owned by Britain and the British Empire. Secretary of State Hull
refused to comment on Lothian’s remarks when reporters tried to pin him down as to which department
would handle negotiations for credits. He likewise refused to express an opinion on whether the Johnson
and Neutrality Acts would have to be revised, or whether the problem might be resolved by a transfer of
Britain’s West Indian possessions to the United States. That same day, Roosevelt also played down the
money question during a press conference when reporters asked him whether the British ambassador had
presented any specific requests for “additional help.” The president responded that there had been no
discussion in the government about providing Britain with credits.110 Morgenthau was equally evasive.
At his press conference on 28 November, when a reporter attempted to bring up the subject of loans or
other financial aid to Britain, the secretary bluntly stated that he was not prepared to air his views at that
time and changed the subject.
The next day, however, the Treasury Department issued a press release, which gave credence to
Lothian’s warning. It summarized the dollar balances in the United States of foreign nations and noted
that, although most nations were building up balances, Britain had actually withdrawn $320,924,000
between 30 August 1939 and 4 September 1940. In addition, the press release called attention to the fact
110

The New York Times, 26 November 1940, 1,4; The Washington Post, 26 November 1940, 1,6; The New York
Times, 27 November 1940, 1,4.

365
that Britain had made heavy sales of gold in order to pay for purchases of war materials. When Phillips
did arrive on 4 December, therefore, reporters anticipated some type of big news, which compelled Hull
to deny again any knowledge of a plan to extend credits to Britain based on a guarantee against future
gold production.111
At the same time, pro-interventionist groups became active once again. On 26 November, the
same day Roosevelt denied knowledge of any specific proposals, the White Committee put out press
releases that urged the president to take stronger measures to provide aid to Britain. They insisted that the
life line between Britain and the Western Hemisphere must “under no circumstances” be severed, and that
the United States “must be prepared to maintain it.” It also called for a massive increase in American
defense production, particularly in terms of shipbuilding, with the ships that were constructed to be either
rented or leased to Britain. In doing so, it also insisted that the time had come for Congress to assume a
larger share of responsibility for the formulation of policies and methods of assisting the Allies.112
There is no explicit evidence connecting Lothian to the White Committee’s current campaign, but
one may reasonably speculate that the Committee consulted with the ambassador. It is certain that
Lothian maintained close contact with Henry Van Dusen of the Century Group.113 It was, furthermore,
possible that Lothian was feeding sensitive information to contacts within the White Committee. A
Special Security Report, issued by the Admiralty, dated 14 November 1940, noted that John Balderston, a
Hollywood script writer working for the White Committee, claimed to have been instrumental in securing
the relaxation of British censorship in relation to the American press. He further claimed that Lothian had
shown him secret operational telegrams: “I got Lord Lothian to show me the detailed stuff that is sent
him daily, marked, ‘for the President’” and hinted that he had seen hundreds of such messages that
arrived daily, after which “it was only necessary to mention a few unpublished details.” While there was
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some sentiment that Balderston was probably exaggerating, the Foreign Office and the Admiralty
expressed concern that clearly he did know the existence of telegrams sent to the president.114
In any event, as he anticipated, Lothian’s comments irritated many officials on both sides of the
Atlantic. From London’s perspective, the problem was that, once again, he had not been sufficiently
careful in handling a delicate issue, and the result was an immediate public relations problem. Lothian
failed to make it clear that, with reference to Britain’s financial problems, he was referring only to its
ability to purchase from the United States with its dollar resources, and not Britain’s overall financial
position. The Sunday Dispatch of London described Lothian’s comments as an “extraordinary diplomatic
blunder.” In a double-column front page display, it “deplored Lord Lothian’s choice of words ‘to launch
on the world.’” As a result of such negative press commentary, the Ministry of Information issued a
statement pointing out that the “financial resources,” which Lothian said were running out, were
“available gold and securities.”115 Furthermore, according to the Associated Press, Lothian stated that
Britain “was beginning to come to the end of her financial resources.” The Reuters account, widely
circulated abroad, used the same phrase. Because most newspapers outside of New York City used these
wire services as the basis of their reports, London’s concern was warranted.116 Almost immediately,
Anglophobe and isolationist papers seized on the ambassador’s comments.

For days, the Chicago

Tribune’s headlines thundered, “ENVOY LOTHIAN CLAIMS BRITAIN IS GOING BROKE” [24
November 1940], “BRITISH ENVOY’S U.S. TALK STIRS UPROAR AT HOME” [25 November
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1940], and “STORM BREWING OVER U.S. FISCAL HELP TO BRITAIN” [26 November 1940].117
British representatives and agents around the world reported that Lothian’s statements had caused “a bad
impression” that Britain was on the verge of bankruptcy, all of which was providing German
propagandists with excellent material.118
Lothian’s action infuriated the British Treasury, which thought the ambassador’s comments to be
reckless and unnecessary, particularly right before Phillips’ imminent visit.

The Chancellor of the

Exchequer, Sir Kingsley Wood, took particular umbrage because he had not been properly consulted.
The Treasury did not send an indignant telegram only when Churchill agreed to chastize Lothian himself.
The prime minister cabled on 27 November: “We are so closely united in thought and friendship,” the
prime minister began, “that I feel you will not mind my making a few comments on your recent remarks.”
In part, he criticized Lothian’s careless language and failure to consult the Treasury. But he also
questioned Lothian’s whole approach. “I do not think it was wise to touch on very serious matters to
reporters on the landing stage. It is safer to utter a few heartening generalities and leave the graver
matters to be raised formally with the President or his chief lieutenants.” The controversy over Lothian’s
remarks illustrated, once again, a key difference in tactics between the ambassador and Churchill. Similar
to their different approaches with respect to publicity, Lothian believed that the appropriate approach was
to force the issue, go public with Britain’s position, and thus place pressure on the president, whereas the
prime minister chose not to push Roosevelt, but to wait instead for the force of events.119
From Washington’s perspective, Lothian’s comments indeed put the Roosevelt administration in
a very difficult political position. Although unperturbed on the public level, officials privately expressed
both annoyance and disbelief at the ambassador’s remarks. The president, who typically resented and
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always resisted perceived efforts to force his hand, was furious with the ambassador. He thus received
Lothian coldly when the two conferred at length on 25 November, stating that the request for financial aid
was “premature” and would remain so until the American public was thoroughly convinced that the
British had liquidated their liquefiable assets in the Western Hemisphere, which Roosevelt estimated to
total over $9 billion dollars. Not surprisingly, The Washington Post, on 26 November, quoted a “high
authority” as saying that Lothian’s request for assistance was “premature.”120 Hull was not only annoyed,
he was also skeptical as to whether the British financial picture was as bleak as Lothian portrayed it.121
Morgenthau, too, was incensed. In a letter to Hull, he complained that Lothian had shown poor
judgment, particularly since the ambassador did not consult with him or the president prior to disclosing
Britain’s fiscal plight.

He also worried about the effect Lothian’s warning might have on British

negotiations with American business leaders, who would now be even more suspicious of Britain’s ability
to pay. He noted in his diary, “It is not difficult to understand why the impression had gotten around in
Washington that things are going badly with England after one listens to Lothian.” He complained to
Canadian Prime Minister Mackenzie King that Lothian’s comments had upset the delicate situation and
“did not help one damn bit!” Perhaps most important, both the president and Morgenthau worried that
Lothian’s bluntness might alienate the Congress and give isolationists further ammunition that might
significantly harm the aid program. As Morgenthau pointed out, during a conversation with Lothian and
Phillips on 2 December 1940, some isolationist senator could now call him up to the Hill and say, “Well,
on such and such a date Ambassador Lothian said the English were running short of money. By what
authority did you let them place additional orders in this country?” This, Morgenthau noted, “seemed a
new idea” to Lothian.122
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In his reaction to the controversy he had aroused, Lothian proved to be just as audacious as in his
decision to push the administration in the first place. Butler argues that Lothian felt some regret for
sparking off such a furious controversy. That does not appear to be the case. At best, Lothian was
somewhat at pains to play down the significance of his remarks. After meeting with Roosevelt on 25
November, for example, he immediately spoke to waiting reporters:

“The President and I never

mentioned finances,” he said. The New York Times reported that Lothian had “rushed over to newspaper
correspondents to make this statement even before he took his hat down from the rack in the White House
waiting room.” He emphasized that his report to the president had focused on the war and the latest
developments; in the main, he asserted, his report was hopeful and optimistic.123

In view of his

government’s disapproval, Lothian deemed it necessary to express some degree of repentance: “I am
extremely sorry that I should have raised the question of dollar finance without obtaining the prior
approval of the Chancellor of the Exchequer,” he telegraphed on 28 November. “I should like to
apologize to him. I will see this mistake is not repeated.”124
In spite of this apology, however, Lothian went on to defend his conduct with a vigor that showed
he firmly and unquestionably believed that he had done the right thing. Too many Americans, he
maintained, even the president, seemed convinced that Britain possessed vast resources that had not been
disclosed and was therefore more than capable of paying for American purchases. In his telegram of 26
November 1940, following his meetings with Roosevelt and Hull, and The Washington Post story that
British requests for aid were “premature,” Lothian stated that “this comment appears to confirm what I
said in London that the Administration still entertains the idea that we must be forced to ‘scrape the
bottom of the barrel’ i.e. strip ourselves of all our assets of value before the United States could be
expected to give financial assistance. I trust the idea will be contested in the Prime Minister’s
123
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memorandum and that Phillips will be equipped with all information necessary to refute it.”125 As Layton
later told Churchill, Lothian “remained confident, in spite of some public and private criticism in
America, that he had made no mistake in broaching the financial question on his arrival in New York. He
was certain that the President would come over handsomely when the situation was put before him, but he
felt that some preparation of public opinion was necessary if quick action was to be taken. He was quite
satisfied with the reaction of public opinion.”126
Lothian was absolutely correct. Many American leaders, especially the president, did not think
Britain’s dollar situation in the autumn of 1940 was urgent. According to Ickes, Roosevelt stated during
the cabinet meeting of 8 November “that England still has sufficient credits and property in this country
to finance additional war supplies.” The president readily admitted that loans or credits would have to be
arranged eventually, but stated that the British have about $2.5 billion in credit and property in the United
States that could be liquidated. “He believes that this money ought to be spent first, although the British
do not want to liquidate their American securities.” Moreover, the day before, 7 November, Roosevelt
had spoken in a similar way to Arthur Purvis, who reported to Churchill that, although the president
raised the question of Britain’s dollar resources, it was clear that Roosevelt thought the problem was still
six months away.127 As late as 1 December, just before leaving on his cruise, the president talked over the
situation with Morgenthau and, after a cursory glance at a Treasury estimate of Britain’s dollar resources,
he threw it on the desk and said, “Well, they aren’t bust -- there’s lots of money there.”128
Therefore, in his telegram of 28 November 1940, Lothian explained that, in spite of the criticism
and perturbation in the United States, his effort to “raise the issue now in an informal way was the right
thing to do,” in part because the controversy would “find its way into the press”:
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In this as in every other question the ultimate determinant is public opinion. That opinion
is saturated with illusions to the effect that we have vast resources available which have
not been disclosed, that it is possible for us to mobilise all the American assets and all the
assets of our Dominions and our allies as well as our properties in the Empire and in
foreign countries and make them available in dollars for paying for munitions and that we
ought to empty this vast hypothetical barrel before we ask for assistance.
He added that “the President said in private today to Thomas Lamont [of Morgan and Company] that he
believed that we could go on paying to July 1942 and that it was therefore premature to raise the issue
now.”129 Furthermore, Lothian emphasized that this was only one facet of the fundamental debate now
waging in the United States, whether to help Britain but only within the limits of neutrality, and
“acquiesce in the defeat” of Britain, “if these half measures do not suffice,” or whether to keep Britain
going even at risk of possible American entry into the war. Churchill’s impending letter to Roosevelt, he
subsequently maintained, could only continue to stimulate the debate and keep the issue in the forefront
of American public discourse.130
Lothian was convinced that by stirring up a heated discussion, he could convince Americans of
the desperation of the British situation. As Wheeler-Bennett noted, the ambassador decided to “throw his
firecracker where it would cause the loudest reverberations, namely into the ranks of the press”:
His terse, succinct statement had been no casual ‘throw-away line’ but a premeditated
simplification of the position of affairs. Nor had he . . . failed to foresee the effect which
his statement would have in high places nor the obloquy which would descend upon him
in consequence. Never was an indiscretion more calculated. It was Philip Lothian at his
best, appreciating instinctively the reaction of the American people, knowing very clearly
what he did.131
In spite of the public concerns raised in London, many in fact agreed that Lothian was correct,
particularly in the Foreign Office, which believed that the long-term effect of his remarks on American
opinion would be beneficial. T. North Whitehead described the ambassador’s comments as “an excellent
statement . . . it can do nothing but good.” David Scott agreed, “Yes, I think that the long term effect will
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be beneficial.”132 In the Treasury, Sir Frederick Phillips admitted privately that the “main difficulty is
that our financial weakness has been so successfully concealed that outside Administration circles no one
in the United States has the least notion of its gravity.”133 In Washington, Richard Gardiner Casey, Lord
Casey, the Australian ambassador to the United States, noted in his diary that, although Lothian was
reproved for having spoken publicly about Britain’s financial needs on arrival in New York, “it may be
that it will prove a good thing to have done,” as there was a very noticeable reluctance in the United
States to face up to it:
The President has been given to believe that Britain has adequate funds for a year or more
-- which is far from being the case. I suspect that Morgenthau hasn’t wanted to tell him
the facts. However, the forward contracts that Britain is now ready to place will oblige
Morgenthau in the light of Lothian’s statement to get Presidential approval -- which
really means backing Britain’s bill -- and I expect it will be rather a shock to the
President to realize that within a very few months, he will have to get legislation through
Congress approving credits to Britain -- when he thought that such a formidable task was
a considerable way off. Morgenthau in turn is likely to get a reproof from the President
for having in effect kept him in the dark.
Casey concluded then that Lothian’s “gaffe” may well be a “blessing in disguise.”134
In New York City, Lothian’s comments generated an exceptionally large volume of commentary
in newspapers of every size all over the country, as a full-scale report by the BPS on 4 December 1940
clearly demonstrated. The report also indicated that, contrary to the concerns raised by some quarters of
the British press, many American editors and commentators quite well understood that Lothian was
talking only about Britain’s dollar problem.

Consequently, the report concluded, “The interview

precipitated realistic discussion of the purpose and implications of the whole so-called ‘Aid-to-Britain’
policy, a question hitherto generally discussed in a vague if well-meaning manner.” That was certainly
what Lothian had intended. His initiative helped to place the dire British financial situation, not just in
the analytical columns on the back editorial pages, but more critically, on the more visible front pages,
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which served to stir up and keep the debate in the public eye until Phillips’s arrival on 4 December
1940.135 Lothian’s candor, as he clearly anticipated, effectively punctured American complacency.
Lothian’s press conference of 23 November also had the result of effectively jump-starting
renewed efforts to launch a more full-scale publicity and propaganda campaign in the United States.
Specifically, London began to build upon efforts initiated earlier in the summer, which had been driven in
a fundamental way by Lothian, to establish the institutional machinery necessary to expand British
publicity efforts in the United States. The Foreign Office News Department, for example, called for the
War Department to set clear propaganda objectives in the United States. In a 27 November letter to Duff
Cooper, Charles Peake bluntly stated that “We know very well how delicate is the ground upon which we
tread. But so long as we are not told how far we can go, what risks we may take, and above all what the
Prime Minister expects and wants, we can only nibble at American propaganda and the time is too urgent
for nibbling.” T. North Whitehead predicted a vigorous American debate over intervention and argued
that Britain’s chances of victory would depend on the outcome of his discussion. Therefore, he asserted,
“It is of the utmost importance that we should do what we can to influence [American public] opinion in
our favour.” Cooper heartily endorsed this assessment and begged Churchill to issue a “directive on
which to base our propaganda effort.” Churchill appeared sympathetic and asked only that any new
British campaign be delayed until he could ascertain how his impending appeal letter to Roosevelt was
received in Washington.136
In the end, the ultimate question remains whether Lothian’s comments, regardless of their impact
on public opinion, had any significant effect on the Roosevelt administration. At first glance, it appears
that the ambassador’s comments may not have been so crucial because the administration was leaning
toward some sort of action in any event. It has already been established that a month before the arrival of
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Churchill’s letter, and two weeks before Lothian returned to the United States, Roosevelt and his key
advisers began addressing the dilemma of how to relieve Britain’s dollar problem.137 It appeared that
there were only two viable possible courses of action. Both, however, required congressional action and
were therefore fraught with political hazard. On the one hand, the United States might make a money
loan to the British, as it did during the First World War. Such a step, however, would require the repeal
of the Johnson Act, which specifically forbade American loans to nations that had defaulted on their
World War One debts. On the other hand, the United States might make an outright gift of matériel, a
choice Morgenthau believed to be infinitely preferable to massive credit extensions. Because this could
not be done, however, within existing neutrality legislation, it would require a specific grant of authority
to the president by Congress; and a direct effort to change those laws would likely mean a confrontation
with the isolationists in Congress over issues that had hurt interventionists in recent years -- war debts,
suspicion of Britain, and foreign entanglements.138
It is, in fact, possible to argue that the concept of Lend-Lease was in the president’s mind as early
as November 1938. At a White House meeting on 14 November 1938, Roosevelt outlined his policy on
rearmament and support for Britain and France. He said: “Had we had this summer 5,000 planes and the
capacity immediately to produce 10,000 per year, even though I might have had to ask Congress for
authority to sell or lend them to the countries in Europe, Hitler would not have dared to take the stand he
did.”139 Moreover, on 2 August 1940, when Harold Ickes wrote Roosevelt a personal letter in support of
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the destroyers-for-bases proposal, he made use of a metaphor that the president would later adopt and
employ with great effect. “It seems to me,” Ickes wrote, “that we Americans are like the householder
who refuses to lend or sell his fire extinguisher to help put out the fire in the house that is next door,
although that house is all ablaze and the wind is blowing from that direction.” Consequently, Roosevelt
wondered, as recently as the cabinet meeting of 8 November, might it not be possible for the United
States to build cargo vessels and lease them to Britain?140

It is clear, however, that, regardless of any earlier formulation of the Lend-Lease concept, many
American leaders, and especially Roosevelt, did not think Britain’s dollar situation in the autumn of 1940
was urgent as of yet. The president’s principal anxiety in October and November was Britain’s merchant
shipping position. He suggested that the United States should build 300 ships and then “rent them” to
Britain, which would also pay for the insurance; and that this system might be extended to cover other
supplies.141 What particularly worried Roosevelt was that London could no longer provide the capital
investment needed to accelerate United States rearmament. Thus, he believed that the United States
should make a large investment in plant and new orders, and should make Britain loans, at the very least,
in order to provide Britain with merchant shipping. The capital investment for new plants and the new
orders for munitions and ships could all be financed from Reconstruction Finance Corporation funds,
which, he believed, did not require congressional approval. In discussions among his advisers, however,
before and during the president’s departure from Washington, there existed a general feeling that they had
reached the acceptable limits of executive action and that the administration must go to Congress for
authority. After all, following the Battle of Britain, the head of the RFC, Jesse Jones, declared that
“Britain was a good risk for a loan.”142
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Hence the significance of Lothian’s comments of 23 November 1940.

The ambassador’s

impromptu airport press conference did what he intended: it pushed into action a White House that was,
at that moment, extremely reluctant to act.143 To be sure, even in late November, Roosevelt continued to
believe that Britain’s financial crisis lay at least six months away, and that its problems could be met by
an extension of existing executive policies, with the addition of some kind of loan arrangement; therefore,
Lothian’s comments did not have a direct or immediate effect upon the president’s thinking. As Hull
wrote, “the ambassador had stated nothing we did not know already.” Nevertheless, Lothian’s remarks
pushed Henry Morgenthau to disabuse Roosevelt of the inflated notion that the British could raise
anywhere remotely near $9 billion on its Western Hemisphere properties. He forwarded a Treasury
Department memo to the president clearly authenticating that the overall global total of British and
British Empire assets at approximately $9.5 billion, and that Britain’s dollar deficit between 1 November
1940 and 30 June 1941 would total approximately over $2.1 billion.144 Morgenthau himself admitted that
Lothian’s initiative “had forced the President and himself to deal with the cash problem immediately.”145
Principally, while the key members of the administration had concluded, by early November, that
the time had come to find a broad solution to Britain’s problems, which would require congressional
endorsement, the president still resisted going to Congress. Knox, Hull, Stimson, and Morgenthau all
concluded that to continue assisting Britain in a makeshift way, which had characterized American aid
efforts thus far, was essentially to do nothing.146 By early December, however, Roosevelt suddenly
encouraged the British to go full speed ahead with matériel orders for which they had proclaimed they
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could never pay. On 1 December, he approved the orders from London for ships, aircraft, and munitions
totaling $2.1 billion, which would require government financing and more elaborate planning.147
This shift can be attributed at least in part to Lothian’s initiative. As Morgenthau told a meeting
of key administration personnel on 3 December, they were under instructions from the president to come
up with a workable solution because “Lothian had publicly put us on notice that [Britain] didn’t have
enough money.” Lothian knew it as well. On 4 December, he wrote the Foreign Office that “The effect
of recent events is that the President and the Secretary will have to explain our dollar position to Congress
in the near future and obtain authority from it as to how it should be dealt with.”148
The Letter
One of Lothian’s most significant achievements as ambassador was convincing Churchill to write
the letter of 8 December 1940 to President Roosevelt, which not only outlined the true extent of Britain’s
need, openly and thoroughly, but ultimately compelled the president to finally address Britain’s financial
problems once and for all. The letter, in other words, was a critical step, perhaps the critical step, to the
creation of the Lend-Lease program. While he later praised the ambassador in his war memoirs, noting
that it was Lothian “who urged me to write a full statement of our position to the President,”149 the prime
minister was in fact initially quite reluctant to write and dispatch the letter. Lothian had to aggressively
and relentlessly lobby Churchill to do so. Even when he agreed to send it, Churchill differed considerably
with Lothian as to its contents. Lady Astor told her brother-in-law in January 1941 that
Philip . . . had a very difficult time making the P.M. see what he wanted to do in
America. He felt that it was imperative that a strong note should go to the President
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telling him of our dire situation, particularly financially. It took him two weekends, one
at Chequers and one at Dytchley but he finally got it done.150
During his visit to Britain, Lothian convinced Churchill to raise once and for all the question of
American aid with Roosevelt and to outline the true depth of Britain’s need. Lothian and Churchill began
to draft the letter during the weekend of 9-10 November 1940, when Lothian was visiting with the prime
minister at Dytchley Park. They drew up a draft, which each man subsequently revised. In his diary, on
12 November 1940, Colville wrote that Lothian’s draft was excellent:
Lord Lothian has drafted a telegram for the PM to send to Roosevelt. It stresses very
frankly our need for American support in obtaining the Irish naval bases, in guarding
Singapore, in getting more ships and above all in buying munitions and aircraft on credit.
It is intended to make R feel that if we go down, the responsibility will be America’s.
Brendan tells me that the PM thinks it so admirably written that he could not improve a
word of it; but it will go before the Cabinet for consideration.151
In the meantime, parts of the original draft went out for comment to responsible departments, but
primarily to the Treasury, the Admiralty, and the Foreign Office, as well as the Chiefs of Staff and the
War Cabinet. Each made suggestions; the Treasury in particular felt that the sections on finance were not
satisfactory. On the basis of these comments, Churchill did some redrafting on 18 November, by which
time Lothian had returned to Washington.152
Lothian’s fundamental intention was that this letter respond to American criticisms that Britain
asked for more than was necessary, primarily by presenting the hard facts. He believed that Churchill
needed to lay Britain’s cards on the table, just as he had done in late July 1940, when Lothian encouraged
the prime minister to write Roosevelt a “most moving statement of our needs and dangers in respect of
destroyers and flying boats,” and, more boldly, when he provided detailed and comprehensive naval
information to pro-British interventionist pressure groups without the approval, or even the knowledge, of
the War Cabinet. After all, he wrote Churchill on 12 November, “there was an opinion in Washington
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that we were inclined to ask for more than was necessary. The only answer to this is a ruthless exposé of
the strategic dangers.” The Foreign Office agreed. The previous day, Cadogan noted in his diary that
Lothian “had produced a very good message from P.M. for President putting all our cards on the table
(which I think is right).”153
Several days later, therefore, on 16 November, Churchill wrote Roosevelt, “I am writing you a
very long letter on the outlook for 1941 which Lord Lothian will give you in a few days.” Nevertheless,
the prime minister remained hesitant to push Roosevelt. It is likely that his confidence in the force of
events, combined with his expectations about the election and his habitual preference for secrecy, account
for Churchill’s reluctance to send the letter in late November. While Lothian, supported by the Foreign
Office, vigorously urged him to action, Churchill dragged his feet, preferring to wait for the right moment
to send his request to Roosevelt. In spite of the ambassador’s repeated urgings that the letter be sent as
soon as possible, there was a hiatus for over than a week. “I am still struggling with my letter to the
president,” Churchill cabled Lothian on 26 November, “but hope to cable it to you in a few days.”154
Lothian continued to impress upon Churchill the need to directly and honestly approach
Roosevelt. In late November, he cited the president’s fatigue, as well as the overall inertia in Washington
in the aftermath of the presidential election, as the perfect reason and, more to the point, the perfect time,
to make Britain’s case. On 26 November, Lothian cabled an account of his meeting with Roosevelt the
previous day, the first since he had left the United States in mid-October. He told the president that
Churchill was about to “lay before him the problems of 1941 as they appeared to the British government”
and that it would ask for assistance from the United States “on a larger scale than had yet been
considered.” He found the president, however, in a fatigued and depressed state of mind, unresponsive to
any new ideas for action. Moreover, he wrote that, although there remains great support for Britain,
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public opinion is “still inclined to live in complacency,” the result of Germany’s failure to launch an
invasion. Therefore, “after talking to the President and a number of people here,” Lothian asserted, “I am
more convinced than ever of the importance of the Prime Minister’s memorandum.”
The Foreign Office and the Admiralty, which for some time had been badgering the United States
Navy to release more destroyers, fully concurred. On 27 November 1940, Whitehead noted that while
most Americans obviously agreed that their security depended upon Britain’s survival, they were largely
engaging “in wishful thinking and have not yet faced the realities of their position. The time has come to
put the whole situation squarely before them.”155 Moreover, after Nevile Butler at the British Embassy
reported on 22 November that Secretary of the Navy Knox had replied that the prospect of receiving more
American destroyers “must be ruled out of the realm of what was possible,” David Scott minuted:
This kind of thing shows how important it is that the President should be given the full
picture of our position and desiderata as set out in the draft message from the Prime
Minister to Mr. Roosevelt drafted by Lord Lothian. I understand from No. 10 that the
P.M. is still mulling it over. The sooner he can get something off the better.
Cadogan and Halifax agreed, and the foreign secretary put Scott’s argument personally to the prime
minister on 27 November 1940.156 Under repeated pressure from Halifax, Churchill promised to get the
letter ready in the next day or two.

He asked Arthur Purvis, the head of the British Purchasing

Commission in the United States, who was then in London, to prepare a preliminary redraft. Purvis, who
also agreed with Lothian and Scott, suggested that Churchill add a “confidential balance sheet” to
dramatize Britain’s needs by setting out, on one side, the forces and equipment probably needed to win
the war, and on the other side, those currently available in the Empire or currently expected from the
United States; the difference between “credit” and “debit” columns would represent Britain’s outstanding
needs from the United States. Purvis explained that “In the past we have suffered by having fed our
requirements to the United States ‘piece-meal’”:
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If the suggestion now made be adopted, the President would be personally presented with
a comprehensive picture, a course which I understood from my last conversation with
him and with Secretary Morgenthau he would welcome. It is only through placing such a
picture in the President’s hands that the U.S. Administration can be brought to visualize
the necessary sacrifices in finance, suspension of labour regulations, restrictions on
industry, etc.157
As a result, Churchill dictated the entire letter at Chequers, on 29 November 1940, after which the
process of departmental consultation began anew.158 Still, he remained hesitant about pushing the issue.
Furthermore, although the prime minister took up the letter again, the disagreements were not over.
Lothian wanted the prime minister to focus on the financial crisis; Churchill, however, decided to focus
on shipping and supply. After dictating his revised version on 29 November, he cabled Lothian: “I am
reluctant to make any additions as I wish to focus on shipping.”159
Finally, on 30 November, Churchill completed the final version of the letter, with assistance from
Purvis, and presented it on 2 December 1940 to the War Cabinet, which approved the text. The danger,
Churchill warned, was that if Britain painted the picture too darkly, “elements in the United States would
say that it was useless to help us, for such help would be wasted and thrown away.” At the same time, if
Britain painted too bright a picture, there might be an opposite tendency to withhold assistance. London
could not certain of Roosevelt’s reaction, given the non-response to Churchill’s congratulatory message
of 6 November. Indeed, Churchill told the War Cabinet that he had been “rather chilled” by Roosevelt’s
silence and the attitude of the United States since the election. He assumed that Roosevelt must be
waiting for the post-election atmosphere to disperse.160
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Lothian cabled very considerable amendments on the night of 4-5 December. He rewrote most of
the last quarter of the letter, partly to focus more fully on the financial problem, but above all “to keep the
perspective right without deducting from the shipping case.”161 Churchill flatly rejected most of the
ambassador’s changes. Colville noted that the prime minister “did not care for many of Lothian’s
alterations,” and described the whole thing as a “bloody business.”162 Moreover, the general feeling in the
Foreign Office and the War Cabinet was that Lothian’s version was far too lengthy and detailed. Specific
information could be sent later, perhaps to the appropriate United States department heads rather than to
Roosevelt.163 Scott, however, explained and supported Lothian’s approach in a minute of 6 December:
The Prime Minister was, I believe, mainly concerned to concentrate on the shipping, but
Lord Lothian obviously still thinks that it would be better to give the President a full
picture now, and I think he is right. His idea was that this letter should be continuously in
the President’s mind and that its existence and the knowledge that some day it might be
published would act as a continual spur in meeting our requirements for fear lest it should
be said in years to come “he knew, he was warned and he didn’t take the necessary
steps.”
Halifax replied that Churchill “did not like much of Lothian’s stuff which he thought verbose and
suffering from an over-attempt at being comprehensive!” He believed that the prime minister alone
should give the letter its final shape, as the product of his own mind rather than a composite effort, and
that this consideration must take priority over logical completeness or particular points of emphasis.164
In the end, Churchill focused on the shipping problem. More than half of the text, which ran to
over 4,000 words, was devoted to shipping, in addition to a detailed statistical appendix setting out the
shipping losses for 1940. After stating London’s assumptions about the “solid identity of interest”
between the two countries, Churchill summarized the developments of 1940 and set out the prospects for
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1941. The previous five months had witnessed “a strong and perhaps unexpected recovery” by Great
Britain fighting alone, although “with the invaluable aid in munitions and destroyers placed at our
disposal by the great Republic of which you are for the third time the chosen Chief.” He discussed the
three great interrelated problems of shipping, munitions, and finance, drawing attention to Britain’s
requirements from the United States in each case.
With respect to the shipping problem, Churchill noted that, although the danger of defeat by “a
swift, overwhelming blow” had for the moment greatly receded, a less sudden “but equally deadly”
danger was the “steady and increasing diminution of sea tonnage.” He warned the president:
The decision for 1941 lies upon the seas. Unless we can establish our ability to feed this
Island, to import the munitions of all kinds which we need, unless we can move our
armies to the various theatres where Hitler and his confederate Mussolini must be met,
and maintain them there, and do all this with the assurance of bring able to carry it on till
the spirit of the Continental Dictators is broken, we may fall by the way, and the time
needed by the United States to complete her defensive preparations may not be
forthcoming.
Churchill set out in detail Britain’s shipping losses, naval building programme, and the continuing danger
that the naval forces of Vichy France would join the Axis, taking control of West Africa, “with the
gravest consequences” to Britain’s sea communications between the north and south Atlantic. He then set
out his requests: “the reassertion by the United States of the doctrine of the freedom of the seas from
illegal and barbarous warfare,” supported by American destroyer protection for all lawful trade on the
high seas and the use by the United States, for convoy protection purposes, of bases in Ireland for the
duration of the war. Failing this, Churchill wanted Roosevelt to agree to “the gift, loan, or supply of a
large number of American vessels of war,” particularly destroyers, to enable Britain to maintain the
Atlantic route. In order to help secure the convoy routes, Churchill asked that American ships extend
U.S. naval control on the western side of the Atlantic, “so as to prevent molestation by enemy vessels of
the approaches” to the new American bases being established in the British West Indies.
Finance, by contrast, took up only about 400 words, toward the end of the letter. Churchill
essentially reiterated what Lothian had already made clear, that “The moment approaches when we shall
no longer be able to pay cash for shipping and other supplies.” He noted that the total of orders already
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placed, orders currently under negotiation, and plant expansion costs, already added up to more than the
total of exchange resources that were available:
While we will do our utmost, and shrink from no proper sacrifice to make payments
across the Exchange, I believe you will agree that it would be wrong in principle and
mutually disadvantageous in effect if at the height of this struggle Great Britain were to
be divested of all saleable assets, so that after victory was won with our blood,
civilisation saved, and the time gained for the United States to be fully armed against all
eventualities, we should stand stripped to the bone. Such a course would not be in the
moral or economic interests of either of our countries. We here would be unable, after
the war, to purchase the large balance of imports from the United States over and above
the volume of our exports, which is agreeable to your tariffs and domestic economy. Not
only should we in Great Britain suffer cruel privations, but widespread unemployment in
the United States and follow the curtailment of American exporting power.
Consequently, without making any specific proposal, Churchill put the British Empire at the
mercy of the United States: without American escorts, extended patrolling, and the use “of every ton of
merchant shipping” that it possessed, the Royal Navy could not keep open the supply routes to Britain
and to its battlefronts around the world; without American munitions, especially aircraft, Britain could not
arm itself or its allies; without financial aid, Britain would not be able to acquire the shipping and
munitions it needed. This, Churchill concluded, was not “an appeal for aid,” but rather “a statement of
the minimum action necessary to the achievement of our common purpose.”165
While the prime minister completed and polished the final draft of his letter, in the United States,
Roosevelt was about to embark upon a post-election Caribbean cruise. Lothian wrote to Churchill that
the president was “jammed with appointments” and it would thus be “a mistake to try and give him your
letter at the last moment when he cannot give any serious consideration to it before he goes.” For that
reason, Lothian suggested that the letter would have much greater effect if delivered while the president
was relaxing and reflecting, rather than in the last-minute bustle before he left Washington.166

As he
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wrote Halifax, the president’s holiday had by this point become “his customary prelude to evolving some
stroke of policy.”167
Consequently, the War Cabinet cabled the letter to the British Embassy in Washington, and
Lothian forwarded the text to the State Department on the morning of 8 December 1940.168 In his cover
letter to Cordell Hull, Lothian asked if the letter if the letter “could be sent on to the President at the
earliest possible moment. I hope it may be possible to send it by seaplane, because the Prime Minister is
most anxious that the President should have time to read it carefully while on his cruise and before he gets
back to the bustle of Washington.”169
The president left Washington on 2 December 1940 for his Caribbean cruise aboard the U.S.S.
Tuscaloosa, bringing along only his immediate staff. The White House announced that the main purpose
of the cruise would be to inspect some of the new base sites recently acquired in the West Indies; in fact,
the principal business for each day was fishing, basking in the sun, and relaxing with friends. At stated
points along the route, U.S. Navy seaplanes landed alongside the ship in order to deliver White House
mail, including quantities of state papers for Roosevelt’s signature.170
The Caribbean cruise provided an opportunity for the president not only to relax but also to
reflect. Not only Lothian, but close associates of the president, such as Sumner Welles and William
Bullitt, observed that Roosevelt had been unusually tired and depressed in the weeks following the
election. Felix Frankfurter, the Supreme Court justice, noted that Roosevelt faced his third term not with
elation, but “in a deep Lincolnesque mood,” conscious of the magnitude of the task ahead. The vacation,

167

PRO FO 414/277, A4627/39/45, Tel. 2927, Lothian to Halifax, 5 December 1940.

168

PRO FO 371/24244, A5048/131/45. Tel. 2975, Lothian to Foreign Office, 8 December 1940.

169

Letter, Lothian to Hull, 8 December 1940, President’s Secretary’s File (PSF), The British Diplomatic Files,
Diplomatic Correspondence: October-December 1940, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library Digital Archives.
170

Davis, The War President, 68; Sherwood, 222-223. There is some confusion, as to when exactly the president
received the letter. It is sometimes asserted that Roosevelt received it on the afternoon of 9 December, but, in fact, it
may not have arrived until the morning of the 11 December. Sherwood argues that the letter arrived on the morning
of 9 December with one of the prearranged deliveries by Navy seaplane of mail from Washington. On Lothian’s
cover letter to Hull of 8 December there were the annotations: “Forwarded to Navy 2:30 PM. Plane departed
between 4 and 5 P.M. due in President’s hands afternoon of 9th.” Sherwood, 223; Kimball, 111-112.

386
sun, fishing, and conversation, however, gave the president time not only to rest, but to draw together
various half-formed ideas.
Churchill’s letter had a considerable effect, chastening and stimulating, which was probably due
less to its comments on finance or shipping than to its comprehensive character and the way it brought
together the interconnected relationship of Britain’s varied problems. According to Harry Hopkins, one
of the few contemporary sources of information about Roosevelt’s immediate reaction to that letter, the
message from the prime minister had a profound effect. As Hopkins told Churchill later, the president
read and reread the letter, brooding in his deck chair, and for about two days seemed unsure of what to do.
Then, on 11 December, Hopkins later told Churchill, the president came up with the Lend-Lease idea.171
Hence, once again, the significance of Lothian’s comments of 23 November 1940. Both before
and after his cruise, Roosevelt still believed Britain’s financial crisis to be six months away. In spite of
Lothian’s airport comments and Churchill’s letter, the president informed the press on his return that the
British had plenty of exchange to pay for existing orders. Moreover, he later told Morgenthau “that he
always had in mind that they would have enough money to last until the first of May.”172 Roosevelt was
concerned, however, about Britain’s shortage of merchant shipping. Furthermore, he was also worried
that Britain could no longer provide the capital investment that had helped to stimulate American
industry. In the fall of 1940, Roosevelt had been clearly leaning toward finding some way to assist
Britain more substantially. On 8 November, he told the cabinet and then the press that he favored a fiftyfifty division of war materials with Britain. He also began to develop an idea that had been in his mind as
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early as November 1938 -- leasing ships or any other property that was “loanable, returnable, or
insurable.” Lothian’s airport comments thus had generated a sufficient amount of debate and anxiety, in
the press and in Congress, which forced the administration to clarify its position. When Roosevelt left for
his two-week cruise, he instructed his cabinet to “use your imaginations” in order to come up with a plan
to address Britain’s financial problems. By the time Roosevelt returned from his cruise, however, having
received, read, and absorbed Churchill’s letter, he had pulled together his ideas into a comprehensive
program for all of Britain’s supply needs, based on the Lend-Lease concept. Lothian’s parallel initiatives
had made clear to Roosevelt, therefore, the need for a comprehensive solution to Britain’s needs.
“Good Night, Philip”
Throughout the fall of 1940, Lothian began to show signs of physical deterioration, the result of
immensely hard work. By the latter part of June, he complained that his golf was shocking, most likely
because “I’m working about twice as hard as I ever have in my life before.” The work, moreover, became
extraordinarily taxing, particularly in July and August, when he was consumed by the destroyers
negotiations. It was not unusual to be roused out of bed in New York City in the small hours and told to
return to Washington by a 2:35 a.m. train in order to deal with some urgent telegrams.173 Already by late
August, Lothian was exhausted. On 1 September, he wrote Lady Astor from Boston:
I came up here to the Bells for this weekend. I felt almost dead beat after all the work
about the naval bases and the destroyers, which has kept me up late of nights. Besides
I’ve only had 4 days real holiday in a year.174
The most outward sign of his intensifying weariness was an increasing tendency to fall asleep,
sometimes when dictating, sometimes on public occasions, or even sometimes while speaking.175 When
Wheeler-Bennett returned from a brief visit to London in September, he was shocked by the extraordinary
change in Lothian’s appearance in only a few weeks:
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He looked greatly fatigued and to my dismay dropped off to sleep for a brief spell in the
middle of one of his sentences. That he had been working desperately hard ever since
June I was well aware, but this seemed unnatural and I was the more anxious when I
found that this falling asleep was a recent development and that it had occurred on public
occasions, between courses at luncheon -- or dinner parties and even when he was
dictating. It was disturbing not only for itself but because it was causing comment in
Washington. . . . To me . . . he looked a sick man.176
It was not, however, exclusively from fatigue and drowsiness alone that Lothian began to fall
asleep. For some time, he had been suffering from a troublesome disease of the kidneys, known as
uremia, which causes lethargy and somnolence,177 although he would usually recover rapidly from its
attacks. In July, for example, he wrote of feeling “dreadfully tired” before starting a brief vacation in
Connecticut but, coming back to Washington, described himself as feeling extraordinarily fit, “like a twoyear old.”178 Nevertheless, what Lothian needed was rest, a complete holiday for at least a month. What
he did, however, was to take a short leave in Britain, most of which he spent working in London, at that
moment enduring the most intensive phase of German bombing. During this visit to Britain, several
people noticed his signs of extreme fatigue. At times, he looked vigorous and healthy, and at other times,
he looked “dreadfully ill.” He was reported to have fallen off to sleep even at the prime minister’s table.
At Oxford, however, on his last day in Britain, he was apparently serene and untired.179
When Lothian returned to Washington, Wheeler-Bennett noted that he did not look rested and did
not seem well. The periods of somnolence became more frequent and more commented upon. Lothian
nevertheless pushed on. He returned to a great mass of work, official and semi-official, taking on as
much as he could. He continued to lunch and dine out as much as before. He even instituted a new
“custom” of “working breakfasts” and occasionally snatched the time for a round of golf.180
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Even as he grew sicker, Lothian continued to make the case for Britain. On the evening of 11
December 1940, Nevile Butler, the Counsellor of the British Embassy, delivered an address, prepared by
Lothian, to the American Farm Bureau Federation in Baltimore. It was to have been Lothian’s first fulllength public speech in five months. Given the urgency of Britain’s need for American assistance,
Lothian considered this to be his most important speech, and had worked on it since the end of November.
In the days before 11 December, however, he took ill, seriously enough that he himself could not deliver
the speech. In the ambassador’s place, therefore, Butler spoke instead.
In general terms, Butler reiterated Lothian’s well-known themes. For example, in one significant
respect, he described the war as an ideological and revolutionary struggle between Hitler’s totalitarian
military machine and democracy. The core of Nazism, he argued, was moral rottenness, the application
of militarism to the entire nation, “in order to subjugate others so that their resources can be organized on
totalitarian lines for the benefit of the German military state.” Hitlerism, Lothian asserted, “cannot stop
and become peaceful. Nazi Germany is organized for war and totalitarian economics and for nothing
else.”

The core of the Allied creed, however, for all of their mistakes, was liberty, justice, and truth:

“The Sermon on the Mount is in the long run much stronger than all Hitler’s propaganda or Goering’s
guns and bombs.” More to the point, however, Lothian continued to reiterate, even to the end, that the
survival of Britain was essential to the security of the United States. He recalled the gloomy speculation
of early June 1940, that if Hitler conquered Britain, “the British Fleet would be sunk or surrendered or
scattered among the British nations overseas.” Yet, Lothian asked, “wasn’t it clear that American security
required two fleets -- the British Fleet based on Britain blocking the entry of hostile European fleets into
the Eastern Atlantic, and the United States Fleet predominant in the Pacific?” He further recounted the
gloomy days of June and July 1940, from Dunkirk, the fall of France, and through the Battle of Britain.
That grim picture, he maintained, had “been dispelled, at any rate for the present, by the action of the
people of a small island in the North Sea, nobly and valiantly aided by the young nations of the British
family across the seas.” Nevertheless, 1941, he predicted, would be the critical year. Even though the
Germans failed to bomb Britain into surrender, and even though the Germans had failed to launch their
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inevitable invasion, Hitler would certainly try again over the next year, “with all his might this winter and
spring.” Lothian predicted that in his next attack, Hitler would concentrate on the sea. He would use his
new submarines, long-distance planes, and his great new battleships, the Bismarck and the Tirpitz, in
order to deliver a knockout blow, “so as to prevent us getting the food, raw materials, and aeroplanes
necessary to enable us to continue the war at full strength.” The danger, he argued, was the result of
Britain fighting alone, while its navy was “strung out terribly thin”:
We think this is a situation which concerns you almost as much as it concerns us. It has
long been clear that your security no less than ours depends upon our holding the Atlantic
impregnable and you the Pacific. . . . Therefore the more secure our control of the
Atlantic the less likely is the outbreak of a two-ocean war.
The essential step towards Britain’s ability to secure the Atlantic was, the “uninterrupted flow of
American munitions to the British Isles.”

If Britain could now withstand Hitler’s fast developing

onslaught by sea and air against its life lines, and assure the uninterrupted flow of American supplies,
Hitler’s defeat was certain; Britain would be victorious. But with his final words, which generated much
attention and comment, Lothian placed the burden of the future firmly on the American people:
It is for you to decide whether you share our hopes and what support you will give in
realizing them. We are, I believe, doing all we can. Since May there is no challenge we
have evaded, no challenge we have refused. If you back us you won’t be backing a
quitter. The issue now depends largely on what you decide to do. Nobody can share the
responsibility with you. It is the great strength of democracy that it brings responsibility
down squarely on every citizen and every nation. And before the judgement [sic] seat of
God each must answer for his own actions.181
Lothian’s speech won raves and praise. Time Magazine described it as “a powerful statement,
ending with an expression of faith in a final democratic victory, and a projection of the stable democratic
world that could come after the war. It was in some respects Lord Lothian’s best speech.” Morgenthau
described it as the perfect response to what he termed “this blue fog here in Washington, that Britain is
licked.”182 Wheeler-Bennett, who helped the ambassador revise it, described the speech as Lothian’s
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“valedictory to America and to Britain and to the World.” It was a “superb quintessence of all that he had
believed in and striven for and for which he was about to die.”183
The following morning, 12 December 1940, the press sought further comment from the
ambassador. Alistair Cooke, the special correspondent of the Times, called at the British Embassy to
interview Lothian. The butler responded to the visitor, however, with solemn composure: “I’m terribly
sorry, Sir, that will be quite impossible. The Ambassador died early this morning.”184
The ambassador had been quite clearly fatigued over the previous months, the result of overwork.
In recent days, moreover, the pattern of strong days followed by weak days persisted. For example,
Lothian played nine holes of golf on Saturday, 7 December, showing no signs of weakness; in fact, he had
seemed fresh and vigorous. That evening, he and Wheeler-Bennett finalized the draft of his speech.
When they had finished, however, Wheeler-Bennett recalled, “I looked up and saw that he was ill:”
I begged him to go to bed. “I can’t,” he said, “I have Norman Davis [the veteran
American statesman and Head of the American Red Cross] coming to dine.” “You know
him well enough to give a tray in your room,” I said. “Do go to bed.” But he would not -at least not then -- and summoning up a smile he said: “Good night, Jack, and thank
you.” I had always preserved strict protocol in dealing with him as my chief, calling him
“sir”, but now somehow I felt as if I were off-duty. “Good night, Philip,” I said. I never
saw him again.185
Lothian dined out that evening, and on the following evening, Sunday, 8 December, he was again at work,
drafting a telegram for the Foreign Office, when he suddenly took ill. His pain was significant enough
that, at his request, his staff contacted an old friend in Boston, Mr. Cudworth, a Christian Science
practitioner, who arrived early the next morning. Another of the ambassador’s long-time friends, Sir
Walter Layton, who was currently preparing to depart for Britain, asked whether a real doctor should be
summoned and if he should stay; Lothian urged him to go, and take personal messages to London. The
ambassador remained drowsy and weak, but on Monday and Tuesday, 9 and 10 December, he seemed to
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rally.186 On Wednesday afternoon, 11 December, he felt sufficiently energetic to have a few words with
Richard Casey, the Australian ambassador, another long-time friend. Casey asked Lothian’s Christian
Science practitioner, Mr. Cudworth, whether “in due course . . . there was not a time element involved -i.e., did not a moment arrive when he was convinced that his treatment was not effective and, when that
time arrived, did he not agree that orthodox medical science should be called in. He reassured me on this
by saying that he was broadminded on these matters and that when he was so convinced, it was his habit
to ask the individual and/or his relatives or associates if they wanted other advice.” Casey, however, was
not convinced. In his own memoirs, he later wrote that Cudworth “was clearly not interested in any
diagnosis of Lothian’s trouble.”187
That evening, however, Lothian’s condition took a turn for the worst.

He was attended

throughout by his secretary, Mrs. Fowler, and his valet-chauffeur, Mr. Winter, as well as by Cudworth
and a Christian Science male nurse.188 Lothian died at approximately 2:00 a.m., 12 December 1940.
Nevile Butler informed the Foreign Office of the ambassador’s death in a telephone message:
I deeply regret to report that Lord Lothian died at 2 a.m. this morning. He was taken ill
on Sunday night and since then had been receiving the treatment that he wished. Shall be
grateful if you will inform his sisters and ascertain their wishes.189
His illness had been sudden and its gravity known only to a few. The ambassador’s Christian Science
beliefs, moreover, had complicated matters. The Embassy’s head of Chancery, Derek Hoyer-Millar,
together with Wheeler-Bennett and the senior diplomatic staff, in addition to other friends such as Layton
and Casey, tried urgently to convince Lothian to see a conventional practitioner, but they found their
efforts obstructed. Lothian’s personal staff -- Mrs. Fowler, Mr. Winter, Nevile Butler -- were also
Christian Scientists, who had reinforced his resolve to refuse conventional medical attention. They
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insisted that he was responding to Christian Science treatment.190 Consequently, the Foreign Office
telegraphed Butler that, “In view of rumours that his death was not accidental please telegraph at once full
report of occasion for and treatment of Lord Lothian’s fatal illness.”191 Butler responded that Lothian
seemed perfectly normal over the weekend, when he played golf on Saturday and had a long conversation
with Cordell Hull on Sunday morning. On Sunday afternoon, however, he fainted. Although he was able
to do business in his bedroom, he was “in a very weak condition with internal pains.” He specifically
requested Christian Science treatment from a Boston practitioner, Mr. Cudworth, whom he had known for
many years. Mr. Cudworth received hourly reports by telephone through Sunday evening and reached
Washington at noon on Monday.
On Sunday and Monday an apparent stoppage of the bladder action was causing distress,
weakness and difficulty of breathing. His condition improved in the course of the day
and voiding took place on Tuesday on which day his condition seemed generally better.
On Wednesday night Lord Lothian . . . [had some restful hours] but between 1 and 1:30
a.m. suffered a sudden seizure of shortness of breath and from this he never recovered.
Fresh symptoms and earlier ones, e.g. a tendency to fall asleep which has been evident all
this year, suggested that death was due to toxic poisoning affecting the hear, and this
seemed [to be the] view of medical practitioner who was called in after [death] and who
arranged for death certificate. This was given to-day by the Coroner.192
With respect to the suggestion that Lothian’s death was not accidental, Butler wrote that “We know
nothing whatever to support any suggestion of foul play, and Coroner gave his certificate after talking to
Dr. Weems.” Nevertheless, Butler undoubtedly felt compelled to defend himself:
It will no doubt be questioned why I did not insist on calling in a medical practitioner.
As regards this, it was Lord Lothian’s clear wish to have the form of treatment he chose .
. . to have forced a change on him would in my view have been dangerous. I had
contemplated calling in today (12 December) an orthodox practitioner in order to give
you his opinion as to the length of time Lord Lothian was likely to be out of action.193
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Lothian’s death stunned the British government. Cadogan described Lothian’s death as a “great
blow.” Colville noted that Lothian’s death represented “a tragic blow to our relations with the United
States where his ability was so marked and his drive so fruitful.” Nicolson wrote that it was “a blow over
the heart.”194 Halifax sarcastically observed, however, “another victim for Christian Science.” Churchill
agreed. “What a monstrous thing,” the prime minister stated to Professor Lindemann, “that Lothian
should not have allowed a doctor to be called.” He further reflected that, “I had at last come to like
Philip, after years of prejudice.”195 Robert Post, the London correspondent of The New York Times,
reported that the news of Lothian’s death stunned London and overshadowed recent British successes in
western Egypt. One “anonymous commentator” on the radio, he wrote, stated that it was if Britain had
lost a battleship, while another commentator in “official circles” asserted that “It is a worse loss to us than
two army corps would have been,” a reflection of not only Lothian’s success in Washington, but also an
indication of the extent to which the British felt the United States was the key to British survival.196 Duff
Cooper expressed sorrow as well.

This did not prevent him, however, from tactlessly initiating a

thorough reorganization of the British Press Service, immediately after the ambassador’s death.197
In London, his memory was honored by a service in Westminster Abbey on 20 December 1940,
and formal tributes were paid to him in both houses of Parliament. Churchill, who described Lothian’s
passing as “a loss to the nation and to the Cause,” immediately telegraphed to Roosevelt: “Am deeply
grieved at loss of Lothian, who was our greatest Ambassador to the United States and who had
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established such intimate and cordial relations with you and your Executive. We have lost a good friend
and high Interpreter.” He later added, “I need not tell you what a loss this is for me personally and to the
War Cabinet.”198 In a speech to the House of Commons, on 19 December 1940, Churchill paid tribute to
Lothian, bestowing praise on his great success as ambassador to the United States: “I take the opportunity
of expressing the grief which the House has felt in all quarters at the untimely, sudden death of our
Ambassador in the United States, Lord Lothian.” After a few observations about his character and career,
Churchill noted that many people sitting in the chamber, himself included, had misjudged his ability:
. . . when he was appointed before the war to the Embassy in the United States, the most
important of all the functions outside this country that can be discharged by any British
subject, there were various opinions upon the wisdom of that choice. Very soon,
however, it was seen that the new Ambassador was gaining in influence every day, that
his stature rose with the greatness of the topics confided to him, and that the contacts
which he established, the intimate relations which he developed, with the high personnel
of the United States Administration, the friendship to which the President of the United
States has himself testified -- all the evidence showed the remarkable efficiency and
success with which he discharged his important and extremely delicate and difficult
mission.
Indeed, the prime minister concluded by noting that Lothian died at the height of his influence:
Suddenly, he is taken from us. He passes away. But I cannot help feeling that to die at
the height of a man’s career, the highest moment of his effort here in this world,
universally honoured and admired, to die while great issues are still commanding the
whole of his interest, to be taken at a moment when he could already see ultimate success
in view -- is not the most unenviable of fates. I feel that the House would have wished
me to express, in these few words, the sorrow which we feel at his death, and also the
very grievous and practical sense that we have of the loss we have suffered at this
particular juncture in having been deprived of his invaluable services.199
Lothian’s sudden and unexpected death was mourned as deeply in the United States as in Britain.
Roosevelt was stung by the news of Lothian’s death, which he received while still at sea. The two men
had developed a warm personal friendship, although Lothian had suffered the president’s wrath during
their last important meeting. At once, Roosevelt dispatched, through the State Department, a message to
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the press and a message to King George VI, expressing shock and grief at this abrupt loss of a personal
friend, who was also America’s great friend: “I am shocked beyond measure to hear of the sudden
passing of my old friend and your Ambassador.” Over the previous 25 years, the president wrote, “we
had come to understand and trust each other.”200 Cordell Hull described Lothian’s death as “an acute
loss,” and immediately cabled Churchill and Halifax.201 He later wrote that few ambassadors had ever
assumed their posts at so tense a moment. “Lothian to my mind was unexcelled as an ambassador by
anyone of my acquaintance. His . . . “outstanding ability, his willingness and readiness to grasp our point
of view and to represent that of his own Government, and his pleasing personality, made him an
unsurpassed medium through which to carry on relations between the two Governments.”202 Harold Ickes
wrote that Lothian “knew America as few Europeans do. He was thoroughly democratic, knew our
American habits and psychology and was very popular here. His death is a severe loss.”203 The
Australian ambassador Lord Casey wrote in his memoirs that one of the Justices of the American
Supreme Court said to him, “Americans love a lord, but only if he doesn’t act like a lord. Lothian was
universally liked and very greatly respected. He did a great job.”204 Lothian’s old friend, the American
diplomat Norman Davis wrote that in all of his experience, he had never known of his own country being
quite so affected by a foreigner’s death: “In some indescribable way he had completely endeared himself
to the country, not only to those who knew him but to those who did not know him.” A taxi driver
reportedly told Mr. Davis’s secretary, “You know lady, I didn’t think Americans would ever be keen
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about an Englishman, but I swear every customer I have had today feels terrible bad [sic] about that Lord
Lothian’s death.”205
The State Department arranged for his temporary internment, attended by an honor guard, in
Arlington National Cemetery, a rare honor reserved for only one other British representative during the
war.206 A very large concourse attended the state funeral in Washington Epicopalian Cathedral at 2:30
p.m. on Sunday, 15 December 1940. The next day, after a private cremation, his remains were placed,
with ceremony, within the national vault, and ultimately beneath the mast of the battleship Maine, to
remain there until 1945, when they were brought home to Scotland aboard an American warship. There
they were finally laid in the family vault in the north transept of Jedburgh Abbey.207
Lothian’s death created a vacuum in the conduct of Anglo-American relations. Never had the
office held such importance. By the fall of 1940, both Churchill and Roosevelt preferred to conduct most
of their business through Lothian, almost completely ignoring Joseph P. Kennedy in London. As recently
as 10 October, Halifax informed Lothian that Kennedy was “very much out of temper” with the White
House, his “principal complaint being that they had not kept him adequately informed of their policy and
doings during the last two or three months. Indeed, he said, if it had not been for what he had learnt in
London, he would have known nothing of what was going on.”208 United States army attaché in London,
General Raymond E. Lee, noted in his diary that Roosevelt relied upon two sources for quick and reliable
information, “my cables and the information which is furnished him by Lord Lothian.”209 Therefore, the
vacancy of Massachusetts Avenue triggered an immediate flurry of speculation as to a suitable successor.
Raymond Gram Swing advised Churchill, “Urgently remember that liberals won the election here so
Ambassador must be Liberal.” He also added, “No old school tie . . . also must not be appeasement.”
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While rumors were rife in both Washington and New York, Churchill’s initial preference was for David
Lloyd George, “if he could trust him,” wrote Colville. The prime minister believed, Colville wrote, that
Lloyd George “would be loyal to him. If not, he could always sack him.”210 On 14 December 1940,
therefore, Churchill telegraphed Roosevelt, “asking if Lloyd George would be acceptable as
Ambassador.” Although Roosevelt was less than enthusiastic, he wrote Churchill the next day, “Choice
will be entirely agreeable. I knew him in world war.” The president added, however, that “I assume that
over here he will in no way play into the hands of the appeasers.”211
The choice of Lloyd George, however, proved to be far more controversial among the British.
Wheeler-Bennett described Churchill’s consideration of Lloyd George as “preposterous.” Moreover, it
caused much consternation among the Embassy staff, which quickly descended “into a combination of
panic and near-mutiny.” Nevile Butler emphatically noted that “Rightly or wrongly, Lloyd George is, I
think, regarded in this country as an appeaser and as not unwilling to consider making terms with
Germany.” Churchill also received, in very quick order, messages from several Dominions leaders,212
deprecating at length his proposal to appoint Lloyd George to Washington. To the relief of many,
however, Lloyd George let Churchill off the hook, declining the appointment on medical grounds, his
doctor having advised that he was too old.213
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In the end, the prime minister’s choice flew directly in the face of Swing’s advice. Churchill
selected an arch-Tory, an Etonian and a patrician, whose political career had been closely identified with
the expediency of appeasement: the Foreign Secretary, Lord Halifax. Halifax himself was appalled by
the idea. He knew enough of the United States to have appointed Lothian, and he understood that, as a
former viceroy of India, he was not a suitable successor. He was a six-foot-six, living, breathing
personification of every negative stereotype that Americans had always nurtured with regard to Britain,
particularly when compared to the “democratic, easygoing, informal, and ever accessible” Lothian.
Churchill, however, insisted that the appointment of Halifax could not fail to impress the Americans, and
he called upon the foreign secretary to accept “This high and perilous charge . . . on which our whole
future depends.”214
Clearly, Churchill stood to gain politically from Halifax’s departure from London. With the
death of Neville Chamberlain in October 1940, Halifax inherited the mantle of Munich and thus became a
political liability. His appointment would therefore enable Churchill to consolidate his own hold on the
War Cabinet, moving Anthony Eden back into the Foreign Office and assuming control of the War Office
himself. Halifax fought valiantly to change Churchill’s mind, but to no avail. When the prime minister
sweetened the offer with an arrangement whereby he would retain a seat in the War Cabinet, Halifax
finally accepted the job. The news of the appointment, however, fell heavily on American journalists and
British propagandists alike. Murrow confessed that he himself was appalled, while René MacColl simply
recorded in his diary: “22 December 1940 . . . Halifax is Ambassador. Christ.”215
Significance: Lothian Nudges the United States to “Unsordidness”
In the meantime, President Roosevelt returned to Washington D.C. on Sunday evening, 16
December 1940, well rested, suntanned, and in excellent humor. He met with Morgenthau over lunch the
next day, 17 December, and laid out the ideas he had developed during his vacation. The president
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bluntly stated that “the thing to do is to get away from the dollar sign. I don’t want to put the thing in
terms of dollars or loans.” He suggested, instead, that the United States increase its production and then
give Britain what it needed with the proviso that it return the goods after the war in kind, properly
repaired, with any depreciations also paid in kind. Morgenthau enthusiastically embraced the proposal,
although he acknowledged that it would be better to appear to be driving a hard bargain.216
That same afternoon, Roosevelt faced a press conference and publicly addressed Britain’s
imminent dollar crisis. After a few opening remarks, in which he denied that there was any real news to
report, Roosevelt presented the administration’s rationale for continuing and increasing aid to Britain. He
stressed that he was “talking selfishly, from the American point of view,” and flatly asserted that British
defense orders had been and were a “tremendous asset to American defense.” The “one thing necessary
for American national defense is additional productive facilities . . . factories, shipbuilding ways,
munitions plants, et cetera, and so on,” he told reporters. British orders helped to create those facilities
and stimulate expansion, so they must be encouraged. The question, of course, was how to do this?
Roosevelt ruled out both straightforward loans and direct gifts. Instead, he proposed that the United
States take over British orders and then “lease or sell” them to Britain, justifying such a plan on the
grounds that, “The best defense of Great Britain is the best defense of the United States.” What he was
trying to do, the president explained, was “eliminate the dollar sign.” He illustrated the concept with an
analogy, which he borrowed from Harold Ickes:
Suppose my neighbor’s home catches fire, and I have a length of garden hose four or five
hundred feet away. If he can take my garden hose and connect it up with his hydrant, I
may help him put out his fire. Now, what do I do? I don’t say to him before that
operation, ‘Neighbor, my garden hose cost me fifteen dollars; you have to pay me fifteen
dollars for it.’ What is the transaction that goes on? I don’t want fifteen dollars -- I want
my garden hose back after the fire is over.
In the end, it was necessary, the president stressed, to lease Britain essential munitions in the
interest of American security, “with the understanding that when the show was over, we would get repaid
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sometime in kind, thereby leaving out the dollar mark in the form of a dollar debt and substituting for it a
gentleman’s obligation to pay in kind.” In answering questions, Roosevelt made it clear that these
proposals would require congressional legislation. He insisted, however, that he was not seeking to repeal
the Neutrality Act. Instead, he wanted to bypass its anti-loan provisions and to avoid the war debts that
had poisoned Anglo-American relations in the 1920s and 1930s. He was evasive, however, when
confronted with questions about whether this brought the United States closer to war or questions about
American preparedness.

Roosevelt simply emphasized that he intended Lend-Lease to galvanize

American rearmament, as well as to provide aid to Britain.217
The implication of Roosevelt’s proposed Lend-Lease proposal was crystal clear. If it achieved
congressional approval, Lend-Lease would tie the British and American economies so closely together as
virtually to fuse them, as the war went on, into a single planned economy -- and therefore commit the
United States so firmly to a British victory that American entry into the war was certain, if or when such
entry became necessary to assure British victory. After all, since the late summer of 1940, Britain and the
United States had begun to share military and scientific secrets. In a formal agreement reached only three
weeks prior to Roosevelt’s press conference, Britain and the United States had agreed to standardize their
basic designs for planes, tanks, guns, and military vehicles so that they could be used interchangeably by
the two countries. Furthermore, Roosevelt had recently approved Admiral Stark’s long-pending request
for highly secret military staff talks, to be held in Washington beginning in January 1941, between
representatives of the British and American chiefs of staff.218 Consequently, the fusion of the two
nations’ economies was to be matched by that of their military science, their armed forces, and the
strategies and tactics for their employment.219
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Roosevelt’s efforts culminated in a major foreign policy address to the nation on 29 December
1940, the night of a ferocious German air raid on London. The president chose to deliver the speech in a
“fireside chat,” his first in months, because he could mold public opinion far more rapidly and reliably
through the wider and more personal contact of radio. This was not, he began, a talk on war, but rather a
discussion on how to keep out of the conflict. For the first half of the address, Roosevelt concentrated on
creating a sense of crisis. He asserted that America now faced the greatest danger in its history, quoting
Hitler’s recent speech, in which he stated that “there are two worlds that stand opposed to each other,”
with no possibility of reconciliation between them. The president maintained that the Axis “New Order”
was simply a “revival of the oldest and the worst tyranny” in which there was “no liberty, no religion, no
hope.” When American appeasers talked of a “negotiated peace,” they were deluding themselves. That,
Roosevelt stated, would be a “dictated peace” with a “gang of outlaws,” who had made it clear that “there
can be no ultimate peace between their philosophy of government and our philosophy of government.”
The president then elaborated on his plans for aiding Britain. He insisted again that American
security and the chances of staying out of the war were in large part dependent upon the survival of
Britain, and that he had no intention of declaring war or sending troops to Europe. The sole purpose of
national policy was “to keep war away from our country and our people.” If Britain went down, Axis
powers would “control the continents of Europe, Asia, Africa, Australasia, and the high seas.” Moreover,
he warned, “all of us, in all the Americas, would be living at the point of a gun -- a gun loaded with
explosive bullets economic as well as military. Frankly and definitely there is danger ahead -- danger
against which we must prepare. But we well know that we cannot escape danger; or the fear of danger,
by crawling into bed and pulling the covers over our head.” What the British needed, therefore, were the
“implements of war, the planes, the tanks, the guns, the freighters which will enable them to fight for their
liberty and our security.” Their needs, moreover, must be integrated with those of the United States.
Present industrial efforts, however, were not good enough: “we must have more ships, more guns, more
planes -- more of everything. This can be done only if we discard the notion of ‘business as usual.’”
Therefore, the United States should become “the great arsenal of democracy.” The inference was very
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clear; the United States was to provide the wherewithal by which Britain would fight the Axis. He placed
no limit of any kind on the material aid to be given, and thus totally committed the United States to
providing full aid to Britain.220
The public reaction to the speech was extraordinarily positive, to a degree that surprised and
delighted Roosevelt. Seventy-five percent of those polled indicated that they had heard or read his words.
More important, public reaction ran well in the president’s favor. Mail and telegrams to the White House
ran at 100-to-one in favor, and the Gallup poll found that, among those who heard or read the speech, 61
percent agreed with the president’s position, whereas only 24 percent were opposed. Highly encouraged
by this support, the president gave the Treasury Department the green light to finish drafting the
appropriate legislation.221 As a result, on 11 March 1941, after two months of speeches, lobbying, and
extensive news coverage on both sides of the Atlantic, Roosevelt signed into law H.R. 1776, popularly
known as the Lend-Lease Act. The bill represented an extraordinary grant of power to the executive
branch of the American government, which therefore enabled the United States to provide Britain with
over $31 billion dollars worth of war materials, in spite of London’s inability to pay for those goods.
At the same time, the passage of Lend-Lease likewise represented a significant British success in
securing an explicit and extensive package of American material assistance.

Because the British

government had actively endeavored to win such American support since the outbreak of the Second
World War in September 1939, many more observers regarded Lend-Lease as not only an unambiguous
American commitment to Britain, but a victory more uplifting and ultimately more valuable than the first
actual British military successes of the war that same December.222
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While this notable achievement obviously cannot be attributed to the efforts of one individual
exclusively, it is nevertheless clear that the role of Lord Lothian was both central and critical. Similar to
most British officials, Lothian recognized that, because Britain was nearing the limits of its financial and
shipping resources, the United States was subsequently nearing the limits of its “cash and carry”
neutrality.

This likewise meant that, in order to provide Britain with substantial material aid, the

Roosevelt administration would have to seek and secure congressional approval. Unlike most British
officials, however, Lothian understood that it generally took about six months to translate congressional
approval into practical reality.

Furthermore, and more significantly, Lothian did not believe that

Roosevelt’s reelection would lead quickly or automatically to an extension of American assistance to
Britain. He therefore took certain initiatives in order to push the Roosevelt administration into action. On
the one hand, he persuaded a reluctant Churchill to send Roosevelt “the letter,” an honest and thorough
overview of Britain’s position and needs. On the other hand, on top of his ongoing efforts to publicize
Britain’s plight through the British Press Service, the Inter-Allied Information Committee, and his
contacts with pro-interventionist American groups, Lothian went public on 23 November 1940, upon his
return to the United States, with a sober and realistic explanation of that situation, especially with respect
to the dollar gap. While Roosevelt apparently was only beginning to face up to this problem, Lothian’s
remarks sparked off a major press and political debate that ultimately compelled the president to take
action. Churchill’s letter, arriving during a much-needed vacation when he had time to think, helped
force the president into a comprehensive program for presentation to Congress, in part due to the climate
of opinion Lothian had already helped to create in the United States preceding its arrival.
Similar to the destroyers-for-bases deal, the conclusion of Lend-Lease inspired a variety of
interpretations. Winston Churchill described the measure, in a speech before Parliament, as “the most
unsordid act in the history of any nation,” as the United States would ultimately provide Britain with over
$31 billion dollars worth of equipment and materiel. Not all Britons, however, agreed with Churchill.
Many became convinced, during and especially after the war, that the United States had taken advantage
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of London’s financial crisis in order to increase the American share of the global economic market at
Britain’s expense; even Adolf Hitler accused the United States of taking advantage of Britain’s woes.223
For better or worse, this “unsordid act” nevertheless represented an irrevocable commitment on
the part of the United States to Britain -- and Lord Lothian was at the center of its creation. Although it
would still be nine months before the United States finally entered the war, driven in, as Lothian had
always maintained it would be, by a direct attack on a vital American interest, the Lend-Lease Act
represented the creation of arguably the most productive and cooperative coalition of modern history -the Anglo-American Alliance against Nazi Germany.
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CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSION
Philip Henry Kerr, eleventh Marquis of Lothian, enjoyed a career of public service stretching
from the zenith of British imperial power in the early twentieth century to the darkest hours of 1940. He
never held any elected public office or bore executive responsibility for any department of state. He was
never a statesman of the first rank. Nevertheless, he managed to be near the “centre of power” at frequent
intervals from January 1917, with his appointment to the secretariat of Prime Minister David Lloyd
George, until his death in December 1940. His most significant role, however, was his service as the
British ambassador to the United States from August 1939 to December 1940. Lord Lothian was
ambassador for only a brief time, but his ambassadorship coincided with a crucial period in relations
between Britain and the United States -- the first year of the Second World War, when Britain faced Nazi
Germany essentially without allies, while the United States remained neutral. Lothian ultimately became
a primary intermediary between Winston Churchill and Franklin Roosevelt, particularly during the
summer and fall of 1940, although he had to overcome his association with appeasement and the
infamous “Cliveden Set” in order to win their confidence. In that capacity, he helped to broker the
celebrated Destroyers-for-Bases deal and lay the foundations for Lend-Lease, which represented one of
the great turning points of the war. Lend-Lease not only represented a program of American assistance to
Britain, which was hardly compatible with neutrality, it became the essential foundation in the
establishment of the Anglo-American alliance during the Second World War. In a vital and fundamental
way, therefore, Lothian’s efforts effectively laid the foundations of the “Special Relationship.”
Lothian, whose father was an officer in the British army and had served in India and Ireland,
grew up an imperialist, convinced of the virtues of British imperial supremacy. His first administrative
experience was as an early protégé of Lord Milner, a member of Milner’s “Kindergarten,” which
implemented South Africa’s post-Boer War reconstruction from 1905-1910. Thereafter, he returned to
Britain, where he helped to found and edit The Round Table, a journal established to promote closer
integration within the British Empire. During and after the First World War, however, he saw at first
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hand the limits of British power and worried about the ramifications of further British decline. The
consequence of his worries was a growing faith in the concept of international federation.1
Although Lothian believed that the extension and consolidation of Pax Brittanica would prevent
international dissolution and anarchy, with the decline of British power, he concluded that the best
alternative was Pax Anglo-Americana. Indeed, the defining theme of Lothian’s entire public career was
his persistent advocacy of strong Anglo-American cooperation as the bedrock of any international
federation.2 Although he began advocating stronger Anglo-American relations long before the outbreak
of the Great War, Lothian in the interwar years urged the United States to undertake a much more central
role in international affairs. For example, he called on Washington to assume a leading role in the League
of Nations to ensure that institution’s success. In 1925, Lothian became the secretary to the Rhodes Trust,
a position he would hold until 1939, which enabled him to undertake even more sustained work to
facilitate closer connections with the United States. Anglo-American relations during the interwar years
were, in fact, characterized by an underlying mistrust, caused principally by war debts, naval rivalry, and
divergent approaches to international security. Lothian nevertheless dedicated his career to the promotion
of Anglo-American harmony. In part, he worked for a closer and more wide ranging Anglo-American
relationship due to his disillusionment with the League of Nations. In the absence of an effective
mechanism for collective security, moreover, his faith in the absolute necessity for Anglo-American
cooperation helps to explain his appeasement of Nazi Germany during the 1930s. Lothian’s appeasement
resulted from his conviction that Britain desperately had to prevent a war that it could not win alone.
Without American assistance, he argued, Britain was simply too weak to oppose Germany alone.
Lothian assumed control of the British Embassy in the United States immediately before the
outbreak of the Second World War. During the first eight months, however, several factors limited his
influence. First, his enthusiasm for Anglo-American cooperation was not shared in the British cabinet,
1
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where there persisted a fundamental distrust of the United States, a concern about becoming dependent on
American aid, and growing strains over the issue, revisited from the First World War, of belligerent
versus neutral rights on the seas. Second, the military circumstances of the “Phoney War” did not
necessitate Anglo-American relations becoming a priority. Britain focused its most serious diplomatic
efforts on keeping Italy and the Balkan states neutral, and thus keeping the war out of the Mediterranean.
The British believed that, if they could survive the initial German onslaught, through their own bombing
campaigns, blockade, and global economic resources, the Germans might accept a negotiated peace.
Third, the delicate state of American public opinion constrained Lothian, at least initially. On the advice
of his predecessor, Sir Ronald Lindsay, Lothian assumed a low profile, particularly as Roosevelt sought
to secure repeal of the American arms embargo in favor of “cash and carry” legislation.
Beginning in May and June 1940, however, Lothian began to play a far more central role in
Anglo-American relations. The collapse of France significantly altered the character of the war for both
London and Washington, since both had considered the French as their first line of defense. Thus, Britain
increasingly saw American assistance as vital to its survival, while the United States increasingly saw the
British fleet as its main line of defense from Nazi Germany. The collapse of France, moreover, coincided
with the change in British leadership, as Winston Churchill, who was considerably more enthusiastic
about an Anglo-American alliance, replaced Neville Chamberlain as prime minister. As a consequence of
this intensification of the war, Lothian followed up Churchill’s request, of mid-May 1940, for American
destroyers. He told Roosevelt, in effect, that if Britain collapsed for want of American help, the United
States would be confronted with a widespread naval crisis. With its main fleet at Hawaii to deter Japan
and a weak Atlantic squadron on the East Coast, the United States would have to confront naval threats
on both coasts. When Roosevelt suggested that if the worst happened, the British fleet might cross the
Atlantic to American waters, Lothian replied that, unless the United States had entered the war, British
public opinion would not likely entrust its fleet to a neutral America. Lothian’s argument established the
guidelines for subsequent discussions over the summer. Indeed, Churchill followed Lothian’s lead and
emphasized that if the battle was lost in Europe due to inadequate American support, there would be no
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British fleet to help defend the Western Hemisphere. Furthermore, if defeated, a pro-German cabinet in
Britain might be compelled to surrender the fleet in order to procure better terms.
Over the summer of 1940, Lothian grew increasingly frustrated by American complacency. In
particular, he was annoyed by the hesitation on the part of the Roosevelt administration, for political
reasons, to openly address Britain’s dire military situation, much less enter the war itself. As a result,
Lothian endeavored to force the issue. During the summer of 1940, Lothian took three initiatives that
helped to shape a political environment far more favorable to the British position. First, Lothian began
taking steps to generate more widespread popular support for Britain through a public relations campaign.
Although sensitive to long-held American suspicions of British propaganda, he made numerous public
speeches that focused on a series of important themes -- themes that would underlie his publicity efforts
over the next year. He condemned German treachery. He emphasized the common foundations of
democracy in Britain and the United States and thus presented the British cause as synonymous with the
American way of life. Most important, he emphasized that the survival of Britain was essential to the
security of the United States. In addition, Lothian made himself accessible to American journalists in
order to disseminate Britain’s position to a larger audience. As a former journalist, he understood the
impact of the press upon American public opinion and the shaping of a public consensus. Nicholas Cull,
in his study of British propaganda in the United States before Pearl Harbor, lauded Lothian’s skillful
management of British public relations, particularly in convincing London to provide more accurate
information and greater access to American journalists. As a result, Lothian’s efforts helped to transform
American opinion, not only toward Britain but the war itself. While in the late 1930s, many Americans
were isolationists and relatively suspicious of Britain, by the end of 1941, they generally associated the
survival of Britain with American security and were increasingly ready to risk war in order to aid the
Allies. Cull, therefore, described Lothian as “the single most significant figure in the development of
British propaganda in the United States.”3 Likewise, Sir John Wheeler-Bennett stated that Lothian’s
“constant harping” upon the issue helped to prepare and condition “the minds of Americans for the impact
3

Cull, 20.

410
of the momentous events which were being matured in secret.” From the very beginning of the war, he
argued, Lothian’s profound knowledge of the American people and his understanding of propaganda
enabled him to direct a public relations campaign that attained remarkable proportions and had farreaching effects.4
Lothian’s second initiative focused on urging London to court the United States with tangible
offers of cooperation, without conditions. For example, in late May 1940, aware of the concern in
Washington for the security of British bases in the Western Hemisphere -- specifically, the threat to
American security if those bases fell under German control -- Lothian encouraged the War Cabinet to
make a unilateral offer of limited facilities in three British colonies, to preempt a possible American
takeover of the islands and, at the same time, promote good will. Churchill, however, was opposed to
such one-sided concessions, unless it involved tangible American concessions or assistance -- a quid pro
quo, such as destroyers or financial credits. Therefore, Lothian’s third important summer initiative was to
convince Churchill to make a direct and personal plea to Roosevelt. In late July, he pushed London to
understand that, with the political conventions over, the president’s nomination secured, and his attention
refocusing on the war, the time was right for the prime minister to make a more direct and candid appeal.
The result was Churchill’s telegram to Roosevelt on 31 July 1940, in which the prime minister set out
Britain’s naval predicament in detail and explained that fifty American destroyers could sustain the Royal
Navy over the next few critical months, thereby possibly deciding “the whole fate of the war.” At the
same time, however, while he pushed a reluctant Churchill into action, Lothian cultivated strong working
relations and had considerable contact with the leading members of Roosevelt’s cabinet who supported
all-out aid to Britain, most notably Henry Morgenthau, Harold Ickes, Henry Stimson, and Frank Knox. It
was due largely to their urging that Roosevelt agreed to open negotiations over destroyers and bases.
The major obstacle to Lothian’s efforts, ironically enough, was Churchill. In one respect, the
prime minister regarded the American proposal, fifty or sixty destroyers in return for British bases in the
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Western Hemisphere and assurances about the British fleet, as excessive and politically unacceptable in
Britain. Frustrated by the prime minister’s delays and objections, Lothian took steps to force the issue.
First, he gave assurances to the Roosevelt administration without authorization or approval. For example,
he told Roosevelt that he had been authorized to say that British naval and air facilities would be made
available as soon as Britain received the American destroyers -- although he possessed, at that moment,
no such authorization. Lothian also gave assurances, again without authorization, that if Britain were on
the verge of collapse, its fleet would cross the Atlantic to American waters; Churchill, in the meantime,
had wanted to retain the fleet as a bargaining counter, and in fact continued to insist that the United States
enter the war as an essential precondition for moving the fleet.
Second, Lothian cultivated strong ties to American interventionist and pro-British pressure
groups, notably the White Committee and the Century Group. In late June, once again, on his own
initiative, without the approval or even the knowledge of the War Cabinet, Lothian provided the Century
Group with a full statistical accounting of Britain’s situation and needs, as the basis for a public relations
campaign to win more widespread American support for the destroyers deal. In all likelihood, had
London known, it would have disapproved of Lothian’s efforts. The War Cabinet, as well as the Foreign
Office, sought to avoid all appearances of undue British influence in American decision making, which
might revive the American phobia about British propaganda. Churchill, in the meantime, saw only
limited value in propaganda, maintaining instead that only “events” would turn opinion in the United
States. More to the point, he remained confident that Washington would be swayed by recognition of its
dependence on the Royal Navy and the intrinsic heroism of the Allied stand. Lothian, however, believed
that the urgency of the situation justified the risk. During the summer of 1940, he recognized the
existence of a gap, between the Roosevelt administration and Congress, as well as the general public, with
respect to their appreciation of Britain’s dire situation. The problem, as he saw it, was a lack of hard facts
about British strength in destroyers. American suspicions about British propaganda diluted the impact of
emotional appeals; Americans would only be convinced by an open accounting of the facts that assistance
was truly needed or would advance American interests. Therefore, the data Lothian supplied secretly to
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the Century Group’s campaign helped to focus the attention of American opinion leaders on the real
gravity of Britain’s predicament. In the end, Lothian’s efforts to facilitate a greater understanding and
appreciation of Britain’s situation, through public relations, helped to create a far more favorable
reception to the deal, which was finally announced on 3 September 1940.
Even more significant, from September to December 1940, Lothian helped to lay the foundations
for the Lend-Lease program. During the fall, as most Americans turned their attention to the presidential
election, many British leaders, particularly Churchill and the Foreign Office, believed that Roosevelt was
ready to take the ultimate step -- that once he was reelected, the United States would almost immediately
enter the war. Lothian, however, played down the significance of Roosevelt’s reelection and argued
instead, as he had for months, that the United States would enter the war only after a direct attack on its
vital interests, which could enable Roosevelt to go to Congress and win unanimous support for a
declaration of war. Therefore, Lothian argued that the procuring of American assistance would require
far more proactive British pressure. In the immediate aftermath of the election, when, as he predicted, the
United States took no immediate steps to initiate more substantive material aid, Lothian sought to force
the action once again. In mid-November, he urged Churchill to frankly and openly put Britain’s cards on
the table in a long, detailed letter to Roosevelt, which outlined the urgent realities of Britain’s strategic,
economic, and logistic positions and needs. While Churchill proved reluctant to draft and dispatch such a
letter, still confident that the United States was about to enter the war, Lothian aggressively argued that
the letter was vital in order to overcome powerful American misperceptions about Britain’s position -that Britain was inclined to ask for more than was necessary, and that Britain in fact had vast assets in the
Dominions and the Empire, which could and should be expended before asking for American assistance.
The only answer to this, he stressed, should be a “ruthless exposé of the strategic dangers.” Lothian’s
strategy, therefore, just as it had been during the destroyers negotiations, was to respond to American
misperceptions by laying out the facts. His position generated much support within the Foreign Office,
including Foreign Secretary Halifax, Permanent Undersecretary Sir Alexander Cadogan, and David Scott,
the assistant undersecretary with oversight of Foreign Office’s American Department, all of whom urged
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Churchill to follow Lothian’s advice, if for no other reason than to light a fire under the Roosevelt
administration.

As a result, by early December 1940, following many delays, revisions, and

consultations, Churchill completed the letter, which Lothian delivered to Roosevelt just before the
president embarked on a short post-election Caribbean cruise. In the end, Churchill’s letter provided the
comprehensive view of Britain’s situation for which Lothian had been striving.
Just as important was the timing of the letter. In one respect, while Roosevelt had already begun
to face up to the British situation, Churchill’s letter arrived during a much-needed vacation, when he had
time to relax and reflect. More important, however, Britain’s financial predicament had become the
major focus of discussion within American policymaking circles, primarily because of another initiative
taken by Lothian. Upon his arrival in New York City on 23 November, following a brief visit to Britain,
Lothian intimated that Britain’s financial matter was “becoming urgent,” and that gold and securities were
beginning to run low. He once again made these remarks without authorization or the permission of the
War Cabinet. He apparently chose his words deliberately, convinced that, by going public with such
candid observations, he could persuade Americans, but particularly key American opinion leaders, policy
making groups, and elites, that the British situation was becoming desperate. Although some controversy
exists over his precise comments, Lothian forced the administration’s hand by provoking popular
discussion in the United States about Britain’s financial plight. Indeed, as a result of his comments, the
British financial crisis remained on the front pages of American newspapers and therefore in the public
eye from December 1940 to January 1941. As Wheeler-Bennett wrote, Lothian was “absolutely right.
His stark assertion to the press at LaGuardia . . . set off a chain of events which in less than two months
had achieved its results.”5 The Lend-Lease Act represented the creation of arguably the most productive
and cooperative coalition of modern history -- the Anglo-American alliance against Nazi Germany.
Sadly, and perhaps unfairly, Lothian did not live to see the results of his labors, having died
suddenly on 12 December 1940. Ironically, Churchill selected as Lothian’s successor, Lord Halifax, the
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man who had originally pushed through Lothian’s own appointment, and whom Churchill now wanted to
discard as a political liability. Eventually, Halifax proved a capable and effective ambassador, but his
first year was not impressive. Arthur Purvis was one of many to compare him unfavorably with his
predecessor. In June 1941, according to J. Pierrepont Moffatt, an official in the United States State
Department, “Purvis missed Lord Lothian whom he considered a great vitalizer. He admitted he made
many mistakes, but on balance rated him as a very great British representative. Lord Halifax he found
unimaginative and terse, less interested in formulating policy than in carrying out instructions.”6
In overall terms, as Purvis observed, assessing Lothian’s achievement is very much a question of
balance. In some respects, critics and skeptics had been correct at the time of his appointment to question
his discretion and judgment. For example, Lothian’s Yale speech of 19 June 1940 and his 23 November
press conference both put the Roosevelt administration momentarily on the defensive, and thus justified
such reservations. Furthermore, in periods of heightened anxiety, Lothian tended to neglect the details of
a problem in his pursuit of an overriding goal. For example, in his handling of the destroyers negotiations
in August 1940, Lothian contributed to a degree of confusion that followed the conclusion of the deal.
Over the course of the negotiations, the British asked for 20 motor torpedo boats, five heavy bombers,
five flying boats and 250,000 rifles with ammunition. Although Roosevelt made it clear in August that he
intended to include MTBs, planes and rifles in the deal, the final document signed by Lothian and Cordell
Hull mentioned only the destroyers. Part of the problem was the generally byzantine conduct of political
affairs within the Roosevelt administration. In late August, Henry Stimson and Sumner Welles, who had
been in charge of the negotiations to that point, left Washington for vacations, handing matters to Hull,
who had been away since the beginning of the month, unaware of what had been settled. At the same
time, Lothian, in his haste to get the deal completed, misled London about the Secretary of State’s
attitude. Even though Hull told him on 27 August that the other items could not be considered part of the
deal for legal reasons, Lothian told the Foreign Office, “Mr Hull begged me to assure you that the
question of transfer of other desiderata, i.e. motor torpedo boats, flying boats and rifles, would be dealt
6
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with in the same spirit that the President has shown hitherto and at the earliest possible moment.”
Consequently, London operated under the assumption that Washington would deal on the basis that
everything was on the table, and that the other items were part of the deal, although they would be
handled separately for political and legal reasons. When Lothian mentioned this to Hull, the secretary
immediately insisted that no promise about the other items could be inferred and that before any
agreement was signed, Lothian must make this quite clear to London. It was not until the following
spring, after complex legal and political difficulties, that the whole transaction was completed.7
Largely as a result of mistakes such as this, there remained some skepticism in London that
Lothian was up to the job; hence the caustic criticism of Hugh Dalton, who wrote in his diary that,
Lothian was “the sort of man Americans like,” who was “very fond of ‘large ideas’, particularly in a
vague and unfinished form.”8 Lothian’s strong suit, he continued, “is high-minded ballyhoo. This may be
quite useful in America so long as the policy of H.M.G. has not to be too exactly based upon it.”9
Nevertheless, Lothian was unquestionably a great success as Britain’s ambassador to the United
States. There were three principal reasons for his success. First, unlike previous British ambassadors,
Lothian had a better understanding of and a genuine passion for the United States. He understood how
American policy making operated. He built up a close relationship of mutual trust with American leaders,
based in part upon the consistency between his own liberal convictions and the thinking of Roosevelt and
the New Dealers.

At the same time, Lothian also appreciated that the United States would not

automatically dispatch assistance on the basis of a common language and heritage, but would act when its
own vital interests were threatened. Therefore, he understood the vital necessity not only of providing the
Roosevelt administration with complete and honest information to justify British requests, but also of
acting in an open and cooperative manner to dispel American suspicions. In doing so, Lothian had to
overcome the reservations of Churchill, who was slow to adopt this tactic. In the summer of 1940, the
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prime minister delayed British offers of bases and military secrets, hoping to tie them to an acceptable
quid pro quo. Even in November, he proved reluctant to put all Britain’s cards on the table in a message
to the president.
Second, Lothian had a clear-cut and plausible argument for Anglo-American cooperation, which
he reiterated with persistence and simplicity: the importance of the Anglo-American division of global
sea power, and the interdependence of American security in the Atlantic with the survival of the British
fleet. Since 1815, the Royal Navy had been the ultimate guarantor of the Monroe Doctrine, preventing
hostile powers from moving out of European waters into the Atlantic. By the late 1920s and 1930s,
however, it had become clear that the era of the Pax Britannica was over.

The growth of German air

power threatened Britain’s insular security, and a potential coalition of three hostile powers, Germany,
Italy, and Japan, challenged its global position. Now, in 1940, with the survival of Britain at stake,
Lothian maintained, it was in the interests of the United States to provide as much material assistance as
possible, to ensure not only the survival of Britain itself but the defense of the Western Hemisphere as
well. In speech after speech, he asserted that the United States ought therefore to share the burden of
patrolling and controlling the oceans -- the American fleet in the Pacific and the Royal Navy in the
Atlantic -- so that by deterrence, or if necessary by war, the totalitarian states could be tamed and a new
peace system secured. Indicative of his influence is the fact that he became so closely identified with this
view, which together with his demand for postwar Anglo-American cooperation, that in British
governmental circles it was later termed the “Lothian Thesis.”10
Last, Lothian understood that the key to lighting a fire under, and maintaining effective pressure
on, the Roosevelt administration, depended first and foremost on mobilizing American public opinion.
Unlike previous British ambassadors to the United States, he understood the value and power of
propaganda and public relations, particularly its effect on popular opinion. Over the course of his
ambassadorship, Lothian built a public relations apparatus and initiated a vigorous publicity campaign in
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the United States. He established an easy and open relationship with the press. He delivered speeches
and gave press conferences to explain Britain’s needs in terms calculated to win American support. He
worked closely with American interventionists in order to build support for Britain among the broader
American population. He deliberately leaked sensitive information explicitly to help American opinion
leaders stimulate debate and apply pressure on the Roosevelt administration. Once again, Lothian had to
overcome the reservations of Churchill, who feared that publicizing Britain’s secrets could aid the enemy
and, perhaps more important, undermine domestic morale. On one occasion, the prime minister told
Lothian that Britain should not pay too much attention “to the eddies of United States opinion.” Churchill
preferred to wait on the “force of events” and on the response of “our best friend,” the president.
In spite of Lothian’s mistakes of judgment, made more often than not in the course of
overzealousness, several of his early critics, including many of the Foreign Office officials who initially
deplored his appointment, eventually recognized what a brilliant job Lothian did in Washington, and
therefore what an invaluable asset he indeed became. Oliver Harvey, who had been one of the sharpest
Foreign Office critics of Lothian’s selection, wrote after the ambassador’s death: “In spite of all our
misgivings L. proved himself a very great Ambassador and he will be very hard indeed to replace.”11 Sir
Robert Vansittart, to whom Lothian was for most of the 1930s a bête noire, “rarely right by accident in
Europe,” later wrote that he “spoke with early authority on the United States, where he became the
greatest of all our Ambassadors.”12 Churchill noted in his tribute of 19 December that, when Lothian was
appointed to the Embassy in the United States, “the most important of all the functions outside this
country that can be discharged by any British subject,” there were quite a few opinions upon the wisdom
of that choice. Churchill reminded the House of Commons that many of those who had originally
doubted Lothian’s ability and temperament ultimately recognized his greatness for the post.13 In his own
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draft of a message to Roosevelt, the prime minister had written of Lothian as “one of our greatest
Ambassadors to the United States.” On second thought, he altered the draft to read “our greatest
Ambassador to the United States.”14 One of the most personal tributes was made by Wheeler-Bennett,
whose original horror at the appointment changed dramatically once he began to work under Lothian in
Washington. “How wrong we [he and Vansittart] both were in our assessment of the new ambassador,
history was to show.” While he “had come handicapped by a past reputation,” Lothian “from the first
convinced all of his ‘apostasy from heresy.’” Indeed, Wheeler-Bennett asserted, Lothian underwent a
“complete metamorphosis” in Washington that triumphantly confounded his critics:
Throughout the fifteen months of his embassage he never failed to gauge the opinion of
America to a nicety. He knew when to cajole and when to shock, when to appeal and
when to issue a clarion-call of leadership. His humour was irresistible, his sincerity
unquestioned, his statesmanship among the most inspired of our time. His was the hand
who laid the foundation of ‘the Special Relationship’.15
In the United States, Francis P. Miller of the Century Group, maintained that Lothian made a
tremendous impact on American public opinion during the final six months of 1940, and that his final
address “was in many respects the most influential statement that any British Ambassador had ever issued
in the United States”:
He spoke to us as one of us. None had spoken so plainly before, and never had an
Englishman’s blunt warning been so well received. Bryce has traditionally been regarded
as the British Ambassador that served his nation best in America. In my opinion Lothian
served Britain better than Bryce or any other ambassador we have had since. He was as
perfect for this assignment as Churchill was for war Prime Minister.16
In his own memoirs, Miller stated that while he had mistrusted Lothian’s earlier association with
appeasement, as well as the effects of Christian Science, it had become evident by July 1940 “that he was
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on the way to becoming one of Britain’s greatest ambassadors to the United States.”17 Robert Sherwood,
a playwright, screenwriter, and editor, who served as a speechwriter for Roosevelt, and for a short period
was the director of the Office of War Information,18 wrote that Lothian had been a “notably successful
Ambassador.” As a liberal, he was “well qualified to talk Roosevelt’s language and, in turn to interpret
Roosevelt to Churchill. He had been able to understand, as a less flexible Briton might have failed to do,
the manifold domestic obstacles that beset Roosevelt’s path and he most scrupulously avoided adding to
the President’s embarrassments by making excessive, impatient demands.”19 Felix Frankfurter, a justice
on the United States Supreme Court and an old friend from the ambassador’s earliest travels in the United
States, said that Lothian’s achievement “was not due to any technical equipment or diplomatic skill. It
flowed from the fact that as a frequent visitor to this country and an unostentatious traveler on its
highways and byways he acquired a spontaneous love for the United States and was able to speak its
language because he shared its ultimate aspirations.”20
A significant part of his success in the United States, to be sure, was that Lothian appealed to
tangible American interests, first and foremost, rather than, as Churchill most certainly preferred, to the
language of kin and common culture. Many in London criticized the ambassador for frequently placing
strong Anglo-American cooperation ahead of British interests. Nevertheless, in doing so, he helped to
build, particularly through his speeches, an intellectual foundation for the Anglo-American wartime
alliance. At the same time, Lothian also helped to popularize, within the United States, the concept of
thinking about an “Atlantic community,” which increasingly dominated American foreign policy during
the Cold War.21
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The key question, of course, involves Lothian’s overall significance as Britain’s ambassador to
the United States. Over the course of his entire career, from South Africa, through The Round Table,
Downing Street, and the Rhodes Trust, to Washington D.C., his influence can appear spotty and
inconsistent. Lothian was often given to deriving policies from broad and generally expressed moral
theories, which not only annoyed career diplomats and Foreign Office functionaries, but also frustrated
historians, many of whom thus found it fairly difficult to identify a particular policy outcome for which he
was responsible.22 Lothian also demonstrated an enthusiasm for trying to overcome difficulties by
personal contact, which equally aggravated career bureaucrats. Throughout his career, Lothian made it a
hallmark of his own diplomacy to see the other side’s point of view, whether it happened to be Indian
peasants or princes, Adolf Hitler, or the Americans. An old acquaintance, for example, the Reverend
A.G. Fraser, recalled that the first time Lothian visited New York City, he gave some direction, in a
snappy and condescending manner, to the hall porter in his hotel:
It was the man’s business to carry out the request, but before doing so he swore at
[Lothian] . . . and told him to hop off his high horse. [Lothian] apologized and all was
well between them but he also went back to his room to think out the incident and see
where he had failed. He concluded that he had not been thinking of the man as a man but
had been thinking of him only as an instrument and so had looked through him to what he
wanted done. He never forgot that lesson.23
While this extraordinary, and at times debilitating, ability to see the other point of view obviously made
Lothian a poor politician, it nevertheless made him a natural diplomat. His principal gift as Britain’s
ambassador, therefore, was to understand, almost inherently, how and why Americans reacted to events.24
If certain officials in Whitehall did not or could not appreciate the value of understanding and addressing
the “other” point of view, Lothian’s unique attributes and abilities certainly did not go unnoticed in the
United States. For one thing, scores of articles in American newspapers praised his skill in public
relations. Moreover, his personal qualities impressed ordinary Americans as novel and surprising for a
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British diplomat. Lothian appeared to lack the class-consciousness of the British establishment, and he
clearly demonstrated a knack for the common touch when he hoisted a black kitten on his shoulders
following the presentation of his credentials at the White House. Previous British ambassadors might
have won Americans’ respect, but were considered remote and unapproachable. Sir Ronald Lindsay, for
example, was highly respected in Washington, but very few people could imagine him taking questions
from a crowd of reporters or being photographed with a kitten on his shoulder.25 Harold Callender in The
New York Times wrote that one of Lothian’s assets was that, although a Marquis, “he does not look like
one, or not like the American conception of one. ‘I can hardly imagine Lothian in coronet and ermine
robes; it would seem comic,’ said one observer, and he meant it as a compliment. He had too often seen
the Ambassador wearing a soft hat and rubbers or standing with his hands in his pockets. This casualness
in dress and posture . . . strikes many in Washington as a refreshing and democratic novelty in an
Ambassador.”26 Arthur Krock, also of The New York Times, added that the sight of Lothian “must often
have sent a pang of disappointment through the breasts of American girls who were acquainted only with
the British peers of romance.” Lothian, quite to the contrary, “looked like a family doctor, or a business
lawyer, or the heartier type of history professor.”27 A journalist from Denver described Lothian as “the
rare combination of perfect aristocrat and perfect democrat.” A Los Angeles newspaper spoke of him as
“almost the first British ambassador to talk frankly off the record,” which led to “probably a better
understanding of British aims and problems by the American people now than at any time in the past.”28
Although some would argue that by the end of 1940, the shift from isolationism to “all aid short
of war,” and from neutrality to active belligerency was an inevitable result of the growing challenge to
American security represented by Hitler’s victories, many observers in the United States credited Lothian
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with opening the eyes of the American people. Time argued that, when Lothian arrived, Americans were
suspicious of all foreigners, especially the British; by the time of his death, however, a major concern of
most Americans was how to increase aid to Britain. “Though no historian would credit that great shift
wholly to the Ambassador, there was no doubt that he had been an integral part of it. He had been right in
his analysis of United States opinion, and of the course of United States foreign policy; he had answered
by word and action much of United States suspicion of British ways; he had presented his view of the
meaning of the war in half-a-dozen speeches which undoubtedly influenced United States thinking.”29
Similarly, a New York Times editorial following his death attributed the change in American
attitudes to Lothian’s strenuous efforts. His final speech at Baltimore, for example, was a “far-sighted
reminder of truths which are more widely recognized among us today, thanks, in part, to Lord Lothian’s
efforts, than when he began his term as Ambassador”:
It reminded us that the British Navy now keeps aggression from this hemisphere, that this
war is primarily a struggle for bases, and that we are safe only while those bases are held
by friends. He also paid us the tribute of being frank with us. The British Navy, he said,
is “terribly thin” for the stupendous tasks now thrown upon it; and the issue of the war
“now depends largely” upon the speed and the determination with which we in the United
States can throw our material resources into the scales.
In return for paying the American people “the tribute of being frank with us,” the American people came
to believe and trust Lothian: “There was a time when we might have resented such advice. We do not
resent it now, for the overwhelming majority of the American people now know that it is true.” For such
frankness and many other similar qualities, Lothian “will hold a high place among British Ambassadors”
with the American people.

As a result, the editorial concluded, “It will be hard for the British

Government to find a successor who will make so few errors, or ruffle so few tempers, or leave so
enduring a memory.”30
Consequently, the key to Lothian’s effectiveness was that he helped to break down the traditional
suspicion of British motives and intentions, through his integrity and his accessibility, unlike the
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traditional type of stand-offish upper class Britons that Americans could not abide. He placed emphasis
on providing open, explicit, and honest information, which made clear how the prospect of Britain’s
collapse would impact direct American interests. Perhaps not without irony, he helped to undermine the
more recent perceptions of British weakness caused by Chamberlain’s appeasement of Hitler, by
proclaiming in the United States, as Churchill was proclaiming at home, that Britain was determined to
fight to the bitter end. Finally, he persuaded a large number of Americans, who were terrified by the
prospect of involvement in war, that the greater danger to the United States was the prospect of German
victory. He did so by preaching the doctrine that he long made his own, that the safety of the United
States depended upon the maintenance of a powerful British fleet operating from the British islands and
other European bases.31 There is good reason, therefore, to concur with the judgment of J.R.M. Butler,
Lothian’s principal biographer. Commenting on Lothian’s death, he wrote:
Exactly a year was to pass before the United States entered the war, but she was already
“in effect a non-belligerent ally”; and perhaps no one except the President, the Prime
Minister -- and Hitler, had contributed more to this result than the man who, as Philip
Kerr, had long shown an instinctive understanding of the American outlook.32
It is probable, then, if such a thing is indeed possible, that Lothian died at the right moment, at a
point, when his most important work had been accomplished. He had been ideally suited to a fluid and
uncertain period in Anglo-American relations, when London needed an ambassador to be more hands-on
and proactive, a jack-of-all-trades. By 1941, however, the essence of the relationship had changed. The
Roosevelt-Churchill axis was becoming the major channel of communication, top level emissaries were
bypassing the official ambassadors, and much of the complex detail was handled by special missions.
Furthermore, Roosevelt was coming round to the idea that he had summarily and angrily rejected when
Lothian had pressed it upon him in January 1939: under the pressure of unforeseen and revolutionary
events, the United States would have to fill the vacuum created by the contraction of British power.33 In
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his memoirs, Sir John Wheeler-Bennett recalled that, as ambassador, Lothian “had been almost
proconsular in his independence”:
During the Phoney War period, when the British Government was running mute, it was
he who had declared to America and, through its media, to the world, what were Britain’s
aims and why she was at war. When the war became open and disastrous it was he who
dared to prepare American opinion for what fate might demand of it.
But by 1941, relations between the two states arrived at “the threshold of that period of personal
communication and conference between the President and the Prime Minister,” which “necessarily
relegated the Embassy to the level of a post-office and the Ambassador to the status of messenger-boy.”
Wheeler-Bennett concluded, “It is difficult to imagine Philip Lothian in that role.”34 Churchill, no doubt,
agreed. In his eloquent and contemplative tribute to Lothian on 19 December 1940, the prime minister
told the House of Commons:
I cannot help feeling that to die at the height of a man’s career, the highest moment of his
effort here in this world, universally honoured and admired, to die while great issues are
still commanding the whole of his interest, to be taken at a moment when he could
already see ultimate success in view – is not the most unenviable of fates.35
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release of “A Big Hunk ‘O Love” by Elvis Presley and four months before the Dodgers won their first
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and mother Irene Louise Snyder Saucier, raised Craig, his sister Carrie and brother Scott over and across
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attended high school at the International School of Bangkok, where he received a cosmopolitan
education; and Alexandria Senior High School, where he received a parochial education. Uncertain about
his future and unlikely to be drafted by major league baseball, he chose to settle for the conventional
course of higher education to a meaningful career, particularly after the Rolling Stones in 1976 chose to
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